错误归因的叠加效应：发生于情感还是语义过程？

错误归因是指将某个效应的来源错认为是其它来源。研究采用修改的、双启动词的情感错误归因程序（AMP）范式,考察了错误归因的叠加效应以及该效应发生于情感还是语义过程。结果表明：(1)经典的AMP范式下,不论是情感启动词还是语义启动词都可以引发错误归因反应。(2)双启动词AMP范式下,先后出现的情感启动词产生了错误归因的叠加效应。（3）双语义启动词AMP范式下,没有发现错误归因的叠加效应。说明双启动词AMP范式下错误归因的叠加效应只发生于情感过程。     

The enduring impact of transient emotions on decision making

People often do not realize they are being influenced by an incidental emotional state. As a result, decisions based on a fleeting incidental emotion can become the basis for future decisions and hence outlive the original cause for the behavior (i.e., the emotion itself). Using a sequence of ultimatum and dictator games, we provide empirical evidence for the enduring impact of transient emotions on economic decision making. Behavioral consistency and false consensus are presented as potential underlying processes.     

Controlling the “uncontrollable”: Faking effects on the affect misattribution procedure

In two experiments, the impact of faking on the affect misattribution procedure (AMP) was examined. Results revealed that faking influences both the overall means and the convergent validity of AMP effects in terms of correlations with self-report measures. Faking effects were very selective in that they affected fake-prime trials only, for which AMP effects were significant, but reversed in direction, while AMP effects for non-fake trials remained intact. Importantly, neither strategic advice nor prior task experience was a necessary prerequisite for successful faking. The discussion focuses on possible processes underlying successful faking in the AMP.     

When the method makes a difference: Antagonistic effects on “automatic evaluations” as a function of task characteristics of the measure

Researchers often employ implicit measures as dependent variables to investigate processes of attitude formation and change. In such studies, experimentally induced differences are typically interpreted as reflecting change in automatic evaluations. We argue that experimentally induced effects on implicit measures may not always reflect genuine changes in evaluative responses, but can be driven by the mechanisms underlying the measurement procedure. In line with this assumption, the present research shows that these mechanisms can produce opposite effects of the same experimental manipulation for otherwise equivalent implicit measures. These results indicate that merely observing experimental effects on implicit measures does not allow direct inferences regarding changes in automatic evaluations. Instead, psychological interpretations of such effects hinge upon the mechanics of how a given measurement procedure responds to variations in the context. Implications for research using implicit measures are discussed.     

Moral dilemmas and moral rules

Recent work shows an important asymmetry in lay intuitions about moral dilemmas. Most people think it is permissible to divert a train so that it will kill one innocent person instead of five, but most people think that it is not permissible to push a stranger in front of a train to save five innocents. We argue that recent emotion-based explanations of this asymmetry have neglected the contribution that rules make to reasoning about moral dilemmas. In two experiments, we find that participants show a parallel asymmetry about versions of the dilemmas that have minimized emotional force. In a third experiment, we find that people distinguish between whether an action violates a moral rule and whether it is, all things considered, wrong. We propose that judgments of whether an action is wrong, all things considered, implicate a complex set of psychological processes, including representations of rules, emotional responses, and assessments of costs and benefits.     

A reanalysis of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research

Greene and colleagues [Greene, J., Sommerville, B. R., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293, 2105-2108.] have revealed an apparent distinction in folk psychology between ‘up close and personal’ and ‘impersonal’ moral dilemmas. Reasoning about these types of dilemmas is purportedly supported by partially dissociable neural systems. However, further investigation of the data supporting this hypothesis indicated that only a small number of stimuli used by Greene et al. are driving the effect originally found. Implications of the apparent distinction initially reported and of other research in the domain of moral psychology are discussed.     

The role of moral commitments in moral judgment

Traditional approaches to moral psychology assumed that moral judgments resulted from the application of explicit commitments, such as those embodied in consequentialist or deontological philosophies. In contrast, recent work suggests that moral judgments often result from unconscious or emotional processes, with explicit commitments generated post hoc. This paper explores the intermediate position that moral commitments mediate moral judgments, but not through their explicit and consistent application in the course of judgment. An experiment with 336 participants finds that individuals vary in the extent to which their moral commitments are consequentialist or deontological, and that this variation is systematically but imperfectly related to the moral judgments elicited by trolley car problems. Consequentialist participants find action in trolley car scenarios more permissible than do deontologists, and only consequentialists moderate their judgments when scenarios that typically elicit different intuitions are presented side by side. The findings emphasize the need for a theory of moral reasoning that can accommodate both the associations and dissociations between moral commitments and moral judgments.     

Describing and testing an intermediate concept measure of adolescent moral thinking

This paper describes the development and preliminary testing of an intermediate concept measure (ICM) of moral thinking for adolescent populations. First proposed by Rest and Narvaez (1994), intermediate concepts are described as more context specific than moral stages defined within the Kohlberg tradition, but are more abstract than assessments of codes of conduct. The process of developing the adolescent ICM is described and data are presented to provide initial support for the measure. Results indicate that the adolescent ICM can distinguish age educational groups across high school and individuals who are acting out in school achieved significantly lower scores than all other students. In addition, ICM scores are related to Defining Issues Test scores providing preliminary support for the claim that both measures assess the moral domain. Coupled with the respectable psychometric properties of the measure, these findings support the adolescent ICM as a measure of moral thinking in adolescent populations and as a potential outcome measure for character education programmes.     

