推理的再认启发模式研究

采用“高校配对比较任务”和“城市配对比较任务”检验Goldstein等2002年提出的推理的再认启发模型,结果证明:人们在相关信息不足、知识和时间都有限的情况下,采用再认启发策略进行推理的比率相当高,并且出现了“少即是多”效应。本研究还探讨了Goldstein等没有考虑的因素,结果发现:在压力作用下,人们仍然会采用再认启发策略进行推理;再认启发中被试会运用无关信息进行推理;在操作时间上也会出现“少即是多”效应。     

Forecasting from ignorance: the use and usefulness of recognition in lay predictions of sports events

Whereas previous studies on how people make forecasts of sports events focused primarily on experts, we examined how laypeople do this task. In particular, we (a) tested the recognition heuristic [Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002). Models of ecological rationality: the recognition heuristic. Psychological Review, 109, 75-90], which requires partial ignorance, against four alternative mechanisms in describing laypeople's forecasts for the European Soccer Championships 2004; (b) evaluated how well recognition predicted the outcomes of the matches compared to direct indicators of team strength (e.g., past performance, rankings); and (c) studied the less-is-more effect--the phenomenon that knowing less leads to more correct forecasts than knowing more--which can occur when the recognition heuristic is used. Two groups of participants (laypeople, experts) made forecasts for the first-round matches of the tournament. Of the five candidate mechanisms, the recognition heuristic predicted laypeople's forecasts best: when applicable, it accounted for 90% of the forecasts. The recognition heuristic correctly predicted the actual winner of the matches substantially better than chance but did not achieve the accuracy of direct indicators of team strength. The experts made more correct forecasts than the laypeople. Moreover, we found no benefit of ignorance among the group of laypeople, although the conditions for a less-is-more effect specified by Goldstein and Gigerenzer were fulfilled.     

A signal detection analysis of the recognition heuristic

The recognition heuristic uses a recognition decision to make an inference about an unknown variable in the world. Theories of recognition memory typically use a signal detection framework to predict this binary recognition decision. In this article, I integrate the recognition heuristic with signal detection theory to formally investigate how judges use their recognition memory to make inferences. The analysis reveals that false alarms and misses systematically influence the performance of the recognition heuristic. Furthermore, judges should adjust their recognition response criterion according to their experience with the environment to exploit the structure of information in it. Finally, the less-is-more effect is found to depend on the distribution of cue knowledge and judges’ sensitivity to the difference between experienced and novel items. Theoretical implications of this bridge between the recognition heuristic and models of recognition memory are discussed.     

推理的启发式再认新模式

本文介绍了推理的启发式再认新模式,阐述了启发式再认的再认基础,介绍了“少即是多”效应,并且引用大量实验介绍了启发式再认的证据以及启发式再认的适用范围。并对启发式理论上的争议问题进行了讨论。同时也对未来的研究方向做了展望。     

Models of ecological rationality: the recognition heuristic

One view of heuristics is that they are imperfect versions of optimal statistical procedures considered too complicated for ordinary minds to carry out. In contrast, the authors consider heuristics to be adaptive strategies that evolved in tandem with fundamental psychological mechanisms. The recognition heuristic, arguably the most frugal of all heuristics, makes inferences from patterns of missing knowledge. This heuristic exploits a fundamental adaptation of many organisms: the vast, sensitive, and reliable capacity for recognition. The authors specify the conditions under which the recognition heuristic is successful and when it leads to the counterintuitive less-is-more effect in which less knowledge is better than more for making accurate inferences.     

Recognition-based inference: When is less more in the real world?

Common wisdom tells us that more information can only help and never hurt. Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) highlighted an instance violating this intuition. Specifically, in an analysis of their recognition heuristic, they found a counterintuitive less-is-more effect in inference: An individual recognizing fewer objects than another individual can, nevertheless, make more accurate inferences. Goldstein and Gigerenzer emphasized that a sufficient condition for this effect is that the recognition validity be higher than the knowledge validity, assuming that the validities are uncorrelated with the number of recognized objects, n. But how is the occurrence of the less-is-more effect affected when this independence assumption is violated? I show that validity dependencies (i.e., correlations of the validities with n) abound in empirical data sets, and I demonstrate by computer simulations that these dependencies often have a strong limiting effect on the less-is-more effect. Moreover, I discuss what cognitive (e.g., memory) and ecological (e.g., distribution of the criterion variable, environmental frequencies) factors can give rise to a dependency of the recognition validity on the number of recognized objects. Supplemental materials may be downloaded from http://pbr.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

