The role of perceptions and attributions for response-outcome noncontingency in learned helplessness: A commentary and discussion

Three papers in the Journal of Personality (Oakes & Curtis, 1982; Tennen, Drum, Gillen, & Stanton, 1982; Tennen, Gillen, & Drum, 1982) report that behavioral deficits characteristic of learned helplessness occur independently of perceptions of and attributions for noncontingency. The present article discusses the problems for the cognitive mediational component of helplessness theory raised by these three papers. It is argued that while these papers do not seriously challenge helplessness theory because they fail to test adequately the central proposition of the model, they point to the theory's need for greater elaboration of the processes or mechanisms linking objective experiences, perceptions, attributions, expectations, and behavioral effects of uncontrollability. Suggestions for some of the additional mediational processes a revised helplessness theory should incorporate are offered, followed by a discussion of the role of these processes in leading to the relatively greater support found for perceptions and attributions as mediators of behavioral helplessness in natural vs. laboratory environments.     

Learned helplessness and defensive strategies: A rejoinder

The results of experiments reported by Oakes and Curtis (1982), Tennen, Drum, Gillen and Stanton (1982), and Tennen, Gillen, and Drum (1982) are seen as inconsistent with the cognitive learned helplessness theory of Seligman and his associates (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Alloy & Seligman, 1979). Comments on the Oakes and Curtis studies by Alloy (1982) and by Silver, Wortman, and Klos (1982) are seen as employing three defensive strategies: (1) Declaring the research findings to be irrelevant to the theory; (2) declaring the experiments to be flawed; and (3) modifying the theory to accommodate the research findings. This rejoinder argues that the research findings are relevant and that the criticisms are of questionable validity. It is suggested that the questions of the validity of the theory raised by these findings not be declared to be resolved, but that additional data bearing on the questions be sought.     

Three accounts of the learned helplessness effect

Two experiments tested predictions drawn from test anxiety theory, learned helplessness theory, and Wortman and Brehm's (1975) integration of helplessness and reactance theories. Experiment 1 demonstrated that performance deficits predicted by learned helplessness do not rely on experimenter-induced failure. It also showed such deficits to be unrelated either to negative affect following exposure to pretreatment or to causal attributions about pretreatment task performance. Experiment 2 showed that experience of uncontrollability need not result in impaired performance, because failure on an unimportant task did not produce the deficits predicted by learned helplessness theory. This result provides qualified support for the integrative model. Finally, because the subjective measures used in Experiment 2 were not consistent with performance measures, the reliability of self-reports is questioned.     

Cognitions, affect, and behavior following uncontrollable outcomes: A response to current human helplessness research

A series of articles in the Journal of Personality challenge several central assumptions of the reformulated learned helplessness model: that perceptions of uncontrollability, awareness of noncontingency between responses and outcomes, and attributions made about the outcome are necessary to explain learned helplessness effects. The present article addresses the validity of this challenge through a consideration of the methodology employed in these and other traditional studies of human helplessness conducted in the laboratory. We maintain that although performance deficits can be demonstrated reliably following exposure to uncontrollable outcomes, a number of factors other than expectations of future uncontrollability (i.e., learned helplessness) may be responsible for these effects. In addition, demands of the experimental situation may prevent subjects from admitting their true underlying thoughts and feelings regarding the manipulations employed. Finally, the current use of artificial laboratory paradigms may unnecessarily restrict the study of a complex psychological phenomenon such as learned helplessness. We suggest that future researchers employ paradigms that more closely parallel real world situations to which they hope to generalize, or utilize naturally occurring uncontrollable life events to study the problem. In addition, we argue that future research should broaden its focus beyond attributions to explore other mediators of human helplessness.     

Attributional style and the generality of learned helplessness

According to the logic of the attribution reformulation of learned helplessness, the interaction of two factors influences whether helplessness experienced in one situation will transfer to a new situation. The model predicts that people who exhibit a style of attributing negative outcomes to global factors will show helplessness deficits in new situations that are either similar or dissimilar to the original situation in which they were helpless. In contrast, people who exhibit a style of attributing negative outcomes to only specific factors will show helplessness deficits in situations that are similar, but not dissimilar, to the original situation in which they were helpless. To test these predictions, we conducted two studies in which undergraduates with either a global or specific attributional style for negative outcomes were given one of three pretreatments in the typical helplessness triadic design: controllable bursts of noise, uncontrollable bursts of noise, or no noise. In Experiment 1, students were tested for helplessness deficits in a test situation similar to the pretreatment setting, whereas in Experiment 2, they were tested in a test situation dissimilar to the pretreatment setting. The findings were consistent with predictions of the reformulated helplessness theory.     

