Extended emotion

Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend (e.g., Clark, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Menary, 2006; Wilson, 2000, 2004) has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas and, in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world.     

Sensory emotion regulation

Decades of evidence reveal intimate links between sensation and emotion. Yet, discussion of sensory experiences as tools that promote emotion regulation is largely absent from current theorizing on this topic. Here, we address this gap by integrating evidence from social-personality, clinical, cognitive-neuroscience, and animal research to highlight the role of sensation as a tool that can be harnessed to up- or downregulate emotion. Further, we review evidence implicating sensation as a rapid and relatively effortless emotion regulation modality and highlight future research directions. Notably, we emphasize the need to examine the duration of sensory emotion regulation effects, the moderating role of individual and cultural differences, and how sensory strategies interact with other strategies.     

Narcissism in emotion

Emotion is always someone's. An emotion is also, at least typically, about something and witnesses the value, or lack of value, in it. Some emotions, such as shame and pride, are actually about the self that has them. But self-concern can insinuate itself into every corner of the emotional life. This occurs when the centre of concern in emotion drifts from the ostensible objects of focus (I was sorry to hear your bad news) to the emotion itself, to the drama of it, to its feel, to the fact that one is having it. In an unobvious way, the world becomes backdrop, the self the omnipresent protagonist. The apparent ordering, the natural ordering of subject and object in emotion, is inverted. Emotion undergoes a kind of commodification. Yet this is paradoxical. For it isolates the self and subverts the communication and uptake of emotion by others. Narcissism is inimical to the social character of emotion.     

Belief as emotion

It is commonly held that (i) beliefs are revisable in the face of counter-evidence and (ii) beliefs are connected to actions in reliable and predictable ways. Given such a view, many argue that if a mental state fails to respond to evidence or doesn't result in the kind of behavior typical or expected of belief, it is not a belief after all, but a different state. Yet, one finds seeming counter examples of resilient beliefs that fail to respond to evidence, or that do not connect to action in the way that is expected. I offer a view of belief that does not force us to exclude states as real beliefs that we pre-reflectively think of as beliefs, and that does not require us to “outsource” the work belief seems to do to other mental states. I propose that we view belief as a type of emotion where emotions are understood a irreducibly blended states, containing representational, motivational and phenomenological elements.     

Genetics of emotion

Emotion is critical to most aspects of human behavior, and individual differences in systems recruited to process emotional stimuli, expressed as variation in emotionality, are characteristic of several neuropsychiatric disorders. We examine the genetic origins of individual differences in emotion processing by focusing on functional variants at five genes: catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT), serotonin transporter (SLC6A4), neuropeptide Y (NPY), a glucocorticoid receptor-regulating co-chaperone of stress proteins (FKBP5) and pituitary adenylate cyclase-activating polypeptide receptor (ADCYAP1R1). These represent a range of effects of genes on emotion as well as the variety of mechanisms and factors, such as stress, that modify these effects. The new genomic era of genome-wide association studies (GWAS) and deep sequencing may yield a wealth of new loci modulating emotion. The effects of these genes can be validated by neuroimaging, neuroendocrine and other studies accessing intermediate phenotypes, deepening our understanding of mechanisms of emotion and variation in emotionality.     

Managing emotion online

I apply emotion work to a case study of reader responses on the blog, Young House Love, owned by Sherry and John Petersik. The author performed a qualitative analysis of 1070 comments, examining readers' collective emotion work. After learning of the bloggers' hiatus, YHL readers responded using interpersonal and personal emotion management techniques. Comments exhibit deep acting and surface acting strategies directed primarily at the bloggers and their perceived emotional state. Positive sentiment emerged among comments as readers shared personal stories of connection, influence, expressions of support, and accounts. Furthermore, readers' comments reveal feeling rules guiding the YHL bloggers and readers. Thus, discursive efforts to influence the bloggers' emotions are conceptually linked to readers' attempts to rescue and repair the bloggers' public persona on YHL. This analysis confirms the relevance of Goffman's (1959) and Hochschild's (1979) work online and explores blogs as a tool for managing emotion. I also discuss the importance of the comments section in the co-creation of a blog.     