A little learning is a dangerous thing: an experimental demonstration of ignorance-driven inference

Studies of ignorance-driven decision making have been employed to analyse when ignorance should prove advantageous on theoretical grounds or else they have been employed to examine whether human behaviour is consistent with an ignorance-driven inference strategy (e.g., the recognition heuristic). In the current study we examine whether - under conditions where such inferences might be expected - the advantages that theoretical analyses predict are evident in human performance data. A single experiment shows that, when asked to make relative wealth judgements, participants reliably use recognition as a basis for their judgements. Their wealth judgements under these conditions are reliably more accurate when some of the target names are unknown than when participants recognize all of the names (a "less-is-more effect"). These results are consistent across a number of variations: the number of options given to participants and the nature of the wealth judgement. A basic model of recognition-based inference predicts these effects.     

A little learning is a dangerous thing: An experimental demonstration of ignorance-driven inference

Studies of ignorance-driven decision making have been employed to analyse when ignorance should prove advantageous on theoretical grounds or else they have been employed to examine whether human behaviour is consistent with an ignorance-driven inference strategy (e.g., the recognition heuristic). In the current study we examine whether—under conditions where such inferences might be expected—the advantages that theoretical analyses predict are evident in human performance data. A single experiment shows that, when asked to make relative wealth judgements, participants reliably use recognition as a basis for their judgements. Their wealth judgements under these conditions are reliably more accurate when some of the target names are unknown than when participants recognize all of the names (a “less-is-more effect”). These results are consistent across a number of variations: the number of options given to participants and the nature of the wealth judgement. A basic model of recognition-based inference predicts these effects.     

Criterion knowledge: A moderator of using the recognition heuristic?

The recognition heuristic (RH) claims that people base inferences on recognition only. This has been questioned by several studies which found that additional knowledge was influential. However, in some of these studies, participants' additional knowledge might have encompassed criterion knowledge thus rendering any inferential strategy superfluous. The present study was therefore designed to test the effect of criterion knowledge on use or non‐use of the RH. Eighty‐one participants made pair‐wise comparisons with respect to the size of Belgian cities and also provided estimates of the cities' actual size. We found that relative criterion knowledge (i.e., knowledge about the relative position of an object on the criterion dimension) did indeed play some role, but its exclusion left the main critical findings intact, nonetheless. We thus conclude that previous studies conducted in the paradigm of natural recognition should not be generally refuted by the argument of participants possessing criterion knowledge. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of subjective recognition experiences on recognition heuristic use: A multinomial processing tree approach

The recognition heuristic (RH) theory states that, in comparative judgments (e.g., Which of two cities has more inhabitants?), individuals infer that recognized objects score higher on the criterion (e.g., population) than unrecognized objects. Indeed, it has often been shown that recognized options are judged to outscore unrecognized ones (e.g., recognized cities are judged as larger than unrecognized ones), although different accounts of this general finding have been proposed. According to the RH theory, this pattern occurs because the binary recognition judgment determines the inference and no other information will reverse this. An alternative account posits that recognized objects are chosen because knowledge beyond mere recognition typically points to the recognized object. A third account can be derived from the memory-state heuristic framework. According to this framework, underlying memory states of objects (rather than recognition judgments) determine the extent of RH use: When two objects are compared, the one associated with a “higher” memory state is preferred, and reliance on recognition increases with the “distance” between their memory states. The three accounts make different predictions about the impact of subjective recognition experiences—whether an object is merely recognized or recognized with further knowledge—on RH use. We estimated RH use for different recognition experiences across 16 published data sets, using a multinomial processing tree model. Results supported the memory-state heuristic in showing that RH use increases when recognition is accompanied by further knowledge.     

