What could have been done (but wasn’t). On the counterfactual status of action in Alva Noë’s theory of perception

Alva Noë’s strategy to solve the puzzle of perceptual presence entirely relies on the principle of presence as access. Unaccessed or unattended parts or details of objects are perceptually present insofar as they are accessible, and they are accessible insofar as one possesses sensorimotor skills that can secure their access. In this paper, I consider several arguments that can be opposed to this claim and that are chiefly related to the modal status of action, i.e. the fact that the action that would secure access to the absent aspects is a possibility, something that can (or maybe could) be done. The main difficulty Noë’s account must face is –as several situations demonstrate– that the action that should be performed for the absent aspects to be actually accessed does not have to be itself available for these aspects to be perceptually present. What matters for the absent aspects to be present is not their de facto (i.e. effective) accessibility, but their de jure accessibility. To overcome those difficulties, I propose to rely on a ternary model of the role of action possibilities in perceptual awareness. This model builds on Husserl’s analysis of the role of perceptual circumstances in perception and connection between sense (Sinn) registering and horizontal intentionality.     

The enigmatic “nature of the subject”

Freud once placed psychoanalysis in a “middle position between medicine and philosophy”. Yet, the meaning of that position has never been sufficiently clarified. The author suggests that the essence of the psychoanalytic experience is defined by the fact that its clinical practice operates within a basically relational or intersubjective frame containing the analysand's self-interpreting reflection, which here is identified as ethical in nature. It is further argued that late modernity is experiencing a crisis in the art of reflection, accompanied by a flight from this ethical dimension. A common social response is to fall back on the authority of neo-positivistic science, making psychoanalysis increasingly redundant. To meaningfully connect with the consequences of this state of affairs, psychoanalysis needs to deepen the understanding of its unique essence. To that end, a model for collaboration with philosophy is briefly sketched.     

On the nature of language – Heidegger and African Philosophy

abstract

This paper explores links between Heidegger’s notion of language and views in African philosophy. My contention is that Heidegger’s daring phenomenology of language is also found and even radicalised within the framework of African philosophy, particularly the philosophy of myth. I argue that the exploration of the relation between these views of language offers the possibility not only to expand on the conventional conception of language but also to challenge the common notion of philosophical language and philosophy as such.     

“It Happens,But I’m Not There”: On the Phenomenology of Childbirth

Human Studies - Phenomenologically grounded research on pregnancy is a thriving area of activity in feminist studies and related disciplines. But what has been largely omitted in this area of...     

On the nature of the delayed “inhibitory” Cueing effects generated by uninformative arrows at fixation

When the interval between a spatially uninformative arrow and a visual target is short (<500 ms), response times (RTs) are fastest when the arrow points to the target. When this interval exceeds 500 ms, there is a near-universal absence of an effect of the arrow on RTs. Contrary to this expected pattern of results, Taylor and Klein (J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 26:1639–1656, 2000) observed that RTs were slowest when a to-be-localized visual target occurred in the direction of a fixated arrow presented 1 s earlier (i.e., an “inhibitory” Cueing effect; ICE). Here we examined which factor(s) may have allowed the arrow to generate an ICE. Our experiments indicated that the ICE was a side effect of subthreshold response activation attributable to a task-induced association between the arrow and a keypress response. Because the cause of this ICE was more closely related to subthreshold keypress activation than to oculomotor activation, we considered that the effect might be more similar to the negative compatibility effect (NCE) than to inhibition of return (IOR). This similarity raises the possibility that classical IOR, when caused by a spatially uninformative peripheral onset event and measured by a keypress response to a subsequent onset, might represent, in part, another instance of an NCE. Serendipitously, we discovered that context (i.e., whether an uninformative peripheral onset could occur at the time of an uninformative central arrow) ultimately determined whether the “inhibitory” aftermath of automatic response activation would affect output or input pathways.     

Jealousy: a response to infidelity? On the nature and appropriateness conditions of jealousy

This paper critically assesses the widespread claim that jealousy is a response to infidelity. According to this claim, herewith called the entitlement theory (ET), jealousy is only an appropriate response to a relationship between a loved one and a rival if, by entertaining this relationship, the loved one does not treat the jealous person the way she is entitled to be treated. I reconstruct different versions of ET, each of them providing a different answer to the question why we should assume that jealousy is a response to infidelity. I show that even the most plausible versions enjoy less argumentative support than it seems at first sight. The positive aim of this paper is to present a more inclusive account of jealousy as an alternative to ET. According to this account, jealousy serves to disturb the rival relationship and to (re-)gain the attention and affection of the loved person. Jealousy so understood is not only an appropriate response to infidelity but has wider appropriateness conditions. However, it plays a role in the negotiation of norms concerning exclusivity in personal relationships. The inclusive account does justice to the continuity and commonalities between adult and infant protest against rival relationships.     

On the nature and systematic role of evidence: Husserl as a proponent of mentalist evidentialism?

