Irrational Wanting and Subrational Liking: How Rudimentary Motivational and Affective Processes Shape Preferences and Choices

People's wanting and liking reactions reflect not only high-level beliefs, but also the operation of rudimentary biopsychological processes. Previous studies suggest that the following wanting and liking processes may be relevant to political behavior: irrational wanting (where wanting is triggered by activation of the brain dopamine system and becomes dissociated from liking); unconscious liking and wanting (where evaluative judgments and behavior are modified without awareness of the eliciting affective stimuli or of the underlying affective response); and fluency-based liking (where preferences are influenced by the ease of stimulus processing). This review suggests how conceptual and methodological tools from affective neuroscience and psychophysiology can refine our understanding of basic affective and motivational processes that shape political attitudes and choices.     

Painting with broad strokes: Happiness and the malleability of event memory

The present study investigated how knowledge-gaps, measured by feeling-of-knowing, and individual differences in epistemic curiosity contribute to the arousal of state curiosity and exploratory behaviour for 265 (210 women, 55 men) university students. Participants read 12 general knowledge questions, reported the answer was either known (“I Know”), on the tip-of-the-tongue (“TOT”), or unknown (“Don't Know”), and indicated how curious they were to see each answer, after which they could view any answers they wanted. Participants also responded to the Epistemic Curiosity (EC) and Curiosity as a Feeling-of-Deprivation (CFD) scales. “TOT” was associated with the smallest knowledge-gap, most curiosity and exploration, and feelings of uncertainty and tension as measured by the CFD scale. “Don't Know” corresponded with the largest knowledge-gap, less curiosity and exploration, and positive feelings of interest as measured by the EC scale. “I Know” states, which reflected the absence of a knowledge-gap, involved the least curiosity and exploration.     

The latent structure of trait curiosity: evidence for interest and deprivation curiosity dimensions

To evaluate Litman and Jimerson's (2004) Interest/Deprivation (I/D) model of curiosity, 355 students (269 women, 86 men) responded to 6 trait curiosity measures including the Curiosity/Interest in the World scale (C/IW; Peterson & Seligman, 2004), the Curiosity and Exploration Inventory (CEI; Kashdan, Rose, & Fincham, 2004), the Perceptual Curiosity scale (PC; Collins, Litman, & Spielberger, 2004), the Epistemic Curiosity scale (EC; Litman & Spielberger, 2003), and the Curiosity as a Feeling-of-Deprivation scales (CFD; Litman & Jimerson, 2004). Consistent with expectations, the results of confirmatory factor analyses demonstrated that the C/IW, CEI, PC, EC scales defined an Interest (I) curiosity factor, whereas the CFD scales formed a Deprivation (D) curiosity factor. However, as compared to the other interest-based curiosity measures, one of the EC subscales was found to be less differentiated from the CFD scales, presumably because these instruments assess overlapping aspects of Berlyne's (1954) concept of epistemic curiosity. The results of this study indicated that I and D curiosity are related but differentiated curiosity dimensions, providing evidence for the validity of the I/D model.     

Against the “system” module

Modularity is a fundamental doctrine in the cognitive sciences. It holds a preeminent position in cognitive psychology and generative linguistics, as well as a long history in neurophysiology, with roots going all the way back to the early nineteenth century. But a mature field of neuroscience is a comparatively recent phenomenon and has challenged orthodox conceptions of the modular mind. One way of accommodating modularity within the new framework suggested by these developments is to go for increasingly soft versions of modularity. One such version, which I call the “system” view, is so soft that it promises to meet practically any challenge neuroscience can throw at it. In this paper, I reconsider afresh what we ought to regard as the sine qua non of modularity and offer a few arguments against the view that an insipid “system” module could be the legitimate successor of the traditional notion.     

PERSONAL PARTICIPATION: Michael Polanyi, Eric Voegelin, and the Indispensability of Faith

In this paper I focus on the central role faith plays in the thought of Polanyi and Voegelin. I begin by indicating how both find the modern conception of scientific knowing seriously wanting. What Polanyi terms “objectivism” and Voegelin calls “scientism” is the modern tendency to reduce knowledge to only that which can be scientifically demonstrated. This errant view of knowledge does not occur in a vacuum, though, and both men draw a connection between this and the political pathologies of the twentieth century. I then show the complementary ways in which these two thinkers believe recovery is possible: an epistemological solution encompassed in Polanyi's personal knowledge and an ontological reorientation that is the core of Voegelin's insistence that we must recover an awareness of human participation in transcendent reality.     

