Reid, Kant and the Philosophy of Mind

I suggest a possible rehabilitation of Reid's philosophy of mind by a constructive use of Kant's criticisms of the common sense tradition. Kant offers two criticisms, explicitly claiming that common sense philosophy is ill directed methodologically, and implicitly rejecting Reid's view that there is direct epistemological access by introspection to the ontology of mind. Putting the two views together reveals a tension between epistemology and ontology, but the problem which Kant finds in Reid also infects his own system, as his weaker ontological claims are undermined to such an extent by the necessary reintroduction of self-consciousness that the justification he seeks for reason fails to be reached epistemologically. Plausible solutions to these parallel tensions imply that both Reid and Kant have a pre-systematic concept of mind, and may lead to the conclusion that Reid's method is more economical in the elaboration of an ontology for the philosophy of mind.     

Common Sense and the Theory of Human Behaviour

I offer an analysis of Reid's notion of the will. Naturalism in the philosophy of action is defined as the attempt to eliminate the capacity of will and to reduce volition to some class of appetite or desire. Reid's arguments show, however, that volition plays a particular role in deliberation which cannot be reduced to some form of motivation present at the time of action. Deliberation is understood as an action over which the agent has control. Will is a higher-order mental capacity enabling us to control our own attitudes, decisions and actions. Reid investigates several distinct forms of this control. I conclude with some remarks about the relation between Reid's arguments about the function of the will and his moral rationalism.     

A Defence of Scottish Common Sense

I provide a reading of Reid as an 'encyclopaedist', in Alasdair MacIntyre's sense, that is, as a scientist who conceives of himself as part of a broader scientific community, and who aims to make a contribution through work in a particular field. Reid's field is pneumatology. On this conception, Reid's recourse to 'common sense' is of a piece with the postulation, by any scientist, of a natural endowment for members of the same ostensible kind. Reid should therefore be understood as rejecting the classical tradition of epistemology and any conception of epistemology as first philosophy. His view resembles, rather, the modern position of 'natural epistemology', though admittedly, on account of his doctrine of active power, he is not committed to 'naturalism' in the contemporary sense.     

Reid's Foundation for the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction

Reid offers an under-appreciated account of the primary/secondary quality distinction. He gives sound reasons for rejecting the views of Locke, Boyle, Galileo and others, and presents a better alternative, according to which the distinction is epistemic rather than metaphysical. Primary qualities, for Reid, are qualities whose intrinsic natures can be known through sensation. Secondary qualities, on the other hand, are unknown causes of sensations. Some may object that Reid's view is internally inconsistent, or unacceptably relativistic. However, a deeper understanding shows that it is consistent, and relative only to normal humans. To acquire this deeper understanding, one must also explore the nature of dispositions, Reid's rejection of the theory of ideas, his distinction between sensation and perception, and his distinction between natural and acquired perceptions.     

The Problem with Reid's Direct Realism

There is a problem about the compatibility of Reid's commitment to both a sign theory of sensations and also direct realism. I show that Reid is committed to three different senses of the claim that mind-independent bodies and their qualities are among the immediate objects of perception, and I then argue that Reid's sign theory conflicts with one of these. I conclude by advocating one proposal for reconciling Reid's claims, deferring a thorough development and defence of the proposal to another paper.     

Reconsidering Reid's Geometry of Visibles

In his Inquiry , Reid claims, against Berkeley, that there is a science of the perspectival shapes of objects ('visible figures'): they are geometrically equivalent to shapes projected onto the surfaces of spheres. This claim should be understood as asserting that for every theorem regarding visible figures there is a corresponding theorem regarding spherical projections; the proof of the theorem regarding spherical projections can be used to construct a proof of the theorem regarding visible figures, and vice versa. I reconstruct Reid's argument for this claim, and expose its mathematical underpinnings: it is successful, and depends on no empirical assumptions to which he was not entitled about the workings of the human eye. I also argue that, although Reid may or may not have been aware of it, the geometry of spherical projections is not the only geometry of visible figure.     

Reid on Fictional Objects and the Way of Ideas

I argue that Reid adopts a form of Meinongianism about fictional objects because of, not in spite of, his common sense philosophy. According to 'the way of ideas', thoughts take representational states as their immediate intentional objects. In contrast, Reid endorses a direct theory of conception and a heady thesis of first-person privileged access to the contents of our thoughts. He claims that thoughts about centaurs are thoughts of nonexistent objects, not thoughts about mental intermediaries, adverbial states or general concepts. In part this is because of the common sense semantics he adopts for fictional-object terms. I show that it is reasonable for Reid to endorse Meinongianism, given his epistemological priorities, for he took the way of ideas to imply that his view about first-person privileged access to our mental contents was false.     

