Persuasion: From Single to Multiple to Metacognitive Processes

ABSTRACT— This article provides a brief overview of major developments in the history of contemporary persuasion theory. The first intuitive and empirical approaches to persuasion were guided by main-effect questions (e.g., are experts more persuasive than nonexperts?). Furthermore, researchers focused on only one process by which variables (e.g., emotion, source credibility) would have an impact (e.g., emotion affected attitudes by classical conditioning). As data began to accumulate, so many new theories and effects were uncovered that the discipline faced collapse from the numerous inconsistencies evident. In response to the reigning confusion of the previous era, contemporary multiprocess theories were proposed (e.g., the elaboration likelihood model). According to these more integrative approaches, any one variable could affect attitudes by different processes in different situations and thereby sometimes produce opposite effects. Finally, we describe the role of a recently discovered new contributor to persuasion: self-validation. Unlike previous mechanisms that focus on primary cognition, this new process emphasizes secondary or meta-cognition.     

Internal representations reveal cultural diversity in expectations of facial expressions of emotion

Facial expressions have long been considered the "universal language of emotion." Yet consistent cultural differences in the recognition of facial expressions contradict such notions (e.g., R. E. Jack, C. Blais, C. Scheepers, P. G. Schyns, & R. Caldara, 2009). Rather, culture--as an intricate system of social concepts and beliefs--could generate different expectations (i.e., internal representations) of facial expression signals. To investigate, they used a powerful psychophysical technique (reverse correlation) to estimate the observer-specific internal representations of the 6 basic facial expressions of emotion (i.e., happy, surprise, fear, disgust, anger, and sad) in two culturally distinct groups (i.e., Western Caucasian [WC] and East Asian [EA]). Using complementary statistical image analyses, cultural specificity was directly revealed in these representations. Specifically, whereas WC internal representations predominantly featured the eyebrows and mouth, EA internal representations showed a preference for expressive information in the eye region. Closer inspection of the EA observer preference revealed a surprising feature: changes of gaze direction, shown primarily among the EA group. For the first time, it is revealed directly that culture can finely shape the internal representations of common facial expressions of emotion, challenging notions of a biologically hardwired "universal language of emotion."     

Risk taking under the influence: A fuzzy-trace theory of emotion in adolescence

Fuzzy-trace theory explains risky decision making in children, adolescents, and adults, incorporating social and cultural factors as well as differences in impulsivity. Here, we provide an overview of the theory, including support for counterintuitive predictions (e.g., when adolescents “rationally” weigh costs and benefits, risk taking increases, but it decreases when the core gist of a decision is processed). Then, we delineate how emotion shapes adolescent risk taking—from encoding of representations of options, to retrieval of values/principles, to application of those values/principles to representations of options. Our review indicates that: (i) gist representations often incorporate emotion including valence, arousal, feeling states, and discrete emotions; and (ii) emotion determines whether gist or verbatim representations are processed. We recommend interventions to reduce unhealthy risk taking that inculcate stable gist representations, enabling adolescents to identify quickly and automatically danger even when experiencing emotion, which differs sharply from traditional approaches emphasizing deliberation and precise analysis.     

Recalcitrant Fears of Death

According to what I will refer to as judgmentalist approaches to the fear of death (JFD), the fear of death conforms to the structure implied by judgmentalist theories of emotion. JFD holds that fears of death are constituted in part by evaluative judgments or beliefs about one’s own death. Although many philosophers endorse JFD (explicitly or implicitly), there is good reason to believe that it may be problematic. For, there is a troubling (and, for the purposes of this discussion, rather interesting) objection to judgmentalist theories of emotion; if judgmentalism is false, then so too is JFD. In brief, the worry with judgmentalist theories is this: it is sometimes the case that one has an emotion, but holds a belief (or beliefs) that is in tension with the emotion. For example, I sometimes fear flying despite the fact that I believe flying is not dangerous. Emotions of this sort are often referred to as recalcitrant emotions, and they are widely thought to pose a serious challenge to judgmentalist theories. In this paper, I consider an objection to JFD based on the existence of recalcitrant bouts of the fear of death. I include in this discussion an Epicurean-inspired solution to the problem of emotional recalcitrance. Although I argue this solution may be ultimately unsuccessful, I believe it is still worth considering. For, in most discussions of the problem of emotional recalcitrance, philosophers abandon judgmentalism in favour of some other theory of emotion. The Epicurean-inspired solution I discuss in this paper, however, may allow one to retain one’s commitment to judgmentalism.     

