Me against we: in-group transgression, collective shame, and in-group-directed hostility

People can experience great distress when a group to which they belong (in-group) is perceived to have committed an immoral act. We hypothesised that people would direct hostility toward a transgressing in-group whose actions threaten their self-image and evoke collective shame. Consistent with this theorising, three studies found that reminders of in-group transgression provoked several expressions of in-group-directed hostility, including in-group-directed hostile emotion (Studies 1 and 2), in-group-directed derogation (Study 2), and in-group-directed punishment (Study 3). Across studies, collective shame-but not the related group-based emotion collective guilt-mediated the relationship between in-group transgression and in-group-directed hostility. Implications for group-based emotion, social identity, and group behaviour are discussed.     

Group-based guilt and shame in the context of intergroup conflict: The role of beliefs and meta-beliefs about group malleability

Group-based guilt and shame are part of a wide range of moral emotions in intergroup conflicts. These emotions can potentially motivate group members to make compromises in order to promote conflict resolution, and increase support for reparations and apologies following moral transgressions committed by the in-group. Thus, it is important to understand how to induce these emotions and the mechanisms for their effects. In the present paper, we examined the mechanisms underlying group-based guilt and shame in four studies. Across the first three studies, conducted in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we found that group-based guilt was mostly predicted by individuals’ implicit theories about groups (ITG). Specifically, we found that the more participants believed that groups are malleable, the more they experienced group-based guilt. Group-based shame, however, was found to be dependent upon individuals’ perception of other people’s perceptions about the malleability of groups (i.e., meta-ITG), as the perceived damage to one’s in-group image is a major component in experiencing shame. In Study 4, conducted in the context of gender relations, we differentiated between the two components of shame, that is, moral and image shame. As predicted, while group-based guilt and moral shame showed similar patterns of results, meta-ITG had a moderating effect on the association between ITG and group-based image shame. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed in relation to promoting intergroup conflict resolution and reconciliation.     

Vicarious shame

We examined an account of vicarious shame that explains how people can experience a self-conscious emotion for the behaviour of another person. Two divergent processes have been put forward to explain how another's behaviour links to the self. The group-based emotion account explains vicarious shame in terms of an in-group member threatening one's social identity by behaving shamefully. The empathy account explains vicarious shame in terms of empathic perspective taking; people imagine themselves in another's shameful behaviour. In three studies using autobiographical recall and experimental inductions, we revealed that both processes can explain why vicarious shame arises in different situations, what variation can be observed in the experience of vicarious shame, and how all vicarious shame can be related to a threat to the self. Results are integrated in a functional account of shame.     

Vicarious shame

We examined an account of vicarious shame that explains how people can experience a self-conscious emotion for the behaviour of another person. Two divergent processes have been put forward to explain how another's behaviour links to the self. The group-based emotion account explains vicarious shame in terms of an in-group member threatening one's social identity by behaving shamefully. The empathy account explains vicarious shame in terms of empathic perspective taking; people imagine themselves in another's shameful behaviour. In three studies using autobiographical recall and experimental inductions, we revealed that both processes can explain why vicarious shame arises in different situations, what variation can be observed in the experience of vicarious shame, and how all vicarious shame can be related to a threat to the self. Results are integrated in a functional account of shame.     

We feel, therefore we are: emotion as a basis for self-categorization and social action

Building on intergroup emotion research, we test the idea that intergroup emotion influences self-categorization. We report two studies using minimal (Study 1) and natural (Study 2) groups in which we measured participants' emotional reactions to a group-relevant event before manipulating the emotional reactions of other ingroup members and outgroup members (anger vs. happiness in Study 1; anger vs. indifference in Study 2). Results supported the hypotheses that (a) the fit between participants' own emotional reactions and the reactions of ingroup members would influence self-categorization, and (b) the specific content of emotional reactions would shape participants' willingness to engage in collective action. This willingness was greater when emotional reactions were not only shared with other group members, but were of anger (consistent with group-based action) rather than happiness or indifference (inconsistent with group-based action). Implications for the relationship between emotion and social identities are discussed.     

