Seeing and doing: ability to act moderates orientation effects in object perception

We investigated whether the impact of an object's orientation on a perceiver's actions (an orientation effect) is moderated by the perceiver's ability to act on the object in question. To do this, we manipulated the physical location of presented objects (Experiment 1) and the perceiver's action capacity (Experiment 2). Regardless of the physical distance of the object, manual responses were sensitive to the object's orientation (the orientation effect) when the object was within the participant's action range but not when the object was outside of the action range. These results support an embodied view of object perception and shed light on peripersonal space representation.     

Clinical intuition versus statistics: different modes of tacit knowledge in clinical epidemiology and evidence-based medicine

Despite its phenomenal success since its inception in the early nineteen-nineties, the evidence-based medicine movement has not succeeded in shaking off an epistemological critique derived from the experiential or tacit dimensions of clinical reasoning about particular individuals. This critique claims that the evidence-based medicine model does not take account of tacit knowing as developed by the philosopher Michael Polanyi. However, the epistemology of evidence-based medicine is premised on the elimination of the tacit dimension from clinical judgment. This is demonstrated through analyzing the dichotomy between clinical and statistical intuition in evidence-based medicine’s epistemology of clinical reasoning. I argue that clinical epidemiology presents a more nuanced epistemological model for the application of statistical epidemiology to the clinical context. Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing is compatible with the model of clinical reasoning associated with clinical epidemiology, but not evidence-based medicine.

Eye gaze versus arrows as spatial cues: two qualitatively different modes of attentional selection

This study aimed to evaluate the type of attentional selection (location- and/or object-based) triggered by two different types of central noninformative cues: eye gaze and arrows. Two rectangular objects were presented in the visual field, and subjects' attention was directed to the end of a rectangle via the observation of noninformative directional arrows or eye gaze. Similar experiments with peripheral cues have shown an object-based effect: faster target identification when the target is presented on the cued object as compared to the uncued object, even when the distance between target and cue was the same. The three reported experiments aimed to compare the location- and object-based attentional orienting observed with arrows and eye gaze, in order to dissociate the orienting mechanisms underlying the two types of orienting cues. Results showed similar cueing effects on the cued versus oppositely cued locations for the two cue types, replicating several studies with nonpredictive gaze and arrow cues. However, a pure object-based effect occurred only when an arrow cue was presented, whereas a pure location-based effect was only found for eye-gaze cues. It is suggested that attention is nonspecifically directed to nearby objects when a noninformative arrow is used as cue, whereas it is selectively directed to a specific cued location when noninformative eye gaze is used. This may be mediated by theory of mind mechanisms.     

Seeing the forest and not the trees: When impact uncertainty heightens causal complexity

This study attempts to isolate the effects of experiencing uncertainty on people's cognitive processes. I argue that people can believe that their actions affect the outcome (i.e. outcome control), but still face uncertainty regarding the extent to which actions will make a difference (i.e. impact uncertainty). To this end, I introduce a novel experimental paradigm which isolates the effects of impact uncertainty from outcome control. The findings revealed that after experiencing impact uncertainty, participants demonstrated greater causal complexity (i.e. more likely to make situational attributions and judge outcomes as having a “ripple effect”), but did not make fewer effort attributions for the outcomes. These findings demonstrate how the experience of impact uncertainty can affect cognitive processing, without compromising outcome control. Implications of these findings for developing more nuanced theories on control and uncertainty are discussed.     

Seeing what we know and understand: How knowledge shapes perception

Expertise in object recognition, as in bird watching or X-ray specialization, is based on extensive perceptual experience and in-depth semantic knowledge. Although it has been shown that rich perceptual experience shapes elementary perception and higher level discrimination and identification, little is known about the influence of in-depth semantic knowledge on object perception and identification. By means of recording event-related brain potentials (ERPs), we show that the amount of knowledge acquired about initially unfamiliar objects modulates visual ERP components already 120 msec after object presentation, and causes gradual variations of activity in similar brain systems within a later timeframe commonly associated with meaning access. When perceptual analysis is made more difficult by blurring object pictures, knowledge has an even stronger effect on perceptual analysis and facilitates recognition. These findings demonstrate that in-depth knowledge not only affects involuntary semantic memory access, but also shapes perception by penetrating early visual processes traditionally held to be immune to such influences.     

