The effect of midazolam on implicit and explicit memory in category exemplar production and category cued recall

Transfer-appropriate processing theory (Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989) proposes that dissociations between performance on explicit and implicit memory tests arise because these tests often rely on different types of information processing (e.g., perceptual processing vs conceptual processing). This perspective predicts that implicit and explicit memory tasks that rely primarily on conceptual processing should show comparable results, not dissociations. Numerous studies have demonstrated such similarities. It is, however, possible that these results arise from explicit memory contamination of performance on implicit memory tasks. To address this issue, an experiment was conducted in which participants were administered the sedative midazolam prior to study. Midazolam is known to create a temporary, but dense, period of anterograde amnesia. The effects of blocking stimulus materials by semantic category at study and generation at study were investigated on category exemplar production and category-cued recall. The results of this study demonstrated a dissociation of the effects of midazolam on category exemplar production and category-cued recall. Specifically, midazolam reduced the effect of blocking stimulus materials in category-cued recall, but not in category exemplar production. The differential effect of midazolam on explicit and implicit memory is at odds with transfer-appropriate processing theory and suggests that theories of memory must distinguish the roles of different types of conceptual processing on implicit and explicit memory tests.     

The effect of midazolam on implicit and explicit memory in category exemplar production and category cued recall

Transfer‐appropriate processing theory (Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989) proposes that dissociations between performance on explicit and implicit memory tests arise because these tests often rely on different types of information processing (e.g., perceptual processing vs conceptual processing). This perspective predicts that implicit and explicit memory tasks that rely primarily on conceptual processing should show comparable results, not dissociations. Numerous studies have demonstrated such similarities. It is, however, possible that these results arise from explicit memory contamination of performance on implicit memory tasks. To address this issue, an experiment was conducted in which participants were administered the sedative midazolam prior to study. Midazolam is known to create a temporary, but dense, period of anterograde amnesia. The effects of blocking stimulus materials by semantic category at study and generation at study were investigated on category exemplar production and category‐cued recall. The results of this study demonstrated a dissociation of the effects of midazolam on category exemplar production and category‐cued recall. Specifically, midazolam reduced the effect of blocking stimulus materials in category‐cued recall, but not in category exemplar production. The differential effect of midazolam on explicit and implicit memory is at odds with transfer‐appropriate processing theory and suggests that theories of memory must distinguish the roles of different types of conceptual processing on implicit and explicit memory tests.     

Dissociating perceptual and conceptual implicit memory in multiple sclerosis patients

Previous studies indicate that Multiple Sclerosis (MS) patients exhibit deficits in tests of explicit memory such as free recall, but show normal priming on implicit tests of memory such as word stem completion. However, the memory performance of patients with different MS disease subtypes has not been fully examined. In the current study, memory was assessed in Primary Progressive (PPMS), Relapsing Remitting (RRMS), and Secondary Progressive (SPMS) MS subgroups. Explicit memory as well as perceptual and conceptual implicit memory were examined using free recall, word fragment completion, and exemplar generation tests, respectively. All three groups of MS patients exhibited free recall deficits and normal priming on the exemplar generation test. However, the PPMS group exhibited a deficit in word fragment completion priming, whereas the RRMS and SPMS groups exhibited normal levels of priming on this task. Lesion load was assessed using magnetic resonance imaging and was negatively correlated with explicit memory performance, but it did not account for the observed deficits in perceptual implicit memory. The results indicate that PPMS patients exhibit a pattern of memory impairment that is distinct from that of the RRMS and SPMS groups. Moreover, the results indicate that perceptual implicit memory can be neurologically dissociated from conceptual implicit memory.     

Implicit memory and depression: preserved conceptual priming in subclinical depression

Depression impairs explicit memory but research on implicit memory is equivocal. Initial studies indicated preserved implicit memory, implying a depressive deficit in intentional but not unintentional forms of memory. Subsequent research indicated that conceptual priming is reduced in depression, implying a deficit in conceptual memory processes be they implicit or explicit. However, the findings with conceptual priming may be compromised by explicit contamination. The present study compared subclinically depressed and non-depressed participants on matched conceptual tests of explicit memory (category-cued recall) and implicit memory (category production). The implicit test was followed by a post-test questionnaire used to categorise participants as test-aware or test-unaware. On the explicit test, the subclinically depressed participants recalled less than the non-depressed participants. The results on the implicit test depended on test-awareness. Among test-unaware participants, conceptual priming was equivalent across the two groups, whereas for the test-aware, non-depressed participants produced significantly more priming than the subclinically depressed. This indicates that when explicit contamination is controlled, depression does not impair conceptual priming. The depressive dissociation between implicit and explicit memory is better accounted for by the difference between intentional and unintentional forms of memory rather than by the difference between conceptual and perceptual memory processes.     

