Children's understanding of anticipatory regret and disappointment

The anticipation of regret and disappointment plays an important role in decision making by adults. The anticipation of regret may also lead to a desire to avoid feedback about likely outcomes of non-chosen courses of action, while the anticipation of disappointment is associated with avoidance of risk-taking and the deliberate dampening of expectations. The present study used the context of a simple game to examine children's understanding of these anticipatory regret and disappointment emotion-regulation strategies. It was found that even though children 7/8 years of age were able to understand the situational factors that produce disappointment and regret, it was not until 9/10 years of age that children exhibited an understanding of anticipatory regret emotion-regulation strategies, and even at this age children did not exhibit an understanding of the use of dampening of expectations as a strategy for coping with the anticipation of disappointment.     

Disruptive effects of disconfirmed expectancies about crowding.

The experiment utilized a 2 (high vs. low room density) X 2 (forewarning of a crowded room vs. no forewarning) X 2 (simple vs. complex task) design to examine the effects of anticipation of crowding on task performance. More tasks were attempted and efficiency was higher when expectancies about the crowd were confirmed. Subjects not told to anticipate a crowd who actually worked under high density and subjects warned about a crowd that did not materialize performed most poorly. These differences were largest for the complex task. Baum and Greenberg's results were replicated with the performance data. Perceptions of the experimental room also differed as a function of anticipation, but failure to obtain a Crowding X Anticipation interaction did not support their hypothesis that anticipating a crowd induces identical perceptions to those obtained under actual crowding. The results are discussed in terms of disconfirmed expectancies being disruptive of performance, particularly complex task performance.     

Behavioural consequences of regret and disappointment in social bargaining games

Previous research on the role of negative emotions in social bargaining games has focused primarily on social emotions such as anger and guilt. In this article, we provide a test for behavioural differences between two prototypical decision-related negative emotions-regret and disappointment-in one-shot social dilemma games. Three experiments with two different emotion-induction procedures (autobiographical recall and imagined scenarios) and two different games (the ultimatum game and the 10-coin give-some game) revealed that regret increased prosocial behaviour, whereas disappointment decreased prosocial behaviour. These results extend previous findings concerning differences between regret and disappointment to interdependent (social) situations.     

The inaction effect in the psychology of regret

Previous research showed that decisions to act (i.e., actions) produce more regret than decisions not to act (i.e., inactions). This previous research focused on decisions made in isolation and ignored that decisions are often made in response to earlier outcomes. The authors show in 4 experiments that these prior outcomes may promote action and hence make inaction more abnormal. They manipulated information about a prior outcome. As hypothesized, when prior outcomes were positive or absent, people attributed more regret to action than to inaction. However, as predicted and counter to previous research, following negative prior outcomes, more regret was attributed to inaction, a finding that the authors label the inaction effect. Experiment 4, showing differential effects for regret and disappointment, demonstrates the need for emotion-specific predictions.     

Mental contrasting of counterfactual fantasies attenuates disappointment,regret, and resentment

Negative emotions elicited by positive counterfactuals about an alternative past—“if only” reconstructions of negative life events—are functional in preparing people to act when opportunities to restore the alternative past will arise. If the counterfactual past is lost, because restorative opportunities are absent, letting go of the negative emotions should be the better solution, sheltering people from feelings of distress. In six experimental studies, the self-regulation strategy of mental contrasting (Oettingen, European Review of Social Psychology 23:1–63, 2012) attenuated the negative emotions elicited by positive fantasies about a lost counterfactual past, specifically, disappointment, regret and resentment. Mental contrasting (vs. relevant control conditions) led people to feel less disappointed when evaluating their lost counterfactual past compared with their current reality, indicating reduced commitment to the lost counterfactual past (Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4), and it attenuated post-decisional regret and resentment (Studies 5 and 6). These findings held when participants were induced to focus on lost counterfactual pasts for which they were responsible (Studies 4 and 5), for which they blamed another person (Study 6), or for which they deemed no one responsible (Studies 2 and 3). The findings are relevant for building interventions that help people to come to terms with their lost counterfactual past.     

Regret and disappointment in taxpayer reporting decisions: An experimental study

This paper reports on experiments which test whether factors such as regret or disappointment influence taxpayer compliance decisions. Previous tests of regret and disappointment theory have been based upon the common-ratio effect in which probabilities vary while outcomes are held fixed. In contrast, our experiments involved trials in which the outcomes were allowed to vary. Previous tests had mainly found evidence of regret effects and to a lesser extent were supportive of disappointment. In contrast, we were able to reject simple theories of both regret and disappointment. A second experiment produced evidence which indicates that whether or not rejected risky alternatives are resolved has no significant influence on subjects' choices. One would expect that regret could only occur when a subject learns the outcome of a non-chosen option. Hence this result can be seen as evidence against regret theory. We shall argue that there is a possible interpretation of regret theory which is compatible with this result.     

