Affective forecasting and self-rated symptoms of depression, anxiety, and hypomania: evidence for a dysphoric forecasting bias

Emerging research has examined individual differences in affective forecasting; however, we are aware of no published study to date linking psychopathology symptoms to affective forecasting problems. Pitting cognitive theory against depressive realism theory, we examined whether dysphoria was associated with negatively biased affective forecasts or greater accuracy. Participants (n=325) supplied predicted and actual emotional reactions for three days surrounding an emotionally evocative relational event, Valentine's Day. Predictions were made a month prior to the holiday. Consistent with cognitive theory, we found evidence for a dysphoric forecasting bias-the tendency of individuals in dysphoric states to overpredict negative emotional reactions to future events. The dysphoric forecasting bias was robust across ratings of positive and negative affect, forecasts for pleasant and unpleasant scenarios, continuous and categorical operationalisations of dysphoria, and three time points of observation. Similar biases were not observed in analyses examining the independent effects of anxiety and hypomania. Findings provide empirical evidence for the long-assumed influence of depressive symptoms on future expectations. The present investigation has implications for affective forecasting studies examining information-processing constructs, decision making, and broader domains of psychopathology.     

Cognitive specificity and affective confounding in social anxiety and dysphoria in children

Cognitive features of social anxiety and dysphoria were examined with a design that allowed for evaluation of each state alone and in combination. From a community sample of 211 8 to 12 year olds, four groups of children were defined based on previous researcher's criteria: mixed (high socially anxious-dysphoric;n= 14), socially anxious (high socially anxiousnondysphoric;n= 14), dysphoric (non-socially anxious-dysphoric;n= 13), and control (non-socially anxious-nondysphoric;n= 14). The negative cognitive triad and negative cognitions pertaining to the self were associated with both dysphoria and social anxiety. Both dysphoric and socially anxious groups reported significantly more cognitive distortions than the control group, yet cognitive distortions of overgeneralizing and personalizing were specific to social anxiety and not dysphoria. Both dysphoric and socially anxious groups reported significantly more depressive cognitions than the control group, and evidence of cognitive content-specificity emerged only for anxiety, although there was some evidence for depressive content-specificity in the mother's ratings. The mixed group was the most dysfunctional on all of the cognitive measures. This study provided some evidence of cognitive-specificity as well as the confounding between the affective states of dysphoria and social anxiety. Methodological, theoretical, and treatment implications are highlighted.     

Self-affirmation and affective forecasting: Affirmation reduces the anticipated impact of negative events

When forecasting how they will feel in the future, people overestimate the impact that imagined negative events will have on their affective states, partly because they underestimate their own psychological resiliency. Because self-affirmation enhances resiliency, two studies examined whether self-affirmation prior to forecasting reduces the extremity of affective forecasts. Participants in self-affirmation conditions completed a values scale or wrote an essay asserting their most important value, whereas participants in the no-affirmation condition asserted a relatively unimportant value. Participants then predicted their affective reactions to a negative or positive imagined event. In both studies, self-affirmation reduced the unpleasant affect expected to result from a negative event, but had no impact on affective forecasts for a positive event. This pattern was mediated by participants’ cognitive appraisals of the imagined event, but not by differential focus on that event. Results are consistent with self-affirmation activating or enhancing psychological resiliency to counteract immune neglect during affective forecasting of a negative event.     

Emotional intelligence: a theoretical framework for individual differences in affective forecasting

Only recently have researchers begun to examine individual differences in affective forecasting. The present investigation was designed to make a theoretical contribution to this emerging literature by examining the role of emotional intelligence in affective forecasting. Emotional intelligence was hypothesized to be associated with affective forecasting accuracy, memory for emotional reactions, and subsequent improvement on an affective forecasting task involving emotionally evocative pictures. Results from two studies (N = 511) supported our hypotheses. Emotional intelligence was associated with accuracy in predicting, encoding, and consolidating emotional reactions. Furthermore, emotional intelligence was associated with greater improvement on a second affective forecasting task, with the relationship explained by basic memory processes. Implications for future research on basic and applied decision making are discussed.     