Lenin's relationship to the ideas of physicists

History and the philosophy of science have played a very important role in dialectical materialism; their results have been destined to support the correctness of the ideas of Marxist philosophers, especially in their application in historical materialism.From this point of view, the circumstances of the origin of the works of the Marxist classics cannot be neglected: Engels wrote hisDialectics in Nature in the period of classical physics, and Lenin published hisMaterialism and Empirio-Criticism at the beginning of the 20th century when our modern physics first began: shortly before the publication of Lenin's book, Röntgen and Becquerel discovered new kinds of radiation, Balmer published his ideas concerning the regularity of the hydrogen spectrum, Plank wrote his first articles about the elementary quantum and Einstein published his three famous articles (1905).During this period, physicists themselves did not understand their results, so important for the further development of physics. In this atmosphere of uncertainty, Lenin — a lawyer and politician — undertook his attempt to criticise the ideas of physicists.We trace one misinterpretation by Lenin of these ideas from books by Mach and Helmholtz.     

A reciprocal control approach to the treatment of repeated parasuicide

Patterson and Reid's formulation of coercive versus reciprocal control offers a theoretical model for understanding both parasuicide and nontherapeutic exchanges between treatment staff and repeat suicide attempters. An interpersonal treatment program, derived from the Patterson and Reid formulation, which has been consistently associated with positive changes in the course of hospitalization for moderate-risk inpatients, is outlined, followed by a case illustration and discussion of the treatment strategy. The article stresses the importance of targeting the interpersonal environment as well as parasuicidal acts in the treatment program for repeat suicide attempters.     

Distributive lattices with an operator

It was shown in [3] (see also [5]) that there is a duality between the category of bounded distributive lattices endowed with a join-homomorphism and the category of Priestley spaces endowed with a Priestley relation. In this paper, bounded distributive lattices endowed with a join-homomorphism, are considered as algebras and we characterize the congruences of these algebras in terms of the mentioned duality and certain closed subsets of Priestley spaces. This enable us to characterize the simple and subdirectly irreducible algebras. In particular, Priestley relations enable us to characterize the congruence lattice of the Q-distributive lattices considered in [4]. Moreover, these results give us an effective method to characterize the simple and subdirectly irreducible monadic De Morgan algebras [7].The duality considered in [4], was obtained in terms of the range of the quantifiers, and such a duality was enough to obtain the simple and subdirectly irreducible algebras, but not to characterize the congruences.I would like to thank my research supervisor Dr. Roberto Cignoli for his helpful suggestions during the preparation of this paper and the referee for calling my attention to Goldblatt's paper [5].     

Sequential Analysis: Monitoring counselling sessions via skin resistance

Very little has been published on the application of the galvanic skin response (GSR) to counselling and psychotherapy, since research has concentrated on applications to lie detection and biofeedback. Dr Ian N. Marshall developed Sequential Analysis in 1968-69, as a system of psychotherapeutic procedures monitored by GSR, but most of his work remains unpublished. Certain meter techniques are described. It is suggested that the ‘paradoxial’ phenomena would be explained by correlating high/low resistance with withdrawal/involvement rather than with relaxation/arousal. The procedures of Sequential Analysis are described briefly. Finally it is suggested that giving oneself sessions is an effective method for training as a counsellor or psychotherapist, because of the experiential understanding of the processes so obtained.     

Freedom and the psychoanalytic ontology of quantum physics

Jung's paper ‘Synchronicity – an acausal connecting principle’, defining the phenomenon as a ‘meaningful’ coincidence depending on archetypal activation, was published in 1952, together with a conceptually related piece by physicist and Nobel Laureate Wolfgang Pauli entitled, ‘The influence of archetypal ideas on the scientific theories of Kepler’. Slavoj ?i?ek, in The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters, suggests that, in contrast to any notion of a ‘pre‐modern Jungian harmony’, the main lesson of quantum physics was that not only was the psychoanalytic, empty subject of the signifier constitutively out‐of‐joint with respect to the world, but that the Real in itself was already incomplete, out‐of‐joint, ‘not‐all’. Yet while ?i?ek frequently tries to separate Jung from his own ontology, this paper shows that his ontology is not as different as he suggests. Consistent with our earlier publications on Jung and Zizek, a closer investigation reveals an underlying congruence of both of their approaches. In this paper we show that this affinity lies in the rejection by both Jung and ?i?ek of the ideology of reductive materialism, a rejection that demonstrably draws on quantum physics in similar ways. While Jung posits an inherently meaningful universe, ?i?ek attempts to salvage the freedom of human subjectivity by opposing his Lacanian ‘dialectical materialism’ to reductive materialism.     

Wilhelm Reich in Soviet Russia: Psychoanalysis,Marxism, and the Stalinist reaction

Abstract

In 1929, Wilhelm Reich lectured on “Psychoanalysis as a natural science” before the Communist Academy in Moscow; he was the only Freudian-trained Central European psychoanalyst to do so. That same year, his article “Dialectical materialism and psychoanalysis” was published in the Academy's journal, Under the Banner of Marxism, in both Moscow and Berlin. By this time, Reich's involvement with political activism aligned with the Austrian Communist Party was increasing, while simultaneously psychoanalysis in the Soviet Union was in decline. Our paper places these events in their proper historical context and includes a discussion of the various attempts to determine the compatibility of psychoanalysis and Marxism. We offer analyses of both the article, “Dialectical materialism and psychoanalysis,” and the lecture, “Psychoanalysis as a natural science,” and the reactions to both by Reich's Russian critics. We show the ways in which responses to his lecture foreshadow what becomes the standard Soviet assessment of psychoanalysis. As an appendix to this paper, we provide the first English translation of the Russian account of his lecture, as published in the Herald of the Communist Academy.     

