Of words and tools 1

Further to Herman Tennessen's recent methodological criticisms of Linguistic philosophy, the present paper seeks to offer some theoretical criticisms. Two main claims of Linguistic philosophy are examined: (1) that the concept of ‘use’ satisfactorily explains how words and expressions are meaningful; and (2), that the correspondence theory of meaning has been successfully repudiated. After a brief exposition, the explanation is further specified as being analogical (words are like tools). Six objections (semantical, logical and psychological) are suggested. It is concluded that not only is the explanation not satisfactory, but that some of the same problems of the older theory may also be implicit in the ‘use’ theory.     

Effects of dynamic and isometric motor practice on position control,force control and corticomuscular coherence in preadolescent children

In this study, we investigated the effects of motor practice with an emphasis on either position or force control on motor performance, motor accuracy and variability in preadolescent children. Furthermore, we investigated corticomuscular coherence and potential changes following motor practice.We designed a setup allowing discrete wrist flexions of the non-dominant hand and tested motor accuracy and variability when the task was to generate specific movement endpoints (15–75 deg) or force levels (5–25% MVC). All participants were tested in both tasks at baseline and post motor practice without augmented feedback on performance. Following baseline assessment, participants (44 children aged 9–11 years) were randomly assigned to either position (PC) or force control (FC) motor practice or a resting control group (CON). The PC and FC groups performed four blocks of 40 trials motor practice with augmented feedback on performance.Following practice, improvements in movement accuracy were significantly greater in the PC group compared to the FC and CON groups (p < 0.001). None of the groups displayed changes in force task performance indicating no benefits of force control motor practice and low transfer between tasks (p-values:0.08–0.45). Corticomuscular coherence (C4-FCR) was demonstrated during the hold phase in both tasks with no difference between tasks. Corticomuscular coherence did not change from baseline to post practice in any group. Our findings demonstrate that preadolescent children improve position control following dynamic accuracy motor practice. Contrary to previous findings in adults, preadolescent children displayed smaller or no improvements in force control following isometric motor practice, low transfer between tasks and no changes in corticomuscular coherence.     

Models of causation and the semantics of causal verbs

This research examines the relationship between the concept of CAUSE as it is characterized in psychological models of causation and the meaning of causal verbs, such as the verb cause itself. According to focal set models of causation (; ), the concept of CAUSE should be more similar to the concepts of ENABLE and PREVENT than either is to each other. According to a model based on theory of force dynamics, the force dynamic model, the concepts of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT should be roughly equally similar to one another. The relationship between these predictions and the meaning of causal verbs was examined by having participants sort causal verbs and rate them with respect to the dimensions specified by the two models. The results from five experiments indicated that the force dynamic model provides a better account of the meaning of causal verbs than do focal set models of causation. Implications for causal inference and induction are discussed.     

The intuitive case for naïve realism

Naïve realism, the view that perceptual experiences are irreducible relations between subjects and external objects, has intuitive appeal, but this intuitive appeal is sometimes thought to be undermined by the possibility of certain kinds of hallucinations. In this paper, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism, and explain why this intuitive case is not undermined by the possibility of such hallucinations. Specifically, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism as arguing that the only way to make sense of the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences is by means of a naïve realist ontology. I then explain why this intuitive argument is not undermined by the possibility of hallucinatory experiences that possess the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences but, being hallucinations, do not have the ontological nature specified by naïve realism.     

Coherence,striking agreement,and reliability

Striving for a probabilistic explication of coherence, scholars proposed a distinction between agreement and striking agreement. In this paper I argue that only the former should be considered a genuine concept of coherence. In a second step the relation between coherence and reliability is assessed. I show that it is possible to concur with common intuitions regarding the impact of coherence on reliability in various types of witness scenarios by means of an agreement measure of coherence. Highlighting the need to separate the impact of coherence and specificity on reliability it is finally shown that a recently proposed vindication of the Shogenji measure qua measure of coherence vanishes.     

