Individual differences in loudness processing and loudness scales

Parameters of the psychophysical function for loudness (a 1000-Hz tone) were assessed for individual subjects in three experiments: (a) binaural loudness summation, (b) temporal loudness summation, and (c) judgments of loudness intervals. The loudness scales that underlay the additive binaural summation closely approximated S. S. Stevens's (1956) sone scale but were nonlinearly related to the scales that underlay the subtractive interval judgments, the latter approximating Garner's (1954) lambda scale. Interindividual differences in temporal summation were unrelated to differences in scaling performance or in binaural summation. Although the exponents of magnitude-estimation functions and the exponents underlying interval judgments varied considerably from subject to subject, exponents computed on the basis of underlying binaural summation varied less. The results suggest that interindividual variation in the exponent of magnitude-estimation functions largely reflects differences in the ways that subjects use numbers to describe loudnesses and that the sensory representations of loudness are fairly uniform, though probably not wholly uniform, among people with normal hearing. The magnitude of individual variation in at least one measure of auditory intensity processing, namely, temporal summation, seems at least as great as the magnitude of the variation in the underlying loudness scale.     

Individual loudness functions determined from direct comparisons of loudness intervals

Five subjects were required in each trial to directly compare two pairs of tones and indicate which pair of tones had the greater loudness difference. Ten 1,200-Hz tones differing only in intensity were employed. Subjects made binary comparisons among the 45 tone pairs that can be formed from these 10 tones. The loudness difference comparisons of each subject were found to satisfy two properties (transitivity and monotonicity) that are required for an interval scale representation of loudness. Therefore, individual loudness scales were constructed using a nonmetric scaling technique designed for comparisons of sensory intervals. These loudness scales differed significantly from subject to subject. Since a nonnumerical scaling procedure was employed, these individual differences could not be attributed to biases in the way in which observers use numbers or numerical concepts to describe the loudness of tones. Hence, they suggest strong individual differences in the coding of sound intensity.     

Cross-modal additive conjoint structures and psychophysical scale convergence

I investigated a variety of issues related to the measurement of the magnitude of psychological experience, especially the magnitude of sensations. Different groups of subjects made pair comparisons, magnitude estimations, and category judgments of the "total sensory magnitude" of light and sound stimuli presented conjointly. Another group judged the dissimilarity of pairs of conjoint stimuli. Various axioms, especially double cancellation, were tested on the resulting rank orders of conjoint stimuli. Judgements of the total magnitude of conjoint combinations of sound and light stimuli formed an additive conjoint structure. Dissimilarity judgments gave rise to a closely related lattice structure. Moreover, various scales of the individual attributes (loudness and brightness) calculated from the two types of judgments of the conjoint stimuli displayed substantial convergence, each scale for a given modality being linear with all other scales for that modality.     

Loudness and loudness discrimination

A model is developed which holds that pure-tone intensity discrimination and suprathreshold loudness judgments are based on the same sensory representation. In this model, loudness is a power function of sound intensity. When two tones are presented sequentially, each gives rise to a loudness value along the sensory continuum. In intensity-discrimination experiments, threshold is reached when the loudness difference between the tones exceeds a criterial value. For suprathreshold presentations of tone pairs, judgments of loudness differences are based on the loudness difference between the two tones. The model is shown to accord well with data from both classes of experiments.     

Bisection of loudness

In a loudness bisection task, subjects varied one sound to lie halfway between two given sounds in terms of loudness. The two given sounds were varied from 30 to 90 dB in a 4 by 9 factorial design. Functional measurement methods based on monotone analysis provided good support for the bisection model, and yielded a loudness scale with an exponent of about .3, except for a falloff at lower intensities. Two other tasks, judging average loudness and difference in loudness of the two given sounds, yielded mixed results. In Experiment 2, in particular, the differencing judgments were not additive, even under monotone transformation. These analyses also indicated that previous applications of monotone analysis have typically lacked adequate power to allow any conclusion about the operative model. Overall, the present bisection scale agrees with Garner’s lambda scale, and the present theoretical approach agrees with that of Garner in its emphasis on algebraic models as a foundation for psychological measurement.     

