Regret aversion and decision process quality: Effects of regret salience on decision process carefulness

A considerable amount of past research has examined the effects of regret aversion on which options decision makers choose. However, past research has largely neglected to address the effect of regret aversion on the decision process. We conducted five experiments to examine the effect of making regret salient on decision process quality. We predicted that increased regret aversion would lead to more careful decision processing. The results consistently supported this prediction across the different decision situations, incentive structures, regret salience manipulations, and dependent variables used. In all experiments making regret salient led decision makers to take significantly longer to reach a decision. In Studies 2a, 2b, and 4 it also led participants to collect significantly more information before making a choice. Implications and future directions are discussed.     

Myopic regret avoidance: Feedback avoidance and learning in repeated decision making

Decision makers can become trapped by myopic regret avoidance in which rejecting feedback to avoid short-term outcome regret (regret associated with counterfactual outcome comparisons) leads to reduced learning and greater long-term regret over continuing poor decisions. In a series of laboratory experiments involving repeated choices among uncertain monetary prospects, participants primed with outcome regret tended to decline feedback, learned the task slowly or not at all, and performed poorly. This pattern was reversed when decision makers were primed with self-blame regret (regret over an unjustified decision). Further, in a final experiment in which task learning was unnecessary, feedback was more often rejected in the self-blame regret condition than in the outcome regret condition. We discuss the findings in terms of a distinction between two regret components, one associated with outcome evaluation, the other with the justifiability of the decision process used in making the choice.     

Power and loss aversion

Four experiments tested the prediction that power reduces loss aversion by increasing the anticipated value of gains and shrinking the negative anticipated value of losses. Experiment 1 provided initial support for the prediction that those in power are less loss averse by replicating a classic paradigm of loss aversion in riskless choice and demonstrating moderation by power. Experiments 2 and 3 expanded on this finding by breaking apart the components of loss aversion to determine how power may reduce it: via gains, losses, or both. Across two scenarios and two different measures of anticipated value, power reduced the anticipated threat associated with a loss. However, the prediction that power increases the anticipated value of gains was not supported. Finally, Experiment 4 replicated the results of Experiments 2 and 3 in the context of a choice with real consequences for the participants. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

影响决策的情感因素——后悔理论的研究述评

情感因素在决策中起着重要的作用。本文对决策中最重要的情感因素——后悔因素的研究发展及其成果做了归纳总结,同时也将一些零散的发现整合在一起,使之更加系统化。后悔情绪对决策的影响作用不容忽视,作为决策理论之一的后悔理论在决策理论中的重要地位日益凸显出来。未来的研究将仍旧主要集中在其对决策的影响方面。后悔理论成为理性决策的一个可替代理论,已为时不远。     

澳门人少涉赌是规避风险还是规避后悔？

是风险规避还是后悔规避左右人们的冒险行为？基于风险行为跨领域特殊性,本研究假设：决策者是规避风险还是规避后悔具有领域特异性。本研究选取有涉赌经验的澳门居民为样本,以其参与13种博彩的次数为指标考察其真实风险行为。结果验证了上述假设,风险规避说或后悔规避说都不能单独解释个体的风险倾向,个体是风险规避、后悔规避,或二者皆有,取决于其所处的具体风险情境类别。该发现有助于加深对风险行为特征的认识,亦可为预防及应对问题赌博提供启发和指导。     

The effects of social comparison on inaction inertia

In this paper, we examine inaction inertia in a social context where the decision-maker is among others who are faced with similar current and past opportunities. We specifically investigate whether the likelihood of taking advantage of a current opportunity after having missed a previous, relatively superior opportunity depends on whether a referent other did or did not take advantage of the previous opportunity. We report results from three studies that provide evidence for the interplay between the past actions and inactions of a referent other and the extent of inaction inertia displayed by a focal decision-maker. We also show that the proximity of the other and the valence of the relationship between the decision-maker and the other influence the extent to which the decision of the other impacts the likelihood to take action. And, finally, we show that regret mediates the relationship between the decision of the other with respect to the past opportunity and the decision-maker's likelihood of taking advantage of the current opportunity.     

