Generic Response Classes And Relational Frame Theory: Response To Hayes And Barnes-Holmes.

Hayes and Barnes‐Holmes (2004) assert that the concept of a topographically unconstrained response class, the concept that carries the explanatory burden of relational frame theory, appeals to no new principles. Operants are properly defined functionally. I argue that they have stretched the concept of the generic response class beyond its appropriate limits. Skinner conceived of response classes as empirically defined units, mutually interchangeable in quantitative functions. The notion of overarching, generalized operants is an uncritical, analogical extension of this concept. I hold that the conceptual work of relational frame theory is incomplete, that a statement of principle is necessary, even if not new. Finally, I distinguish a supposed commitment to a philosophical “mediationism” from a valid inquiry about mediating behavior; that is, behavior with stimulus products that participate in the control of the behavior of primary interest.     

Data In Search Of A Principle: A Review Of Relational Frame Theory: A Post-Skinnerian Count Of Human Language And Cognition.

Responding to derived relations among stimuli and events is the subject of an accelerating research program that represents one of the major behavior analytic approaches to complex behavior. Relational Frame Theory: A Post‐Skinnerian Account of Human Language and Cognition (Hayes, Barnes‐Holmes, & Roche, 2001) offers a conceptual framework for this work and explores its implications for verbal behavior and a variety of other domains of complex human behavior. The authors dismiss Skinner's interpretation of verbal behavior as unproductive and conceptually flawed and suggest a new definition and a new paradigm for the investigation of verbal phenomena. I found the empirical phenomena important but the conceptual discussion incomplete. A new principle of behavior is promised, but critical features of this principle are not offered. In the absence of an explicit principle, the theory itself is difficult to evaluate. Counterexamples suggest a role for mediating behavior, perhaps covert, thus raising the question whether a new principle is needed at all. The performance of subjects in relational frame experiments may be a mosaic of elementary behavioral units, some of which are verbal. If so, verbal behavior underlies relational behavior; it is not defined by it. I defend Skinner's definition of verbal behavior and argue that an account of relational behavior must be integrated with Skinner's analysis; it will not replace it.     

Operants Were Never "Emitted," Feeling Is Doing, And Learning Takes Only One Trial: A Review Of B. F. Skinner's Recent Issues In The Analysis Of Behavior

This final collection of Skinner's papers was intended for the professional, although other readers will find much of interest. The first five chapters are devoted to what Skinner called “theoretical issues” and include clear presentations of his positions on “feelings” and on the “self” as an apparent agent of volition. Skinner skillfully discusses thinking, the origins of cognitive-mediational theories, and a favorite topic: the similarity of processes occurring in the histories of species and of individuals. The next four chapters cover what he called “professional issues,” including the often-misunderstood philosophy known as radical behaviorism as well as the operant aspects of behavior therapy and attempts to influence educational practices. He seemed disappointed in the lack of acceptance of programmed learning methods and pessimistic about the possibility of improving education practices. This pessimism was evident in the final section, “personal issues,” in which he expressed doubt that the powerful and self-serving forces of government, business, and religion will ever permit the changes that could be wrought by the application of behavior analysis to the great problems of society. Two other chapters in the last section will be useful to historians who are curious about the influence of logical positivism on Skinner's thinking (apparently there was not much influence) and to sophisticated readers who are interested in Skinner's retrospective consideration of his work.