How causal knowledge affects classification: A generative theory of categorization

Several theories have been proposed regarding how causal relations among features of objects affect how those objects are classified. The assumptions of these theories were tested in 3 experiments that manipulated the causal knowledge associated with novel categories. There were 3 results. The 1st was a multiple cause effect in which a feature's importance increases with its number of causes. The 2nd was a coherence effect in which good category members are those whose features jointly corroborate the category's causal knowledge. These 2 effects can be accounted for by assuming that good category members are those likely to be generated by a category's causal laws. The 3rd result was a primary cause effect, in which primary causes are more important to category membership. This effect can also be explained by a generative account with an additional assumption: that categories often are perceived to have hidden generative causes.     

Seeing the small picture: Ad-self versus ad-culture congruency in international advertising

Participants in a cross-cultural study in the United States and Taiwan indicated no preference for ads depicting values (individualist or collectivist) consistent with those of their culture. Congruency between personal and ad-portrayed values, however, significantly affected responses. The higher the congruency between ad and self, the more participants related personally to the ad. In addition, affective response, ad liking, perceived ad believability, and brand attitudes were all positively associated with ad-self congruency, but not with ad-culture congruency. Implications for international advertising and cross-cultural research are discussed.     

Estimating causal strength: the role of structural knowledge and processing effort.

The strength of causal relations typically must be inferred on the basis of statistical relations between observable events. This article focuses on the problem that there are multiple ways of extracting statistical information from a set of events. In causal structures involving a potential cause, an effect and a third related event, the assumed causal role of this third event crucially determines whether it is appropriate to control for this event when making causal assessments between the potential cause and the effect. Three experiments show that prior assumptions about the causal roles of the learning events affect the way contingencies are assessed with otherwise identical learning input. However, prior assumptions about causal roles is only one factor influencing contingency estimation. The experiments also demonstrate that processing effort affects the way statistical information is processed. These findings provide further evidence for the interaction between bottom-up and top-down influences in the acquisition of causal knowledge. They show that, apart from covariation information or knowledge about mechanisms, abstract assumptions about causal structures also may affect the learning process.     

Predictive versus diagnostic causal learning: Evidence from an overshadowing paradigm

Causal directionality belongs to one of the most fundamental aspects of causality that cannot be reduced to mere covariation. This paper is part of a debate between proponents of associative theories, which claim that learners are insensitive to the causal status of cues and outcomes, and proponents of causal-model theory, which postulates an interaction of assumptions about causal directionality and learning. Some researchers endorsing the associationist view have argued that evidence for the interaction between cue competition and causal directionality may be restricted to two-phase blocking designs. Furthermore, from the viewpoint of causal-model theory, blocking designs carry the potential problem that the predicted asymmetries of cue competition are partly dependent on asymmetries of retrospective inferences. The present experiments use a one-phase overshadowing paradigm that does not allow for retrospective inferences and therefore represents a more unambiguous test of sensitivity to causal directionality. The results strengthen causal-model theory by clearly demonstrating the influence of causal directionality on learning. However, they also provide evidence for boundary conditions for this effect by highlighting the role of the semantics of the learning task.     

Defensiveness versus remediation: self-theories and modes of self-esteem maintenance

How people maintain and repair their self-esteem has been a topic of widespread interest. In this article, the authors ask, What determines whether people will use direct, remedial actions, or defensive actions? In three studies, they tested the hypothesis that a belief in fixed intelligence (entity theory) would produce defensiveness, whereas a belief in improvable intelligence (incremental theory) would foster remediation. In each study, participants assigned to the entity condition opted for defensive self-esteem repair (downward comparison in Studies 1 and 3; a tutorial on already mastered material in Study 2), but those in the incremental condition opted for self-improvement (upward comparison in Studies 1 and 3; a tutorial on unmastered material in Study 2). Experiment 3 also linked these strategies to self-esteem repair; remedial strategies were the most effective in recovering lost self-esteem for those in the incremental condition, whereas defensive strategies were most effective for those in the entity condition.     