Systems of coping associated with dysphoria, anxiety and depressive illness: a multivariate profile perspective

As numerous coping strategies to deal with stressors can be used concurrently or sequentially, it may be productive to consider coping from a broad, systemic perspective. Using profile analysis and multivariate techniques, we demonstrated that coping profiles comprising multiple strategies distinguished between various mood states (dysphoria, anxiety, major depression, dysthymia and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)). Generally, affective disturbances were associated with increased levels of rumination, cognitive distraction and emotion-focused coping (emotional expression, other-blame, self-blame, emotional containment and passive resignation) coupled with diminished problem solving and social support seeking. These coping profiles, however, varied as a function of anxiety vs. dysphoria, and severity of dysphoric symptoms, although the profile of dysphoric individuals was similar to that of clinically diagnosed dysthymic and major depressive patients. While coping profiles were generally stable over time (6 months), improvement or deterioration of mood was accompanied by corresponding alterations of coping profiles. Importantly, coping profile was not simply a correlate of dysphoric mood, but was also found to be an antecedent condition that favored the evolution of more severe affective problems. It is suggested that a multidimensional approach may prove useful in understanding coping as a dynamic system, and may have implications for clinical intervention.     

Personality as a Prospective Vulnerability to Dysphoric Symptoms Among College Students: Proposed Mechanisms

Personality and psychopathology have long been associated; however, the mechanisms that account for this link are not well understood. Stress generation and cognitive vulnerability are examined as potential mechanisms to explain the association between negative emotionality and dysphoria. To evaluate these mechanisms, college students completed measures of personality, dysfunctional attitudes, negative cognitive style, dysphoric symptoms, and negative events. Two years later the same students reported on the occurrence of negative events and levels of dysphoric symptoms that they had experienced over the 2-year follow-up period. Consistent with hypotheses, negative emotionality predicted prospective increases in dysphoric symptoms and the generation of more stressors over time. Both dysfunctional attitudes and negative cognitive style interacted with these additional stressors to predict prospective elevations in dysphoria, and these cognitive vulnerability–stress components partially mediated the association between negative emotionality and future elevations of dysphoric symptoms.

Mispredicting distress following romantic breakup: Revealing the time course of the affective forecasting error

People evidence significant inaccuracies when predicting their response to many emotional life events. One unanswered question is whether such affective forecasting errors are due to participants’ poor estimation of their initial emotional reactions (an initial intensity bias), poor estimation of the rate at which these emotional reactions diminish over time (a decay bias), or both. The present research used intensive longitudinal procedures to explore this question in the wake of an upsetting life event: the dissolution of a romantic relationship. Results revealed that the affective forecasting error is entirely accounted for by an initial intensity bias, with no contribution by a decay bias. In addition, several moderators of the affective forecasting error emerged: participants who were more in love with their partners, who thought it was unlikely they would soon enter a new relationship, and who played less of a role in initiating the breakup made especially inaccurate forecasts.     

Realistic affective forecasting: The role of personality

Affective forecasting often drives decision-making. Although affective forecasting research has often focused on identifying sources of error at the event level, the present investigation draws upon the “realistic paradigm” in seeking to identify factors that similarly influence predicted and actual emotions, explaining their concordance across individuals. We hypothesised that the personality traits neuroticism and extraversion would account for variation in both predicted and actual emotional reactions to a wide array of stimuli and events (football games, an election, Valentine's Day, birthdays, happy/sad film clips, and an intrusive interview). As hypothesised, individuals who were more introverted and neurotic anticipated, correctly, that they would experience relatively more unpleasant emotional reactions, and those who were more extraverted and less neurotic anticipated, correctly, that they would experience relatively more pleasant emotional reactions. Personality explained 30% of the concordance between predicted and actual emotional reactions. Findings suggest three purported personality processes implicated in affective forecasting, highlight the importance of individual-differences research in this domain, and call for more research on realistic affective forecasts.     

Affective forecasting and the Big Five

Recent studies on affective forecasting clarify that the emotional reactions people anticipate often differ markedly from those they actually experience in response to affective stimuli and events. However, core personality differences in affective forecasting have received limited attention, despite their potential relevance to choice behavior. In the present study, 226 college undergraduates rated their anticipated and experienced reactions to the emotionally-evocative event of Valentine's Day and completed a measure of the Big Five personality traits - neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness - and their facet scales. Neuroticism and extraversion were associated with baseline mood, experienced emotional reactions, and anticipated emotional reactions. The present findings hold implications for the study of individual differences in affective forecasting, personality theory, and interventions research.     

Blind spots in the search for happiness: Implicit attitudes and nonverbal leakage predict affective forecasting errors

We investigated implicit knowledge and affective forecasting, reasoning that although conscious evaluations are available to people when predicting their future emotional responses, nonconscious evaluations are not. However, these automatically-activated evaluations should contribute to in-the-moment emotional experiences, and thus they should account for misforecasts (i.e., discrepancies between affective forecasts and actual experiences). We conducted two studies to explore affective misforecasts, using food items as stimuli. In Study 1, participants' implicit attitudes (but not their explicit attitudes) predicted misforecasts of food enjoyment, supporting the role of nonconscious evaluations in affective forecasting errors. In Study 2, we examined participants' facial expressions (another index of nonconscious evaluation) upon the presentation of food items, and we found that these nonverbal behaviors predicted affective misforecasts as well. In sum, although nonconscious evaluations are unavailable when anticipating the future, they may contribute to one's in-the-moment experiences and thus serve as blind spots in affective forecasting.     

