The role of cognitive appraisal in media-induced presence and emotions

In the present study, we applied Valins' (1966) bogus bodily feedback paradigm to investigate the roles of cognitive appraisal (tele)presence, and emotion in the context of media usage. Participants (N=30) viewed short sequences of a TV show, whereby false heart rate feedback was provided. In line with Valins' paradigm, the manipulation we used in this study included two levels: high vs. low false heart rate feedback. We assessed presence, enjoyment, and the real heart rate. Participants reported stronger experiences of presence and enjoyed the clips more when they wrongly believed that they had been aroused. Since bogus feedback increases the sensation of presence, the results indicate that presence-like emotions-can be influenced by cognitive appraisals. It is likely that the false heart rate feedback was attributed to the stimulus, which in turn enhanced the sensation of presence.     

The effects of false feedback on attributed arousal and rated attractiveness in female subjects1

In an expanded version of the Valins false feedback paradigm, female subjects viewed ten slides of seminude males accompanied by either an increase or no change in amplified heart beats. Heart rate increase slides were rated as both more attractive and more arousing than no-change slides. These two measures were highly correlated, and did not differ significantly in the degree to which they were influenced by feedback. Subjects also showed significantly greater changes in actual heart rate for the increasing feedback slides than for the no-change slides, although the feedback produced no corresponding differences in GSR. Despite the effects on both subjective report and cardiac activity, correlations between these two measures were generally nonsignificant. Subjects classified as high in autonomic perception showed no significant relationship between actual cardiac activity and slide ratings, nor were they more influenced in their ratings by the feedback than subjects low in autonomic perception. Implications for the false feedback paradigm and for current issues in the social psychology and psychophysiology of emotion are discussed.     

The role of perceived physiological activity in affective judgments

This study assessed the physiological and cognitive effects of Valins' (Valins, S. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 4, 400–408) false heart rate procedure. Twenty-two male subjects were exposed to two feedback conditions during which measures of actual heart rate and skin conductance were obtained. In each condition, eight slides of nude females were presented; some slides were associated with false heart rate increases, while for other slides the feedback remained stable. In one condition, subjects were told that the heart rate was that of another subject; in the other condition, subjects were told that the feedback was their own heart rate. In both conditions, subjects judged the attractiveness of the slides from their own point of view and from the point of view of the other subject. Slides associated with false heart rate increases were rated as more attractive than stable slides when subjects (1) heard their own heart rate and rated their own attraction; (2) heard the other subject's heart rate and rated their own attraction; and (3) heard the other subject's heart rate and rated the other subject's attraction. Skin conductance responses and actual cardiac decelerations were greater when subjects heard what was allegedly their own heart rate and when the slides were accompanied by apparent cardiac acceleration. However, these actual physiological responses did not play a causal role in relation to the affective judgments. Instead, the relationship between perceived physiological changes and feelings of attractiveness was mediated by cognitive processes associated with informational and directive influences of the feedback.     

The perseverance effect in the debriefing paradigm: Replication and extension

A classic study conducted by Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) revealed a perseverance effect wherein people who received positive performance feedback on an alleged social perceptiveness test reported more favorable self-perceptions in this domain than those who received negative feedback despite the fact that they had received standard outcome debriefing (i.e., been informed about the false, predetermined, and random nature of the feedback) prior to reporting self-assessments. The present studies extend this past research by revealing that (a) there is a form of outcome debriefing (i.e., informing participants about the bogus nature of the test as well as the bogus nature of the feedback) that effectively eliminates the perseverance effect, (b) the perseverance effect that occurs after standard outcome debriefing is limited to perceptions of specific task-relevant skills rather than more global abilities, and (c) affective reactions do not underlie the perseverance effect that occurs in the false feedback paradigm.     

