Narrative self-appropriation: embodiment,alienness, and personal responsibility in the context of borderline personality disorder

It is often emphasised that persons diagnosed with borderline personality disorder (BPD) show difficulties in understanding their own psychological states. In this article, I argue that from a phenomenological perspective, BPD can be understood as an existential modality in which the embodied self is profoundly saturated by an alienness regarding the person’s own affects and responses. However, the balance of familiarity and alienness is not static, but can be cultivated through, e.g., psychotherapy. Following this line of thought, I present the idea that narrativising experiences can play an important role in processes of appropriating such embodied self-alienness. Importantly, the notion of narrative used is that of a scalar conception of narrativity as a variable quality of experience that comes in degrees. From this perspective, narrative appropriation is a process of gradually attributing the quality of narrativity to experiences, thereby familiarising the moods, affects, and responses that otherwise govern ‘from behind’. Finally, I propose that the idea of a narrative appropriation of embodied self-alienness is also relevant to the much-debated question of personal responsibility in BPD, particularly as this question plays out in psychotherapeutic contexts where a narrative self-appropriation may facilitate an increase in sense of autonomy and reduce emotions of guilt and shame.     

Is Life’s Meaning Ultimately Unthinkable?: Guy Bennett-Hunter on the Ineffable

In this critical notice of Guy Bennett-Hunter’s Ineffability and Religious Experience, I focus on claims he makes about what makes a life meaningful. According to Bennett-Hunter, for human life to be meaningful it must obtain its meaning from what is beyond the human and is ineffable, which constitutes an ultimate kind of meaning. I spell out Bennett-Hunter’s rationale for making this claim, raise some objections to it, and in their wake articulate an alternative conception of ultimate meaning.     

On Persons and Immortality Symposium on Pedro Tabensky,Happiness: Personhood,Community, Purpose

Abstract

This paper considers Tabensky’s method of critical introspection, and in particular the conception of personhood that informs it. By interrogating the lives of pure hedonism, divinity and immortality from our already existing conception of personhood, Tabensky argues that such lives are incompatible with what it is to be a person, and desiring to live them is therefore irrational. Concentrating on the example of immortality, I argue that, while there are undoubtedly disadvantages associated with the immortal life, these are contingent rather than essential to the notion of being a person. In fact, we have very little idea of the boundaries of that concept. The paper concludes by looking at the consequences of Tabensky’s approach for issues surrounding moral vision and improvement, and new technologies of the person.     

对希波克拉底警句的深层解读--审美修养是从医之必需

试图透过医学与艺术的联系,深入到医学与美学关系的层面,进而发掘希波克拉底关于"医学的艺术乃是一切艺术之中最为卓越的艺术"这一论断的深刻内涵,指出希波克拉底警句蕴涵着:医学是美的职业,它具有崇高地位和独特的重要性;医学所追求的是健康而美好的人生,医学所创造的是健康之美、生命之美、至善之美、仁爱之美.既然医学是最为卓越的艺术,医务工作者就应该重视美学修养,并让医学审美意识牢牢植根于自己的医学实践之中.换句话说,审美修养是从医之必需.     

Virtues in action – the new look of character traits

The present study aimed to take fresh look at the nature and psychological meaning of consistency in character traits and virtuous behaviour as manifested in everyday life. To this end, a 10‐day experience‐sampling study was conducted. Using smartphone technology, a sample of 83 working mothers and fathers provided a total of 4,342 momentary behavioural reports while being in the role of the parent versus being in the job role. Consistent with recent research on personality traits, the findings of the present study showed that people express a wide range of virtue states in their everyday lives. Within‐person changes in virtue states were not random but were contingent on people's current role context and also meaningfully related to their momentary affective experiences. At the same time, people's average level of virtue states, their degree of variation in virtue states, and their signature ways of reacting to role contexts turned out to be stable, trait‐like individual difference characteristics. Discussion focuses on the implications for the conception of character traits in scientific psychology and beyond.     

From personality disorders to the fact-value distinction

Louis Charland’s claim that DSM Cluster B personality disorders are moral rather than clinical kinds has recently triggered a lively debate. In order to deliver a reliable report of the latter, both (1) Charland’s arguments concerning the impossibility of identifying and treating personality disorders without applying a morally laden conceptual framework and (2) some critical responses they provoked are discussed. Then, in turn, the conceptual history of the notion of personality disorder is traced, including not only well-recognized contributions from (3) medical psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and DSM nosology, but also (4) an important, but often neglected, tradition of virtue and moral character. Finally, (5) the idea of a normatively neutral concept of personality disorder is scrutinized in the context of its logical dependence on the fact-value distinction. The latter dichotomy’s recent criticism, in particular, is employed to support Charland’s argument and to suggest that the normative character of personality disorders may go much deeper than this or that DSM formulation.     