Presentism and the objection from being-supervenience

In this paper, we show that presentism—the view that the way things are is the way things presently are—is not undermined by the objection from being-supervenience. This objection claims, roughly, that presentism has trouble accounting for the truth-value of past-tense claims. Our demonstration amounts to the articulation and defence of a novel version of presentism. This is brute past presentism, according to which the truth-value of past-tense claims is determined by the past understood as a fundamental aspect of reality different from things and how things are.     

Mental models and other misconceptions in children’s understanding of the earth

This study investigated the claim (e.g., Vosniadou & Brewer’s, 1992) that children have naive “mental models” of the earth and believe, for example, that the earth is flat or hollow. It tested the proposal that children appear to have these misconceptions because they find the researchers’ tasks and questions to be confusing and ambiguous. Participants were 6- and 7-year-olds (N = 127) who were given either the mental model theorists’ original drawing task or a new version in which the same instructions and questions were rephrased to minimize ambiguity and, thus, possible misinterpretation. In response to the new version, children gave substantially more indication of having scientific understanding and less of having naive mental models, suggesting that the misconceptions reported by the mental model theorists are largely methodological artifacts. There were also differences between the responses to the original version and those reported by Vosniadou and Brewer, indicating that other factors, such as cohort and cultural effects, are also likely to help explain the discrepant findings of previous research.     

Impure temporalities in the history of political philosophy: the historiography of dēmokratia in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain

ABSTRACT

Building on Bernard Williams’ thesis about the intertwining of history and political philosophy, the essay explores how the problem of the history of dēmokratia after the late-eighteenth and over the nineteenth-century in Britain constituted a primary and critical field in which the philosophical meaning of democracy was debated. Configuring a new temporal perspective grounded in the relationship between ancient and modern democracy, historiographical works by John Gillies, William Mitford, and George Grote put forth an understanding of the concept as a battlefield, involving several conflicting meanings, narratives and historical forces. This historiographical tradition highlighted the tensions underpinning the definition of democracy in the long-term temporal frame linking antiquity and modernity. So even more than contemporary philosophical and political writings, historical understanding constituted a unique concept of democracy that both concentrated and dispersed meaning; it was not just one vision of democracy, among others, but one that acquired the paradoxical power to forge some semantic stability and coherence over time, and to accentuate the threat of the concept’s break up into distinct political premises and historical moments that constituted it.     

“Part of the Very Concept”: Wittgensteinian Moral Philosophy1

X is “part of the very concept” of Y. This formulation recurs throughout Raimond Gaita's philosophy and informs Christopher Cordner's. I elucidate the formulation's meaning and the nature of the necessity posited, then conclude with a criticism. One cannot love evil. One cannot love cow dung. For Gaita, these claims differ in type. The first testifies to a conceptual relation, but the second to a “mere fact.” I see no clear basis for assigning to claims one type over another, which challenges the footing of Wittgensteinian moral philosophy. Why do no moral“mere facts” partly define our form of life?     

Predictive value and psychological meaning of vocational aspirations

The psychological meaning and predictive value of a person's vocational aspirations were examined by applying Holland's typology to the vocational aspirations of high school juniors (N = 1005), college juniors (N = 692), employed adults (N = 140), and a second sample of college students studied over a one-year interval (N = 624). The aspirational data were obtained from the Daydreams section of the Self-Directed Search (Holland, 1972). Categorical and correlational analyses show that a person's retrospective vocational aspirations have coherence and yield efficient predictions of subsequently expressed choice. In addition, the degree of coherence or similarity among a person's vocational aspirations provides a potentially useful index of a person's decision-making ability.     