Response bias in category and magnitude estimation of difference and similarity for loudness and pitch

Interval scales of sensory magnitude were derived from magnitude and category estimates of loudness differences, loudness similarities, pitch differences, and pitch similarities. In each of the four loudness experiments, a loudness scale was constructed from a nonmetric analysis of the rank order of the judgments. The four loudness scales so constructed were found to be equivalent to one another and indicated that loudness was a power function of sound pressure with an exponent of .29. A similar analysis for the four pitch experiments found the pitch scales derived in each case to be equivalent to one another and linear with the mel scale of pitch. Thus the same sensory and similarities for two distinct perceptual continua. For both pitch and loudness, these sensory scales were used to generate scales of sensory differences. A comparison of the category and magnitude estimates of sensory differences with the scale of sensory differences derived from the nonmetric analyses indicated the presence of significant response biases in both category and magnitude estimation procedures.     

The perceptual basis of loudness ratio judgments

In Experiment 1, subjects were required to estimateloudness ratios for 45 pairs of tones. Ten 1,200-Hz tones, differing only in intensity, were used to generate the 45 distinct tone pairs. In Experiment 2, subjects were required to directly compare two pairs of tones (chosen from among the set of 45) and indicate which pair of tones had the greaterloudness ratio. In both Experiments 1 and 2, the subjects’ judgments were used to rank order the tone pairs with respect to their judged loudness ratios. Nonmetric analyses of these rank orders indicated that both magnitude estimates of loudness ratios and direct comparisons of loudness ratios were based on loudnessintervals ordifferences where loudness was a power function of sound pressure. These experiments, along with those on loudness difference judgments (Parker & Schneider, 1974; Schneider, Parker, & Stein, 1974), support Torgerson’s (1961) conjecture that there is but one comparative perceptual relationship for ioudnesses, and that differences in numerical estimates for loudness ratios as opposed to loudness intervals simply reflect different reporting strategies generated by the two sets of instructions.     

Top-down gain control in the auditory system: evidence from identification and discrimination experiments

The influence of intensity range in auditory identification and intensity discrimination experiments is well documented and is usually attributed to nonsensory factors. Recent studies, however, have suggested that the stimulus range effect might be sensory in origin. To test this notion, in one set of experiments, we had listeners identify the individual tones in a set. One baseline condition consisted of identifying four 1-kHz, low-intensity tones; the other consisted of identifying four 1-kHz, high-intensity tones. In the experimental conditions, these baseline tone sets were augmented by adding a fifth tone at either 1 or 5 kHz. Added 5-kHz tones had little effect on identification accuracy for the four baseline tones. When an added 1-kHz tone differed substantially in intensity from the four baseline tones, it adversely affected performance, with the addition of a high-intensity tone to a set of low-intensity tones having a more deleterious effect than the addition of a low-intensity tone to a set of high-intensity tones. These and further results, obtained in an exploration of this asymmetrical range effect in a third identification experiment and in two intensity-discrimination experiments, were consistent with the notion of a nonlinear amplifier under top-down control whose functions include protection against sensory overload from loud sounds. The identification data were well described by a signal-detection model using equal-variance Laplace distributions instead of the usual Gaussian distributions.     

Children's scales of length and loudness: A developmental application of cross-modal matching

The cross-modal matching techniques that have produced scales of sensory magnitude for a variety of perceptual continua in adults were used to construct similar scales in children. Subjects were adults and children 4, 6, 8, and 12 years old. Their task was, first, to match the loudness of a 1000-Hz tone to various visual lengths, and, second, to match the length of a white tape to various loudnesses of the tone. Almost all subjects were able to perform the matching tasks; the average precision of older subjects (12 and Adult) was somewhat greater, but in each of the younger age groups a majority of subjects performed with a precision that equaled that of older subjects. The exponent of the power function that relates length and loudness does not change with age. The scale factor does change, in a way that suggests either that a given sound intensity seems softer, or, more probable, that a given length seems longer, to younger children. The success of cross-modal matching with subjects as young as 4 years means that it is possible to investigate not only single perceptual scales but also intermodal organization in young children.     