Cultural perspectives on the linguistic representation of emotion and emotion events

It is argued that the linguistic representation of emotions and events giving rise to them is influenced by the cultural regulation of the relationship between a person and others. Such cultural variations are expected to be reflected in how emotions and emotion events are represented in language. The two studies provide support for the hypothesis that in a culture where relationships and interdependence are valued emotion terms function as relationship-markers and emotion events are represented by the use of concrete linguistic terms when compared with cultures that emphasise the value of the individual. Moreover, we also found support for the argument that emotion terms function predominantly as self-markers in cultures that value individuality and that they are represented by more abstract terms (adjectives, nouns). The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Reason and emotion,not reason or emotion in moral judgment

One of the central questions in both metaethics and empirical moral psychology is whether moral judgments are the products of reason or emotions. This way of putting the question assumes that reason and emotion are two fully independent cognitive faculties, whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be cleanly separated. However, there is a significant body of evidence in the cognitive sciences that seriously undercuts this conception of reason and emotion, and supports the view that moral judgments are caused by a complex interplay of psychological mechanisms that are both cognitive and affective, but in a way that is not simply a function of the independent causal contributions of reason and emotion. The paper concludes by considering the implications of this view for metaethics.     

Priming of emotion recognition

Four experiments investigated priming of emotion recognition using a range of emotional stimuli, including facial expressions, words, pictures, and nonverbal sounds. In each experiment, a prime-target paradigm was used with related, neutral, and unrelated pairs. In Experiment 1, facial expression primes preceded word targets in an emotion classification task. A pattern of priming of emotional word targets by related primes with no inhibition of unrelated primes was found. Experiment 2 reversed these primes and targets and found the same pattern of results, demonstrating bidirectional priming between facial expressions and words. Experiment 2 also found priming of facial expression targets by picture primes. Experiment 3 demonstrated that priming occurs not just between pairs of stimuli that have a high co-occurrence in the environment (for example, nonverbal sounds and facial expressions), but with stimuli that co-occur less frequently and are linked mainly by their emotional category (for example, nonverbal sounds and printed words). This shows the importance of the prime and target sharing a common emotional category, rather than their previous co-occurrence. Experiment 4 extended the findings by showing that there are category-based effects as well as valence effects in emotional priming, supporting a categorical view of emotion recognition.     

The demanding world of emotion: A Gestalt approach to emotion experience

Psychology is biased towards thinking of emotions as feelings rather than as an experiences of the world. But they are both. World-focused emotion experiences (WFEE) are how the world appears or is consciously perceived in one's emotion experience. For example, when happy the world may seem welcoming, or when sad the world may seem barren of possibilities. What explains these experiences? This article discusses explanations of WFEE from phenomenology and Gestalt psychology. Influenced by Lewin, I propose an “emotional demand model” of WFEE. The emotional demand character of objects (e.g. bear-to-be-run-from) is distinguished from their expressive character (e.g. angry bear). It is a mistake to think of emotion faces only as expressions—they are also demands. This distinction explains some anomalous findings in infancy and autism research. The model highlights another tool for recognizing our own emotions: noticing when we feel “demanded of” by the world, with implications for emotion regulation.     

Congruence of meaning between facial expressions of emotion and selected emotion terms

How similar are the meanings of facial expressions of emotion and the emotion terms frequently used to label them? In three studies, subjects made similarity judgments and emotion self-report ratings in response to six emotion categories represented in Ekman and Friesen's Pictures of Facial Affect, and their associated labels. Results were analyzed with respect to the constituent facial movements using the Facial Action Coding System, and using consensus analysis, multidimensional scaling, and inferential statistics. Shared interpretation of meaning was found between individuals and the group, with congruence between the meaning in facial expressions, labeling using basic emotion terms, and subjects' reported emotional responses. The data suggest that (1) the general labels used by Ekman and Friesen are appropriate but may not be optimal, (2) certain facial movements contribute more to the perception of emotion than do others, and (3) perception of emotion may be categorical rather than dimensional.