Motivational Influences on Cognitive Performance in Children: Focus Over Fit

Cognitive psychologists have begun to address how motivational factors influence adults' performance on cognitive tasks. However, little research has examined how different motivational factors interact with one another to affect behavior across the life span. In the current study, the authors examined how children perform on a classification task when placed in a regulatory fit or mismatch. Nine-year-old children performed a classification task in which they either gained or lost points for each response. Additionally, children were given either a global promotion focus (trying to earn a gift card) or a prevention focus (trying to avoid losing a gift card). Previous work indicates that adults in this task tend to perform better when there is a match (or fit) between the incentive to gain, or avoid losing, a global reward, and the more local task reward structure to either maximize points gained or minimize points lost on a trial-by-trial basis. Unlike adults, 9-year-olds perform better in the promotion condition than in the prevention condition regardless of task reward structure. Possible explanations for the differences between adults' and children's performance are discussed as are possible applications for academic settings.     

Dissociable influences of reward motivation and positive emotion on cognitive control

It is becoming increasingly appreciated that affective and/or motivational influences contribute strongly to goal-oriented cognition and behavior. An unresolved question is whether emotional manipulations (i.e., direct induction of affectively valenced subjective experience) and motivational manipulations (e.g., delivery of performance-contingent rewards and punishments) have similar or distinct effects on cognitive control. Prior work has suggested that reward motivation can reliably enhance a proactive mode of cognitive control, whereas other evidence is suggestive that positive emotion improves cognitive flexibility, but reduces proactive control. However, a limitation of the prior research is that reward motivation and positive emotion have largely been studied independently. Here, we directly compared the effects of positive emotion and reward motivation on cognitive control with a tightly matched, within-subjects design, using the AX-continuous performance task paradigm, which allows for relative measurement of proactive versus reactive cognitive control. High-resolution pupillometry was employed as a secondary measure of cognitive dynamics during task performance. Robust increases in behavioral and pupillometric indices of proactive control were observed with reward motivation. The effects of positive emotion were much weaker, but if anything, also reflected enhancement of proactive control, a pattern that diverges from some prior findings. These results indicate that reward motivation has robust influences on cognitive control, while also highlighting the complexity and heterogeneity of positive-emotion effects. The findings are discussed in terms of potential neurobiological mechanisms.     

Exercise modulates the interaction between cognition and anxiety in humans

Despite interest in exercise as a treatment for anxiety disorders the mechanism behind the anxiolytic effects of exercise is unclear. Two observations motivate the present work. First, engagement of attention control during increased working memory (WM) load can decrease anxiety. Second, exercise can improve attention control. Therefore, exercise could boost the anxiolytic effects of increased WM load via its strengthening of attention control. Anxiety was induced by threat of shock and was quantified with anxiety-potentiated startle (APS). Thirty-five healthy volunteers (19 male, age M?=?26.11, SD ?=?5.52) participated in two types of activity, exercise (biking at 60–70% of heart rate reserve) and control-activity (biking at 10–20% of heart rate reserve). After each activity, participants completed a WM task (n-back) at low- and high-load during safe and threat. Results were not consistent with the hypothesis: exercise vs. control-activity increased APS in high-load (p?=?.03). However, this increased APS was not accompanied with threat-induced impairment in WM performance (p?=?.37). Facilitation of both task-relevant stimulus processing and task-irrelevant threat processing, concurrent with prevention of threat interference on cognition, suggests that exercise increases cognitive ability. Future studies should explore how exercise affects the interplay of cognition and anxiety in patients with anxiety disorders.     

Nonspatial attentional capture by previously rewarded scene semantics

Recent research has shown that reward influences visual perception and cognition in a way that is distinct from the well-documented goal-directed mechanisms. In the current study we explored how task-irrelevant stimulus-reward associations affect processing of stimuli when attention is constrained and reward no longer delivered. During a training phase, participants performed a choice game, exposing them to different reward schedules for different semantic categories of natural scene pictures. In a separate test session in which no additional reward was provided, the differentially rewarded scene categories were used as task-irrelevant non-targets in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task. Participants performed a detection task on a previously non-rewarded target category. Results show that participants' sensitivity index (d′) for target detection decreased as a function of whether the reward was coupled to the distractor category during training. The semantic category of natural scenes associated with high reward caused more interference in target detection than the semantic category associated with a low reward. The same was found when new, unseen distractor pictures of the same semantic categories were used. The present findings suggest that reward can be selectively associated with high level scene semantics. We argue that learned stimulus-reward associations persistently bias perceptual processing independently of spatial shifts in attention and the immediate prospect of reward.     