Representations and Cognitive Explanations: Assessing the Dynamicist's Challenge in Cognitive Science

Advocates of dynamical systems theory (DST) sometimes employ revolutionary rhetoric. In an attempt to clarify how DST models differ from others in cognitive science, I focus on two issues raised by DST: the role for representations in mental models and the conception of explanation invoked. Two features of representations are their role in standing-in for features external to the system and their format. DST advocates sometimes claim to have repudiated the need for stand-ins in DST models, but I argue that they are mistaken. Nonetheless, DST does offer new ideas as to the format of representations employed in cognitive systems. With respect to explanation, I argue that some DST models are better seen as conforming to the covering-law conception of explanation than to the mechanistic conception of explanation implicit in most cognitive science research. But even here, I argue, DST models are a valuable complement to more mechanistic cognitive explanations.     

Integration of Two Skeptical Emotion Theories: Dimensional Appraisal Theory and Russell's Psychological Construction Theory

This inquiry attempts to integrate two skeptical emotion theories: dimensional appraisal theory and Russell's (2003) psychological construction theory. To bring out the skeptical elements of these theories, I compare them first with two classic theories: affect program theory and discrete appraisal theory. The skeptical theories are similar to each other in that they replace the concept of emotion with the concept of emotional episode, and that they organize the variety within the set of emotional episodes according to dimensions instead of vernacular emotion subsets. Their differences concern the strength of the relations among the components in emotional episodes and the scientific status of the set of emotional episodes. To make an informed decision about the elements to keep and to revise from both theories, I engage in a separate analysis of the behavior-related components and the experience component, guided by insights from general behavior theories and general theories of consciousness. The analysis of the behavior-related components suggests the relatively uncharted idea that the so-called emotional aspect of behavior can be caused by a goal-directed mechanism. The analysis of the experience component reveals that different theories have emphasized different aspects of experience and hence different paths toward experience. The inquiry ends with an integrated theory that rejects the scientific status of emotions or emotional episodes, but accepts the scientific status of the components and sees strong causal relations among them.     

Learning new problem-solving strategies leads to changes in problem representation

Children sometimes solve problems incorrectly because they fail to represent key features of the problems. One potential source of improvements in children's problem representations is learning new problem-solving strategies. Ninety-one 3rd- and 4th-grade students solved mathematical equivalence problems (e.g., 3 + 4 + 6 = 3 + __) and completed a representation assessment in which they briefly viewed similar problems and either reconstructed each problem or identified it in a set of alternatives. Experimental groups then received a lesson about one or both of two solution strategies, the equalize strategy and the add–subtract strategy. A control group received no instruction. All children completed posttest assessments of representation and problem solving. Children taught the equalize strategy improved their problem representations more than those not taught it. This pattern did not hold for the add–subtract strategy. These results indicate that learning new strategies is one source of changes in problem representation. However, some strategies are more effective than others at promoting accurate problem representation.     

The Role of Trait Emotional Intelligence in Academic Performance: Theoretical Overview and Empirical Update

Considerable debate still exists among scholars over the role of trait emotional intelligence (TEI) in academic performance. The dominant theoretical position is that TEI should be orthogonal or only weakly related to achievement; yet, there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that TEI plays a key role in performance. The purpose of the current article is to provide (a) an overview of the possible theoretical mechanisms linking TEI with achievement and (b) an update on empirical research examining this relationship. To elucidate these theoretical mechanisms, the overview draws on multiple theories of emotion and regulation, including TEI theory, social-functional accounts of emotion, and expectancy-value and psychobiological model of emotion and regulation. Although these theoretical accounts variously emphasize different variables as focal constructs, when taken together, they provide a comprehensive picture of the possible mechanisms linking TEI with achievement. In this regard, the article redresses the problem of vaguely specified theoretical links currently hampering progress in the field. The article closes with a consideration of directions for future research.     

The Ontology of Causal Process Theories

There is a widespread belief that the so-called process theories of causation developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe have given us an original account of what causation really is. In this paper, I show that this is a misconception. The notion of ??causal process?? does not offer us a new ontological account of causation. I make this argument by explicating the implicit ontological commitments in Salmon and Dowe??s theories. From this, it is clear that Salmon??s Mark Transmission Theory collapses to a counterfactual theory of causation, while the Conserved Quantity Theory collapses to David Fair??s phsyicalist reduction of causation.     

