简单暴露效应的理论模型

简单暴露效应（MereExposureEffect,MEE）的概念最初由Zajonc提出,指的是刺激的简单暴露能够成为提高个体态度的充分条件。文章在简要回顾简单暴露效应概念、影响因素以及表现类型的基础之上,重点介绍了解释简单暴露效应产生机制的理论模型,并探讨了理论构建中存在的一些问题     

Subjective,physiological, and behavioural responses towards evaluatively conditioned stimuli

Evaluative Conditioning (EC) is commonly defined as the change in liking of a stimulus (conditioned stimulus, CS) due to its pairings with an affective unconditioned stimulus (US). In Experiment 1, we investigated effects of repeated stimulus pairings on affective responses, i.e. valence and arousal ratings, pupil size, and duration estimation. After repeatedly pairing the CSs with affective USs, a consistent pattern of affective responses emerged: The CS_negative was rated as being more negative and more arousing, resulted in larger pupils, and was temporally overestimated compared to the CS_neutral. In Experiment 2, the influence of a mere instruction about the contingency between a CS and US on affective responses was examined. After mere instruction about upcoming pairings between the CS and US, subjective ratings also changed, but there was neither evidence for differential pupillary responses nor for differential temporal processing. The results indicate that EC via pairings or instructions can change the affective responses towards formerly neutral stimuli and introduce pupil size as a physiological measure in EC research. However, Experiment 2 suggests that there might be moderating factors based on the type of EC procedure involved.     

Identification,discrimination, and match-to-sample as instances of comparative judgment

Identification, discrimination, and match-to-sample paradigms are discussed in the context of a comparative judgment between an external stimulus and a memorial representation. An experiment comparing the paradigms at different levels of stimulus dimensionality is described. The absence of clear-cut interactions of the paradigms with dimensionality differences is offered as support for the contention that the three seemingly diverse procedures may be considered as part of a comparative judgment continuum,with performance differences reflecting increased memorial demands.     

Loading working memory enhances affective priming

Stronger affective priming (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) with suboptimal (i.e., reduced consciousness) than with optimal (i.e., full consciousness) prime presentation suggests that nonconscious processes form an important part of emotions. Merikle and Joordens (1997) have argued that both impoverished presentation and divided attention can produce suboptimal conditions and result in parallel effects. We manipulated attention by means of a concurrent working memory load while keeping presentation duration constant, as participants evaluated Japanese ideographs that were preceded by happy, neutral, or angry faces (affective priming) and male or female faces (nonaffective priming). In contrast to nonaffective priming, affective priming was larger with divided attention than with focused attention. It is concluded that manipulations of stimulus quality and of attention can both be used to probe the distinction between conscious and nonconscious processes and that the highest chances of obtaining the pattern of stronger priming with suboptimal presentation than with optimal presentation occur in the affective domain.     

Motivational effects in the mere-exposure paradigm

Three experiments investigated the effects of time-pressure and evaluation apprehension on the mere-exposure phenomenon (Zajonc, 1968). Subjects viewed slides of abstract paintings at different frequencies of exposure and subsequently indicated their liking for the stimuli. Evaluation apprehension during the assessment phase consistently undermined mere-exposure effects. Furthermore, when evaluation apprehension was high, time-pressure magnified those effects. These findings were discussed in terms of the notions that (1) prior exposure may increase the sense of processing fluency associated with a stimulus (Jacoby & Kelley, 1990), (2) fluency may be interpreted as plausibility of a judgmental cue evoked by the stimulus, (3) motivational factors like time-pressure and evaluation apprehension may moderate the impact of plausibility information on judgment, hence, may moderate ‘mere-exposure’ effects.     