Perception: a model comprising two modes of consciousness

A model of human perception is proposed in which conscious awareness is assumed to be the result of two separate mechanisms each involving consciousness, one outer, sensori-produced, and one inner, conceptual. By mediation of flexible memory representations the sensory data of the outer consciousness give rise to a matched "copy" in the inner consciousness which conceptually organizes the former and also serves as input to the memory store. The model is applied to some perceptual problems in vision such as ambiguous stimuli, subjective contours, space perception, a case of metacontrast, and subliminal perception.     

Bayes and blickets: effects of knowledge on causal induction in children and adults

People are adept at inferring novel causal relations, even from only a few observations. Prior knowledge about the probability of encountering causal relations of various types and the nature of the mechanisms relating causes and effects plays a crucial role in these inferences. We test a formal account of how this knowledge can be used and acquired, based on analyzing causal induction as Bayesian inference. Five studies explored the predictions of this account with adults and 4-year-olds, using tasks in which participants learned about the causal properties of a set of objects. The studies varied the two factors that our Bayesian approach predicted should be relevant to causal induction: the prior probability with which causal relations exist, and the assumption of a deterministic or a probabilistic relation between cause and effect. Adults' judgments (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) were in close correspondence with the quantitative predictions of the model, and children's judgments (Experiments 3 and 5) agreed qualitatively with this account.     

Seeing two faces together: preference formation in humans and rhesus macaques

Humans, great apes and old world monkeys show selective attention to faces depending on conspecificity, familiarity, and social status supporting the view that primates share similar face processing mechanisms. Although many studies have been done on face scanning strategy in monkeys and humans, the mechanisms influencing viewing preference have received little attention. To determine how face categories influence viewing preference in humans and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), we performed two eye-tracking experiments using a visual preference task whereby pairs of faces from different species were presented simultaneously. The results indicated that viewing time was significantly influenced by the pairing of the face categories. Humans showed a strong bias towards an own-race face in an Asian–Caucasian condition. Rhesus macaques directed more attention towards non-human primate faces when they were paired with human faces, regardless of the species. When rhesus faces were paired with faces from Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus) or chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), the novel species’ faces attracted more attention. These results indicate that monkeys’ viewing preferences, as assessed by a visual preference task, are modulated by several factors, species and dominance being the most influential.     

Having versus doing: The roles of moral identity internalization and symbolization for prosocial behaviors

Moral identity has been identified as a consistent predictor of prosocial behavior, but the specific relationship and predictive strength of its two dimensions, internalization (“having”) and symbolization (“doing”), are less clear. The current article explores this through two self-report studies. In study 1 (N = 228) a series of hierarchical regression analyses showed that, for three out of four domains of prosocial behavior, symbolization was the only significant predictor, and that its strength differed across outcomes. Building on these results, Study 2 (N = 299) proposed that the observed vs. anonymous nature of prosocial behavior could account for these differences. Unexpectedly, symbolization predicted both public and private behaviors, whereas internalization generally did not. Significant interactions between internalization and symbolization were also observed. These findings are discussed in relation to their theoretical implications and future moral identity research.     

Prime and probability: causal knowledge affects inferential and predictive effects on self-agency experiences

Experiences of having caused a certain outcome may arise from motor predictions based on action–outcome probabilities and causal inferences based on pre-activated outcome representations. However, when and how both indicators combine to affect such self-agency experiences is still unclear. Based on previous research on prediction and inference effects on self-agency, we propose that their (combined) contribution crucially depends on whether people have knowledge about the causal relation between actions and outcomes that is relevant to subsequent self-agency experiences. Therefore, we manipulated causal knowledge that was either relevant or irrelevant by varying the probability of co-occurrence (50% or 80%) of specific actions and outcomes. Afterwards, we measured self-agency experiences in an action–outcome task where outcomes were primed or not. Results showed that motor prediction only affected self-agency when relevant actions and outcomes were learned to be causally related. Interestingly, however, inference effects also occurred when no relevant causal knowledge was acquired.