Beyond prototypes and classical definitions: Evidence for a theory-based representation of emotion concepts

The question of how people represent emotions is eminently important for a number of different domains of psychological research. The present study tested the assumption that emotion concepts are represented similar to theories in that they are comprised of a set of causally interrelated features. Using emotional scenarios and investigating the emotion concepts of anger, anxiety, and sadness it was found that people's representations of emotion concepts essentially involved the representation of the causal relation of emotion features and that the causal status of a feature determined the feature's centrality in the concept. Moreover, people's representations of emotion concepts corresponded to basic assumptions of cognitive emotion theories, namely that cognitive appraisals cause other surface features of emotion, like expression and behaviour. By providing evidence for a theory-based representation, the present results show that the classical and the prototype approach are insufficient to model the representation of emotion concepts.     

Interacting Minds: A Framework for Combining Process- and Accuracy-Oriented Social Cognitive Research

A number of problems posed by cognitive-mediational theories of emotion offer major challenges for theory and research. I address five problems that seem particularly important and vexing, and I offer some possible solutions. My purpose is to stimulate additional thought and interdisciplinary discussion. The problems include unconscious appraising; confusions about the bares of emotional variations across cultures; irrationality in our emotional life; research demands imposed by the transactional nature of emotion; and the potential for tautology when we treat appraisal as a cause of emotions. Although these problems are widely recognized, they have not been thoroughly dealt with, and they call for renewed efforts to seek solutions in the design of our research.     

A Note from the Editor

In this article I detail the conceptual trajectory of a classroom of 2nd- and 3rd-grade students as they reinvent topographical lines to represent height in a map within the constraints of an overhead perspective. In my analysis I pay special attention to the role of social interaction—and in particular the role of the teacher—in the process of knowledge production. First, I demonstrate how the invention of representational forms by individuals occur as part of a larger social process of creating cultural conventions and negotiating a taken-as-shared understanding of these new tools. Second, I show how gesture, as a part of the larger semiotic ecology for meaning making around representations, contributes to creation of understanding. Third, I make some preliminary proposals regarding the process of transforming personal inventions into cultural conventions. The analyses are intended to contribute to our field's growing understanding of young children's activity when inventing representations (i.e., metarepresentational competence), the mechanisms for learning within instructional activities based on the iterative refinement of these representations (i.e., progressive symbolization), and a rejection of the dichotomy between an individual's cognition and her participation within a cultural community.     

Dealing with diversity in workgroups: Preventing problems and promoting potential

Diversity is a popular topic among academics and practitioners alike. It is also a topic that is surrounded with controversies and passionate opinions. This makes understanding the ambiguous consequences of diversity a highly interesting and puzzling endeavor. To facilitate understanding of diversity's effects in workgroups, I present an overview of the state‐of‐the‐art in diversity research and discuss the potential problems and benefits that are associated with group diversity. Moreover, I discuss how research on diversity interventions uses this problems versus potential approach to distinguish moderators of diversity's effects. Based on this overview, I argue that similar to the importance of contingencies for predicting diversity's effects, contingencies also play a crucial role in predicting the effectiveness of diversity interventions. As such, the current overview stresses the lack of main effects of both diversity and diversity interventions. Finally, I discuss recent work illustrating these contingencies and conclude that positive diversity mindsets—favorable mental representations of group diversity—are a necessary prerequisite to prevent problems and promote potential of group diversity.     

PRIMITIVE CAUSAL RELATIONS AND THE PAIRING PROBLEM

There is no doubt that spatial relations aid us in pairing up causes and effects. But when we consider the possibility of qualitatively indiscernible things, it might seem that spatial relations are more than a mere aid – they might seem positively required. The belief that spatial relations are required for causal relations is behind an important objection to Cartesian Dualism, the pairing problem. I argue that the Cartesian can answer this objection by appeal to the possibility of primitive causal relations, a possibility I defend. This topic is of importance beyond the philosophy of mind; the possibility that causal relations might sometimes hold brutely is of general metaphysical importance. I close with a discussion of what Cartesians should say about embodiment, and how that bears on issues of mental causation.     