Emotion,cognition, and decision making

We examine two explanations of the subliminal affective priming effect. The feelings-as-information model (Schwarz &; Clore, 1988) holds that judgements are based on perceptible feelings. Hence, affective influences depend on the source to which feelings are (mis)attributed. In contrast, the affective primary hypothesis (Zajonc, 1980) suggests that affective influences should resist attributional interventions. This is because the affective system responsible for preferences is separate from the cognitive system responsible for inferences; because early affective processes are automatic and therefore inaccessible to higher-order interventions; and because early affective responses are not represented as conscious feelings. We tested these explanations in two experiments that crossed subliminal affective priming with (mis)attribution manipulations. Both studies found reliable shifts in judgements of neutral stimuli as a result of primes even when subjects were aware that their feelings might not be diagnostic for the judgement at hand. Subjects did not report experiencing any feelings in response to the primes. The obtained affective priming effect was independent of response times and subjective reports of engaging in judgemental corrections. However, the priming effect did prove sensitive to the experimental instructions. We discuss the implications of these findings for the affective primacy hypothesis and the feelings-as-information model.     

The effect of comparative context on evaluative conditioning

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is a change in the evaluation of a stimulus after the stimulus co-occurred with affective stimuli. The present research examined whether EC of one stimulus depends also on the co-occurrence of another stimulus with positive or negative stimuli. We paired two target people with affective stimuli. We found that a person who appeared eight times with positive stimuli and eight times with negative stimuli was liked more when the other person appeared always (16 times) with negative stimuli than when the other person appeared always with positive stimuli. The manipulation did not change the US evaluation or the general standard on the value dimension of what a positive or negative stimulus is. We suggest that like other evaluative traits (e.g., evil, pretty) co-occurrence with affective stimuli is sensitive to temporary standards. The manipulation changed the standard of what co-occurrence with affective stimuli is considered positive versus negative.     

Moral cognition,affect, and psychopathy

Few theorists would challenge the idea that affect and emotion directly influence decision-making and moral judgment. There is good reason to think that they also significantly assist in decision-making and judgment, and in fact are necessary for fully effective moral cognition. However, they are not sufficient. Deliberation and more reflective thought processes likewise play a crucial role, and in fact are inseparable from affective processes. I will argue that while the dual-process account of moral judgment set forth by Craigie (2011) has great merit, it fails to appreciate fully the extent to which affective and reflective processes are not only integrated, but also mutually interdependent. Evidence from psychopathy indicates that when reflective processes are not assisted adequately by what I will call ‘affective framing’, and moral cognition is of the “cooler,” less emotionally-informed variety, what results is not effective cognitive functioning, but rather psychopathology. My proposed account of affective framing aims to make sense of the way in which affect plays a strictly necessary and integral role not just in intuitive moral responses, but also in reflective moral judgments, so that moral cognition is accomplished by the joint operation of affective processes and reflective reasoning processes.     

情绪词对新异刺激喜好度变化的调节机制

通过三个实验探讨了情绪词的情绪信息对新异刺激喜好度变化的调节机制。实验采用评价条件化(Evaluative Conditioning)范式, 将新异刺激(相当于条件刺激, CS)与情绪词(相当于无条件刺激, US)配对呈现, 最后测量被试对新异刺激的喜好程度。三个实验通过设置表面故事, 控制新异刺激与情绪词间的配对关系, 并改变任务的加工深度, 揭示了情绪词调节新异刺激喜好度变化的机制。研究结果表明, 情绪词对新异刺激喜好度的调节不依赖于对刺激间偶联关系的意识以及被试的任务状态, 是一种自下而上的自动化的联想学习过程。     

Test-retest reliability of subliminal facial affective priming

Since the seminal 1993 demonstrations o f Murphy an d Zajonc, researchers have replicated and extended findings concerning subliminal affective priming. So far, however, no data on test-retest reliability of affective priming effects are available. A subliminal facial affective priming task was administered to 22 healthy individuals (15 women and 7 men) twice about 7 wk. apart. Happy and sad facial expressions were used as affective primes and neutral Chinese ideographs served as target masks, which had to be evaluated. Neutral facial primes and a no-face condition served as baselines. All participants reported not having seen any of the prime faces at either testing session. Priming scores for affective faces compared to the baselines were computed. Acceptable test-retest correlations (rs) of up to .74 were found for the affective priming scores. Although measured almost 2 mo. apart, subliminal affective priming seems to be a temporally stable effect.     