Morality,choice and inwardness

The present paper tries to analyse the way in which Judge William, in Sören Kierkegaard's work Either/Or, distinguishes between the aesthetic and the ethical way of life. Basically his distinctions seem to be that the ethicist is a seriously committed person (has inwardness) whereas the aestheticist is indifferent, and that the former accepts universal rules whereas the latter makes an exception for himself. — In order to come from the aesthetic to the ethical stage one must, according to Judge William, make a choice of oneself. We try to show that such a choice is only one among several factors implicit in his reasoning and that he does not at all consider it as a ‘leap’, but as based upon reasons, though his reasons are mostly of an aesthetic nature. Far from seeing the Judge as a champion of choice, we maintain that the book primarily contains a plea for a certain personality ideal. This probably has to do with the fact that he does not seem to be in doubt as to what one ought to do, only as to how to become a person who does what he ought to do. We shall also argue that a choice of oneself, as a matter of fact, is neither necessary nor sufficient in order to bring a person within the ethical stage, as described by the Judge. — A person who lives ethically does not, according to Judge William, necessarily act rightly, but his actions are either right or wrong, as opposed to the actions of the aestheticist which fall outside the domain of the ethical. In order to obtain a tenable distinction within his philosophy between ‘being within the ethical stage’ and ‘acting ethically rightly’ the first concept should be defined in terms of inwardness (serious commitment), the latter as inward conformity with certain universal rules. — This idea of inwardness, probably the most original and fruitful contribution of ‘Equilibrium’, seems to be based, however, like most of his ethical reasoning, on certain controversial assumptions about human nature.     

Narrative Unity as a Condition of Personhood

Abstract: In this article I critically discuss a claim made by several writers in philosophy and the social sciences that for an individual to count as a person, a single personality, or the subject of a life, the experiences of the subject in question must take a narrative form. I argue that narrativity is a misleading and, in some ways of understanding it, implausible condition of what it is that adds unity to personhood and personality. I pursue this critique by considering canonical accounts of narrativity in philosophy and literary studies. I consider those connections between events that must hold for the sequence to be considered a narrative: causal, teleological, and thematic connections. I argue that for each of these, the condition that experiential sequences (for a given subject) must have this structure is empty: any life sequence that is reflected upon in an interpretive spirit can meet it. What the condition of narrativity amounts to, then, is the more basic requirement that the person must be able to look upon the factors and events of her life with a certain interpretive reflection, whether or not those factors and events have any particular narrative unity in a traditional sense.     

THE BLOOD CRISIS: <Emphasis Type="Italic">A CHOICE BETWEEN DYING AND REARRANGING?</Emphasis>

I began my Ferenczi studies in the fall of 1987, a year before the English translation of his Clinical Diary was published. Since then, I have demonstrated in writing, teaching, working, and living that there is scarcely a passage in this “laboratory notebook of psychoanalysis” that fails to illuminate the clinical and the personal. And above all is Ferenczi’s late awareness that his personality had been constructed upon false assumptions. This is a reckoning of thirty years’ conscious and unconscious usage of Ferenczi’s experience to illustrate, to interpret, and to expose the clinical and personal dimensions of my own life lived as “the will of another person.” What constitutes, what allows, a choice between dying and rearranging? Now that I am long past Ferenczi’s fifty-nine years, I take the risk every day, and I know it.     

Toward Poetic Science

This article is an extension of earlier discussion in the present journal regarding feelings in literature and, more broadly, the distinction between literary and scientific discourse. Valid though this distinction may be on some level, it is argued herein that it owes its very existence, in part, to a problematically narrow view of what constitutes science, one that not only eschews the life of feeling but that fails to abide by the primary obligation of the scientific endeavor—namely, to practice fidelity to the phenomena of concern. In this respect, it might plausibly be said that much of contemporary psychological science is not scientific enough and that, consequently, a more open and capacious conception is called for. More specifically, it is suggested that a portion of the discipline move in the direction of what might be called poetic science, a form of science that, in its very art-fulness, can do justice to the ambiguity, complexity, and depth that characterizes lived experience.     