Collective narcissism and explicit and implicit collective self-esteem revisited: A preregistered replication and extension

Research on the positivity of collective narcissists’ in-group evaluation is scarce. So far, only one published study has shown that collective narcissists favorably evaluate their in-group at the explicit level but have negative (or, less positive) implicit in-group evaluations (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, Study 4). The present preregistered replication study used a larger sample (N = 481), carefully constructed implicit association measures, and examined agentic and communal facets of collective narcissism and implicit collective self-esteem. Yet, our study did not replicate the core finding of Golec de Zavala et al. (2009, Study 4). Although our study does not support the mask model of collective narcissism, it provides further evidence for the distinctiveness of agentic and communal collective narcissism.     

Collective self-continuity,group identification and in-group defense

The present research tested the proposition that the sense of self-continuity that people derive from their group membership provides a basis for group identification and drives in-group defensive reactions in the context of identity threat. This proposition was examined in three studies, using the context of national identity. Study 1 found that collective self-continuity uniquely and strongly predicted national identification, when controlling for other identity motives. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that existential threats to national identity particularly increase a sense of collective self-continuity, compared to other identity motives, and that this enhanced sense of collective selfcontinuity results in stronger in-group defense in the form of opposition towards out-groups (Study 2) and social developments (Study 3) that may undermine group identity, as well as in stronger in-group protectionism (Study 3). Taken together, these findings indicate that collective selfcontinuity is an important motive for group identification and in-group defense in the context of identity threat.     

Intergroup emotions: explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context

Three studies tested the idea that when social identity is salient, group-based appraisals elicit specific emotions and action tendencies toward out-groups. Participants' group memberships were made salient and the collective support apparently enjoyed by the in-group was measured or manipulated. The authors then measured anger and fear (Studies 1 and 2) and anger and contempt (Study 3), as well as the desire to move against or away from the out-group. Intergroup anger was distinct from intergroup fear, and the inclination to act against the out-group was distinct from the tendency to move away from it. Participants who perceived the in-group as strong were more likely to experience anger toward the out-group and to desire to take action against it. The effects of perceived in-group strength on offensive action tendencies were mediated by anger.     

Nuestra culpa: collective guilt and shame as predictors of reparation for historical wrongdoing

Three studies examined the hypothesis that collective guilt and shame have different consequences for reparation. In 2 longitudinal studies, the ingroup was nonindigenous Chileans (Study 1: N = 124/120, lag = 8 weeks; Study 2: N = 247/137, lag = 6 months), and the outgroup was Chile's largest indigenous group, the Mapuche. In both studies, it was found that collective guilt predicted reparation attitudes longitudinally. Collective shame had only cross-sectional associations with reparation and no direct longitudinal effects. In Study 2, collective shame moderated the longitudinal effects of collective guilt such that the effects of guilt were stronger for low-shame respondents. In Study 3 (N = 193 nonindigenous Chileans), the cross-sectional relationships among guilt, shame, and reparation attitudes were replicated. The relationship between shame and reparation attitudes was mediated by a desire to improve the ingroup's reputation.     

Acknowledging the skeletons in our closet: the effect of group affirmation on collective guilt, collective shame, and reparatory attitudes

Just as with threats to personal identity, people defend against social identity threats. In the context of intergroup injustice, such defensiveness undercuts collective guilt and its prosocial consequences. The current research examines whether group affirmation allows perpetrator groups to disarm threat without undermining guilt. In Study 1, men accepted greater guilt for gender inequality after affirming the ingroup. Given the distinction between collective guilt and collective shame, Studies 2-4 assessed both emotions and revealed that Canadians accepted greater guilt and shame over the mistreatment of Aboriginals following group affirmation. In Study 3, group affirmation also moderated the relation of each emotion with reparatory attitudes. When controlling for each other, collective shame predicted compensation in a nonaffirmation control condition whereas guilt predicted compensation once identity threat had been disarmed by group affirmation. In Study 4, the effect of group affirmation on the collective emotions was mediated by defensive appraisals of the injustice.     