Knowing our Reasons: Distinctive Self-Knowledge of Why We Hold Our Attitudes and Perform Actions

This paper argues that subjects at least sometimes learn why they hold an attitude or perform an action in a distinctive first-personal way, i.e., they learn of those facts in a manner that mere observers cannot. Subjects have this first-personal self-knowledge in virtue of first-personal self-knowledge of the reasons for which they hold an attitude or perform an action—their motivating reasons. This paper focusses on one’s reasons for holding an attitude. So, it is not just that subjects have distinctive access to the fact that they, say, believe that q; they also have distinctive access to the fact that they believe that p for the reason that p. I argue for this position contra the prevailing orthodoxy. Philosophers and psychologists often deny that subjects have distinctive access to why they hold their attitudes. Indeed, even many of those who claim that subjects can use a special method to learn that they have a given attitude deny that this method provides knowledge of why one holds that attitude.     

Mental causation in a physical world

It is generally accepted that the most serious threat to the possibility of mental causation is posed by the causal self-sufficiency of physical causal processes. I argue, however, that this feature of the world, which I articulate in principle I call Completeness, in fact poses no genuine threat to mental causation. Some find Completeness threatening to mental causation because they confuse it with a stronger principle, which I call Closure. Others do not simply conflate Completeness and Closure, but hold that Completeness, together with certain plausible assumptions, entails Closure. I refute the most fully worked-out version of such an argument. Finally, some find Completeness all by itself threatening to mental causation. I argue that one will only find Completeness threatening if one operates with a philosophically distorted conception of mental causation. I thereby defend what I call naïve realism about mental causation.     

Do Tropes Resolve the Problem of Mental Causation?

David Robb has argued (in 'The Properties of Mental Causation', The Philosophical Quarterly , 47 (1997), pp. 178–94), that tropes are the properties of causation, i.e., the properties in virtue of which causal relations hold. He thinks that the welcome upshot of this is that there is no problem of mental causation. I argue that his reasons for thinking that tropes are the properties of causation are unsound. In addition, even if one takes the trope approach as a reasonable reform of our current practice, the problem of mental causation still arises. It is just been hidden in the question of what makes tropes identical.     

Consumers' attributions and brand evaluations in product‐harm crises: The role of implicit theories of personality

This study aims to examine the moderating role of implicit theories of personality in the relationship between corporate recovery strategy (i.e., support versus stonewalling) and consumers' attributions (and brand evaluations). It is suggested that consumers' implicit theories about the fixedness/malleability of personality can affect consumers' attributions and brand evaluations during a product‐harm crisis. In addition, corporate image (i.e., strong versus weak) can moderate the influence of the role of implicit theories of personality. Two experiments were conducted to examine the proposed hypotheses. Results of Experiment 1 show that consumers who endorse entity theory (i.e., entity theorists) are likely to attribute crisis as more internal, stable, and controllable, particularly when they do not have any prior knowledge about the firm. The entity theorists would have more negative brand evaluations than incremental theorists (who endorse incremental theory), when “support” strategy was used by the firm. Results of Experiment 2 show that entity theorists are prone to have more external (internal) and unstable (stable) attributions toward a firm with a strong (weak) corporate image. Furthermore, entity theorists would provide more positive brand evaluations than incremental theorists when “stonewalling” strategy was used by a firm with strong corporate image, but not when “support” strategy was used by a firm with weak corporate image. Managerial implications are provided to managers with regard to product‐harm crisis and recovery strategies. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Probabilistic Causation Can Account for the Use of Mechanistic Evidence

In a recent article in this journal, Federica Russo and Jon Williamson argue that an analysis of causality in terms of probabilistic relationships does not do justice to the use of mechanistic evidence to support causal claims. I will present Ronald Giere’s theory of probabilistic causation, and show that it can account for the use of mechanistic evidence (both in the health sciences—on which Russo and Williamson focus—and elsewhere). I also review some other probabilistic theories of causation (of Suppes, Eells, and Humphreys) and show that they cannot account for the use of mechanistic evidence. I argue that these theories are also inferior to Giere’s theory in other respects.     

Neuroscience findings are consistent with appraisal theories of emotion; but does the brain "respect" constructionism?

I reject Lindquist et al.'s implicit claim that all emotion theories other than constructionist ones subscribe to a "brain locationist" approach. The neural mechanisms underlying relevance detection, reward, attention, conceptualization, or language use are consistent with many theories of emotion, in particular componential appraisal theories. I also question the authors' claim that the meta-analysis they report provides support for the specific assumptions of constructionist theories.