Are human embryos Kantian persons?: Kantian considerations in favor of embryonic stem cell research

One argument used by detractors of human embryonic stem cell research (hESCR) invokes Kant's formula of humanity, which proscribes treating persons solely as a means to an end, rather than as ends in themselves. According to Fuat S. Oduncu, for example, adhering to this imperative entails that human embryos should not be disaggregated to obtain pluripotent stem cells for hESCR. Given that human embryos are Kantian persons from the time of their conception, killing them to obtain their cells for research fails to treat them as ends in themselves. This argument assumes two points that are rather contentious given a Kantian framework. First, the argument assumes that when Kant maintains that humanity must be treated as an end in itself, he means to argue that all members of the species Homo sapiens must be treated as ends in themselves; that is, that Kant regards personhood as co-extensive with belonging to the species Homo sapiens. Second, the argument assumes that the event of conception is causally responsible for the genesis of a Kantian person and that, therefore, an embryo is a Kantian person from the time of its conception. In this paper, I will present challenges against these two assumptions by engaging in an exegetical study of some of Kant's works. First, I will illustrate that Kant did not use the term "humanity" to denote a biological species, but rather the capacity to set ends according to reason. Second, I will illustrate that it is difficult given a Kantian framework to denote conception (indeed any biological event) as causally responsible for the creation of a person. Kant ascribed to a dualistic view of human agency, and personhood, according to him, was derived from the supersensible capacity for reason. To argue that a Kantian person is generated due to the event of conception ignores Kant's insistence in various aspects of his work that it is not possible to understand the generation of a person qua a physical operation. Finally, I will end the paper by drawing from Allen Wood's work in Kantian philosophy in order to generate an argument in favor of hESCR.     

The authority of pleasure

The aim of the paper is to reassess the prospects of a widely neglected affective conception of the aesthetic evaluation and appreciation of art. On the proposed picture, the aesthetic evaluation and appreciation of art are non‐contingently constituted by a particular kind of pleasure. Artworks that are valuable qua artworks merit, deserve, and call for a certain pleasure, the same pleasure that reveals (or at least purports to reveal) them to be valuable in the way that they are, and constitutes their aesthetic evaluation and appreciation. This is why and how art is non‐contingently related to pleasure. Call this, the Affective View. While I don't advance conclusive arguments for the affective view in this paper, I aim to reassess its prospects by (1) undermining central objections against it, (2) dissociating it from hedonism about the value of artworks (the view that this value is grounded in, and explained by, its possessors’ power to please), and (3) introducing some observations on the practice of art in support of it. Given that the objections I discuss miss their target, and given the observations in support of it, I conclude that the affective view is worth serious reconsideration.     

Topical Roots of Formal Dialectic

Formal dialectic has its roots in ancient dialectic. We can trace this influence in Charles Hamblin’s book on fallacies, in which he introduced his first formal dialectical systems. Earlier, Paul Lorenzen proposed systems of dialogical logic, which were in fact formal dialectical systems avant la lettre, with roles similar to those of the Greek Questioner and Answerer. In order to make a comparison between ancient dialectic and contemporary formal dialectic, I shall formalize part of the Aristotelian procedure for Academic debates. The resulting system will be compared (1) with Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s system of rules of Critical Discussion (the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure), which must, however, first itself be reconstructed as a formal dialectical system, and (2) with a Hamblin-type system, and (3) a Lorenzen-type system. When drawing comparisons, it will become clear that there is a line to be drawn from Aristotle to formal dialectic and pragma-dialectics, extending to contemporary computational models of argument.     

The “New Big Five” from a personalistic point of view

McAdams and Pals (2006) “New Big Five” principles are contrasted with William Stern's conception of the person. It is criticized that the intra-individual organization of the person is not adequately addressed in the “New Big Five” approach: McAdams and Pals are shifting the issue of the idiosyncratic organization of the person to the level of a more or less coherent life narrative. The person tells or constructs a narrative, the person, however, is not the narrative.It is therefore suggested to complement and enrich the “New Big Five” with the three primary characteristics of the person as proposed by William Stern: unitas multiplex, purposefulness and individuality. In addition, Stern's concept of introception is suggested as a more integrated view of how the external world is internalized within the person. In concluding, the significance of Stern's critical personalism for an integrative science of personality in the 21^st century is highlighted.     

Morality and the philosophy of life in Guyau and Bergson

In this essay I examine the contribution a philosophy of life is able to make to our understanding of morality, including our appreciation of its evolution or development and its future. I focus on two contributions, namely, those of Jean-Marie Guyau and Henri Bergson. In the case of Guyau I show that he pioneers the naturalistic study of morality through a conception of life; for him the moral progress of humanity is bound up with an increasing sociability, involving both the intensification of life and its expansion. In the case of Bergson I show that he also pioneers a novel naturalistic appreciation of morality, one that is keen to demonstrate morality’s two sources and so as to give us a firm grasp of the chances of a moral progress on the part of humanity. I suggest that of the two appreciations of morality Bergson’s is the richer since it contains a set of critical reflections on humanity’s condition that is lacking in Guyau. I conclude by suggesting that Bergson’s idea that modern humanity is confronted with the decision whether it wishes to continue living or not has lost none of its relevance today.     