Professional judgement in the assessment of risk: is there a role for systemic practice?

Risk assessment is an example of professional decision‐making pared to its stark essentials. Political pressures towards accountability and the need for defensible decisions encourage a ‘tick‐box’ approach to risk assessment, but this can create unrealistic expectations of certainty. In practice, as technological approaches produce ever more complex formal tools for assessing risk, their effectiveness remains dubious while our human decision‐making apparatus is marginalized. This article examines whether we should respect our ability to apprehend complex multi‐stranded narrative realities intuitively, with the hope that such intuitions might contribute to professional decision‐making. This idea is explored with reference to a case study.     

儿童完全信息最后通牒博弈决策的发展

考查了200名4-12岁儿童及40名成人完全信息最后通牒博弈决策的发展趋势与特点,并对情绪在最后通牒博弈决策中的作用做了初步探索。结果表明：（1）完全信息最后通牒任务中,作为分配者时4-6岁儿童更多提出小于半数的要约,而9-12岁儿童和成人则更多地提出平等分配的要约。作为应答者时儿童和成人均接受大部分要约。（2）公平策略和权宜策略是儿童与成人分配者采取的主要策略,而儿童与成人应答者则主要采用权宜策略。（3）基于满意与否的情绪体验是儿童应答者是否行使否决权的直接动力。     

Challenges for the sequential two-system model of moral judgement

Considerable evidence supports the sequential two-system (“default interventionist”) model of moral judgement, as proposed by Greene and others. We tested whether judgement speed and/or personal/impersonal moral dilemmas can predict the kind of moral judgements (utilitarian or deontological) subjects make for each dilemma, and whether personal dilemmas create difficulty in moral judgements. Our results showed that neither personal/impersonal conditions nor spontaneous/thoughtful-reflection conditions were reliable predictors of utilitarian or deontological moral judgements. Yet, we found support for an alternative view, in which, when the two types of responses are in conflict; the resolution of this conflict depends on both the subject and the dilemma. While thinking about this conflict, subjects sometimes change their minds in both directions, as suggested by the data from a mouse-tracking task.     

Dynamic adjustments of cognitive control during economic decision making

Decision making in the Ultimatum game requires the resolution of conflicts between economic self-interest and fairness intuitions. Since cognitive control processes play an important role in conflict resolution, the present study examined how control processes that are triggered by conflicts between fairness and self-interest in unfair offers affect subsequent decisions in the Ultimatum game. Our results revealed that more unfair offers were accepted following previously unfair, compared to previously fair offers. Interestingly, the magnitude of this conflict adaptation effect correlated with the individual subjects' focus on economic self-interest. We concluded that conflicts between fairness and self-interest trigger cognitive control processes, which reinforce the focus on the current task goal.     

Methodological concerns in moral judgement research: Severity of harm shapes moral decisions

Research on moral judgement traditionally deals with scenarios involving trade-offs between saving lives and causing harm or death. In the field of moral psychology and philosophy, these specific scenarios are regularly used jointly, regardless of the severity of harm. We predicted that the confounding between distinct phrasings involving different degrees of harm will have an impact on the frequency of utilitarian judgements regardless of the mere moral value of the action (as usually investigated in the moral judgement field). In line with this prediction, a first experiment showed that utilitarian responses were less frequent for conflicting moral scenarios that involved death, as compared to scenarios that involved non-lethal harm. A second experiment showed that participants' utilitarian responses decreased as the severity of harm increased. Experimental studies on moral reasoning should take greater care to avoid potential confounds associated with this content factor.     

How do mothers signal shared feeling‐states to their infants? An investigation of affect attunement and imitation during the first year of life

The present study examined how mothers signal shared feeling-states to their infants. Affect attunement and imitation were investigated cross-culturally in 39 mother-infant dyads from Sweden (N = 22) and the former Yugoslavia (N = 17) during the first year of life. Video-recordings of playful interaction between mothers and their infants were analysed using the Affect Attunement Protocol. A significant negative association between imitation and age was found, while there was a significant positive association between affect attunement and age. Single occurrences of affect attunement appeared already at two or three months of age, and by 6 months of age episodes of affect attunement were more common than imitation. Frequencies of imitation and affect attunement were similar cross-culturally and in terms of gender, although there was a significant interaction between age and gender. The results suggest that the signalling of shared feeling-states is not a static process. Mothers do not signal shared feeling-states in the same manner at different ages. Imitation is the most important process during the earliest months, but is superseded by affect attunement earlier than previously thought. The functional implications of this developmental variation are discussed.     

Can Affect Disengagement Produce Moral Standard Violation?

Bandura has suggested that people can escape the self-regulatory power of internalized moral standards by disengaging the standards, allowing violation. We consider the possibility that disengaging the emotional warning signs of impending self-censure may be sufficient to permit violation. To test this idea, we led some research participants to misattribute to a pill (actually a placebo) any feelings of tension and anxiety evoked by the prospect of violating their standards of fairness. As predicted, participants in the misattribution condition were more likely to self-favor than those in a no-misattribution condition. This effect was mediated by the amount of tension and anxiety attributed to the pill. The role that affect disengagement may play in moral decisions outside the laboratory is discussed.