Correspondences among pupillary dilation response,subjective salience of sounds,and loudness

A pupillary dilation response is known to be evoked by salient deviant or contrast auditory stimuli, but so far a direct link between it and subjective salience has been lacking. In two experiments, participants listened to various environmental sounds while their pupillary responses were recorded. In separate sessions, participants performed subjective pairwise-comparison tasks on the sounds with respect to their salience, loudness, vigorousness, preference, beauty, annoyance, and hardness. The pairwise-comparison data were converted to ratings on the Thurstone scale. The results showed a close link between subjective judgments of salience and loudness. The pupil dilated in response to the sound presentations, regardless of sound type. Most importantly, this pupillary dilation response to an auditory stimulus positively correlated with the subjective salience, as well as the loudness, of the sounds (Exp. 1). When the loudnesses of the sounds were identical, the pupil responses to each sound were similar and were not correlated with the subjective judgments of salience or loudness (Exp. 2). This finding was further confirmed by analyses based on individual stimulus pairs and participants. In Experiment 3, when salience and loudness were manipulated by systematically changing the sound pressure level and acoustic characteristics, the pupillary dilation response reflected the changes in both manipulated factors. A regression analysis showed a nearly perfect linear correlation between the pupillary dilation response and loudness. The overall results suggest that the pupillary dilation response reflects the subjective salience of sounds, which is defined, or is heavily influenced, by loudness.     

Does stimulus context affect loudness or only loudness judgments?

Marks (1988) reported that when equal-loudness matches were inferred from magnitude estimates of loudness for tones of two different frequencies, the matches were affected by changes in the stimulus intensity range at both frequencies. Marks interpreted these results as reflecting the operation of response biases in the subjects' estimates; that is, the effect of range was to alter subjects' judgments but not necessarily the perception of loudness itself. We investigated this effect by having subjects choose which of two tone pairs defined the larger loudness interval. By using tones of two frequencies, and varying their respective intensity ranges, we reproduced Marks' result in a procedure devoid of numerical responses. When the tones at one frequency are all soft, but the tones at the other frequency are not all soft, cross-frequency loudness matches are different from those obtained with other intensity range combinations. This suggests that stimulus range affects the perception of loudness in addition to whatever effects it may have on numerical judgments of loudness.     

Stimulus context and absolute magnitude estimation: a study of individual differences

The effect of stimulus context on absolute-magnitude-estimation (AME) judgments was examined by determining whether the loudness judgment of a tone is influenced by the intensities of other tones presented within the session. A group of 18 subjects was tested in separate sessions in which they judged stimuli within either a low (10-60 dB SL) or a high (40-90 dB SL) range of intensities. Examination of the results of individual subjects revealed that judgments of stimuli common to the two ranges were, in most subjects, unaffected or only slightly affected by the position of the range. The judgments of 2 subjects who failed to follow the instructions, however, showed very large context effects due to changing the stimulus range. The results of a second experiment, in which 22 subjects judged the loudness of tones within either a narrow (35-65 dB SL) or a wide (20-80 dB SL) range, revealed that, in all but 1 subject, the width of the range had no systematic effect on the loudness judgments of stimuli common to both ranges. This was also true 1 month later when 16 of the subjects returned to the laboratory to judge the loudness of tones within an even wider range of 10-90 dB SL. It was concluded that AME judgments are relatively insensitive to the potential biasing influences of stimulus context.     