A neural autopilot theory of habit: Evidence from consumer purchases and social media use

This article applies a two-process “neural autopilot” model to field data. The autopilot model hypothesizes that habitual choice occurs when the reward from a behavior has low numerical “doubt” (i.e., reward prediction errors are small). The model toggles between repeating a previous choice (habit) when doubt is low and making a goal-directed choice when doubt is high. The model has ingredients established in animal learning and cognitive neuroscience and is simple enough to make nonobvious predictions. In two empirical applications, we fit the model to field data on purchases of canned tuna and posting on the Chinese social media site Weibo. This style of modeling is called “structural” because there is a theoretical model of how different variables influence choices by agents (the “structure”), which tightly restricts how hidden variables lead to observed choices. There is empirical support for the model, more strongly for tuna purchases than for Weibo posting, relative to a baseline “reduced-form” model in which current choices are correlated with past choices without a mechanistic (structural) explanation. An interesting set of predictions can also be derived about how consumers react to different kinds of changes in prices and qualities of goods (this is called “counterfactual analysis”).     

Cognitive psychology in sport: Progress and prospects

ProblemThere has been a recent upsurge of research interest in cognitive sport psychology or the scientific study of mental processes (e.g., mental imagery) in athletes. Despite this interest, an important question has been neglected. Specifically, is research on cognitive processes in athletes influential outside sport psychology, in the “parent” field of cognitive psychology or in the newer discipline of cognitive neuroscience?ObjectivesThe purpose of this paper is to explore the theoretical significance of research on expertise, attention and mental imagery in athletes from the perspective of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience.MethodFollowing analysis of recent paradigm shifts in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience, a narrative review is provided of key studies on expertise, attention and mental imagery in athletes.Results and conclusionsThis paper shows that cognitive sport psychology has contributed significantly to theoretical understanding of certain mental processes studied in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. It also shows that neuroscientific research on motor imagery can benefit from increased collaboration with cognitive sport psychology. Overall, I conclude that the domain of sport offers cognitive researchers a rich and dynamic natural laboratory in which to study how the mind works.     

Levinasian Reflections on Somaticity and the Ethical Self

In this article, I attempt to bring some conceptual clarity to several key terms and foundational claims that make up Levinas's body‐based conception of ethics. Additionally, I explore ways that Levinas's arguments about the somatic basis of subjectivity and ethical relatedness receive support from recent empirical research. The paper proceeds in this way: First, I clarify Levinas's use of the terms “sensibility”, “subjectivity”, and “proximity” in Otherwise than Being: or Beyond Essence. Next, I argue for an interpretation of Levinas's thought that I suggest is buttressed by recent experimental work in both developmental psychology and neuroscience. I provide examples of research that I suggest opens up Levinas's phenomenological analysis in new and interesting ways. I also urge the importance of Levinas's phenomenological analysis in contextualizing the ethical significance of these empirical findings.     

Neuroscience and Whitehead II: Process-Based Ontology of Brain

While neuroscience has made enormous progress in understanding the brain, the implications of these empirical findings for ontological questions in philosophy including the mind–body problem remain yet unclear. In the first paper, I discussed the model of brain that as implied and supported by the empirical data. This leads me now to the question of an empirically plausible ontology of brain. Therefore, the aim in this second paper is the ontological characterization of the brain in terms of a process-based ontology that avoids what Whitehead described as “simple location” and “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. The discussion of the model of the brain is complemented by developing a process-based ontological characterization of the brain. Specifically, as based on Whitehead, I argue that “simple location” of the brain as thing or object in time and space amounts to nothing but an abstraction rendering what Whitehead described as “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. Instead of describing the brain as static, non-temporal and isolated thing or object, I characterize the brain ontologically by dynamic, temporal, and relational processes. This leads me to a process-based ontology of brain which may be specified in spatiotemporal terms. Since the world’s larger spatiotemporal range or scale contains, e.g., nests, the smaller one of the brain, I characterize their ontological relationship by “spatiotemporal nestedness” and “spatiotemporal directedness”. Such spatiotemporal relationship between world and brain precludes the confusion between the world as whole and the brain as part, e.g., “mereological confusion”. I conclude that process-based or better, more specifically, spatiotemporal ontology of the brain and its relationship to the world may offer novel views on the question for the ontological relationship between mind and brain, e.g., the mind–brain problem, by converting or reformulating it as “world-brain problem”.     