Thinking emergence as interaffecting: approaching and contextualizing Eugene Gendlin’s Process Model

Prior to A Process Model, Gendlin’s theoretical and practical work focused on the interfacing of bodily-felt meaningfulness and symbolization. In A Process Model, Gendlin does something much wider and more philosophically primary. The hermeneutic and pragmatist distinction between the concept of experience, on the one hand, and actual experiential process, on the other, becomes for Gendlin the methodological basis for a radical reconceptualization of the body. Wittgenstein’s formulation of “meaning” as “language-use in situations” is spelled out by Gendlin in embodied terms, yielding a profound new grasp of language, meaning, situation, language-use and culture as interactional body-process. Gendlin, in building his text, answers the pragmatist critique of a wrong progression of thinking where the results of an inquiry are read back to be its premises. With his central concept “eveving” (“everything interaffected by everything”) Gendlin shows how the seeming determinacy of preceding structure is opened in the actual occurring. He thereby elaborates a new conception of continuity where the possibility for responsive novelty is emergent in the event itself. The conceptual development of the text itself instances this kind of emergent novelty. We will somewhat follow Gendlin’s own path in using language-in-situations as entry-point into his more fundamental process-thinking, thereby asking ourselves how to engage his new kind of model. In the last part, we introduce some of the philosophical roots of Gendlin’s A Process Model.     

Moral expertise

We offer a theory of moral expertise based on an updated version of the Thomistic concept of habitus. We maintain that mature moral control arises from internalized standards of belief married to corresponding actions; the result is moral expertise. Beliefs and actions (conceptualized as habitus) coalesce in a moral identity, which is then sustained by the beliefs and actions that comprise the habitus; what we do affects who we are and what we believe, just as what we believe guides what we do. In support of these claims, we examine recent research on moral judgment, moral identity, and moral emotions.     

The assertion-candidate and the meaning of mood

The meaning of a declarative sentence and that of an interrogative sentence differ in their aspect of mood. A semantics of mood has to account for the differences in meaning between these sentences, and it also has to explain that sentences in different moods may have a common core. The meaning of the declarative mood is to be explained not in terms of actual force (contra Dummett), but in terms of potential force. The meaning of the declarative sentence (including its mood) is called the assertion-candidate, which is explained by what one must know in order to be entitled to utter the declarative with assertive force. Both a cognitive notion (knowledge) and a pragmatic notion (assertive force) are thus part of the explanation of the assertion-candidate. Davidson’s criticism that such a theory is in need of an account of the distinction between standard and non-standard uses of the declarative is answered: without counter-indications an utterance of a declarative sentence is understood as having assertive force. The meaning of an interrogative sentence, the question-candidate, and that of the other sentence types can ultimately be explained in terms of their specific relations to the assertion-candidate. Martin-Löf’s constructive type theory is used to show the philosophical relevance of a semantics of mood. The constructivist notion of proposition needs to be embedded in a theory of the assertion-candidate, which fulfils the offices of being the meaning of the declarative sentence, the content of judgement and assertion and the bearer of epistemic truth.     

François Noël’s Contribution to the Western Understanding of Chinese Thought: <Emphasis Type="Italic">Taiji sive natura</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Philosophia sinica</Emphasis> (1711)

Jesuits in China adopted key Confucian terms to express Christian notions; for example, Tian 天 or Shangdi 上帝 was considered an equivalent for God, and guishen 鬼神 for angels. A Terms controversy started among the Jesuits and other missionaries and developed into the famous Rites Controversy. However, all the missionaries agreed in rejecting the Neo-Confucian concept of Taiji 太極, which was believed to be materialistic, pantheistic, or atheistic. The Flemish Jesuit François Noël (1651–1729), after a careful study of Neo-Confucian texts, interpreted Taiji with the Western concept of nature, and even claimed that it held theistic meaning. We shall analyze and evaluate here this early Western attempt in giving a positive meaning to Taiji.     

Conditional Random Quantities and Compounds of Conditionals

In this paper we consider conditional random quantities (c.r.q.’s) in the setting of coherence. Based on betting scheme, a c.r.q. X|H is not looked at as a restriction but, in a more extended way, as \({XH + \mathbb{P}(X|H)H^c}\) ; in particular (the indicator of) a conditional event E|H is looked at as EH +  P(E|H)H ^c . This extended notion of c.r.q. allows algebraic developments among c.r.q.’s even if the conditioning events are different; then, for instance, we can give a meaning to the sum X|H + Y|K and we can define the iterated c.r.q. (X|H)|K. We analyze the conjunction of two conditional events, introduced by the authors in a recent work, in the setting of coherence. We show that the conjoined conditional is a conditional random quantity, which may be a conditional event when there are logical dependencies. Moreover, we introduce the negation of the conjunction and by applying De Morgan’s Law we obtain the disjoined conditional. Finally, we give the lower and upper bounds for the conjunction and disjunction of two conditional events, by showing that the usual probabilistic properties continue to hold.     