习得性无助是习得的吗？——对习得性无助理论及其反思的评述

Seligman和Maier（1967）在动物实验的基础上提出了著名的习得性无助理论,但在2016年,Maier和Seligman二人却联合发文对该理论进行了反思：从最新的神经生物学证据来看,习得性无助的经典理论概括存在基本错误,习得性无助并非习得而来！所谓“习得性”无助,实质上是动物对厌恶刺激长期作用的先天适应性反应,而非认知学习的结果。本文简要梳理习得性无助理论的起源与发展,深入分析这一反思的核心内容、依据及意义,对其中否定习得性无助理论概括的观点,从证据的充分性、研究范式的效度、规范概念等角度作了进行进一步的探讨,并结合新的实验范式对未来研究提出建议。     

Learned helplessness and “fear of success” in college women

Anagram performance in comparison and noncomparison situations of 90 high, medium, or low fear-of-success (FOS) women was examined after these subjects had experienced conditions within the traditional triadic learned helplessness design. Low FOS women in the comparison condition proved significantly more susceptible to learned helplessness effects than high FOS women on one dependent measure (number of incorrect anagrams), though not on the other (response latency). Results are discussed with reference to the FOS construct and to Zuckerman and Allison's (1976) scale, used in the present study. An argument is made for increased attention to personality variables within the learned helplessness paradigm.     

The role of extraversion in the development of learned helplessness

An experiment is reported which investigated the effect of the individual fdifference variable of introversion-extraversion on a typical learned-helplessness induction procedure. It was found that introverts displayed a much more marked helplessness effect than extraverts, in accord with predictions made by the Brebner-Cooper model of extraversion in terms of inhibition and excitation deriving from stimulus analysis and response organization. It was concluded that there are individual differences in response to uncontrollable outcomes which are not taken into account by the current theories of learned helplessness, and further, that these may be mediated by characteristics of the actual task employed.     

The debilitating effect of exposure to noncontingent escape: A test of the learned helplessness model

Two studies were conducted to test the hypothesis that exposure to non-contingent escape leads to performance deficits similar to those observed when subjects are exposed to noncontingent aversive outcomes from which there is no escape, and that causal attributions mediate these deficits. Previous attempts to produce “appetitive helplessness” (deficits resulting from exposure to noncontingent positive events) have been plagued by subjects' tendency to believe that they are responsible for positive events. In Experiment 1, 40 subjects were exposed to contingent or noncontingent noise escape trials. As predicted by the learned helplessness model, subjects who received inescapable noise performed less well on a subsequent anagram task than subjects exposed to escapable noise. Similarly, subjects who escaped from the noise owing to the benevolence of a powerful other rather than because of their own efforts, showed performance deficits paralleling those of the inescapable noise subjects. In Experiment 2, subjects who escaped an aversive tone through no effort of their own showed subsequent performance deficits, but globality of their self-reported attributions did not predict subsequent anagram performance. The results of these studies provide support for the hypothesis that uncontrollability, independent of the valence of a particular outcome, is responsible for helplessness deficits, but do not support the mediational role of attributions, at least in the laboratory.     

Learned helplessness and the detection of contingency: A direct test

Two studies tested a basic hypothesis of the learned helplessness model: That performance deficits associated with exposure to uncontrollable outcomes are directly mediated by an individual's perception of response-outcome independence. In the first experiment 48 subjects were exposed to noise bursts. For one experimental group, the termination of the noise was response-contingent. For five other groups, noise-burst termination was independent of subjects' responses. These five groups varied in the number of trials on which they received positive feedback: As predicted, subjects overestimated the amount of control they had over noise termination as a positive linear function of the amount of noncontingent positive feedback they received. Although subjects exposed to either noncontingent positive or negative feedback showed subsequent performance deficits on an anagrams task, the expected relation between perceived control and subsequent performance failed to emerge. These findings were replicated in a second experiment. In addition, subjects' locus, stability, and globality attributions failed to predict subsequent performance. These results call into question the central premises of helplessness theory: That perceived uncontrollability and causal attributions mediate learned helplessness.     

Learned helplessness in high school students following experience of noncontingent rewards

High school students differing in achievement motivation were subjects in a learned helplessness experiment using a yoked triadic design with noncontingent rewards. A strong helplessness effect was observed in both high- and low-achievement motivation groups. A postexperimental questionnaire revealed that perceived response-outcome independence was induced under the noncontingent reinforcement condition, but was not associated with perceived failure. The results were seen as strong support for the original learned helplessness model in two important respects. First they refute recent claims that learned helplessness depends on aversive outcomes, and second they show that human helplessness can be distinguished from experimenter-induced failure.     

Can Moral Realists Deflect Defeat Due to Evolutionary Explanations of Morality?

I address Andrew Moon's recent discussion (2016, this journal) of the question whether third‐factor accounts are valid responses to debunking arguments against moral realism. Moon argues that third‐factor responses are valid under certain conditions but leaves open whether moral realists can use his interpretation of the third‐factor response to defuse the evolutionary debunking challenge. I rebut Moon's claim and answer his question. Moon's third‐factor reply is valid only if we accept externalism about epistemic defeaters. However, even if we do, I argue, the conditions Moon identifies for a valid third‐factor response are not met in the case of moral realism.     