Affective Arousal as Information: How Affective Arousal Influences Judgments,Learning, and Memory

The affect‐as‐information framework posits that affect is embodied information about value and importance. The valence dimension of affect provides evaluative information about stimulus objects, which plays a role in judgment and decision‐making. Affect can also provide evaluative information about one's own cognitions and response inclinations, information that guides thinking and reasoning. In particular, positive affect often promotes, and negative affect inhibits, accessible responses or dominant modes of thinking. Affect thus moderates many of the textbook phenomena in cognitive psychology. In the current review, we suggest additionally that the arousal dimension of affect amplifies reactions, leading to intensified evaluations, increased reliance on particular styles of learning, and enhanced long‐term memory for events. We conclude that whereas valenced affective cues serve as information about value, the arousal dimension provides information about urgency or importance.     

The effects of diffuse and distinct affect

In a series of suboptimal priming studies, it was shown that both affective and nonaffective reactions to a stimulus may occur without awareness. Moreover, it was demonstrated that affective information is detected earlier than nonaffective information. Therefore, early reactions to an affect-laden stimulus (e.g., a smiling man) are cognitively unappraised and thus diffuse (e.g., "positive"), whereas later affective reactions can be more specific and distinct (e.g., "a smiling man"). Through variations of prime exposure (extremely short, moderately short) the impact of early diffuse and late distinct affect on judgment was investigated. Findings show that distinctness (and prime-target similarity) is an essential determinant of whether the effect of affect is null, assimilation, or contrast. Furthermore, whether affect priming activates diffuse or distinct reactions is a matter of a fraction of seconds.     

Stronger suboptimal than optimal affective priming?

The finding of stronger affective priming in less conscious (suboptimal) conditions than in fully conscious (optimal) conditions (S. T. Murphy & R. B. Zajonc, 1993) is theoretically important because it contradicts notions that emotions are primarily reflected by conscious states. In 2 experiments, this pattern of results was obtained. Happy and angry faces were presented both optimally and suboptimally and were masked by unknown ideographs. In Experiment 1, instructions for the conscious and less conscious affective priming conditions were matched, and affective ratings of ideographs were determined. In Experiment 2, a more implicit affective measure (facial electromyography of musculus zygomaticus major and musculus corrugator supercilii) served as the dependent variable. Stronger suboptimal than optimal affective priming was found in both experiments. It is concluded that stronger suboptimal than optimal processing is characteristic for affective processing and that it can also be found when instructions are matched and when a more implicit measure is assessed.     

Hand mental rotation is not systematically altered by actual body position: Laterality judgment versus same–different comparison tasks

It is commonly believed that during mental rotation of body parts, participants tend to imagine their own body part moving toward the stimulus, thus using an egocentric strategy. Several studies have also shown that the mental rotation of hands is affected by the actual hand position, especially if the hand is kept in an awkward position. However, this hand posture effect, as well as the use of an egocentric strategy during mental rotation of body parts, is not systematic. Several experiments have demonstrated that manipulating the stimulus features or the paradigm could induce a shift to visual and allocentric strategies. Here, we studied the effects of hand posture and biomechanical constraints on one-hand mental rotation (laterality judgment task), two-hand mental rotation (same–different judgment task), and mental rotation of one or two alphanumeric symbols (control tasks). Effects of posture and biomechanical constraints were observed solely for the laterality judgment task. Response times in the same–different hand mental rotation items were influenced by the angular disparity between the stimuli. We interpreted our result as evidence of the use of different strategies for each task. Future research should focus on disentangling the exact subprocesses in which an egocentric strategy is used, in order to propose better tests for participants with motor impairments.     

Higher order sequential effects in psychophysical judgments

We found that the depth of sequential effects depends on the judgment task. An experiment with squares indicated that stimulus-response pairs up to two trials back were included in the judgment process when subjects were required to make category judgments of size, whereas only the immediately preceding event was incorporated when subjects were making magnitude estimations. In the case of category judgment, interactions between the current stimulus and prior stimuli as well as configural effects indicated that events one and two trials back meet an equivalent function in the judgment process and that these events may jointly operate in one trial. These findings can be explained by a class of models that assume that the position of preceding stimuli relative to the current stimulus is decisive in the judgment process. The multiple-standards model is a representative of this class according to which there are two types of standards: (1) the endpoints of the range as long-term standards and (2) traces of preceding stimuli as short-term standards.     