Effects of color on perceptual and conceptual tests of implicit memory

Two experiments are reported that explore why recent investigations of implicit memory failed to find any effects of color information on test performance. In the first experiment, participants studied colored pictures as well as words printed in colored ink without any memory instructions. During the test phase, a verbal and a pictorial version of a color-choice task (a conceptual priming test) were compared to two perceptual tests (word-stem completion and picture-fragment identification). Similar and significant amounts of priming to color occurred in both color-choice tasks. The perceptual tests were found to be sensitive to changes in the stimulus-presentation mode from study to test, but stimuli remaining the same color and those changed to black-and-white did not differ in the priming scores. In the second experiment, a mild division of attention was introduced in the study phase. Once again, priming to color was observed only in the verbal version of a color-choice test and not in the word-stem completion test. Dividing attention did not decrease performance on both implicit tests, whereas an explicit test of color recall for studied pictures suffered from dividing attention at encoding. It is concluded that a perceptual attribute such as color may be represented and coded by conceptual processing. Furthermore, automatic (or not attention-demanding) encoding processes may suffice for later conceptual tests of implicit memory. Previous failures to find any effects of color information on implicit performance are attributed to the use of perceptual priming tests. Received: 30 June 1997 / Accepted: 20 April 1998     

提取干扰对知觉和概念启动的影响

通过学习—测验范式,分别以词汇判断、语义分类任务为测验,探讨提取干扰对不同识别式记忆的影响差异。结果发现,实验1验证了识别式知觉内隐记忆的提取干扰效应,实验2发现识别式概念内隐记忆在提取干扰下也明显降低;两个实验启动量联合分析发现,相比无干扰条件,概念启动比知觉启动受到提取干扰的破坏更大。上述结果说明识别式内隐记忆的提取干扰具有普遍性,提取干扰产生了不同识别式内隐记忆之间的分离,识别式概念内隐记忆更容易受到提取干扰的影响。     

Midazolam amnesia and conceptual processing in implicit memory

Prominent theories of implicit memory (D. Schacter, B. Church, & J. Treadwell, 1994) emphasize the dominant role of perceptual processing in mediating priming on perceptual implicit memory tests. Examinations of the effects of conceptual processing on perceptual implicit memory tests have produced ambiguous results. Although a number of investigations (e.g., J. Toth & R. Hunt, 1990) have demonstrated that variations in conceptual processing affect priming on perceptual implicit memory tests, these effects may arise because of the contaminating effects of explicit memory. The current experiment examined this controversy using midazolam, a benzodiazepine that produces a dense, albeit temporary, anterograde amnesia when injected prior to study. The experiment examined whether the effects of generation found on the implicit memory test of perceptual identification were affected by a midazolam injection prior to study. Results demonstrated that midazolam substantially diminished generation effects in free and cued recall, as well as overall performance on these tests, but had no detectable effect on the generation effect in perceptual identification.     

Implicit memory for novel conceptual associations in amnesia

In two experiments, we evaluated the status of implicit memory for novel associations in amnesia. Experiment 1 assessed priming in a category exemplar generation task in which contextual information associated with a target could increase the likelihood of target generation. Control participants, but not amnesic patients, showed associative priming. Amnesics’ impairment was not due to the use of explicit memory by control subjects but reflected a genuine impairment in implicit memory for novel conceptual associations. Experiment 2 assessed priming in a relatedness judgment task, in which associative priming was manifest as longer latencies for old than for recombined pairs of unrelated words. Amnesic patients showed intact associative priming in this task. We discuss differences in the status of implicit memory for novel conceptual associations in amnesia, with reference to the nature of the representation that supports priming in the two tasks and the type of processing that is required at test.     

Dissociation of implicit and explicit memory tests: Effect of age and divided attention on category exemplar generation and cued recall

In this article, we report an experiment that provides further evidence concerning the differences between explicit and implicit measures of memory. The effects of age and divided attention on the implicit conceptual test of category exemplar generation (CEG) were compared with their effects on the explicit test of cued recall, where the category names served as cues in both tasks. Four age groups (20–35, 40–55, 60–75, and 76–90) were compared. Half of the subjects were also required to carry out a secondary letter-detection task during the learning phase. Cued recall performance was significantly impaired by increased age and imposition of the secondary task. In contrast, the CEG task was unaffected by these two factors. These results suggest that implicit conceptual tasks and explicit memory tasks are mediated by different processes. This conclusion opposes those of previous studies that showed that experimental manipulations (level of processing, generation, organization) influenced these two kinds of memory tests in a similar way.     

Clinical depression and implicit memory.

We investigated performance on implicit and explicit memory tasks in subjects diagnosed with major depression and matched controls. Depressed subjects showed impaired performance on both the explicit and implicit tasks in comparison with controls. These findings are in contrast to groups such as amnesic patients and older adults, who show preserved abilities on implicit tasks and deficits on explicit tasks.     