Emotions are not always contagious: Longitudinal spreading of self-pride and group pride in homogeneous and status-differentiated groups

The members of task groups are emotionally more similar to each other than to others outside the group; yet, little is known about the conditions under which this emotional similarity emerges. In two longitudinal studies, we tested the idea that emotions only spread when they contain information that is relevant to all group members. We compared the spreading of group pride (relevant) with self-pride (not relevant). The first study followed emotions in 68 task groups (N = 295) across 4 moments. Multilevel cross-lagged path analyses showed that group members mutually influenced each other's group pride, but not self-pride. The second study followed emotions in 27 task groups (N = 195) across 3 moments in time. Longitudinal social network analyses showed that group members adjusted their group pride, but not their self-pride, to members they perceived to be more influential. Findings from both studies are consistent with a social referencing account of emotion spreading.     

Separating the confident from the correct: Leveraging member knowledge in groups to improve decision making and performance

Groups often struggle to distinguish expert members from others who stand out for various reasons but may not be particularly knowledgeable (Littlepage & Mueller, 1997). We examined an intervention designed to improve group decision making and performance through instructing group members to search for information they already possessed that was relevant to a problem. Participants estimated values and expressed their confidence in their estimates individually and then a second time either individually or in a group. This was done with or without the intervention. Results indicated that: (1) groups were more confident than, and out-performed, individuals, (2) group decision making was best captured by models predicting more influence for more accurate members when the intervention was used and more influence for more confident members in its absence, and (3) groups that received the intervention out-performed groups that did not.     

Intergroup and Intragroup Aspects of Leadership in Social Dilemmas: A Relational Model of Cooperation

Two experiments investigated how leadership shapes individual contributions in small groups facing public goods dilemmas. We predicted that the influence of leaders would be determined by their ability to fulfill both instrumental needs (solve the free-rider problem) and relational needs (contribute to the identity) of group members. The relative importance of these two needs was expected to vary with the salience of group membership (social vs personal identity). This hypothesis was supported in two experiments. Experiment 1 revealed that leaders showing group commitment and fairness toward members were more effective at raising contributions when social identity was salient. Furthermore, Experiment 2 showed that highly committed leaders were more influential when social identity was salient, whereas leaders with intrinsic leadership skills were more influential when personal identity was salient. This suggests that the effectiveness of leader solutions to social dilemmas depends upon the fit between leader characteristics and member expectations.     

“How many bad apples does it take to spoil the whole barrel?”: Social exclusion and toleration for bad apples

In social dilemmas, where personal welfare is in conflict with collective welfare, there are inherent incentives to act non-cooperatively. Moreover, there is evidence that the example of a few uncooperative group members (“bad apples”) is more influential than the example of comparable numbers of cooperative members (a bad apple effect). Two studies are reported that examine the functional relationship between the number of likely bad apples and individual cooperation, and whether and when the threat of social exclusion for uncooperative behavior may effectively counter the temptation to follow the example of such “bad apples”. It is shown that (a) the threat of exclusion is sufficient to counter the temptation to follow a few bad apples’ example, (b) such threats cannot, however, overcome the cooperation-degrading effects of large numbers (e.g., a majority) of bad apples, and (c) the effectiveness of such threats may be greater in relatively smaller groups.     

The effect of group-identification on emotion recognition: The case of cats and basketball players

It has been suggested that the in-group advantage in the recognition of emotional expressions by members of different cultural groups may be due to either encoder differences in expressive style or to decoder biases. The latter may be explained by the fact that individuals who identify with an ethnic or social group exert more effort when trying to decode the emotional expressions of group members. The present study investigates this notion. For this, two target groups were chosen such that in-group and out-group members shared the same cultural knowledge and linguistic background and all participants rated the same expressions to control for encoder differences. Both studies showed that individuals who identified with a social group were better at recognizing expressions by individuals perceived as members of that group.     

The recognition heuristic in memory‐based inference: is recognition a non‐compensatory cue?