Effects of expectations on loudness and loudness difference

To determine how expectations affect loudness and loudness difference, in two experiments we induced some subjects to expect loud sounds (condition L), some to expect soft sounds (condition S), and others to have no particular expectations (control). In Experiment 1, all subjects estimated the loudnesses of the same set of three moderately loud 1-kHz tones. Estimates were greatest for subjects in condition S and smallest for subjects in condition L. Control subjects’ estimates were intermediate but closer to those of condition S subjects. In Experiment 2, subjects estimated the difference in loudness for pairs of moderately loud 1-kHz tones. Again, estimates were smallest for condition L subjects; estimates were greatest for control subjects, and condition S subjects’ estimates were closer to control estimates than to condition L estimates. This pattern of results is explainable by a combination of (1) Parducci’s (1995) range-frequency theory and (2) a gain control mechanism in the auditory system under top-down governance (Schneider, Parker, & Murphy, 2011).     

Eliminating subjective biases in judging the loudness of a 1-kHz tone

It is possible to eliminate most of the known subjective biases that affect judgments of sensory magnitude using numbers. Experiments are described which do this, and which also investigate some of the biases. The least biased estimate for doubling the loudness of a 1-kHz tone is found to be about 11.5 dB. This value is still slightly affected by the logarithmic bias, although the bias could be eliminated. It is also affected by the stimulus equalizing bias, produced by the inequality between the finite range of loudnesses to which the ears are sensitive and the infinite range of numbers to which the loudnesses are matched. This last bias cannot be eliminated completely in direct magnitude estimation.     

An Adaptive Bias in the Perception of Looming Auditory Motion

Rising acoustic intensity can indicate movement of a sound source toward a listener. Perceptual overestimation of intensity change could provide a selective advantage by indicating that the source is closer than it actually is, providing a better opportunity for the listener to prepare for the source's arrival. In Experiment 1, listeners heard equivalent rising and falling level sounds and indicated whether one demonstrated a greater change in loudness than the other. In 2 subsequent experiments listeners heard equivalent approaching and receding sounds and indicated perceived starting and stopping points of the auditory motion. Results indicate that rising intensity changed in loudness more than equivalent falling intensity, and approaching sounds were perceived as starting and stopping closer than equidistant receding sounds. Both effects were greater for tones than for noise. Evidence is presented that suggests that an asymmetry in the neural coding of egocentric auditory motion is an adaptation that provides advanced warning of looming acoustic sources.     

The Spectrally Dependent Monotic Component in the Decreasing-Loudness Aftereffect: Implications for Dynamic Auditory Localization

Listeners exposed to a tone increasing in intensity report an aftereffect of decreasing loudness in a steady tone heard afterward. In the present study, the spectral dependence of the monotic decreasing-loudness aftereffect (adapting and testing 1 ear) was compared with (a) the spectral dependence of the interotic decreasing-loudness aftereffect (adapting 1 ear and testing the other ear) and (b) a non-adaptation control condition. The purpose was to test the hypothesis that the decreasing-loudness aftereffect may concern the sensory processing associated with dynamic localization. The hypothesis is based on two premises: (a) dynamic localization requires monaural sensory processing, and (b) sensory processing is reflected in spectral selectivity. Hence, the hypothesis would be supported if the monotic aftereffect were more spectrally dependent and stronger than the interotic aftereffect; A. H. Reinhardt-Rutland (1998) showed that the hypothesis is supported with regard to the related increasing-loudness aftereffect. Two listeners were exposed to a 1-kHz adapting stimulus. From responses of “growing softer” or “growing louder” to test stimuli changing in intensity, nulls were calculated; test carrier frequencies ranged from 0.5 kHz to 2 kHz. Confirming the hypothesis, the monotic aftereffect peaked at around the 1-kHz test carrier frequency. In contrast, the interotic aftereffect showed little evidence of spectrally dependent peaking. Except when test and adaptation carrier frequencies differed markedly, the interotic aftereffect was smaller than the monotic aftereffect.     

