Knowledge and Appraisal in the Cognition—Emotion Relationship

Abstract

Recently there has been considerable theoretical and empirical work attempting to identify specific cognitive dimensions that shape the emotional response. However, this work has almost universally neglected an important theoretical distinction between two types of cognition relevant to emotion: knowledge and appraisal. Knowledge has to do with the facts of an adaptational encounter, whereas appraisal defines the personal significance of an encounter for well-being. In the shaping of an emotion, knowledge is a distal variable which requires an additional process of appraisal to produce an emotion; appraisal is a proximal variable which directly influences whether an emotion will be generated, and if so, its kind and intensity.

In this article we examine the distinctions between knowledge and appraisal that are relevant to the emotion process, and how the failure to consider them muddies theoretical and empirical work. We examine a number of putative appraisal dimensions prominent in current theoretical systems, examine why they often constitute knowledge rather than appraisal, and discuss some of the appraisal dimensions in the emotion process. In addition, the major techniques used to study the cognition-emotion relationship are examined and their potential for providing evidence of appraisal rather than knowledge is evaluated.     

Potential pitfalls in computational modelling of appraisal processes: A reply to chwelos and oatley

Abstract

This paper extends the discussion on computational approaches towards modelling emotion antecedent appraisal processes, based on Scherer (1993a) and Chwelos and Oatley (1994). In the first part we briefly discuss the different goals that motivate such modelling as well as potential pitfalls. We then take up some of the critiques of GENESE expressed by Chwelos and Oatley, and examine the proposed alternatives. The paper concludes with an outline of perspectives for future work in this domain.     

Better together: a unified perspective on appraisal and emotion regulation

ABSTRACT

Advances in our understanding of appraisal processes and emotion regulation have been two of the most important contributions of research on cognition and emotion in recent decades. Interestingly, however, progress in these two areas has been less mutually informative than one might expect or desire. To help remedy this situation, we provide an integration of appraisal theory and the process model of emotion regulation by describing parallel, interacting and iterative systems for emotion generation and emotion regulation. Outputs of the emotion generation system are perceived by the emotion regulation system, and emotion regulation strategies then modulate emotion by intervening at specific stages of the emotion generation system, ultimately changing appraisal dimensions. We hope that our unified perspective will encourage and guide future research at the interface of cognition and emotion.     

Discriminating emotions from appraisal-relevant situational information: Baseline data for structural models of cognitive appraisals

Abstract

Cognitive emotion theorists assume that the quality of emotions is determined by the appraisal of the eliciting states of affairs. Accordingly, a central criterion for the evaluation of structural models of cognitive appraisal is their capacity to discriminate between emotions on the basis of the proposed appraisal dimensions. It is suggested that a good model should approximate subjects' “natural” ability to distinguish emotions on the basis of appraisal-relevant situational information. Corresponding data for 23 common emotions, which can serve as a baseline for the evaluation of cognitive appraisal theories, are reported, and various factors that may have deflated the discrimination rates obtained so far in empirical studies are discussed.     

The role of emotion in bridging the intention–behaviour gap: The case of sports participation

ProblemPsychological models of sports participation frequently draw on the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) in order to predict health-behaviour-related intentions. While these models commonly show high predictive power with respect to intention, they often fall short in the prediction of behaviour (the ‘intention–behaviour gap’). The present study contends that integrating emotional processes into TPB can substantially improve the model's predictive power over and above traditional cognitive predictors.MethodIn a longitudinal study structural equation modelling was employed to test a traditional model (based on TPB) and an extended model including emotion associated with the intention to exercise as a mediator variable. A community sample (N = 237) completed a questionnaire measuring the components of a traditional TPB model. Prior to each of 16 expected exercise sessions (over 8 weeks) intention to exercise and emotion associated with the intention were measured.ResultsResults confirmed a substantial increase of 17% in explained variance of exercise frequency and 20% in exercise duration for the extended model. Emotional appraisal of the intention to exercise thus appears to mediate the traditional intention–behaviour relationship, suggesting that emotionally based interventions aimed at increasing sports participation may be helpful.ConclusionIt is concluded that emotion variables should be added to traditional TPB models in order to predict health behaviour more fully.     

A computational unification of cognitive behavior and emotion

Existing models that integrate emotion and cognition generally do not fully specify why cognition needs emotion and conversely why emotion needs cognition. In this paper, we present a unified computational model that combines an abstract cognitive theory of behavior control (PEACTIDM) and a detailed theory of emotion (based on an appraisal theory), integrated in a theory of cognitive architecture (Soar). The theory of cognitive control specifies a set of required computational functions and their abstract inputs and outputs, while the appraisal theory specifies in more detail the nature of these inputs and outputs and an ontology for their representation. We argue that there is a surprising functional symbiosis between these two independently motivated theories that leads to a deeper theoretical integration than has been previously obtained in other computational treatments of cognition and emotion. We use an implemented model in Soar to test the feasibility of the resulting integrated theory, and explore its implications and predictive power in several task domains.     