The recognition heuristic makes the strong claim that probabilistic inferences in which a recognized object is compared to an unrecognized one are made solely on the basis of whether the objects are recognized or not, ignoring all other available cues. This claim has been seriously challenged by a number of studies that have shown a clear effect of additional cue knowledge. In most of these studies, either recognition knowledge was acquired during the experiment, and/or additional cues were provided to participants. However, the recognition heuristic is more likely to be a tool for exploiting natural (rather than induced) recognition when inferences have to be made from memory. In our study on natural recognition and inferences from memory, around 85% of the inferences followed recognition information even when participants had learned three cues that contradicted recognition and when some of the contradictory cues were deemed more valid than recognition. Nevertheless, there were strong individual differences in the use of recognition. Whereas about half of the participants chose the recognized object regardless of the number of conflicting cues—suggestive of the hypothesized noncompensatory processing of recognition—the remaining participants were influenced by the additional knowledge. The former group of participants also tended to give higher estimates of recognition's validity. In addition, we found that the use of recognition for an inference may be affected by whether additional cue knowledge has been learned outside or within the experimental setting. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Adaptive Use of Recognition in Group Decision Making

Applying the framework of ecological rationality, the authors studied the adaptivity of group decision making. In detail, they investigated whether groups apply decision strategies conditional on their composition in terms of task‐relevant features. The authors focused on the recognition heuristic, so the task‐relevant features were the validity of the group members' recognition and knowledge, which influenced the potential performance of group strategies. Forty‐three three‐member groups performed an inference task in which they had to infer which of two German companies had the higher market capitalization. Results based on the choice data support the hypothesis that groups adaptively apply the strategy that leads to the highest theoretically achievable performance. Time constraints had no effect on strategy use but did have an effect on the proportions of different types of arguments. Possible mechanisms underlying the adaptive use of recognition in group decision making are discussed.     

Reactions to threatening critical messages from minority group members with shared or distinct group identities

Reactions to members of other groups are important in multicultural societies. In four studies (N = 725), we investigate the reactions of majority group members to minority group members who stress either their distinct identity or their shared identity when they express threatening critical messages. In Study 1, we investigate reactions to a person who stresses the importance of either his Moroccan and Muslim identity or his Dutch and non‐Islamic identity. In Studies 2 and 3, we disentangle national and religious identity. Across all studies, we find that minority group members who stress their shared identity rather than their distinct identity are evaluated more positively, are perceived as more similar to the self, and tend to evoke less anger. In Study 4, we replicate this finding and show that perceived similarity mediates the impact of identity on these evaluations, but constructiveness only partially mediates these relations. Results are discussed in terms of recategorization models and the intergroup sensitivity effect. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Skill mastery inhibits adoption of observed alternative solutions among chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

Geographic variation in socially transmitted skills and signals, similar to human culture, has been well documented for great apes. The rules governing the adoption of novel behaviours, however, are still largely unknown. We conducted an innovation-and-transmission experiment with two groups of chimpanzees living at hopE Primate Sanctuary Gänserndorf, Austria, presenting a board on which food had to be manoeuvred around obstacles to be acquired. Most chimpanzees used sticks to acquire the food, but five adults independently invented a novel technique, rattling, which was subsequently tested by almost all group members. However, individuals who had become proficient with sticks were reluctant to switch to rattling, despite it being more efficient. Similarly, after rattling was prevented, rattle specialists kept trying to rattle and made no attempt to use the stick technique, despite their knowledge about its existence. We conclude that innovators stimulate others to experiment with the solutions they display, but that chimpanzees are nevertheless conservative; mastery of a skill inhibits further exploration, and hence adoption of alternative techniques even if these are more efficient. Consequently, conformity among group members should not be expected in great apes when individuals develop proficiency at different techniques. Conservatism thus joins conformity as a mechanism to bring about cultural uniformity and stability.     

Empirical tests of the recognition heuristic

The recognition heuristic postulates that individuals should choose a recognized object more often than an unrecognized one whenever recognition is related to the criterion. This behavior has been described as a one‐cue, noncompensatory decision‐making strategy. This claim and other assumptions were tested in four experiments using paired‐comparison tasks with cities and other geographical objects. The main results were (1) that the recognized object was chosen more often than the unrecognized one when the recognition cue was valid; (2) that participants' behavior did not reflect the recognition validity of their own knowledge; (3) that a less‐is‐more effect (i.e., better performance with less knowledge) was either absent or of only small size; and (4) that judgments were influenced by further knowledge, which could even compensate for the recognition cue. In sum, the recognition cue represents an important piece of knowledge in paired comparisons, but apparently not the only one. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.