The spectrally dependent monotic component in the decreasing-loudness aftereffect: implications for dynamic auditory localization

Listeners exposed to a tone increasing in intensity report an aftereffect of decreasing loudness in a steady tone heard afterward. In the present study, the spectral dependence of the monotic decreasing-loudness aftereffect (adapting and testing 1 ear) was compared with (a) the spectral dependence of the interotic decreasing-loudness aftereffect (adapting 1 ear and testing the other ear) and (b) a non-adaptation control condition. The purpose was to test the hypothesis that the decreasing-loudness aftereffect may concern the sensory processing associated with dynamic localization. The hypothesis is based on two premises: (a) dynamic localization requires monaural sensory processing, and (b) sensory processing is reflected in spectral selectivity. Hence, the hypothesis would be supported if the monotic aftereffect were more spectrally dependent and stronger than the interotic aftereffect; A. H. Reinhardt-Rutland (1998) showed that the hypothesis is supported with regard to the related increasing-loudness aftereffect. Two listeners were exposed to a 1-kHz adapting stimulus. From responses of "growing softer" or "growing louder" to test stimuli changing in intensity, nulls were calculated; test carrier frequencies ranged from 0.5 kHz to 2 kHz. Confirming the hypothesis, the monotic aftereffect peaked at around the 1-kHz test carrier frequency. In contrast, the interotic aftereffect showed little evidence of spectrally dependent peaking. Except when test and adaptation carrier frequencies differed markedly, the interotic aftereffect was smaller than the monotic aftereffect.     

Judgments of average magnitude: Analyses in terms of the functional measurement and two-stage models

Subjects made magnitude estimates of the average loudness of pairs of 1,000-Hz tones varying in sound pressure. A test of fit of an averaging model employing an analysis of variance suggested that the judgments were internally consistent. However, estimates of the parameters of a two-stage model based on the assumption that power transformations were imposed in both input and output implied a nonlinear output function, inconsistent with the averaging model. Additional analyses employing a nonmetric scaling solution also suggested that output was nonlinear, indicating that this implication was not an artifact of the strong assumptions of the two-stage model. Large differences were found among the output functions of individual subjects, and it was suggested that these may have inflated the error term in the analysis of variance, reducing its power to detect violations of the additive model. Similar analyses were performed on data from judgments of average grayness collected by Weiss (1972).     

The duration and perceived intensity of sucrose taste

Thirty-two subjects judged the perceived intensity of each of four concentrations of sucrose over 2 min. Stimuli were either sipped and expectorated or flowed over the subject’s extended tongue. Ratio judgments on a line scale and category ratings were made. Sixteen of the subjects had had extensive training in judging the sensory attributes of food products, and another group of 16 subjects were untrained. The perceived intensity of sucrose rose to a peak within 5 or 10 sec, and then declined over 2 min. In both the sip and the flow conditions, the taste disappeared completely for 26 of 32 subjects. Stronger concentrations were perceived as having greater peak intensities and longer lasting taste. The differences between concentrations were enhanced when sipped rather than flowed over the tongue. Judgments of intensity and duration were largely unaffected by the training level of subjects and the use of different rating scales.     

Effects of stimulus context on magnitude estimations and category ratings of perceived loudness--the spacing of intensity intervals

Effects of stimulus context on magnitude estimations and on category ratings were examined for a range of stimulus intensities of a 1-kHz tone. The stimuli were distributed in equal-interval steps of energy so they formed a perceptual cluster of high-intensity tones with a perceptual outlier at the lowest intensity. According to the Invariance Principle, the shape of the response function should not be affected by the distribution of stimulus intensities. However, neither magnitude estimations nor category ratings yielded the linear functions predicted from the Invariance Principle when plotted on log-log axes. Instead, both procedures yielded concave-upward response functions for the group data as well as for the individual data sets of the six subjects. Moreover, unlike previous reports of a nonlinear relationship, we found a linear relationship between magnitude estimations and category ratings. Rather than implying an equivalence of the underlying sensory scales, however, our results may imply subjects used a similar attention strategy for both procedures. We consider some theoretical suggestions, including an attention-band concept, for modification of a multistage stimulus-response (S-R) transformation model.