Supplication and appeasement in conflict and negotiation: The interpersonal effects of disappointment, worry, guilt, and regret

This study examined the social effects of emotions related to supplication and appeasement in conflict and negotiation. In a computer-simulated negotiation, participants in Experiment 1 were confronted with a disappointed or worried opponent (supplication), with a guilty or regretful opponent (appeasement), or with a nonemotional opponent (control). Compared with controls, participants conceded more when the other experienced supplication emotions and conceded less when the other experienced appeasement emotions (especially guilt). Experiment 2 replicated the effects of disappointment and guilt and showed that they are moderated by the perceiver's dispositional trust: Negotiators high in trust conceded more to a disappointed counterpart than to a happy one, but those with low trust were unaffected. In Experiment 3, trust was manipulated through information about the other's personality (cooperative vs. competitive), and a similar moderation was obtained.     

When good decisions have bad outcomes: The impact of affect on switching behavior

Four experiments test the hypothesis that an unfavorable outcome of a good decision leads individuals to switch away from that decision due to negative emotional responses to the outcome. Negative emotional reactions led many participants to abandon the option that they recalled as having been more successful overall in the past (Study 1) and which they expected to perform better in the future (Study 2). A prompt to consider the future success rates of the two alternatives did not eliminate switching (Study 2). An experimental manipulation in Study 3 indicated that individuals switch when they focus on their affective reactions rather than beliefs about the earlier disappointing outcome. In Study 4, individuals with a general tendency to focus on cognitions (i.e., those high in need for cognition) were less likely to switch away from the better option following a disappointing outcome. These results suggest that an emotional reaction to a negative outcome can lead people to switch away from the options that they believe are most likely to be successful on the next occasion.     

Feeling bad about being sad: the role of social expectancies in amplifying negative mood

Our perception of how others expect us to feel has significant implications for our emotional functioning. Across 4 studies the authors demonstrate that when people think others expect them not to feel negative emotions (i.e., sadness) they experience more negative emotion and reduced well-being. The authors show that perceived social expectancies predict these differences in emotion and well-being both more consistently than-and independently of-personal expectancies and that they do so by promoting negative self-evaluation when experiencing negative emotion. We find evidence for these effects within Australia (Studies 1 and 2) as well as Japan (Study 2), although the effects of social expectancies are especially evident in the former (Studies 1 and 2). We also find experimental evidence for the causal role of social expectancies in negative emotional responses to negative emotional events (Studies 3 and 4). In short, when people perceive that others think they should feel happy, and not sad, this leads them to feel sad more frequently and intensely.     

Cultural grounding of regret: regret in self and interpersonal contexts

The purpose of this study was to explore cultural similarities and differences in regret, focusing on distinctions between interpersonal and self-situations, and between action and inaction regrets. Japanese and American undergraduates were asked to describe regrets experienced in interpersonal and self-situations. We found that both situational and cultural contexts influenced the likelihood of regretting inactions over actions. Participants were more likely to recall inaction regrets in self-situations than in interpersonal situations, and that the likelihood of recalling inaction regrets was more pronounced for Americans than for Japanese. Furthermore, we examined the intensity of the regret. Whereas American students experienced regret as intense as that of Japanese students in self-situations, Japanese students experienced regret more strongly than American students in interpersonal situations. Detailed content analysis also showed that individuals experienced regret in ways consistent with cultural values. The situational and cultural grounding of regret is discussed.     

Self-regulation and protective health behaviour: How regulatory focus and anticipated regret are related to vaccination decisions

Objective: We examined how individual motivational orientations and anticipated regret are related to the protective health decision of vaccination behaviour.

Design: The proposed relations were examined in a large-scale sample (N = 3168) and three medium-sized samples (N = 151, N = 194, N = 208). Questionnaires were applied to assess regulatory focus, anticipated regret and vaccination behaviour.

Results: Increased prevention-focused self-regulation – which is represented by concerns about security-related goals, responsibilities and obligations – was related to a greater likelihood of vaccination. Prevention-focused individuals’ higher likelihood of getting vaccinated seems at least in part to be a consequence of anticipated regret for not vaccinating. Study 3 suggests that regulatory focus is less related to vaccination decisions when regret is increased by the decision-making context; that is, when information highlighting vaccination effectiveness and a low likelihood of adverse responses is provided.

Conclusion: Prevention-focused self-regulation is related to a greater likelihood of engaging in health-protective behaviour. This can be explained by prevention-focused individuals’ greater tendency to anticipate regret about getting ill as a consequence of not adopting protective measures. If people perceive a protective measure such as a vaccination as highly effective, anticipated regret for not adopting it is generally increased, and individual differences in regulatory focus no longer predict the decision.     