The impact of past behaviour normality on regret: replication and extension of three experiments of the exceptionality effect

Norm theory (Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. Psychological Review, 93, 136–153) described a tendency for people to associate stronger regret with a negative outcome when it is a result of an exception (abnormal behaviour) compared to when it is a result of routine (normal behaviour). In two pre-registered studies, we conducted a replication and extension of three classic experiments on past behaviour exception/routine contrasts (N?=?684). We successfully replicated Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) experiments with the classic hitchhiker-scenario (Part 1) and car accident-scenario (Part 2). In both cases, participants examined negative outcomes and tended to indicate a protagonist who deviated from own past behaviour as more regretful than another who followed routine. Pre-registered extensions also showed effects for ratings of social norms, negative affect, and perceived luck. We did not find support for the Miller, D. T., and McFarland, C. [(1986). Counterfactual thinking and victim compensation: A test of norm theory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12, 513–519] experiment robbery scenario (Part 3) using a compensation measure, in that compensation to a victim of a robbery was not significantly different comparing exceptional and routine circumstances. However, a pre-registered extension showed that robbery under exceptional circumstances was perceived as more regretful than robbery under routine circumstances. We discuss implications for current and future research.     

Psychological determinants of decision attitude

Decision attitude — an analog of risk attitude — is the propensity to make (or avoid making) a decision: in decision aversion, a person finds it more desirable to receive through fiat the better of two options than to have a choice between them; in decision seeking, the choice is more desirable, even though it can lead to nothing better than the best option. Both decision aversion and decision seeking were found in hypothetical scenarios. Experimental manipulations and subjects' justifications point to anticipated regret, fear of blame for poor outcomes, and desire for equitable distributions as sources of decision aversion. One source of decision seeking (for self) and decision aversion (when deciding for others) appears to be the desire for the self-determination of the affected parties. We consider the implications of our results for personal choice and public policy decisions.     

安于现状偏差的心理机制、影响因素及应用启示

安于现状偏差是指个体在决策时,倾向于不作为、维持当前或者以前的决策的一种现象。安于现状偏差包括内源的安于现状偏差与外源的安于现状偏差。目前研究者对这一现象的解释主要有两种:损失规避与后悔理论。安于现状偏差的影响因素主要包括备择项的数目、决策者的情绪以及认知与动机特征等。安于现状偏差有利于认识日常决策行为,而且在销售、管理与公共政策等实践领域有着重要的研究价值。未来的研究则需要从安于现状偏差与其他决策现象之间的关系,安于现状偏差的产生根源及其应用研究的拓展等方面来进一步探讨。     

自尊与模糊决策中的决策偏好

从自尊的角度出发,与是否需要承担决策结果的责任相结合,探讨了低自尊、中等自尊和高自尊水平下的被试在模糊决策中的决策偏好。结果发现：角色差异对决策偏好没有影响;自尊水平的高低对决策偏好有影响,高自尊被试与中等、低自尊被试相比,更容易模糊规避。支持了高自尊个体比低自尊个体更具有防御反应的理论。     

The role of emotion expectancies in adolescents' moral decision making

This study investigated the impact of emotion expectancies on adolescents’ moral decision making in hypothetical situations. The sample consisted of 160 participants from three different grade levels (mean age = 15.79 years, SD = 2.96). Participants were confronted with a set of scenarios that described various emotional outcomes of (im)moral actions and needed to decide what they would do if they were in the protagonist’s shoes. Findings demonstrate that emotion expectancies differentially influenced adolescents’ hypothetical decision making in antisocial versus prosocial behavioral contexts. Whereas negatively charged self-evaluative emotions over failing to act morally (e.g., guilt) were the strongest predictor for moral choice in antisocial behavioral contexts, positively charged self-evaluative emotions over acting morally (e.g., pride) most strongly predicted moral choice in prosocial contexts. Older adolescents paid greater attention to outcome-oriented emotions that make the decision to act morally less attractive (e.g., regret). Overall, the study suggests that emotion expectancies influence moral decision making in unique and meaningful ways.     

Optimal correction for guessing in multiple-choice tests

Subjects’ decisions in multiple-choice tests are an interesting domain for the analysis of decision making under uncertainty. When the test is graded using a rule that penalizes wrong answers, each item can be viewed as a lottery where a rational examinee would choose whether to omit (sure reward) or answer (take the lottery) depending on risk aversion and level of knowledge. We formalize students as heterogeneous decision makers with different risk attitudes and levels of knowledge. Building on IRT, we compute the optimal penalty given students’ optimal behavior and the trade-off between bias and measurement error. Although MCQ examinations are frequently used, there is no consensus as to whether a penalty for wrong answers should be used or not. For example, examinations for medical licensing in some countries include MCQ sections with penalty while in others there is no penalty for wrong answers. We contribute to this discussion with a formal analysis of the effects of penalties; our simulations indicate that the optimal penalty is relatively high for perfectly rational students but also when they are not fully rational: even though penalty discriminates against risk averse students, this effect is small compared with the measurement error that it prevents.     