Dysphoria and the prediction and experience of emotion

Depression and dysphoria have been characterised by dampened positive emotional experiences. However, it remains unclear whether dysphoria is also characterised by dampened expectancies about positive emotional experiences. In the present study, participants with (dysphoric group; n=36) and without (non-dysphoric group; n=36) dysphoria reported on their expected and actual emotional responses to winning and losing money in a computer task. Results showed the dysphoric group predicted and experienced less happiness and contentment after winning money than the non-dysphoric group. Results also showed the dysphoric group predicted and experienced as much negative emotion after losing money as the non-dysphoric group. Moreover, the dysphoric group predicted they would experience more happiness after winning money than they actually did, whereas the non-dysphoric group experienced as much happiness as they had predicted. Results suggest that disturbances in positive emotional responding are characteristic of people experiencing dysphoria.     

Cognitive reappraisal attenuates the association between depressive symptoms and emotional response to stress during adolescence

Depression is associated with increased emotional response to stress. This is especially the case during the developmental period of adolescence. Cognitive reappraisal is an effective emotion regulation strategy that has been shown to reduce the impact of emotional response on psychopathology. However, less is known about whether cognitive reappraisal impacts the relationship between depressive symptoms and emotional responses, and whether its effects are specific to emotional reactivity or emotional recovery. The current study examined whether cognitive reappraisal moderated the relationship between depressive symptoms and trait or state measures of emotional reactivity and recovery. A community sample of 127 adolescents (M-age?=?15.28; 49% female, 47% Caucasian), at an age of risk for depression, completed self-report measures of trait emotional responding and depressive symptoms. In addition, they completed an in vivo social stress task and were assessed on state emotional reactivity and recovery from the stressor. Findings suggested that cognitive reappraisal was associated with an attenuated impact of depressive symptoms on trait and state emotional recovery. These results provide evidence that cognitive reappraisal may be an effective strategy for improving some aspects of emotional responding in relation to depressive symptoms among adolescents.     

Age differences in affective forecasting and experienced emotion surrounding the 2008 US presidential election

In everyday life, people frequently make decisions based on tacit or explicit forecasts about the emotional consequences associated with the possible choices. We investigated age differences in such forecasts and their accuracy by surveying voters about their expected and, subsequently, their actual emotional responses to the 2008 US presidential election. A sample of 762 Democratic and Republican voters aged 20 to 80 years participated in a web-based study; 346 could be re-contacted two days after the election. Older adults forecasted lower increases in high-arousal emotions (e.g., excitement after winning; anger after losing) and larger increases in low-arousal emotions (e.g., sluggishness after losing) than younger adults. Age differences in actual responses to the election were consistent with forecasts, albeit less pervasive. Additionally, among supporters of the winning candidate, but not among supporters of the losing candidate, forecasting accuracy was enhanced with age, suggesting a positivity effect in affective forecasting. These results add to emerging findings about the role of valence and arousal in emotional ageing and demonstrate age differences in affective forecasting about a real-world event with an emotionally charged outcome.     

Self-guides, autobiographical memory, and anxiety and dysphoria: toward a cognitive model of vulnerability to emotional distress.

Several aspects of a cognitive model of vulnerability to emotional disorders based on self-discrepancy theory were tested. Anxious, dysphoric, anxious/dysphoric, and control subjects participated in 3 studies over a 4-month period: screening, assessment of self-guides and self-discrepancies, and an autobiographical memory task in which different types of retrieval cues (including self-guides) were presented and subjects reported childhood memories as they came to mind. Actual:ideal discrepancy was associated with persistent dysphoria, whereas actual:ought discrepancy was associated with persistent anxiety. Self-guide cues resulted in more efficient retrieval and greater unintended negative emotional content than comparable cue types. The groups were differentiated only by negative affect content in response to self-guide cues.     

Motivated prediction of future feelings: effects of negative mood and mood orientation on affective forecasts

This article examines the role of motivational factors in affective forecasting. The primary hypothesis was that people predict positive emotional reactions to future events when they are motivated to enhance their current feelings. Three experiments manipulated participants' moods (negative vs. neutral) and orientation toward their moods (reflective vs. ruminative) and then assessed the positivity of their affective predictions for future events. As hypothesized, when participants adopted a reflective orientation, and thus should have been motivated to engage in mood-regulation processes, they predicted more positive feelings in the negative than in the neutral mood condition. This pattern of mood-incongruent affective prediction was not exhibited when participants adopted a ruminative orientation. Additionally, within the negative mood condition, generating affective forecasts had a more positive emotional impact on reflectors than on ruminators. The findings suggest that affective predictions are sometimes driven by mood-regulatory motives.     