When feeling bad is expected to be good: emotion regulation and outcome expectancies in social conflicts

According to the instrumental approach to emotion regulation, people may want to experience even unpleasant emotions to attain instrumental benefits. Building on value-expectancy models of self-regulation, we tested whether people want to feel bad in certain contexts specifically because they expect such feelings to be useful to them. In two studies, participants were more likely to try to increase their anger before a negotiation when motivated to confront (vs. collaborate with) a negotiation partner. Participants motivated to confront (vs. collaborate with) their partner expected anger to be more useful to them, and this expectation in turn, led them to try to increase their anger before negotiating. The subsequent experience of anger, following random assignment to emotion inductions (Study 1) or engagement in self-selected emotion regulation activities (Study 2), led participants to be more successful at getting others to concede to their demands, demonstrating that emotional preferences have important pragmatic implications.     

The development of regret

In two experiments, 4- to 9-year-olds played a game in which they selected one of two boxes to win a prize. On regret trials the unchosen box contained a better prize than the prize children actually won, and on baseline trials the other box contained a prize of the same value. Children rated their feelings about their prize before and after seeing what they could have won if they had chosen the other box and were asked to provide an explanation if their feelings had changed. Patterns of responding suggested that regret was experienced by 6 or 7 years of age; children of this age could also explain why they felt worse in regret trials by referring to the counterfactual situation in which the prize was better. No evidence of regret was found in 4- and 5-year-olds. Additional findings suggested that by 6 or 7 years, children's emotions were determined by a consideration of two different counterfactual scenarios.     

On bad luck: Job and jesus

I reflect on certain random events that befall us and to those we love, random events we never would have chosen because of the pain and suffering they involve. A distinction is drawn between the bad luck of physical assaults, such as genetic defects and the bad luck growing out of value conflicts. Illuminated by the writings of two philosophers— Wilcox and Wolterstorff—I examine the story of Job's maturing response to bad luck. I conclude with some reflections on Christ's response to pain and suffering and its implications for our response to bad luck.     

On the construction and maintenance of expectancies

Reaction time techniques were used to examine the role of attention in the construction and maintenance of expectancies. In Experiment I, a primed letter matching task, expectancies were observed through a delay (cost) in responding to misprimed letter arrays. A secondary probe task was interpolated between prime and array letters on some of the trials, with attentional demands inferred from delayed responding to probes. By varying the amount of time between onset of the prime and either a probe or letter array, it was found that there is attentional involvement (as reflected in probe inhibition) prior to the observation of expectancies (as reflected in letter matching cost). It was also found that the interpolation of an attention-demanding probe task did not entirely disrupt primed expectancies. Experiment II found that an expectancy persists even when an interpolated distractor task signals that the expectancy is no longer valid. These expectancies were found to decay as a function of time. The implications of these results for attention allocation and memory activation views of expectancy were discussed.     

Replicated alternatives and the role of confusion,chasing, and regret in decisions from experience

The current paper explores choice among alternatives that can be classified into distinct classes. All the members of a particular class were ‘replicated alternatives’: they promised the same payoff distribution. Information to decision makers was limited to feedback concerning the realized (obtained and foregone) payoffs. Experiment 1 demonstrates that increasing the number of replicated alternatives creates confusion (which facilitates random choice) and changes the implications of the tendency to chase recent returns (i.e., select the alternative with the best recent outcomes). This effect, termed ‘confused chasing,’ facilitates risk seeking even when this behavior impairs expected earnings. Experiment 2 reveals that increasing the number of replicated alternatives can reduce (but does not eliminate) the tendency to underweight rare events. Experiment 3 shows that the relative importance of chasing and confusion is sensitive to the likelihood of realizing lower payoffs than the forgone payoffs. The main results are summarized with a simple model assuming that payoff sensitivity decreases with experienced regret. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

失望情绪在不作为惯性产生中的作用

以往不作为惯性领域的研究发现, 当个体没有获得先前更优机会是源于他人或外界等不可控因素时, 个体仍会倾向于继续放弃当前次优机会, 且后悔情绪未能对此进行解释。本研究认为失望情绪适用于解释此种情况下的不作为惯性, 或可成为后悔情绪解释的有效补充。本研究通过两个实验首次探讨了失望情绪在不作为惯性产生中的作用。结果发现, 各自变量对失望情绪（体验失望和预期失望）和作为可能性均具有一致的影响力, 且预期失望在不作为惯性的产生中具有中介作用。本研究表明, 失望情绪可能也是导致不作为惯性的一个重要因素。