False physiological feedback and emotion: Experimenter demand and salience effects

Four experiments examined the hypothesis that the Valins (1966) false physiological feedback effect with attractiveness ratings of slides is due to experimenter demand. Experiments 1 and 2 showed significant feedback effects with 5-sec feedback periods, previously reported by Barefoot and Straub (1971) to be too brief a time to search the slides for a cause of the apparent physiological arousal. Experiments 3 and 4 had 17 variations of instructions (emotional, nonemotional), stimuli (slides of people, scenic tourist slides), and type of feedback information (heart rate, eyeblink, or none). The typical false feedback effect was found under many conditions that did not seem to meet the presumptive attributional requirements for the effect. In Experiment 4, only subjects who said they were supposed to rate feedback slides higher showed the effect, regardless of instructions, stimuli, or type of feedback. The overall results are interpreted in terms of experimenter demand and stimulus salience effects.     

Cognitive-style differences in belief persistence after evidential discrediting

Cognitive-style differences in belief persistence were investigated in a debriefing paradigm by comparing the reactions of field-dependent and field-independent persons to the total evidential discrediting of their beliefs. Ss were exposed to apparent success or failure experiences via false performance feedback on a novel discrimination task. Following a debriefing procedure which revealed the bogus nature of the feedback. Ss estimated their actual performance and ability at the task. The results showed that belief persistence after evidential discrediting was greater for field dependents than for field independents. Explanations of the findings based on dissonance-reduction mechanism and disbelief in the discrediting were discussed, but the preferred interpretation of the results involved differences in cognitive re-structuring as a function of cognitive style.     

Opportunity for information search and the effect of false heart rate feedback

The role of information search in the attribution of physiological states was investigated by manipulating the subject’s opportunity for information search following the presentation of false information about his heart-rate reactions to photographs of female nudes. Consistent with the self-persuasion hypothesis proposed by Valins, the rated attractiveness of the slides was not affected by the false heart-rate feedback for those subjects who were prevented from visually searching the slides. Those subjects who had ample opportunity to view the slides rated those slides accompanied by false information of a heart-rate change as more attractive than those slides which were not paired with a change in heart rate.     

Opportunity for Information Search and the Effect of False Heart Rate Feedback

The role of information search in the attribution of physiological states was investigated by manipulating the subject's opportunity for information search following the presentation of false information about his heart-rate reactions to photographs of female nudes. Consistent with the self-persuasion hypothesis proposed by Valins, the rated attractiveness of the slides was not affected by the false heart-rate feedback for those subjects who were prevented from visually searching the slides. Those subjects who had ample opportunity to view the slides rated those slides accompanied by false information of a heart-rate change as more attractive than those slides which were not paired with a change in heart rate.     

Determinants of emotion attributions: A unifying view

Two cognitive approaches, introduced by Schachter and Singer (1962) and by Valins (1966), have dominated the experimental study of emotion attributions. However, subsequent results using these approaches have not appeared to be very consistent, and this view is not consistent with more physiologically oriented theory. Research significant in the development of theory from these approaches was examined. Inconsistent findings using the Schachter and Singer paradigm were attributed to the difficulty of producting completely ambiguous physiological cues. The existence of active search in determining the cause of arousal was established and found central to production of Valins's false feedback effect. Postulated mediation by self-persuasion was found to provide the best fit to the existing data. The generality of these studies was described in terms of a more comprehensive theory based on the finding that the relative ambiguity of situational and physiological cues seems to provide the fundamental control over the emotion attribution process. This synthesis eliminates the deficiencies in previous hypotheses by more completely encompassing potential cue combinations.     