Evaluation of publication bias in response interruption and redirection: A meta-analysis

Publication bias is the disproportionate representation of studies with large effects and statistically significant findings in the published research literature. If publication bias occurs in single-case research design studies on applied behavior-analytic (ABA) interventions, it can result in inflated estimates of ABA intervention effects. We conducted an empirical evaluation of publication bias on an evidence-based ABA intervention for children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, response interruption and redirection (RIRD). We determined effect size estimates for published and unpublished studies using 3 metrics, percentage of nonoverlapping data (PND), Hedges' g, and log response ratios (LRR). Omnibus effect size estimates across all 3 metrics were positive, supporting that RIRD is an effective treatment for reducing problem behavior maintained by nonsocial consequences. We observed larger PND for published compared to unpublished studies, small and nonsignificant differences in LRR for published compared to unpublished studies, and significant differences in Hedges' g for published compared to unpublished studies, with published studies showing slightly larger effect. We found little, if any, difference in methodological quality between published and unpublished studies. While RIRD appears to be an effective intervention for challenging behavior maintained by nonsocial consequences, our results reflect some degree of publication bias present in the RIRD research literature.     

George Herbert Mead and the Allen controversy at the University of Wisconsin

This essay uses previously unpublished correspondence of George Herbert Mead to tell the story of his involvement in the aftermath of a political dispute that took place at the University of Wisconsin during the years 1914-1915. It seeks thereby to clarify the historical significance of an article he published on this controversy in late 1915. Taken together with relevant information about the educational activities of William H. Allen of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, Mead's correspondence and article throw helpful light upon his understanding of how an educational survey of a university should proceed; they also show how he went about the task of evaluating a failed attempt at such a survey.     

大学生物质主义与儒家传统价值观的冲突研究

以价值观冲突理论为依据,探讨中国社会转型时期物质主义与儒家传统价值观的并存给当代大学生带来的心理冲突。采用测谎仪记录被试回答价值观选择两难情境问题时的皮电值,结果发现：对于高儒家传统价值观的大学生而言,物质主义水平的上升会引起其皮电值的显著增加,而对于低儒家传统价值观的大学生则没有这种效应。表明同时拥有高水平的物质主义和儒家传统价值观的大学生会体验到大量的心理冲突。     

On the evolution of handedness: a speculative analysis of Darwin's views and a review of early studies of handedness in "the nearest allies of man"

Scientists today who seek clues into the evolutionary origins of human handedness make extensive use of evidence from comparative studies, that is, studies that ask whether handedness occurs in other species, especially apes and monkeys, as the Darwinian principle of continuity would seem to imply, or whether it is uniquely human. Early investigations had the same goal and drew on much the same kind of evidence. In this article, I review studies of animal handedness in the period before 1859, when Darwin published On the Origin of Species, and afterward, through the 1st decade of the 20th century. Inasmuch as Darwin's published writings contain hardly any statements about handedness and none at all about its evolution and continuity across species, I also speculate about what Darwin himself might have said on the subject. To do this, I draw on his statements on related matters, such as the form and structure of the hand and the transition from a quadrupedal to bipedal stance, on other writers' reports and opinions about handedness with which he was familiar or likely to have been familiar, and finally, on clues from his own and only statement about animal handedness in an unpublished letter. I conclude by asking whether and how early investigators, lacking any statement by Darwin on the evolution of handedness, invoked his theory of evolution and his views on related matters in the interpretation of their findings.     

Hilbert,logicism, and mathematical existence

David Hilbert’s early foundational views, especially those corresponding to the 1890s, are analysed here. I consider strong evidence for the fact that Hilbert was a logicist at that time, following upon Dedekind’s footsteps in his understanding of pure mathematics. This insight makes it possible to throw new light on the evolution of Hilbert’s foundational ideas, including his early contributions to the foundations of geometry and the real number system. The context of Dedekind-style logicism makes it possible to offer a new analysis of the emergence of Hilbert’s famous ideas on mathematical existence, now seen as a revision of basic principles of the “naive logic” of sets. At the same time, careful scrutiny of his published and unpublished work around the turn of the century uncovers deep differences between his ideas about consistency proofs before and after 1904. Along the way, we cover topics such as the role of sets and of the dichotomic conception of set theory in Hilbert’s early axiomatics, and offer detailed analyses of Hilbert’s paradox and of his completeness axiom (Vollständigkeitsaxiom).     

Priestley Duality for Quasi-Stone Algebras

In this paper we describe the Priestley space of a quasi-Stone algebra and use it to show that the class of finite quasi-Stone algebras has the amalgamation property. We also describe the Priestley space of the free quasi-Stone algebra over a finite set. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.