The logic of obligation, ‘better’ and ‘worse’

Research for this paper was supported by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, FT-33794. I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for remarks on an earlier version of this paper.     

The “Friendly visitor” program data: A reply to Denney

Conclusion In summary, Denney's failure to obtain the original results with her reanalyses can be attributed to the fact that she (a) scored some variables differently, (b) included an inappropriate subjects who was not entered into the original analyses, (c) excluded appropriate subjects who were used in the original analyses, (d) included an additional invalid dependent measure previously dicarded, and (e) may have used a different residualization algorithm. In view of these differences, it is not surprising that the multivariate and unvariate results that she obtained were different from those originally reported.We hope that now the procedural differences that account for the inconsistencies alleged by Denney are clear.     

A reply to Cling’s “The epistemic regress problem”

Andrew Cling presents a new version of the epistemic regress problem, and argues that intuitionist foundationalism, social contextualism, holistic coherentism, and infinitism fail to solve it. Cling??s discussion is quite instructive, and deserving of careful consideration. But, I argue, Cling??s discussion is not in all respects decisive. I argue that Cling??s dilemma argument against holistic coherentism fails.     

The conjunction fallacy? A reply to Bar-Hillel

In her commentary on our article, Bar-Hillel (1991) argues that our normative interpretation of the Lindaproblem is inaccurate and that the representativeness heuristic can account for all of the relevant data. I argue that the normative interpretation of the Linda problem remains slippery and that representativeness fails to account for much of the data. Furthermore, substantial evidence supports our suggestion that subjects use different underlying models in estimating likelihoods in different con problems.     

Russellizing Russell: A reply to his “A critique of Lehrer's coherentism”

Conclusion Russell's attempt to demonstrate the insufficiency and nonnecessity of Lehrer's epistemology fails on both counts. His modified Nogot example does not constitute a counterexample to Lehrer's theory, though it does establish the insufficiency of (RTK). The relevant versions of both of his counterexamples to necessity occasion radically conflicting intuitions and, as a result, are far from decisive. Moreover, if they work against Lehrer's theory, and it is by no means obvious that they do, then they also demonstrate the nonnecessity of Russell's theory. In the final analysis, we may conclude that if Russell's three counterexamples demonstrate anything, they demonstrate that Lehrer's epistemology is superior to (RTK).     

The functional theory of human values: From intentional overlook to first acknowledgement—A reply to Schwartz (2014)

Schwartz has been aware of the Functional Theory of Values for over a decade. For the first time, Schwartz (2014) acknowledges the Gouveia theory and provides considerations based on the Gouveia, Milfont, and Guerra (2014) study. In this reply we present a historical overview of the development of the theory, noting unwarranted barriers to the publication of our work. We then address his comments, focusing on the theoretical innovations of the theory and remarking that recent refinements of Schwartz’s model were already evident in the Gouveia theory. Hypotheses tested in Gouveia et al. (2014) are also re-tested and supported with European Social Survey data using the Schwartz PVQ-21. We conclude by summarizing current projects that offer further opportunities to continue the theoretical debate.     

“Rules” of language: A reply

Philosophical Studies -     

Children’s judgements of the obligation to help: The role of relationships

ABSTRACT

Children at ages 7 (N = 24, M _age = 6.96, SD _age =.20), 9 (N = 29, M _age = 8.76, SD _age =.44), and 11 (N = 25, M _age = 10.76, SD _age =.66), and adults (N = 30) made judgements about the obligation to help when it conflicts with a personal desire. Across ages, the obligation to help was judged to be strongest when there were positive or neutral past interactions with the person in need of help, compared to mean past interactions. Expectation of a future friendship predicted the obligation to help, even after controlling for age and sex. However, we found no effect of children helping gender in-group members more. Evidence for altruism was not found: expected positive emotions did not predict the obligation to help. We conclude that an expectation of future relationship is the strongest predictor of helping obligation.     

The contingency argument—A reply

Conclusion Brian Medlin has excluded the possibility of something being self-explanatory in anything but a logical sense. Hence any non-logical necessity has always to be in terms of something other than the explicand. In this context, the principle of sufficient reason cannot escape contraction to a form so patently useless that no proponent of the contingency argument would want to employ it. Many of the objections in Section 4 have point, however, only against an argument which uses such an unacceptable form of the principle. The objections in Section 5 are directed against an argument framed in the only other way allowable under Medlin’s dichotomy, but which is of no use to the theist, for the simple-reason that its conclusion is not existential in the required (present actuality) sense. Objections against such an argument would concern the theist only if their validity were so wide as to embrace a truly existential argument as well. As we have-seen it is in just that case that they break down. In neither Section 4 nor 5, therefore, does the article come to grips with the contingency argument. The objections leave it untouched, because neither of Medlin’s notions of contingency and necessity corresponds to that which is operative in the argument.     

Prior’s defence of Hintikka’s theorem. A discussion of Prior’s ‘The logic of obligation and the obligations of the logician’

In his paper, The logic of obligation and the obligations of the logician, A.N. Prior considers Hintikka??s theorem, according to which a statement cannot be both impossible and permissible. This theorem has been seen as problematic for the very idea of a logic of obligation. However, Prior rejects the view that the logic of obligation cannot be formalised. He sees this resistance against such a view as an important part of what could be called the obligation of the logician. Prior argues that Hintikka??s theorem should not be seen as something paradoxical. On the contrary, it should be seen as a fully acceptable consequence of a basic and reasonable assumption in deontic logic, namely Hintikka??s rule.     

Which is the real intelligence? A reply to Robinson (1999)

Robinson's ([Robinson, D.L. (1999). The ‘IQ’ factor: implications for intelligence theory and measurement. Personality and Individual Differences, 27, 715–735]) arguments that crystallized intelligence represents the “one valid intelligence factor” are disputed. It is argued that Robinson seriously underestimated the relevance of fluid abilities to “intelligence”, by using an inappropriate criterion for assessing the intelligence-saturation of cognitive ability variables. The relevance of fluid and crystallized abilities to popular, psychometric, and biological conceptions of intelligence is discussed, and the issue of age-related changes in fluid and crystallized intelligence is also addressed.     

The frozen cyborg: A reply to Selinger and Engström

Selinger and Engstrom, A moratorium on cyborgs: Computation, cognition and commerce, 2008 (this issue) urge upon us a moratorium on ‘cyborg discourse’. But the argument underestimates the richness and complexity of our ongoing communal explorations. It leans on a somewhat outdated version of the machine metaphor (exemplified perhaps by a frozen 1970’s Cyborg). The modern cyborg, informed by an evolving computational model of mind, can play a positive role in the critical discussions that Selinger and Engstrom seek.