Spatial perseveration error by alpacas (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Vicugna pacos</Emphasis>) in an A-not-B detour task

Spatial perseveration has been documented for domestic animals such as mules, donkeys, horses and dogs. However, evidence for this spatial cognition behavior among other domestic species is scarce. Alpacas have been domesticated for at least 7000 years yet their cognitive ability has not been officially reported. The present article used an A-not-B detour task to study the spatial problem-solving abilities of alpacas (Vicugna pacos) and to identify the perseveration errors, which refers to a tendency to maintain a learned route, despite having another available path. The study tested 51 alpacas, which had to pass through a gap at one end of a barrier in order to reach a reward. After one, two, three or four repeats (A trials), the gap was moved to the opposite end of the barrier (B trials). In contrast to what has been found in other domestic animals tested with the same task, the present study did not find clear evidence of spatial perseveration. Individuals’ performance in the subsequent B trials, following the change of gap location, suggests no error persistence in alpacas. Results suggest that alpacas are more flexible than other domestic animals tested with this same task, which has important implications in planning proper training for experimental designs or productive purposes. These results could contribute toward enhancing alpacas’ welfare and our understanding of their cognitive abilities.     

Continuity in social cognition from infancy to childhood

Research examining the development of social cognition has largely been divided into two areas: infant perception of intentional agents, and preschoolers’ understanding of others’ mental states and beliefs (theory of mind). Many researchers have suggested that there is continuity in social cognitive development such that the abilities observed in infancy are related to later preschool ability, yet little empirical evidence exists for this claim. Here, we present preliminary evidence that capacities specific to the social domain contribute to performance in social cognition tasks both during infancy and in early childhood. Specifically, looking time patterns in an infant social cognition task correlated with preschool theory of mind; however, no such relationship was found for infants in a nonsocial cognition task.     

Study of a cognitive effects model in Dohsa‐hou for the elderly

This study investigates the primary factors responsible for cognitive performance improvements as a result of dohsa‐hou (Japanese body‐oriented psychotherapy) for the elderly. The study divided participants into two homogeneous groups: an experimental group that attempted to improve upright balance by performing dohsa‐hou, and a control group to establish the drop‐off period for the effect of performing the given activities. The task processing time of Stroop Test and body sway and the situational anxiety during task processing of Stroop Tests were measured before and after the dohsa‐hou and drop‐off period. The results confirm that only the experimental group improved in body sway, had a shorter Stroop Color Test processing time and lower situational anxiety. From this study, it has been identified that: (a) information‐processing capacities spared for posture control are affected by distribution of processing resources towards solving other cognitive tasks; and (b) the effect of the release of attention from threat‐related information due to a decrease in attentional bias, which accompanied the decrease in situational anxiety, are primary factors in improving cognitive task performance.     

Reward enhances backward inhibition in task switching

Recently, effects of reward incentives on interference-induced cognitive adjustments have drawn much attention. It has been demonstrated that reward can reduce or eliminate switch costs which occurred when alternating between different tasks. However, it still remains a question how reward affects inhibitory processes underlying task switching. The present study examined this issue by combining a task-switching paradigm with performance-contingent reward. Results showed that the inhibitory processes were modulated by reward, with n-2 repetition costs incremented after reward delivery. Data suggest that reward-triggered reduction or elimination of switch costs may reflect enhancing inhibitory processes which are motivated by reward signals and targeted at the irrelevant task set. These findings shed new light on the role of reward in cognitive control.     

Do cleaner fish learn to feed against their preference in a reverse reward contingency task?