Higher order sequential effects in psychophysical judgments

We found that the depth of sequential effects depends on the judgment task. An experiment with squares indicated that stimulus-response pairs up to two trials back were included in the judgment process when subjects were required to make category judgments of size, whereas only the immediately preceding event was incorporated when subjects were making magnitude estimations. In the case of category judgment, interactions between the current stimulus and prior stimuli as well as configural effects indicated that events one and two trials back meet an equivalent function in the judgment process and that these events may jointly operate in one trial. These findings can be explained by a class of models that assume that the position of preceding stimuli relative to the current stimulus is decisive in the judgment process. The multiple-standards model is a representative of this class according to which there are two types of standards: (1) the endpoints of the range as long-term standards and (2) traces of preceding stimuli as short-term standards.     

Applicability increases the effect of misattribution on judgment

Feelings and cognitions influence judgment through attribution. For instance, the attribution of positive feelings and cognitions to a stimulus leads to a positive judgment of that stimulus. We examined whether misattribution is moderated by the applicability of a distractor to the judgment question. For instance, when are people more likely to attribute to a target person the affective and cognitive experiences triggered by a kitten – when trying to judge the person’s cuteness or trustworthiness? The kitten triggers experiences specifically relevant to cuteness, but people might more easily suspect the kitten’s potential influence when judging cuteness rather than trustworthiness. Using the Affect Misattribution Procedure, we found that applicability increases the effect of misattribution on valenced judgments. The results emphasise the importance of specific information (rather than only general valence) in attribution and suggest that high applicability of distractors to the judgment question does not elicit effective correction.     

Norms with feeling: towards a psychological account of moral judgment

There is a large tradition of work in moral psychology that explores the capacity for moral judgment by focusing on the basic capacity to distinguish moral violations (e.g. hitting another person) from conventional violations (e.g. playing with your food). However, only recently have there been attempts to characterize the cognitive mechanisms underlying moral judgment (e.g. Cognition 57 (1995) 1; Ethics 103 (1993) 337). Recent evidence indicates that affect plays a crucial role in mediating the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction. However, the prevailing account of the role of affect in moral judgment is problematic. This paper argues that the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction depends on both a body of information about which actions are prohibited (a Normative Theory) and an affective mechanism. This account leads to the prediction that other normative prohibitions that are connected to an affective mechanism might be treated as non-conventional. An experiment is presented that indicates that "disgust" violations (e.g. spitting at the table), are distinguished from conventional violations along the same dimensions as moral violations.     

Dynamic variations in affective priming

The present study investigates the dynamics of emotional processing and awareness using an affective facial priming paradigm in conjunction with a multimodal assessment of awareness. Key facial primes are visually masked, and are presented for brief (unconscious) and extended (conscious) durations. Using a preference measure, we examine whether the effects of the primes differ qualitatively (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). We show that: (a) unconscious affective priming with faces emerges strongly in initial presentations and diminishes rapidly with repetition; (b) conscious affective priming also emerges strongly in initial presentations, however it persists in strength with repetition; and (c) in contrast to other reports on the salience of negative stimuli, happy faces appear more salient than sad faces when presented outside awareness. We discuss the limits and extensions of unconscious affective priming with faces, and consider several methodological and conceptual questions concerning emotional processing out of awareness.     

The assessment of attitudes toward individuals with disabilities in the workplace

The authors conducted 2 studies to develop and test measures that assess beliefs about what constitutes a disability, affective reactions to working with individuals with disabilities, and beliefs about the reasonableness of workplace accommodations, in general and within the context of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The results of these 2 studies showed substantial differences in what was considered to be a disability. In general, more physical and sensory-motor conditions were considered disabilities than were psychological conditions. Furthermore, the conditions believed to be disabilities did not necessarily match what is covered by the ADA. Gender and experience with individuals who are disabled were also found to predict affective reactions and the reasonableness of accommodations. Implications for organizations are discussed.