The false fame illusion in people with memories about a previous life

The present study examined whether individuals with full-blown memories of highly implausible events are prone to commit source monitoring errors. Participants reporting previous-life memories and those without such memories completed a false fame task. This task provides an index of source monitoring errors (i.e., misclassifying familiar non-famous names as famous names). Participants with previous-life memories had a greater tendency to judge the names of previously presented non-famous people as famous than control participants. The two groups did not differ in terms of correct recognition of new non-famous names and famous names. Although dissociation, cognitive failures, sleep-related experiences, depressive symptoms, and signs of psychological distress were all significantly higher in participants with previous-life memories than in controls, these variables did not predict the false fame illusion.     

Famous faces as icons. The illusion of being an expert in the recognition of famous faces

It is a common belief that we are experts in the processing of famous faces. Although our ability to quickly and accurately recognise pictures of famous faces is quite impressive, we might not really process famous faces as faces per se, but as 'icons' or famous still pictures of famous faces. This assumption was tested in two parallel experiments employing a recognition task on famous, but personally unfamiliar, and on personally familiar faces. Both tests included (a) original, 'iconic' pictures, (b) slightly modified versions of familiar pictures, and (c) rather unfamiliar pictures of familiar persons. Participants (n = 70 + 70) indeed recognised original pictures of famous and personally familiar people very accurately, while performing poorly in recognising slightly modified, as well as unfamiliar versions of famous, but not personally familiar persons. These results indicate that the successful processing of famous faces may depend on icons imbued in society but not on the face as such.     

The solitaire illusion: An illusion of numerosity

A new illusion in which the apparent number of elements of two kinds is determined by their spatial arrangement is described. The illusion is such that one large cluster appears to contain more elements than several small clusters, clustering being determined by Gestalt principles. The illusion was found both in adults and in children of 8 years.     

Retinal and extraretinal information in movement perception: how to invert the Filehne illusion

During a pursuit eye movement made in darkness across a small stationary stimulus, the stimulus is perceived as moving in the opposite direction to the eyes. This so-called Filehne illusion is usually explained by assuming that during pursuit eye movements the extraretinal signal (which informs the visual system about eye velocity so that retinal image motion can be interpreted) falls short. A study is reported in which the concept of an extraretinal signal is replaced by the concept of a reference signal, which serves to inform the visual system about the velocity of the retinae in space. Reference signals are evoked in response to eye movements, but also in response to any stimulation that may yield a sensation of self-motion, because during self-motion the retinae also move in space. Optokinetic stimulation should therefore affect reference signal size. To test this prediction the Filehne illusion was investigated with stimuli of different optokinetic potentials. As predicted, with briefly presented stimuli (no optokinetic potential) the usual illusion always occurred. With longer stimulus presentation times the magnitude of the illusion was reduced when the spatial frequency of the stimulus was reduced (increased optokinetic potential). At very low spatial frequencies (strongest optokinetic potential) the illusion was inverted. The significance of the conclusion, that reference signal size increases with increasing optokinetic stimulus potential, is discussed. It appears to explain many visual illusions, such as the movement aftereffect and center-surround induced motion, and it may bridge the gap between direct Gibsonian and indirect inferential theories of motion perception.     

An interest in fame: Confirming the measurement and empirical conceptualization of fame interest

The following paper introduces and develops the conceptualization of Fame Interest. Study 1 (N=1,978), through the use of factor analysis techniques, introduces the Fame Interest Scale which comprises six dimensions of Fame Interest (intensity, vulnerability, celebrity life‐style, drive, perceived suitability, and altruistic) with evidence for the reliability and validity of the scale. Study 2 (N=376) examined the relationship between an interest in fame and measures of the five‐factor model of personality, narcissism, self‐esteem, curiosity, attachment style and perceived family, and peer and media influence. From this second study four findings emerge; (1) Fame Interest typified by a perceived suitability and intensity for a celebrity life‐style was associated with perceived family, peer and media influence, (2) Fame Interest that arises from a vulnerability is a reflection of neuroticism, low self‐esteem, and problematic attachments, (3) Fame Interest for altruistic reasons is associated with agreeableness, and (4) Fame Interest that reflects an overall drive is associated with conscientiousness.     

The peripheral drift illusion: a motion illusion in the visual periphery

Circularly repeating patches containing sawtooth luminance gradients produce a sensation of motion when viewed in the periphery. Illusory motion is perceived in a dark-to-light direction, but only when one's gaze is directed to different locations around the stimulus, a point outside the display is fixated and the observer blinks, or when the stimulus is sequentially displayed at different locations whilst the observer fixates one point. We propose that the illusion is produced by the interaction of three factors: (i) introducing transients as a result of eye movements or blinks; (ii) differing latencies in the processing of luminance; and (iii) spatiotemporal integration of the differing luminance signals in the periphery.     