Conformity effects in memory as a function of group size,dissenters and uncertainty

In two experimental studies we investigated how false memory reports provided by anonymous group members affect individuals' recognition. Participants were presented with a series of salient and non‐salient objects and recognition memory was subsequently assessed for presented and non‐presented stimuli. In this recognition test, participants were confronted with (in)correct responses from bogus group members. The findings indicate that the bogus answers influenced memory reports only in the absence of a clear recollection and if the stimulus was not judged to be particularly memorable. Moreover, we found no evidence that motivational influences affected participants' judgements. However, the influence of the bogus group decreased with the presence of dissenters who broke the unanimity of the group, and it increased with higher uncertainty. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Memory performance in older adults: Experimental evidence for the indirect effect of memory self-efficacy on processing efficiency through worry

This research examined the mediating role of worry in the relationship between memory self-efficacy (MSE) and processing efficiency during episodic memory performance in older adults. We conducted an experimental study in which we manipulated older adults’ MSE using a false feedback paradigm. The memory task was adapted to provide an indicator of performance effectiveness (recall score) and an indicator of processing efficiency (ratio of recall score to number of encoding trials needed). We measured participants’ worry and emotionality before task completion. The causal impact of MSE condition (high vs. low MSE) on processing efficiency was significantly mediated through worry, with lower MSE leading to increased worry, which predicted impaired processing efficiency. This study provides the first experimental evidence for the mediating effect of worry on the causal impact of MSE on processing efficiency in older adults when they perform challenging memory tasks. We discuss implications for the clinical diagnosis of cognitive impairment and for age-related disengagement from everyday cognitive activities.     

False external feedback modulates posterror slowing and the f-P300: implications for theories of posterror adjustment

People tend to slow down after mistakes. This posterror slowing (PES) has commonly been explained by a change to a more conservative response threshold to avoid future errors. Alternatively, the attention-orienting account posits that all infrequent, surprising events (including errors) elicit an orienting response followed by a time-consuming process of task reorientation, explaining PES without increased response caution. In the present study, we employed both behavioral and electrophysiological measures to compare the predictions of these accounts using a flanker paradigm in which accurate or false external response feedback was provided. Participants demonstrated typical posterror adjustments, responding more slowly and accurately in posterror than in postcorrect trials. This finding provides initial evidence suggesting that posterror adjustments are motivated by the avoidance of subsequent mistakes. Most importantly, PES and an event-related potential relating to the attentional processing of feedback, the feedback-related P300 (f-P300), were modulated by feedback type. More specifically, the f-P300 was larger after false than after accurate feedback, suggesting that participants oriented their attention toward (i.e., were surprised by) inaccurate feedback signals. Interestingly, false feedback differentially modulated reaction times: Participants were slower after correct responses when feedback falsely informed of an error rather than confirmed the correct response. In contrast, faster responses were made after errors when feedback falsely indicated correct rather than incorrect performance. When these patterns of results are regarded together, they are best explained by theories of cognitive control in which posterror adjustments in choice reaction time tasks are assumed to reflect control processes leading to more conservative performance after error signals.     

The social dynamics of boys with callous and unemotional traits: Uncooperative and proud of it

This study examined the social dynamics of boys with callous and unemotional (CU) traits when experiencing betrayal by peers and engaging in such betrayal themselves. Participants (n = 90 boys; ages 10–13 years) completed a novel prisoner’s dilemma game in which they could cooperate with, or betray, a computerized co-player. They also reported on their subjective experience of emotions during game-play and were provided with bogus feedback regarding the emotions of their co-players. Boys’ CU traits, conduct problems, and anxiety, were indexed independently via parent reports. Higher levels of CU traits were associated with lower rates of cooperation, independent of anxiety and conduct problem severity. Boys’ CU traits were also uniquely associated with greater pride following their betrayal of a co-player.     

The effect of mood on false memory for emotional DRM word lists

In the present study, we investigated the effect of participants’ mood on true and false memories of emotional word lists in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm. In Experiment 1, we constructed DRM word lists in which all the studied words and corresponding critical lures reflected a specified emotional valence. In Experiment 2, we used these lists to assess mood-congruent true and false memory. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three induced-mood conditions (positive, negative, or neutral) and were presented with word lists comprised of positive, negative, or neutral words. For both true and false memory, there was a mood-congruent effect in the negative mood condition; this effect was due to a decrease in true and false recognition of the positive and neutral words. These findings are consistent with both spreading-activation and fuzzy-trace theories of DRM performance and have practical implications for our understanding of the effect of mood on memory.     