Effects of dysphoria and induced negative mood on the processes underlying hindsight bias

Hindsight bias is the tendency to overestimate one’s prior knowledge of facts or events once the actual facts or events are known. Several theoretical frameworks suggest that affective states might influence hindsight bias. Nondysphoric participants (n?=?123, BDI?≤?13) in negative or neutral mood, and dysphoric participants (n?=?19, BDI?>?13) generated and recalled answers to difficult knowledge questions. All groups showed hindsight bias, that is, their recalled estimates were closer to the correct answer when this answer was shown at recall. Multinomial modelling revealed, however, that under dysphoria and induced negative mood different processes contributed to hindsight bias. Dysphoria, but not induced negative mood, was associated with a stronger reconstruction bias, compared with neutral mood. A recollection bias appeared in neutral, but neither in induced negative nor dysphoric mood. These findings highlight differences between the cognitive consequences of dysphoria and induced negative mood.     

Affective Processing and Emotion Regulation in Dysphoria and Depression: Cognitive Biases and Deficits in Cognitive Control

In this article, we take a closer look at the cognitive processing of emotional material in dysphoria and depression and link cognitive biases and deficits to individual differences in emotion regulation, an important risk factor for depression. Specifically, we propose that cognitive biases are associated with individual differences in the initial appraisal and reappraisal of emotion‐eliciting events. In addition, deficits in cognitive control result in prolonged processing of negative, goal‐irrelevant aspects of information as well as in decreased accessibility of mood‐incongruent material. These deficits further affect people’s ability to regulate negative affect by setting the stage for ruminative responses and by interfering with the use of reappraisal after the onset of an emotional response. This article provides a brief summary of findings that support these propositions and outlines implications for future research on the relation among affective processing, cognitive control, and emotion regulation in dysphoria and depression.     

Anxiety sensitivity cognitive concerns drive the relation between anxiety sensitivity and symptoms of depression

Depression is typically treated as a homogeneous construct despite evidence for distinct cognitive, affective, and somatic symptom dimensions. Anxiety sensitivity (AS; the fear of consequences of anxiety symptoms) is a cognitive risk factor implicated in the development of depressive symptoms. However, it is unclear how lower order AS dimensions (i.e. physical, cognitive, and social concerns) relate to depressive symptom factors. Confirmatory factor analysis, followed by structural equation modeling, were conducted to examine the factor structure of depression and to then examine the relations between these factors and the lower order factors of AS. This study was conducted in a sample of 374 adults (M age = 35.5, 54.3% female) with elevated levels of psychopathology (89.2% meeting criteria for at least one DSM-5 diagnosis, 25.6% primary depressive disorder). In this study a two-factor model of depression, composed of Cognitive and Affective/Somatic factors, was superior to one- and three-factor solutions. AS cognitive concerns were related to both cognitive and affective/somatic symptoms of depression. Neither of the other AS dimensions was related to depression symptom dimensions. These findings provide a better understanding of the relations between AS and depression symptoms.     

Identity recognition and happy and sad facial expression recall: influence of depressive symptoms

Relatively few studies have examined memory bias for social stimuli in depression or dysphoria. The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of depressive symptoms on memory for facial information. A total of 234 participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory II and a task examining memory for facial identity and expression of happy and sad faces. For both facial identity and expression, the recollective experience was measured with the Remember/Know/Guess procedure (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). The results show no major association between depressive symptoms and memory for identities. However, dysphoric individuals consciously recalled (Remember responses) more sad facial expressions than non-dysphoric individuals. These findings suggest that sad facial expressions led to more elaborate encoding, and thereby better recollection, in dysphoric individuals.     

Depressive personality styles, dysphoria, and social comparisons in everyday life

"Sociotropic" people are supposedly vulnerable to dysphoria after negative interpersonal events, whereas "autonomous" people are supposedly vulnerable to achievement-related failures. The present study examined whether these personality styles are borne out in social comparison processes. For 3 weeks, 27 sociotropic and 35 autonomous undergraduates completed records of their social comparisons. Depressive personality style moderated comparison frequency and the affective consequences of comparisons, especially for dysphoric individuals: Dysphoric respondents were especially likely to make comparisons in domains that were congruent with their personalities, and comparisons in congruent domains were associated with greater mood change than comparisons in other domains, perhaps especially for dysphoric respondents. These results have implications for the literatures on social comparison and on depressive personality styles.