The ability to control impulsive behaviour has been studied in animals with a standard test in which subjects need to choose the smaller of two food items in order to receive the larger one (reverse reward contingency). As a variety of mammals that have been tested so far (mostly primates) have great difficulties to solve the task, it has been proposed that it is generally cognitively demanding. However, according to an ecological approach to cognition, a species’ ability to solve the task should not depend on its general cognitive abilities but on whether its ecology causes selective pressure on the ability to restrain foraging behaviour. We tested this hypothesis using the cleaner wrasse (Labroides dimidiatus), a fish species that feeds against its preference in nature when engaging in cleaning interactions with so called ‘client fish’. None of the eight tested individuals learned to choose a non-preferred item after 200 trials. In a subsequent test, one subject learned to respond correctly in a large or none contingency task (only the choice of the small food was rewarded). After a short re-experience treatment, this individual learned to solve the reverse reward task after 30 trials. In conclusion, we did not find support for the general idea that interactions with clients prepared cleaners to quickly solve a reverse reward test. However, the results suggest that the potential to solve a reverse reward contingency may not be restricted to mammals but could be present also in a fish species in which the problem of choosing a non-preferred food over a preferred one is an ever present challenge in nature.     

Dogs are able to solve a means-end task

Dogs, although very skilled in social-communicative tasks, have shown limited abilities in the domain of physical cognition. Consequently, several researchers hypothesized that domestication enhanced dogs’ cognitive abilities in the social realm, but relaxed selection on the physical one. For instance, dogs failed to demonstrate means-end understanding, an important form of relying on physical causal connection, when tested in a string-pulling task. Here, we tested dogs in an “on/off” task using a novel approach. Thirty-two dogs were confronted with four different conditions in which they could choose between two boards one with a reward “on” and another one with a reward “off” (reward was placed next to the board). The dogs chose the correct board when (1) both rewards were placed at the same distance from the dog, when (2) the reward placed “on” the board was closer to the dog, and (3) even when the reward placed “off” the board was much closer to the dog and was food. Interestingly, in the latter case, dogs did not perform above chance, if instead of a direct reward, the dogs had to retrieve an object placed on the board to get a food reward. In contrast to previous string-pulling studies, our results show that dogs are able to solve a means-end task even if proximity of the unsupported reward is a confounding factor.     

A note on the interference between verbal output and a cognitive task

Verbal output has been shown to depress cognitive performance. Examining the durations of speech and silence in a secondary verbal task suggests that the processing load even of practiced speech is sufficient to limit the parallel processing of a cognitive task forcing serial processing during the silent gaps in speech.     

Performance on the Hamilton search task,and the influence of lateralization,in captive orange-winged Amazon parrots (Amazona amazonica)

Psittacines are generally considered to possess cognitive abilities comparable to those of primates. Most psittacine research has evaluated performance on standardized complex cognition tasks, but studies of basic cognitive processes are limited. We tested orange-winged Amazon parrots (Amazona amazonica) on a spatial foraging assessment, the Hamilton search task. This task is a standardized test used in human and non-human primate studies. It has multiple phases, which require trial and error learning, learning set breaking, and spatial memory. We investigated search strategies used to complete the task, cognitive flexibility, and long-term memory for the task. We also assessed the effects of individual strength of motor lateralization (foot preference) and sex on task performance. Almost all (92 %) of the parrots acquired the task. All had significant foot preferences, with 69 % preferring their left foot, and showed side preferences contralateral to their preferred limb during location selection. The parrots were able to alter their search strategies when reward contingencies changed, demonstrating cognitive flexibility. They were also able to remember the task over a 6-month period. Lateralization had a significant influence on learning set acquisition but no effect on cognitive flexibility. There were no sex differences. To our knowledge, this is the first cognitive study using this particular species and one of the few studies of cognitive abilities in any Neotropical parrot species.     

Attentional bias towards angry faces in trait-reappraisal

Emotion regulation (ER) strategies differ in when and how they influence emotion experience, expression, and concomitant cognition. However, no study to date has directly compared cognition in individuals who have a clear disposition for either cognitive or behavioural ER strategies. The present study compared selective attention to angry faces in groups of high trait-suppressors (people who are hiding emotional reactions in response to emotional challenge) and high trait-reappraisers (people who cognitively reinterpret emotional events). Since reappraisers are also low trait-anxious and suppressors are high trait-anxious, high and low anxious control groups, both being low in trait-ER, were also included. Attention to angry faces was assessed using an emotional dot-probe task. Trait-reappraisers and high-anxious individuals both showed attentional biases towards angry faces. Trait-reappraisers’ vigilance for angry faces was significantly more pronounced compared to both trait-suppressors and low anxious controls. We suggest that threat prioritization in high trait-reappraisal may allow deeper cognitive processing of threat information without being associated with psychological maladjustment.     