Fake feedback on pain tolerance impacts proactive versus reactive control strategies

It is well-known that beliefs about one’s own ability to execute a task influence task performance. Here, we tested the hypothesis that beliefs about a specific self-control capacity, namely pain tolerance, modulate basic cognitive control processes. Participants received fake comparative social feedback that their ability to tolerate painful stimulations was either very poor or outstanding after which they performed an unrelated go/no-go task. Participants receiving low-tolerance feedback, relative to high-tolerance feedback, were less successful at inhibiting their responses and more influenced by previous trial conditions, as indicated by an increased slowdown following errors and more failed inhibitions following go-trials. These observations demonstrate a shift from a more proactive to a more reactive control mode. This study shows that providing feedback about one’s own capacity to control impulsive reactions to painful stimulations directly influences low-level cognitive control dynamics.     

False autonomic feedback: Effects of attention to feedback on ratings of pleasant and unpleasant target stimuli

This study investigates the potential interactions among some of the key variables in Valins's (1966) false autonomic feedback paradigm. Subjects were shown mildly pleasant or mildly unpleasant slides of animals while they either paid attention to or ignored a continuous-tone soundtrack that increased in pitch in conjunction with half of the pictures. This soundtrack was described either as feedback of skin conductance level or as a neutral auditory stimulus. Slides associated with increased pitch were generally rated as more affectively potent (in either the positive or negative direction, depending on their initial affective valence). For pleasant slides, this effect was contingent on attention to the soundtrack, such that subjectsignoring the sounds showed a stronger differential rating effect regardless of the meaning ascribed to the sound. For both pleasant and unpleasant slide conditions, the only subject groups showing significant rating effects were those ignoring neutrally described sound. It is argued that this pattern of results poses severe problems for a conventional attributional analysis of the Valins effect.This article is based on research funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) under its Postdoctoral Research Fellowship Scheme. Its contents are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Economic and Social Research Council.We are grateful to Andrew Gregory for producing the computer program used in generating the soundtrack, and to Tony Manstead for his useful advice about an earlier version of this article.     

Predicting and accepting personality test scores

Three studies are reported concerned with people's perception of their own personality, their acceptance of bogus ‘personality’ feedback, and the relationship between their ‘actual’ personality scores and their willingness to accept bogus feedback. In the first study subjects attempted to predict their own and a well-known other person's personality scores. They were fairly good at predicting some of their own scores (extraversion, neuroticism) but less so others, suggesting that people can recognize their own ‘correct’ personality feedback. In the second study subjects were given either positive (Barnum Statements) or negative (reverse Barnum Statements) ‘bogus’ feedback after a personality test. They tended to accept the positive feedback as more accurate than the negative feedback though this was not related to their actual scores. In the third study subjects were given four types of feedback statements after a personality test: general positive, general negative, specific positive and specific negative. As predicted, people tend to accept general rather than specific, and positive rather than negative feedback as true. Furthermore, acceptance was closely related to neuroticism and extraversion in a predicted direction. These results are discussed in terms of the uses and abuses of validation of personality feedback.     

Manipulating memory associations changes decision-making preferences in a preconditioning task

Memories of past experiences can guide our decisions. Thus, if memories are undermined or distorted, decision making should be affected. Nevertheless, little empirical research has been done to examine the role of memory in reinforcement decision-making. We hypothesized that if memories guide choices in a conditioning decision-making task, then manipulating these memories would result in a change of decision preferences to gain reward. We manipulated participants’ memories by providing false feedback that their memory associations were wrong before they made decisions that could lead them to win money. Participants’ memory ratings decreased significantly after receiving false feedback. More importantly, we found that false feedback led participants’ decision bias to disappear after their memory associations were undermined. Our results suggest that reinforcement decision-making can be altered by false feedback on memories. The results are discussed using memory mechanisms such as spreading activation theories.