Studying the emotion-antecedent appraisal process: An expert system approach

Abstract

The surprising convergence between independently developed appraisal theories of emotion elicitation and differentiation is briefly reviewed. It is argued that three problems are responsible for the lack of more widespread acceptance of such theories: (1) the criticism of excessive cognitivism raised by psychologists working on affective phenomena; (2) the lack of process orientation in linking appraisal to the complex unfolding of emotion episodes over time; and (3) the lack of consensus on the number and types of appraisal criteria between theorists in this domain. Although readers are referred to recent theoretical discussions and evidence from the neurosciences with respect to the first two issues, an empirical study using computerised experimentation is reported with respect to the third issue. Data obtained with an expert system based on Scherer's (1984a) “stimulus evaluation check” predictions show the feasibility of this approach in determining the number and types of appraisal criteria needed to explain emotion differentiation. It is suggested to use computer modelling and experimentation as a powerful tool to further theoretical development and collect pertinent data on the emotion-antecedent appraisal process.     

Cognition and emotion: a plea for theory

ABSTRACT

Research on cognition and emotion during the past 30 years has made reasonable progress in theory, methods and empirical research. New theories of the cognition–emotion relation have been proposed, emotion research has become more interdisciplinary, and improved methods of emotion measurement have been developed. On the empirical side, the main achievement of the past 30 years is seen to consist in the reduction of the set of serious contenders for a theory of emotions. Still, several important issues are not fully resolved, including the computational implementation of appraisal processes, the nature of emotions, and the link between emotions and actions. Also, quantitative theories of the cognition–emotion relation need to be refined and tested, and improved theories of the link between emotions and bodily and facial expressions need to be developed. To counter the dangers of theoretical fragmentation and knowledge loss, more efforts should be devoted to the analysis, reconstruction, comparison and integration of important theories and hypotheses in the field of emotion, as well as to the systematization of arguments in favor and against these theories and hypotheses.     

The place of appraisal in emotion

Abstract

The concept of “appraisal” has been used in the literature in a dual way: to refer to the content of emotional experience, as well as to the cognitive antecedents of emotions. I argue that appraisal in the former sense is what is contained in information in self-reports and that this information is of limited use for making inferences on emotion antecedents. This is so because emotional experience may contain appraisals that are part of the emotional response rather than belonging to its causes. They often result from elaboration of the experience after it has begun to be generated. Although in most or all emotions some cognitive appraisal processes are essential antecedents, these processes may be much simpler than self-reports (and the semantics of emotion words) may suggest. The appraisal processes that account for emotion elicitation can be assumed to be of a quite elementary kind.     

Boo! The consciousness problem in emotion

ABSTRACT

This paper will examine the conscious aspects of emotion (i.e. emotional experience), arguably the defining features of emotion. I will argue that emotion IS emotional experience and, consequently, that emotion researchers rarely study emotion itself. I will suggest a research agenda for examining the conscious aspects of emotion and end with a consideration of appraisal theory and how it can be made more relevant to the study of emotion by treating appraisals as components of a pre-reflective perceptual process rather than as causal antecedents of a cognitive process that can be self-reported on.     

Studying appraisal-driven emotion processes: taking stock and moving to the future

ABSTRACT

Appraisal theories of emotion, and particularly the Component Process Model, have claimed over the past three decades that the different components of the emotion process (action tendencies, physiological reactions, expressions, and feeling experiences) are essentially driven by the results of multi-level cognitive appraisals and that the feeling component constitutes a central integration and representation of these processes. Given the complexity of the proposed architecture of emotion generation, comprehensive experimental tests of these predictions are difficult to perform and thus evidence has been slow to appear. Complementing earlier work on self-reported appraisal, a massive amount of empirical results from studies with experimental designs based on appraisal manipulation, using electroencephalographic and electromyographic measures, now confirms many of the theoretical predictions with respect to the effect of different appraisal checks, their interactions, and their exact timing. A major issue for future research is the nature of the coherence or synchronisation of the appraisal-driven components in the unfolding emotion process. It is suggested that interdisciplinary multi-team research will be needed to face the theoretical and methodological challenges of experimentally investigating the dynamics of the emotion process.     

Revisiting the past and back to the future: Horizons of cognition and emotion research

ABSTRACT

To commemorate that Cognition & Emotion was established three decades ago, we asked some distinguished scholars to reflect on past research on the interface of cognition and emotion and prospects for the future. The resulting papers form the Special Issue on Horizons in Cognition and Emotion Research. The contributions to Horizons cover both the field in general and a diversity of specific topics, including affective neuroscience, appraisal theory, automatic evaluation, embodied emotion, emotional disorders, emotion-linked attentional bias, emotion recognition, emotion regulation, lifespan development, motivation, and social emotions. We hope that Horizons will spark constructive debates, while offering guidance for the future growth and development of research on the interface between cognition and emotion. Finally, we provide an update on how Cognition & Emotion has fared over the past year, and announce some changes in editorial policies and the editorial board.     