Reconcilable Differences? Human Diversity,Cultural Relativity,and Sense of Community

Sense of community (SOC) is one of the most widely used and studied constructs in community psychology. As proposed by Sarason in (The Psychological sense of community: prospects for a community psychology, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1974), SOC represents the strength of bonding among community members. It is a valuable component of community life, and it has been linked to positive mental health outcomes, citizen participation, and community connectedness. However, promotion of SOC can become problematic in community psychology praxis when it conflicts with other core values proposed to define the field, namely values of human diversity, cultural relativity, and heterogeneity of experience and perspective. Several commentators have noted that promotion of SOC can conflict with multicultural diversity because it tends to emphasize group member similarity and appears to be higher in homogeneous communities. In this paper, we introduce the idea of a community-diversity dialectic as part of praxis and research in community psychology. We argue that systematic consideration of cultural psychology perspectives can guide efforts to address a community-diversity dialectic and revise SOC formulations that ultimately will invigorate community research and action. We provide a working agenda for addressing this dialectic, proposing that systematic consideration of the creative tension between SOC and diversity can be beneficial to community psychology.     

On negativity in Revolution in Poetic Language

Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language offers a challenge to theories of the subject in psychoanalysis, linguistic theory, and in philosophy. Central to that challenge is Kristeva’s conception of negativity. In this article, I trace the development of the concept of negativity in Revolution in Poetic Language from its root in Hegel, to rejection, which Kristeva develops out of Freud. Both are crucial to the development of the material dialectic between the semiotic and the symbolic that makes up Kristeva’s subject-in-process/on trial. I argue that a clearer understanding of Kristeva’s conception of negativity helps us to better appreciate the force of Kristeva’s challenge, both philosophically and politically. Finally I argue that Kristevan negativity also helps us to clarify the relation between the delimited space of politics and its conditions, laying the groundwork for constitutive exclusion as political critique and opening a space for the possibility of political re-constitutions.     

Healing Multiculturalism: Middle-Ground Liberal Forgiveness in a Diverse Public Realm

This article examines debates about political forgiveness in liberal, pluralist societies. Although the concept of forgiveness is not usually taken up by liberals, I outline a plausible conception by exploring two recent approaches. The first, ‘unattached articulation’, concept requires no real emotional change on the forgiver’s part, but rather a form of civic restraint. In contrast, the second version highlights a strong form of empathy for perpetrators. In spite of their advantages, each concept proves too extreme. The problems are revealed by focusing on the case of the Harkis, who fought for the French during the Algerian war. Often still marginalised in French society, their case helps to highlight the conceivability of a ‘middle-ground’ or moderate concept of political forgiveness. Its core rests on the forgiver’s care for the social world. While this concept brings considerable challenges also, and is not inevitable in any particular case, it entails a more plausible combination of emotional and rational shifts in the forgiver’s world-view. Although the article does not recommend forgiveness by any person or group, it observes, recalling Arendt’s idea of amor mundi or ‘love of the world’, that political forgiveness may sustain a viable connection between diverse citizens’ public and non-public lives.     

天命观对中国人格心理的构建与影响

中国文化传统强调天与命对人的控制,天命是人格神对人的主宰。这种思想深远的影响着中国人对人格的建构,形成了中国人典型的人格特征,并影响和渗透到现代人生活的各个方面,影响着现代社会中人对人与人、人与社会、人与自然关系的建构。     

Empathy, an integrative model

Empathy research has yielded various separate insights into empathy and its correlates. Yet a comprehensive theoretical account that situates these factors within a larger framework is lacking. In this paper a conception of empathy is proposed and defended, which makes it possible to provide an encompassing reconstruction of the processes that are characteristic of empathic encounters. This conception situates empathy within a context of communication. Doing so allows one to connect various treads in empathy research, but at the same time urges one to take new factors into account. It is argued that empathy is a response to a specific demand occurring in a specific context. The type of answer persons are able to provide depends on four types of factors. First, there are the psychological empathic components. We argue that empathy should be seen as a combination of (especially) parallel and reactive emotions, against a background of specific cognitive abilities. Second, it is argued that empathy is aided by a twofold control system, comprised of judgements and forms of self-control. Third, personality factors play a part in how a person responds to demands. Finally, but most importantly, it is pointed out that specific relational factors codetermine empathic reactions. In this paper we describe the theoretical background of our model and provide an elaborated account of the four factors that determine empathic acts in a given context. We illustrate the viability of our model by presenting observational data of children's empathic acts.