Put your money where your mouth is! Explaining collective action tendencies through group-based anger and group efficacy

Insights from appraisal theories of emotion are used to integrate elements of theories on collective action. Three experiments with disadvantaged groups systematically manipulated procedural fairness (Study 1), emotional social support (Study 2), and instrumental social support (Study 3) to examine their effects on collective action tendencies through group-based anger and group efficacy. Results of structural equation modeling showed that procedural fairness and emotional social support affected the group-based anger pathway (reflecting emotion-focused coping), whereas instrumental social support affected the group efficacy pathway (reflecting problem-focused coping), constituting 2 distinct pathways to collective action tendencies. Analyses of the means suggest that collective action tendencies become stronger the more fellow group members "put their money where their mouth is." The authors discuss how their dual pathway model integrates and extends elements of current approaches to collective action.     

Collective Narcissism Predicts Hypersensitivity to In‐group Insult and Direct and Indirect Retaliatory Intergroup Hostility

Results of five studies (N = 1596) linked collective narcissism—a belief in in‐group exaggerated greatness contingent on external validation—to direct and indirect, retaliatory hostility in response to situations that collective narcissists perceived as insulting to the in‐group but which fell well beyond the definition of an insult. In Turkey, collective narcissists responded with schadenfreude to the European economic crisis after feeling humiliated by the Turkish wait to be admitted to the European Union (Study 1). In Portugal, they supported hostile actions towards Germans and rejoiced in the German economic crisis after perceiving Germany's position in the European Union as more important than the position of Portugal (Study 2). In Poland, they supported hostile actions towards the makers of a movie they found offensive to Poland (Studies 3 and 5) and responded with direct and indirect hostility towards a celebrity whose jokes about the Polish government they found offensive (Study 4). Comparisons with self‐positivity and in‐group positivity indices and predictors of intergroup hostility indicated that collective narcissism is the only systematic predictor of hypersensitivity to in‐group insult followed by direct and indirect, retaliatory intergroup hostility. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Defend or repair? Explaining responses to in-group moral failure by disentangling feelings of shame, rejection, and inferiority

Research on shame about in-group moral failure has yielded paradoxical results. In some studies, shame predicts self-defensive motivations to withdraw. In other studies, shame predicts pro-social motivations, such as restitution. We think that this paradox can be explained by disentangling the numerous appraisals and feelings subsumed under the label "shame." In 2 studies, we asked community samples of Norwegians about their in-group's discrimination against the Tater minority. Confirmatory factor analysis validated the measures of the appraisals and feelings used in Study 1 (N = 206) and Study 2 (N = 173). In both studies, an appraisal of the in-group as suffering a moral defect best predicted felt shame, whereas an appraisal of concern for condemnation of the in-group best predicted felt rejection. In both studies, felt rejection best predicted self-defensive motivation, whereas felt shame best predicted pro-social motivation. Implications for conceptualizing and studying shame are discussed.     

Empathy and humanitarianism predict preferential moral responsiveness to in-groups and out-groups

ABSTRACT

The current research tests whether empathy—sharing others’ emotions—and humanitarianism—recognizing the moral worth of all people—each predict moral responsiveness toward others but in ways that favor in-groups and out-groups, respectively. In Studies 1 and 2, empathy and humanitarianism differentially predicted preferential moral concern for in-groups and out-groups. In Study 3, humanitarianism predicted lower in-group-targeted prosociality and greater out-group prosociality. In Study 4, empathy and humanitarianism predicted perceived moral obligation to in-groups and out-groups respectively. In Study 5, out-group obligation mediated between humanitarianism and allocations to out-group charities, and in-group obligation mediated between empathy and one of two in-group charities. In sum, empathy and humanitarianism are associated with preferential morality via group-based obligation, suggesting that morality could be extended by altering empathy, humanitarianism, or group processes.     

Affirmation, acknowledgment of in-group responsibility, group-based guilt, and support for reparative measures

Three studies, 2 conducted in Israel and 1 conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, demonstrated that affirming a positive aspect of the self can increase one's willingness to acknowledge in-group responsibility for wrongdoing against others, express feelings of group-based guilt, and consequently provide greater support for reparation policies. By contrast, affirming one's group, although similarly boosting feelings of pride, failed to increase willingness to acknowledge and redress in-group wrongdoing. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated the mediating role of group-based guilt. That is, increased acknowledgment of in-group responsibility for out-group victimization produced increased feelings of guilt, which in turn increased support for reparation policies to the victimized group. Theoretical and applied implications are discussed.     