The collapse illusion effect: A semantic-pragmatic illusion of truth and paradox

Abstract

Two Experiments demonstrate the existence of a “collapse illusion”, in which reasoners evaluate Truthteller-type propositions (“I am telling the truth”) as if they were simply true, whereas Liar-type propositions (“I am lying”) tend to be evaluated as neither true nor false. The second Experiment also demonstrates an individual differences pattern, in which shallow reasoners are more susceptible to the illusion. The collapse illusion is congruent with philosophical semantic truth theories such as Kripke's (1975 Kripke, S. 1975. Outline of a theory of truth. The Journal of Philosophy, 72: 690–716. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), and with hypothetical thinking theory's principle of satisficing, but can only be partially accounted for by the model theory principle of truth. Pragmatic effects related to sentence cohesion further reinforce hypothetical thinking theory interpretation of the data, although the illusion and cohesion data could also be accounted for within a modified mental model theory.     

The Poggendorff illusion: consider all the angles

In the Poggendorff display, which consists of parallel lines interrupting a transversal, one of the two transversal segments was replaced by a dot lying along the parallel. The angle between the remaining transversal segment and the parallels was varied in 15 degree increments, as was the orientation of the transversal with respect to the subject. Subjects set the dot to appear collinear with the transversal. Judgmental errors can be partitioned into additive components, one linearly related to the size of the obtuse angle between transversal and parallels and the other a sinusoidal function of transversal and parallels and the other a sinusoidal function of transversal orientation (collinearity settings err toward the horizontal or vertical, whichever is closer), plus a meridional effect, an interaction term that magnifies the errors of a given obtuse angle as the transversal approaches an oblique orientation.     

The box alignment illusion: An orientation illusion induced by pictorial depth

In four experiments, observers attempted to align two sets of oblique edges to parallel. The contexts for these alignments included lines in isolation (2-D control), lines embedded in orthogonal drawings of same-oriented and different-oriented boxes (3-D objects), and each of these viewed against backgrounds depicting strong linear perspective (3-D backgrounds). A consistent distortion was observed in the alignments of different-oriented boxes relative to control lines, indicating that the parallel lines in these stimuli appeared to diverge toward the top of the picture. Furthermore, thisbox alignment illusion decreased with interstimulus distance, whereas alignment distortions in control lines and same-oriented boxes increased with distance. Viewing the stimuli against 3-D backgrounds produced a dramatic reversal of the illusion, with control lines now appearing to converge more than the boxes. These results suggest that the illusion reflects basic processes involved in pictorial depth perception.     

The Fraser illusion: complex figures

The cause of the Fraser illusion, which occurs when a line made up of tilted segments itself appears tilted, is examined further. In this series of experiments, we used figures that resembled the original Fraser illusion; they were more complex than those reported on in our previous paper (Stuart & Day, 1988). The figures were used to explore two theories of the Fraser illusion further: that it is the result of interactions between orientation selective units, and that it is a consequence of the local, distributed processing of orientation. The presence of background elements like those used in the original illusion led to an increase in the strength of the illusion, but the shape of these elements had no differential effect on illusion strength. There was a differential effect of the background on the assimilative and contrast illusions, owing respectively to small and large tilts of the inducing elements. The illusion was markedly reduced at small visual angles when the background was absent, but it was only slightly affected when the background was present. All these findings are difficult to explain in terms of interactions between single units, either at the same or at different scales in the image. The effects of luminance contrast and isoluminance on the illusion were not consistent with either theory, but they indicated that researchers need to consider the role of figure-ground organization in this illusion.     

The basis of the Bourdon illusion

Day (1990) and Day, Mitchell, and Stecher (1990) recently reported new data on the Bourdon illusion, showing that the effect occurs in novel variations of the classic figure--for example, with orthogonal and parallel test edges--and also that it occurs in the haptic modality. Day (1990) criticized theories of the Bourdon effect proposed by Wenderoth, Criss, and van der Zwan (1990), Wenderoth and O'Connor (1987a, 1987b), and Wenderoth, O'Connor, and Johnson (1986), and proposed his own "perceptual compromise" hypothesis. It is argued that Day has inaccurately portrayed the Wenderoth et al. theory, and that his own hypothesis lacks predictive power because it lacks any reference to neural mechanisms. Day's theory is thus unable to account for extant data, including his own. It is demonstrated how Day's novel experiments provide insights into the mechanisms of the Bourdon effect, and also how the Wenderoth et al. theory can account for the new data of Day (1990) and Day et al. (1990).