How can reward contribute to efficient self-control? Reinforcement of task-defined responses diminishes ego-depletion

We examined whether reinforcement learning of habitual actions diminishes ego depletion after a cognitive control task. Participants performed the Stroop task after a card selection task, in which one group was reinforced to respond to colors in the Stroop task (Stroop-color group) while another group was reinforced to respond to colors not in the Stroop task (non-Stroop-color group). We measured ego depletion in terms of decrement in endurance on an isometric handgrip task after the Stroop task. The Stroop-color group exhibited less decrease in their isometric handgrip endurance compared to the non-Stroop-color group. These results suggest that the former needed less effort for cognitive control during conflict processing, as reinforcement learning make task-defined response habitual. This finding provides a new perspective on the role of reward in cognitive control.     

Investigating the influence of an effort–reward interaction on cognitive fatigue in individuals with multiple sclerosis

This study examined whether an alteration in the effort–reward relationship, a theoretical framework based on cognitive neuroscience, could explain cognitive fatigue. Forty persons with MS and 40 healthy age- and education-matched cognitively healthy controls (HC) participated in a computerized switching task with orthogonal high- and low-demand (effort) and reward manipulations. We used the Visual Analog Scale of Fatigue (VAS-F) to assess subjective state fatigue before and after each condition during the task. We used mixed-effects models to estimate the association and interaction between effort and reward and their relationship to subjective fatigue and task performance. We found the high-demand condition was associated with increased VAS-F scores (p < .001), longer response times (RT) (p < .001) and lower accuracy (p < .001). The high-reward condition was associated with faster RT (p = .006) and higher accuracy (p = .03). There was no interaction effect between effort and reward on VAS-F scores or performance. Participants with MS reported higher VAS-F scores (p = .02). Across all conditions, participants with MS were slower (p < .001) and slower as a function of condition demand compared with HC (p < .001). This behavioural study did not find evidence that an effort–reward interaction is associated with cognitive fatigue. However, our findings support the role of effort in subjective cognitive fatigue and both effort and reward on task performance. In future studies, more salient reward manipulations could be necessary to identify effort–reward interactions on subjective cognitive fatigue.     

Anxiety‐induced performance catastrophes: Investigating effort required as an asymmetry factor

Two studies are reported that test the hypothesis that previous support for the cusp catastrophe model of anxiety and performance, and the hysteresis effect in particular, could have been due to a complex interaction between cognitive anxiety and effort required rather than between cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal. We used task difficulty to manipulate effort required in a letter transformation task. Experiment 1 (N=32) used high levels of trait anxiety together with a competitive environment to induce state anxiety. Experiment 2 (N=20) used a competitive environment with social pressure and ego threat instructions to induce high levels of worry. Both studies revealed significant three‐way interactions as hypothesized with follow‐up tests showing some support for the hysteresis hypothesis in Study 1, and strong support for the hysteresis hypothesis in Study 2. The findings support a processing efficiency theory explanation of anxiety‐induced performance catastrophes and indicate that two cusp catastrophe models of performance may exist; one that incorporates the interactive effects of cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal upon performance and the other that incorporates the interactive effects of cognitive anxiety and effort required upon performance.     