Associations to unfamiliar words: Learning the meanings of new words

Five experiments were designed to examine whether subjects attend to different aspects of meaning for familiar and unfamiliar words. In Experiments 1–3, subjects gave free associations to high- and low-familiarity words from the same taxonomic category (e.g.,seltzer:sarsparilla; Experiment 1), from the same noun synonym set (e.g.,baby:neonate; Experiment 2), and from the same verb synonym set (e.g.,abscond:escape; Experiment 3). In Experiments 4 and 5, subjects first read a context sentence containing the stimulus word and then gave associations; stimuli were novel words or either high- or low-familiarity nouns. Low-familiarity and novel words elicited more nonsemantically based responses (e.g.,engram:graham) than did high-familiarity words. Of the responses semantically related to the stimulus, low-familiarity and novel words elicited a higher proportion of definitional responses [category (e.g.,sarsparilla:soda), synonym (e.g.,neonate:newborn), and coordinate (e.g.,armoire:dresser)], whereas high-familiarity stimuli elicited a higher proportion of event-based responses [thematic (e.g.,seltzer:glass) and noun:verb (e.g.,baby:cry)]. Unfamiliar words appear to elicit a shift of attentional resources from relations useful in understanding the message to relations useful in understanding the meaning of the unfamiliar word.     

Exploring outcomes through narrative: the long-term impacts of Better Beginnings, Better Futures on the turning point stories of youth at ages 18-19

This study examined the long-term effects of the Better Beginnings, Better Futures project, a community-based early childhood development program, on 18–19 year-old youths’ narratives about turning points in their lives. The sample consisted of youth who participated in Better Beginnings from ages 4–8 (n = 62) and youth from a comparison community who did not participate in Better Beginnings (n = 34). Controlling for covariates, significant differences favoring youth from the Better Beginnings sites were found on several dimensions of the turning point stories: ending resolution, personal growth, meaning-making, coherence, and affect transformation. Effect sizes ranged from .45 to .76 for these outcome dimensions, indicating moderate to large effects. Also, turning point story dimensions were found to be significantly correlated with two standardized measures of well-being: youths’ self-esteem and community involvement. Youths’ self-esteem was directly related to story ending resolution, personal growth, and meaning making, and youths’ community involvement was directly related to story specificity, meaning making, and coherence. Family functioning was also examined in relation to these narrative dimensions but was not found to be significantly related to them. The findings suggest the utility of a narrative approach for the evaluation of the long-term outcomes of early childhood development programs.     

Before and beyond dialogicality: Transformative trialectics of human dialogues

I first revisit Bakhtin's discourse-driven account of dialogue to situate the concept in its broad sociohistorical, political, and philosophical (i.e., epistemology-ontology-ethics-aesthetics-praxis) meaning context. Not only is the concept of dialogicality highly relevant for the psychology of difference but it also poses many strong meta/theoretical challenges. Second, therefore, I rapidly evaluate psychology's disciplinary developmental status and transformative potentials of Bakhtinian dialogicalism in/for psychological discourses. I pay particular attention to the (im)possibilities of a potential dialogue between psycho-logic/-logy and dia-logic/-logue in reference to our biosociocultural (real-symbolic-imaginary) human be(com)ings. Thus, while triangulating, reframing and refracting with/in my seemingly more radically pluralist and dynamic perspective, using some core notions from its conceptual matrix for(potentially) self-reflective transformative-transformations, such as triopus and transformational trialectics, it is hoped that the fascination with pragmatics of dialogicality would not overshadow the concept's hermeneutically transformative utility which asks for serious dialogical confrontations, insights, bold philosophical commitments and consistent knowledge-practices in/towards all areas of our human(e) worlds.