Meditative Dialogue: Cultivating the Transformative Theater of Psychotherapy

This article offers a selective review of literature on the use of improvisation and play to promote “the bursting forth from the unknown in the moment” (Kindler, 2010, p. 224) in what I term the “theater of psychotherapy.” It presents an innovative Meditative Dialogue process through which clients and their therapists are able to cultivate and access this “theater” as they co-create creative spaces in which transformative experiences are accessible. A brief vignette offers an illustration of how the Meditative Dialogue process helps to develop intimacy, presence, and focus through a collaborative positioning of curiosity, openness, and enlivenment in the therapeutic relationship.     

A Defense of Partisan-Science: An Assessment of Stenmark's Non-Partisan Science3

Abstract

In his influential book “How to Relate Science and Religion,” Mikael Stenmark argues for the legitimateness of what he calls “partisan science”: “science that is aligned with or supports a particular ideology, religion, or worldview over another.” However, he maintains that we should make an exception: the justification phase of science (phase 3) requires neutral science. Thus, he argues for “non-partisan science₃.” In this article, I assess his arguments for non-partisan science₃. I find them wanting and I will argue for partisan science₃ and maintain that we should adhere to “Augustinian” or “theistic science.”     

Uncanny Communication and the Porous Mind

In this paper I examine the phenomenon of “uncanny” unconscious communication and the plausibility of “telepathic” interconnectivity between patient and therapist. While reexamining long-standing psychoanalytic reluctance to engage with the topic of the “uncanny,” I present clinical examples of seeming anomalous transmission, followed by discussion from contrasting perspectives of psychoanalysis, neuroscience, quantum physics, and parapsychology. The patient’s and analyst’s reactions to these uncanny moments are explored, along with the potential clinical value of nurturing receptivity to this “frequency” of unconscious attunement.     

Barriers to Reporting Sexual Victimization: Prevalence and Correlates among Undergraduate Women

This study examined the frequency and correlates of barriers to reporting sexual victimization to law enforcement. Participants were 127 female undergraduate sexual assault victims who completed self-report surveys. The most frequently reported barriers were “I handled it myself” and “I didn't think it was serious enough.” Factor analysis of the reported barriers items revealed two factors: shame/not wanting others involved and did not acknowledge the event as a crime?/handled it myself. Shame/not wanting others involved was positively associated with physical injury, being victimized by a relative, and self-blame. Acknowledgment/handled it myself was negatively associated with being victimized by a relative. Findings suggest that intervention efforts should focus on increasing acknowledgment, decreasing negative reactions to disclosure, and decreasing victims' self-blame.     

Lessons for experimental philosophy from the rise and “fall” of neurophilosophy

Experimental philosophy is a recent development whose broader aims and goals are still being debated. Some prominent experimental philosophers have articulated an attitude toward perennial philosophy that is reminiscent of an early explicitly defended goal of neurophilosophy, a field that predated experimental philosophy by at least one decade. But relative to that early goal, neurophilosophy quickly “fell” within broader philosophy, and came to assume its current status, a technical specialty within the philosophy of science (now more commonly referred to as “the philosophy of neuroscience”). In this paper I document the revolutionary goal of early neurophilosophy, provide a novel explanation of its “fall,” and suggest that analogous goals of some experimental philosophers set that field up for a similar “fall.” I document recent published evidence that experimental philosophy is trending in this direction.     

Neuroscience and the possibility of locally determined choices: Reply to Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias

In a previous paper, I argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle undermine libertarian free will by providing support for a subset of what I called “statements of local determination.” I also argued that Libet-style experiments have not so far supported statements of that sort. In a commentary to the paper, Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias accept the claim about Libet-style experiments, but reject the claim about the possibilities of neuroscience. Here, I explain why I still disagree with their conclusion, despite being sympathetic to a lot of what they say in support of it.     