The past thirty years of emotion research: appraisal and beyond

ABSTRACT

For this Special Issue, I highlight the past and present importance of appraisal theory as well as the challenges to its status as a total theory of emotions from the other functions of emotions: associative learning, self-regulation and social communication. This theoretical view applies both to emotion research in general and the specific fields of my interest in the emotions of moral judgment and intergroup processes. Methodologically, developments in analyses of large and more naturally occurring data sets will give an opportunity to square psychology’s structural models of discrete emotions with the more complicated reality that exists. Both for the field and for individual researchers picking up the study of emotions, my advice is to pay special attention to measures, their assumptions and their context.     

An argument for basic emotions

Abstract

Emotions are viewed as having evolved through their adaptive value in dealing with fundamental life-tasks. Each emotion has unique features: signal, physiology, and antecedent events. Each emotion also has characteristics in common with other emotions: rapid onset, short duration, unbidden occurrence, automatic appraisal, and coherence among responses. These shared and unique characteristics are the product of our evolution, and distinguish emotions from other affective phenomena.     

On motivational influences,moving beyond valence,and integrating dimensional and discrete views of emotion

ABSTRACT

The field of cognition and emotion has grown considerably over the past 30 years, with an increased emphasis on the relationships between emotional and motivational components and how they contribute to basic perceptual, cognitive, and neural processes. For instance, research has revealed that emotion often influences these processes via emotion’s relationship with motivational dimensions, as when positive emotions low versus high in approach motivational intensity have different influences on attentional and other cognitive processes. Research has also revealed that motivational direction (approach vs. withdrawal) and affective valence (positive vs. negative) are not as closely related as once was theorised; that is, positive affect is not inevitably associated with approach motivation and negative affect is not inevitably associated with withdrawal motivation. These and other lines of research with anger have suggested that the field needs to move beyond a focus on affective valence and it needs to consider an integration of dimensional and discrete models of emotion. The article also includes some suggestions for improving methods of measuring and inducing emotions and some recommendations for future researchers.     

Sad mood,emotion regulation,and response inhibition

ABSTRACT

Affect-as-information models, resource allocation models, and arousal biased competition theory predict different effects of mood on cognition. To test these theories, this study examines the effect of sad mood on response inhibition (RI) and whether emotion dysregulation impacts this potential relationship. Participants were 273 undergraduates who wrote about either a typical day or a sad event from their life. They self-reported mood and emotion regulation difficulties, and RI was a composite score of Colour-Word Stroop, Stop-Signal, and go/no-go computerised tasks. The intensity of self-reported sad mood did not affect RI as predicted, but those who wrote about sad events had worse RI. Worse emotion regulation also predicted worse RI. Cognitive loads, rumination, and mind-wandering are discussed as possible mechanisms. Findings are extended from well-established areas such as working memory to the less-established area of RI.     

Early antecedents of emotion differentiation and regulation: Experience tunes the appraisal thresholds of emotional development in infancy

In this review, we synthesize evidence to highlight cognitive appraisal as an important developmental antecedent of individual differences in emotion differentiation and adept emotion regulation. Emotion differentiation is the degree to which emotions are experienced in a nuanced or “granular” way—as specific and separable phenomena. More extensive differentiation is related to positive wellbeing and has emerged as a correlate of emotion regulation skill among adults. We argue that the cognitive appraisal processes that underlie these facets of emotional development are instantiated early in the first year of life and tuned by environmental input and experience. Powerful socializing input in the form of caregivers’ contingent and selective responding to infants’ emotional signals carves and calibrates the infant’s appraisal thresholds for what in their world ought to be noticed, deemed as important or personally meaningful, and responded to (whether and how). These appraisal thresholds are thus unique to the individual child despite the ubiquity of the appraisal process in emotional responding. This appraisal infrastructure, while plastic and continually informed by experience across the lifespan, likely tunes subsequent emotion differentiation, with implications for children’s emotion regulatory choices and skills. We end with recommendations for future research in this area, including the urgent need for developmental emotion science to investigate the diverse sociocultural contexts in which children’s cognitive appraisals, differentiation of emotions, and regulatory responses are being built across childhood.     

Conceptualizing stress to study effects on health: Environmental,perceptual, and emotional components

Abstract

Stress has been operationalized in numerous ways across studies of physical and mental health, raising questions about the appropriate definition of stress and the construct validity of stress measures. The present paper discusses the theoretical and operational strengths of three prominent approaches to stress definition and then attempts to integrate them into a comprehensive and robust multidimensional definition of stress. In a study of socioeconomically disadvantaged pregnant women, structural equation modelling techniques were used to test whether a single latent construct underlies environmental, perceptual, and response-based indicators of stress. Results suggested a two-factor, rather than a single-factor, model of stress. Stress perception and emotion were part of a single underlying latent factor, a phenomenological stress construct, whereas environmental conditions in the form of major life events represented a second and distinct component of stress. Failure to find a single latent stress construct is interpreted as evidence for the importance of individual perception or appraisal as a mediator of response to difficult environmental conditions. The findings suggest that multidimensional models of stress are theoretically justified and that enhancement of stress measurement in this manner may enable researchers to better identify health effects of stress.