Keeping one's options open: The detrimental consequences of decision reversibility

People generally prefer to have the opportunity to revise their decisions. Surprisingly however, research has shown that keeping one's options open yields lower satisfaction with the decision outcome (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). Two studies aimed to gain more insight into the detrimental consequences of decision reversibility and the cognitive processes underlying decision reversibility. Building upon literature on goal fulfillment we hypothesized and found in a first experiment that as long as decisions are still open to change, accessibility of decision-related constructs is increased compared to neutral constructs. A second experiment demonstrated that decision reversibility undermines working memory capacity. Moreover participants experienced higher regret after having made a reversible decision, an effect that was mediated by decreased working memory capacity. The study set implies that reversible decisions yield lower working memory capacity because people continue to think about the, still relevant, choice options. In the end this might increase dissatisfaction with the decision and regret.     

Is luck on my side? Optimism,pessimism, and ambiguity aversion

The influences of optimism and pessimism on ambiguity aversion were investigated in two tasks that manipulated the presence or absence of a potentially competitive experimenter. A total of 112 participants chose which option—ambiguous or known-risk—they preferred in the two slightly differing Ellsberg urns tasks. Optimism was measured using the Extended Life Orientation Test (ELOT). Highly optimistic people showed significantly less ambiguity aversion than less optimistic people when information was given that the number of balls was randomly determined. This pattern was present but less pronounced in the condition when the composition of the ambiguous urn could be interpreted as being influenced (rigged) by the experimenter. Pessimism was uninfluential. Perceptions of the situation, especially the degree of trust in the experimenter, were significantly influenced by the participants' optimism. People who do not have highly optimistic personalities tend to shy away from choosing ambiguous options. When ambiguity is clear, and trust issues are removed, people's optimistic outlook influences their degree of ambiguity aversion and thus their decisions.     

伤害厌恶的二因素结构及其抑制攻击的机制

伤害厌恶是人类道德的核心, 揭示它的结构与功能具有重要意义。伤害厌恶由伤害行为厌恶和伤害结果厌恶这两个相对独立的因素构成的观点尚未获得有力的实证支持, 这两个因素在抑制攻击方面的差异及其背后的机制也不清楚。为了探究这些问题, 我们实施了1个预实验和3个正式实验。预实验基于加工分离程序开发了伤害行为/结果厌恶分离任务, 实验1使用该任务检验了伤害厌恶的结构, 实验2(包括2a和2b)探究了伤害行为/结果厌恶抑制攻击的道德认知机制。研究结果显示, 伤害厌恶由伤害行为厌恶和伤害结果厌恶这两个相对独立的因素构成。伤害结果厌恶可以通过道德推脱抑制攻击, 但伤害行为厌恶对道德推脱和攻击的抑制作用不稳健。通过上述实验, 本研究开发了伤害厌恶的研究工具, 检验了伤害厌恶的二因素结构及其在抑制攻击认知与行为上的差异, 揭示了伤害厌恶抑制攻击的道德认知路径。     

Decomposition of multivariate utility functions in non-additive expected utility theory

In expected utility many results have been derived that give necessary and/or sufficient conditions for a multivariate utility function to be decomposable into lower-dimensional functions. In particular, multilinear, multiplicative and additive decompositions have been widely discussed. These utility functions can be more easily assessed in practical situations. In this paper we present a theory of decomposition in the context of nonadditive expected utility such as anticipated utility or Choquet expected utility. We show that many of the results used in conventional expected utility carry over to these more general frameworks. If preferences over lotteries depend only on the marginal probability distributions, then in expected utility the utility function is additively decomposable. We show that in anticipated utility the marginality condition implies not only that the utility function is additively decomposable but also that the distortion function is the identity function. We further demonstrate that a decision maker who is bivariate risk neutral has a utility function that is additively decomposable and a distortion function q for which q(½) = ½.