The Explanatory Challenge: Moral Realism Is No Better Than Theism

Many of the arguments for and against robust moral realism parallel arguments for and against theism. In this article, I consider one of the shared challenges: the explanatory challenge. The article begins with a presentation of Harman's formulation of the explanatory challenge as applied to moral realism and theism. I then examine two responses offered by robust moral realists to the explanatory challenge, one by Russ Shafer‐Landau and another by David Enoch. Shafer‐Landau argues that the moral realist can plausibly respond to the challenge in a way unavailable to theists. I argue that Shafer‐Landau's response is implausible as it stands and that once revised, it will apply to theism just as well. I then argue that Enoch's response, to the extent that it is plausible, can be used to defend theism as well.     

Realism,Utopianism, and Radical Values

One of the more debated topics in the recent realist literature concerns the compatibility of realism and utopianism. Perhaps the greatest challenge to utopian political thought comes from Bernard Williams' realism, which argues, among other things, that political values should be subject to what he calls the ‘realism constraint’, which rules out utopian arguments based on values which cannot be offered by the state as unrealistic and therefore inadmissible. This article challenges that conclusion in two ways. First, it argues that the rationale for accepting Williams' original argument for the ‘realism constraint’ fails. Secondly, it argues that there is at least one genuinely political value of liberty available which is both compatible with realism and something that cannot be offered by the state, namely that of the political anarchist. This opens the way for far more ambitious and utopian forms of realist political thought and implies that the arguments of what we call political anarchists must be met by (realist) political argumentation, not simply ruled out by methodological stipulation.     

The effect of debriefing on laboratory induced helplessness: An attributional analysis1

Debriefing was assessed as means of reversing helplessness deficits through reattribution. Fifty-five subjects listened to escapable or inescapable tones. One inescapable group, prior to anagrams, was debriefed regarding noise uncontrollability. A second inescapable group was administered anagrams by a different experimenter. While exposure to inescapable noise led to performance deficits, switching experimenters obviated these deficits. Debriefing actually facilitated anagram performance. All inescapable subjects—debriefed or not—attributed their lack of control on the noise task to experimenter interference, casting some doubt on reattribution as an explanation of debriefing's effects. Results were discussed in terms of the reformulated learned helplessness model and the ethical implications of debriefing in learned helplessness research.     

Being proven wrong elicits learning in children – but only in those with higher executive function skills

This study investigated whether prompting children to generate predictions about an outcome facilitates activation of prior knowledge and improves belief revision. 51 children aged 9–12 were tested on two experimental tasks in which generating a prediction was compared to closely matched control conditions, as well as on a test of executive functions (EF). In Experiment 1, we showed that children exhibited a pupillary surprise response to events that they had predicted incorrectly, hypothesized to reflect the transient release of noradrenaline in response to cognitive conflict. However, children's surprise response was not associated with better belief revision, in contrast to a previous study involving adults. Experiment 2 revealed that, while generating predictions helped children activate their prior knowledge, only those with better inhibitory control skills learned from incorrectly predicted outcomes. Together, these results suggest that good inhibitory control skills are needed for learning through cognitive conflict. Thus, generating predictions benefits learning – but only among children with sufficient EF capacities to harness surprise for revising their beliefs.     

Depression, realism, and the overconfidence effect: are the sadder wiser when predicting future actions and events?

Do depressed individuals make more realistic judgments than their nondepressed peers in real world settings? Depressed and nondepressed Ss in 2 studies were asked to make predictions about future actions and outcomes that might occur in their personal academic and social worlds. Both groups of Ss displayed overconfidence, that is, they overestimated the likelihood that their predictions would prove to be accurate. Of key importance, depressed Ss were less accurate in their predictions, and thus more overconfident, than their nondepressed counterparts. These differences arose because depressed Ss (a) were more likely to predict the occurrence of low base-rate events and (b) were less likely to be correct when they made optimistic predictions (i.e., stated that positive events would occur or that aversive outcomes would not). Discussion focuses on implications of these findings for the depressive realism hypothesis.     

A parametric study of learned helplessness in humans

In two experiments designed to assess the effect of varying amounts of exposure to noncontingency training, it was discovered that performance decrements could be produced after relatively brief training and again after extended training. Between these conditions was a period of recovery during which no performance deficits were evident. There was also a tendency for individual differences in motivation to moderate deficits following brief but not extended training. A four-stage model is proposed to account for these results. In response to uncontrollable outcomes, individuals are said to pass through a phase of no effect, followed by temporary helplessness, recovery, and final helplessness. The model also proposes that motivational differences and perceptions of noncontingency exert independent and opposing influences on learned helplessness deficits.     

It’s Greek to me: Domain specific relationships between intellectual helplessness and academic performance

ABSTRACT

In a study of the domain specificity of intellectual learned helplessness, we collected data from 376 students in 14 classrooms. We measured feelings of intellectual helplessness for mathematics and language skills, anxiety about performance in each of these domains, and general working memory. Multilevel modeling analyses found that feelings of helplessness in language skills were negatively related to grades in language but were unrelated to grades in mathematics. Similarly, feelings of helplessness in mathematics were negatively related to grades in mathematics but were unrelated to grades in language. Controlling for anxiety or working memory did not change these relationships, nor did they vary across the age of students. The results support conceptualizations in which learned helplessness has a domain specific component.