Measuring Epistemic Curiosity in Young Children

Epistemic curiosity (EC) is the desire to obtain new knowledge capable of either producing positive experiences of intellectual interest (I‐type) or of reducing undesirable conditions of informational deprivation (D‐type). Although researchers acknowledge that there are individual differences in young children's epistemic curiosity, there are no existing measures to assess the I‐ and D‐type constructs of EC in early childhood. The aim of this study was to develop and validate parent‐report scales that reliably assessed early expressions of I‐ and D‐ type EC in young children. To develop the I/D‐Young Children (I/D‐YC) scales, 16 potential items were administered to 316 parents of children aged 3 to 8. These items were adaptations of an existing adult self‐report measure of EC as well as newly developed items. Confirmatory factor analyses demonstrated that a 10‐item 2‐factor (5 I‐type, 5 D‐type) model had the best fit. Construct validity analyses and psychometric data indicated that our newly developed I/D‐YC scales are valid and reliable measures of individual differences in early expressions of I‐ and D‐type EC. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Minimal models and canonical neural computations: the distinctness of computational explanation in neuroscience

In a recent paper, Kaplan (Synthese 183:339–373, 2011) takes up the task of extending Craver’s (Explaining the brain, 2007) mechanistic account of explanation in neuroscience to the new territory of computational neuroscience. He presents the model to mechanism mapping (3M) criterion as a condition for a model’s explanatory adequacy. This mechanistic approach is intended to replace earlier accounts which posited a level of computational analysis conceived as distinct and autonomous from underlying mechanistic details. In this paper I discuss work in computational neuroscience that creates difficulties for the mechanist project. Carandini and Heeger (Nat Rev Neurosci 13:51–62, 2012) propose that many neural response properties can be understood in terms of canonical neural computations. These are “standard computational modules that apply the same fundamental operations in a variety of contexts.” Importantly, these computations can have numerous biophysical realisations, and so straightforward examination of the mechanisms underlying these computations carries little explanatory weight. Through a comparison between this modelling approach and minimal models in other branches of science, I argue that computational neuroscience frequently employs a distinct explanatory style, namely, efficient coding explanation. Such explanations cannot be assimilated into the mechanistic framework but do bear interesting similarities with evolutionary and optimality explanations elsewhere in biology.     

Collective emotions

Research on collective emotions has been limited until recently to theories of irrational crowds, scepticism about genuinely group‐level psychological phenomena and analyses of the unconscious or ritual sources of mass affective experience. However, collective emotion is now a thriving research area that combines studies from philosophy, anthropology, sociology, social psychology and neuroscience. This article examines neo‐Durkheimian theories of collective emotions and relevant contributions of discursive psychologists and other social scientists influenced by the “turn to affect.” I argue that future theoretical and empirical investigations should do the following: (1) critically examine theories focusing on diffuse emotional energy and discrete collective emotions by also exploring the generation and production of genuinely collective mixed emotions; (2) clarify problems with “bottom‐up” models of causal mechanisms through exploration of “affective practices”; and (3) explore the implications of Tuomela's ( 2013 ) “top‐down” social ontology of “group agents” as a framework for theories and studies of collective emotion.     

From Gibson and Crooks to Damasio: The role of psychology in the development of driver behaviour models

This article presents a brief history and perspective of behavioural model development in traffic psychology. As one specific example of a key behavioural model, Gibson and Crooks (1938), in their classic field theoretical study, offered the first scientific attempt to deal with the issue of compensation. Two central theoretical concepts were developed: “Field of safe travel” and “Minimum stopping zone”. The interplay between the two was used to describe and explain risk compensation and illustrated by observing the impact of brakes on driver behaviour: Better brakes could make the field of safe travel – i.e. the distance to the car in front – shorter. Nearly 50 years later, the launch of Wilde’s Risk Homeostasis Theory (RHT) gave rise to a profound debate about risk homeostasis and risk compensation. The core issue in the debate was Wilde’s strict assertion that all individuals, not only car-drivers, carry an inherent target level of risk that they are seeking to maintain or restore. Gibson and Crooks fell well within psychological theories of the time, while Wilde’s RHT emerged more from control theory and economic utility theory than from psychology. In the 1990s neuroscience emerges, especially by Damasio who introduces a paradigm that has proven fruitful as a framework of more recent driver behaviour models. But neuroscience also had its forerunner in Taylor’s proposal that driver behaviour is governed by a constancy in Galvanic Skin Response (GSR) which makes driving a self-paced task aiming at keeping the GSR at a constant level. Näätänen and Summala’s integrated Taylor in their “Zero-risk model” which has persisted and still prevails as a solid and well accepted model. Psychological learning theory has, however, rarely been adequately dealt with which is quite odd given the prevalence of speeding and risk compensation which cannot escape explanations based on operant conditioning. The paper discusses the emerging role of psychology and psychological concepts that has been proposed and evolved through the development of driver behaviour models since Gibson and Crooks’ study of 1938. The views presented are subjective, they do not represent any attempt to describe the objective reality of the time.