Problem Solvers Adjust Cognitive Offloading Based on Performance Goals

When incorporating the environment into mental processing (cf., cognitive offloading), one creates novel cognitive strategies that have the potential to improve task performance. Improved performance can, for example, mean faster problem solving, more accurate solutions, or even higher grades at university.¹ Although cognitive offloading has frequently been associated with improved performance, it is yet unclear how flexible problem solvers are at matching their offloading habits with their current performance goals (can people improve goal‐related instead of generic performance, e.g., when being in a hurry and aiming for a “quick and dirty” solution?). Here, we asked participants to solve a cognitive task, provided them with different goals—maximizing speed (SPD) or accuracy (ACC), respectively—and measured how frequently (Experiment 1) and how proficiently (Experiment 2) they made use of a novel external resource to support their cognitive processing. Experiment 1 showed that offloading behavior varied with goals: Participants offloaded less in the SPD than in the ACC condition. Experiment 2 showed that this differential offloading behavior was associated with high goal‐related performance: fast answers in the SPD, accurate answers in the ACC condition. Simultaneously, goal‐unrelated performance was sacrificed: inaccurate answers in the SPD, slow answers in the ACC condition. The findings support the notion of humans as canny offloaders who are able to successfully incorporate their environment in pursuit of their current cognitive goals. Future efforts should be focused on the finding's generalizability, for example, to settings without feedback or with high mental workload.     

The role of prevention focus under stereotype threat: Initial cognitive mobilization is followed by depletion

Previous research has demonstrated that stereotype threat induces a prevention focus and impairs central executive functions. The present research examines how these 2 consequences of stereotype threat are related. The authors argue that the prevention focus is responsible for the effects of stereotype threat on executive functions and cognitive performance. However, because the prevention focus is adapted to deal with threatening situations, the authors propose that it also leads to some beneficial responses to stereotype threat. Specifically, because stereotype threat signals a high risk of failure, a prevention focus initiates immediate recruitment of cognitive control resources. The authors further argue that this response initially facilitates cognitive performance but that the additional cognitive demands associated with working under threat lead to cognitive depletion over time. Study 1 demonstrates that stereotype threat (vs. control) facilitates immediate cognitive control capacity during a stereotype-relevant task. Study 2 experimentally demonstrates the process by showing that stereotype threat (vs. control) facilitates cognitive control as a default, as well as when a prevention focus has been experimentally induced, but not when a promotion focus has been induced. Study 3 shows that stereotype threat facilitates initial math performance under a prevention focus, whereas no effect is found under a promotion focus. Consistent with previous research, however, stereotype threat impaired math performance over time under a prevention focus, but not under a promotion focus.     

The relationship between outcome prediction and cognitive fatigue: A convergence of paradigms

Cognitive fatigue is common after strenuous cognitive effort. A large body of literature has implicated a network of brain areas in fatigue, including the basal ganglia and cortical areas including ventro-medal prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Furthermore, the ACC has been shown to be involved in processes such as error and conflict monitoring, outcome prediction, and effort processing. Thus, the ACC appears to be one common denominator between clinical work on fatigue and research on outcome prediction and effort. In the present study, we examined whether the same region of the ACC is activated during the processing of errors and fatigue. Cognitive fatigue was induced by having subjects perform a difficult working memory task, during which they rated on-task fatigue. Activation associated with error processing was determined by using error trials on the working memory task. After localizing the region engaged in error processing, we evaluated whether there was a relationship between BOLD activation of that region and on-task fatigue scores. The results showed that as subjects became more fatigued, they responded with longer latencies and increased accuracy for the more difficult task. Moreover, the ACC areas that were activated by error processing were also associated with fatigue. These results suggest that cognitive fatigue may be related to changes in effort and reward. We speculate that as the brain detects these changes, cognitive fatigue is generated as a way for the brain to signal itself that the effort required for the task no longer merits the rewards received for performing it.     

On the role of reduced auditory feedback and kinesic self-stimulation during Stroop Color-Word performance1

Feedback from one's own voice provides important vocal–motor cues for effective cognitive processing. Reduction of such feedback is known to disturb such functioning. Work in our laboratory has shown that kinesic self-stimulation also plays an important role in cognition, and appears to regulate the focusing of attention under conditions of distraction. The present study investigated the effects of both auditory feedback and kinesic self-stimulation in the regulation of cognitive interference during performance of the Stroop Color-Word Task. Twelve subjects were tested on the Stroop task under conditions of normal and occluded hearing. Kinesic self-stimulation and response errors during color-word performance were recorded on video tape. The findings indicated that not only did self-stimulation increase when voice feedback was reduced, but that this increase was associated with a reduction in specific types of color-word performance errors. Individual differences revealed that high kinesic responders made significantly fewer errors in task performance than did low kinesic responders. Results were interpreted as revealing a kinesic feedback mechanism which has adaptive significance in regard to self-editing when auditory feedback is reduced.