Levels-of-processing effects on conceptual automatic memory

This study aimed to provide converging evidence for the conceptual processing effect on conceptual priming that involved automatic retrieval. Two experiments examined whether the levels-of-processing manipulation affects the conceptual priming effect in the speeded category-production task and the relation between the magnitude of conceptual priming and the level of participants’ awareness of the study–test relationship. In the implicit category-production task, participants were required to respond to the category name with the first corresponding category member to come to mind, whereas in the explicit category-cue recall task, participants were instructed to use the category name as a cue to recall the studied word. Response speed was emphasised for all participants. The results, based on response times, suggest that the implicit groups did not shift to a conscious retrieval strategy after the practice trial. The magnitude of priming was also not related to participants’ test-awareness. Furthermore, both conceptual implicit and explicit tests were sensitive to the levels-of-processing manipulation after considering the problems of both conscious contamination and diminished lexical processing. Using a purer measure of conceptual implicit memory, this study replicated the previous findings of the levels-of-processing effect on the conceptual implicit test.     

Perceptual and conceptual priming in patients with dissociative identity disorder

The present study examined implicit memory transfer in patients with dissociative identity disorder (DID). To determine priming impairments in DID, we included both several perceptual priming tasks and a conceptual priming task using neutral material. We tested a large sample of DID patients (n = 31), in addition to 25 controls and 25 DID simulators, comparable on sex, age, and education. Controls replicated conceptual priming results of Vriezen, Moscovitch, and Bellos (1995) by showing that conceptual priming seems to require the formation of domain-specific semantic representations, denoting either sensory or functional object attributes. We extended a study performed by Schacter, Cooper, and Delaney (1990) by demonstrating priming for impossible object using the sensitive priming index of response times. The simulators in the study were not able to simulate interidentity amnesia on the implicit memory tasks employed. Partly in contrast to participants in previous studies, DID patients showed evidence of perceptual priming as well as conceptual priming comparable to that of controls. DID patients thus displayed normal implicit memory performance.     

Relationships between implicit and explicit uncertainty monitoring and mindreading: Evidence from autism spectrum disorder

We examined performance on implicit (non-verbal) and explicit (verbal) uncertainty-monitoring tasks among neurotypical participants and participants with autism, while also testing mindreading abilities in both groups. We found that: (i) performance of autistic participants was unimpaired on the implicit uncertainty-monitoring task, while being significantly impaired on the explicit task; (ii) performance on the explicit task was correlated with performance on mindreading tasks in both groups, whereas performance on the implicit uncertainty-monitoring task was not; and (iii) performance on implicit and explicit uncertainty-monitoring tasks was not correlated. The results support the view that (a) explicit uncertainty-monitoring draws on the same cognitive faculty as mindreading whereas (b) implicit uncertainty-monitoring only test first-order decision making. These findings support the theory that metacognition and mindreading are underpinned by the same meta-representational faculty/resources, and that the implicit uncertainty-monitoring tasks that are frequently used with non-human animals fail to demonstrate the presence of metacognitive abilities.     

Conceptual implicit memory and environmental context

Changes in environmental context between encoding and retrieval often affect explicit memory but research on implicit memory is equivocal. One proposal is that conceptual but not perceptual priming is influenced by context manipulations. However, findings with conceptual priming may be compromised by explicit contamination. The present study examined the effects of environmental context on conceptual explicit (category-cued recall) and implicit memory (category production). Explicit recall was reduced by context change. The implicit test results depended on test awareness (assessed with a post-test questionnaire). Among test-unaware participants, priming was equivalent for same-context and different-context groups, whereas for the test-aware, the same-context group produced more priming. Thus, when explicit contamination is controlled, changes in environmental context do not impair conceptual priming. Context dependency appears to be a general difference between implicit and explicit memory rather than a difference between conceptual and perceptual implicit memory. Finally, measures of mood indicated no changes in affect across contexts, arguing against mood mediation for the context effects in explicit recall.     

Input- and output-monitoring in implicit and explicit memory

Previous experiments have shown that the procedure of questioning subjects retrospectively about the input and output status of information (input and output monitoring) is a useful method for assessing the awareness states of subjects during implicit and explicit memory tasks. The main purpose of the present study was to investigate whether the previous findings could be extended to other implicit and explicit memory tasks. We were especially interested in whether differences in input- and output-monitoring performance can be observed when both the implicit and explicit memory tasks are conceptual ones. In a final test phase, the target items from the study phase and new distractor items were presented. In a recognition-like situation, subjects had to decide whether an item had been presented in the study phase (input status), as well as whether they had produced the item in the memory-test phase (output status). In all three experiments judgments about the input status - but only for those items that had been produced in the implicit or in the explicit memory test - were more precise after explicit than after implicit memory testings. This finding was not influenced by the distinction between perceptual and conceptual-memory tasks (Exp. 1), and was obtained under conditions in which the implicit and the explicit memory tasks were both conceptual and differed only in test instructions (Exps. 2 and 3). These results suggest that not only subjects performing a perceptual test of implicit memory, but also subjects in a conceptual implicit test were less aware of using information from a previous study episode than subjects who received memory instructions. It is concluded that requiring judgments about the input status of information is a good method for assessing subjects test awareness and is preferable to the use of a questionnaire (Exp. 3). In contrast, in all three experiments no differences were found with the output-monitoring measure between implicit and explicit test conditions.     