Self-esteem and favoritism toward novel in-groups: the self as an evaluative base

The self-as-evaluative base (SEB) hypothesis proposes that self-evaluation extends automatically via an amotivated consistency process to affect evaluation of novel in-groups. Four minimal group studies support SEB. Personal trait self-esteem (PSE) predicted increased favoritism toward a novel in-group that, objectively, was equivalent to the out-group (Study 1). This association was independent of information-processing effects (Study 1), collective self-esteem, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), and narcissism (Studies 2 and 3). A self-affirmation manipulation attenuated the association between in-group favoritism and an individual difference associated with motivated social identity concerns (RWA) but did not alter the PSE effect (Study 3). Finally, the association between PSE and in-group favoritism remained positive even when the in-group was objectively less favorable than the out-group (Study 4).     

Protesting to challenge or defend the system? A system justification perspective on collective action

Social identity, shared grievances, and group efficacy beliefs are well-known antecedents to collective action, but existing research overlooks the fact that collective action often involves a confrontation between those who are motivated to defend the status quo and those who seek to challenge it. Using nationally representative data from New Zealand (Study 1; N = 16,147) and a large online sample from the United States (Study 2; N = 1,513), we address this oversight and demonstrate that system justification is negatively associated with system-challenging collective action, but positively associated with system-supporting collective action, for members of both low-status and high-status groups. Group identification, group-based injustice, group-based anger, and system-based dissatisfaction/anger mediated these relationships. These findings constitute the first empirical integration of system justification theory into a model of collective action that explains when people will act collectively to challenge—and, just as importantly, defend—the status quo.     

The paradox of group-based guilt: modes of national identification, conflict vehemence, and reactions to the in-group's moral violations

The authors examined the relationships between 2 modes of national identification (attachment to the in-group and the in-group's glorification) and reactions to the in-group's moral violations among Israeli students. Data were collected during a period of relative calm in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as during a period of great intensification of this conflict. As expected, in Study 1, the 2 modes of identification had contrasting relationships with group-based guilt: Attachment was positively related whereas glorification was negatively related to group-based guilt for in-group's past infractions. Glorification suppressed the attachment effect but not vice versa. Both relationships were mediated by the use of exonerating cognitions. In Study 2, group-based guilt for the in-group's current wrongdoings was increased by priming critical rather than conventional attachment to the in-group, suggesting a causal effect of mode of identification on the experience of negative group-based emotions.     

In search of an imaginary enemy: Catholic collective narcissism and the endorsement of gender conspiracy beliefs

ABSTRACT

Gender studies have often been criticized for undermining family and religious values. In this paper, we argue that these criticisms exhibit the characteristics of conspiracy theories. We define gender conspiracy beliefs as convictions that gender studies and gender-equality activists represent an ideology secretly designed to harm traditional values and social arrangements. In two studies conducted among Catholics in Poland (Study 1 N= 1019; Study 2 N= 223), we examined the prevalence of gender conspiracy beliefs and their psychological concomitants. We hypothesized that gender conspiracy beliefs should be associated with a defensive identification with one’s religious group, captured by religious collective narcissism. In both studies, Catholic collective narcissism was demonstrated to be a robust predictor of gender conspiracy beliefs. We additionally demonstrated that Catholic collective narcissism predicted outgroup hostility, and this effect was mediated by gender conspiracy beliefs. We discuss the implications for gender-based prejudice.     

群体愤怒与群体效能对集体行动的驱动：内在责任感的中介作用

采用问卷法（研究一）和实验法（研究二）探讨群体愤怒与群体效能对集体行动意愿的影响及其内在心理机制。结果表明：（1）群体愤怒与群体效能对集体行动意愿有显著的预测作用;（2）内在责任感中介群体愤怒与群体效能对集体行动意愿的影响;（3）应对群体问题的自我效能感是联接群体效能与内在责任感的桥梁（中介变量）。