Bias in conceptual priming

In recent years, Ratcliff, McKoon, and colleagues have argued that priming in perceptual implicit memory tests is the result of biases in information processing. Three experiments are presented that extend this framework to the conceptual implicit memory domain. Participants studied a list of words before receiving a set of general knowledge questions. For some questions, participants studied the correct answer; for others, they studied a similar but incorrect answer. Although study of a correct answer facilitated performance, study of the similar alternative hurt performance. Costs and benefits of previous study were observed in both production and forced-choice tasks. However, there was no benefit of previous study when participants studied both the correct answer and the similar but incorrect alternative. The pattern of results indicates that participants were biased to respond with previously studied words on the conceptual implicit memory test. This pattern is concordant with the biased information-processing approach to priming.     

Aging affects word-stem completion and recognition but not category generation

In this study, we investigated the effect of aging on two implicit memory tasks, word-stem completion and category generation, and on explicit recognition. We compared the performance of young and older adults on these implicit memory tasks with those of explicit recognition. We expected better performance of young than older adults in the explicit memory task and similar priming in both implicit memory tasks. The results showed that young adults performed better than older adults in the recognition task. Moreover, both age groups showed priming in the implicit memory tasks, although priming was greater in young adults compared to older adults in the word-stem completion memory task, whereas both age groups showed similar levels of priming in the category generation task. The present results showed dissociations as a function of age not only between the explicit and the implicit tasks but also between the implicit tasks.     

Does survival processing enhance implicit memory?

Recent research has shown that human memory may have evolved to remember information that has been processed for the purpose of survival, more so than information that has been processed for other purposes, such as home-moving. We investigated this survival-processing advantage using both explicit and implicit memory tests. In Experiment 1, participants rated words in one of three scenarios: survival, pleasantness, and moving, followed by a timed stem-cued recall/stem-cued completion task. Items were completed more quickly in the survival scenario, as compared with the other two for the explicit task, but no differences were found across conditions in the implicit task. In Experiment 2, the implicit task was changed to concreteness judgments to encourage more conceptual processing. Again, the survival-processing advantage occurred in the explicit task (speeded item recognition), but not in the implicit task. These results suggest that a survival-processing advantage may benefit participants’ memory performance only during explicit retrieval.     

Probing memory with conceptual cues at multiple retention intervals: a comparison of forgetting rates on implicit and explicit tests

The time courses for implicit and explicit conceptual tests of memory were compared in two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants encoded target words by judging the apparent pleasantness of their meaning. Immediately thereafter or 48 h later, retrieval cues were presented to different groups of participants for either an implicit or an explicit free-association task. Whereas explicit test performance showed a decline over the 48-h delay, implicit test performance was statistically unaltered. In Experiment 2, memory was tested at five retention intervals, lasting up to 3 weeks. The forgetting functions of both implicit and explicit tests conformed to a logarithmic function. Despite the large conceptual priming effect, which resulted from relational encoding instructions, implicit memory performance still declined at a much slower rate than did performance on the cued-recall test. We argue that because nominal conceptual cues were held constant across the implicit and the explicit conditions, the observed dissociation in performance supports a memory systems approach.     

Familiarity is related to conceptual implicit memory: An examination of individual differences

Explicit memory is thought to be distinct from implicit memory. However, growing evidence has indicated that explicit familiarity-based recognition memory judgments rely on the same process that supports conceptual implicit memory. We tested this hypothesis by examining individual differences using a paradigm wherein we measured both familiarity and conceptual implicit memory within the same participants. In Experiments 1a and 1b, we examined recognition memory confidence ROCs and remember/know responses, respectively, to estimate recollection and familiarity, and used a free association task to measure conceptual implicit memory. The results demonstrated that, across participants, familiarity, but not recollection, was significantly correlated with conceptual priming. In contrast, in Experiment 2, utilizing a similar paradigm, a comparison of recognition memory ROCs and explicit associative cued-recall performance indicated that cued recall was related to both recollection and familiarity. These results are consistent with models assuming that familiarity-based recognition and conceptual implicit memory rely on similar underlying processes.