In this paper, I shall show that for Husserl, (a) evidence determines epistemic justification and (b) evidence is linked to originary givenness in the sense that one's ultimate evidence consists of one's originary presentive intuitions. This means that in contemporary analytic terminology, Husserl is a proponent of evidentialism and mentalism. Evidentialism and mentalism have been introduced into current debates by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. Finally, I shall highlight that there is one significant difference between Husserl and Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. Although Conee and Feldman argue that the fundamental principles of epistemology are principles of best explanation, Husserl opts for phenomenological principles as the most fundamental epistemic principles. The main difference is that for Husserl, experiences gain their justificatory force by virtue of their phenomenal character, namely, their originary givenness.     

On the Usefulness of “Value” in the Definition of Creativity: A Commentary

From the mid-1950s to the present time, creativity researchers have typically adopted the view that any new piece of work must be statistically novel as well as non-trivially valuable to some group of people if it is to be considered creative. A few scholars have suggested that a new piece of work must also be surprising, non-obvious, or interesting if it is to be considered truly creative. The utility of these traditional definitions of creativity has recently been sharply questioned in an article published in a previous volume of this journal (Weisberg, 2015). The commentary presented here took issue with a suggestion presented in that article that creativity researchers replace their traditional definitions of creativity with a simpler definition according to which any statistically novel and intentionally generated product is considered creative “regardless of whether it is ever of value to anyone” and with a logically related suggestion that the creativity of any intentionally-generated product be assessed purely in terms of its statistical novelty (Weisberg, 2015). After carefully evaluating both of these suggestions on conceptual and practical grounds, it was recommended that creativity researchers not follow either suggestion.     

On the nonautomaticity of “automatic” activation: Evidence of selective seeing

Early perceptual selection refers to a sequence of perceptual processing in which attentional selection of stimuli occurs before perceptual processing is complete. By contrast, late perceptual selection refers to a sequence in which all stimuli receive complete perceptual processing before selection takes place. An attempt was made to determine if early selection is possible. Three experiments were conducted in which subjects were presented with arrays containing a variable number of red items and a variable number of black items; all array items were randomly positioned around the circumference of an imaginary circle. The subjects task was to report the number of red items. Response time increased with the number of red items, but was essentially independent of the number of black items. The nature of the red and black items was also varied. When the to-be-attended red items were given “Stroop-like” quality (the symbols that were used were directly inconsistent with the correct response for that trial), mean reaction time was increased compared to a baseline condition; when the to-be-ignored black items were given “Stroop-like” quality, mean reaction time was unaffected. These results imply that the relevant (red) and irrelevant (black) items were processed differentially. We conclude that early selection is possible; late-selection models are not supported.     

Inherent directionality of “even if” counterfactual conditionals

In this research, we investigate whether semifactual conditionals such as “even if there had been an A, there would have been a B” are understood by thinking initially of the antecedent “A”, as was found with factual conditionals. The “inherent directionality” hypothesis assumes that for the comprehension of most relational statements, a presuppositional element (i.e. the “relatum”) is initially established. For “even if”, both terms could work as “relatum”. This is because on the one hand, people tend to infer “B” from “A” and “not-A” and, on the other hand, “B” could work as a pragmatic presupposition. In the present experiment, semifactual and factual conditionals were tested with a sentence-picture verification task. Results were consistent with the “inherent directionality” hypothesis: only “if then” factual conditionals, but not semifactuals, showed a preference for reasoning from the antecedent, with faster verifications.     

On the “recovery” of masked targets

Subjective magnitude characteristics for vibrotaction were determined by the method of numerical magnitude balance for three body sites varying in the density of neural innervation: the distal pad of the middle finger, the thenar eminence, and the volar forearm. The effects of a rigid surround upon threshold and the rate of growth of subjective intensity were measured. The results support the suggestion that absolute threshold and the rate of growth of subjective intensity are inverse functions of the total number of sensory neural units stimulated rather than being related simply to the density of neural innervation.     

Revisiting the Stanford prison experiment: could participant self-selection have led to the cruelty?

The authors investigated whether students who selectively volunteer for a study of prison life possess dispositions associated with behaving abusively. Students were recruited for a psychological study of prison life using a virtually identical newspaper ad as used in the Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE; Haney, Banks & Zimbardo, 1973) or for a psychological study, an identical ad minus the words of prison life. Volunteers for the prison study scored significantly higher on measures of the abuse-related dispositions of aggressiveness, authoritarianism, Machiavellianism, narcissism, and social dominance and lower on empathy and altruism, two qualities inversely related to aggressive abuse. Although implications for the SPE remain a matter of conjecture, an interpretation in terms of person-situation interactionism rather than a strict situationist account is indicated by these findings. Implications for interpreting the abusiveness of American military guards at Abu Ghraib Prison also are discussed.     

What have we been priming all these years? On the development,mechanisms, and ecology of nonconscious social behavior

Priming or nonconscious activation of social knowledge structures has produced a plethora of rather amazing findings over the past 25 years: priming a single social concept such as aggressive can have multiple effects across a wide array of psychological systems, such as perception, motivation, behavior, and evaluation. But we may have reached childhood's end, so to speak, and need now to move on to research questions such as how these multiple effects of single primes occur (the generation problem); next, how these multiple simultaneous priming influences in the environment get distilled into nonconscious social action that has to happen serially, in real time (the reduction problem). It is suggested that models of complex conceptual structures (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980 ), language use in real‐life conversational settings (Clark, 1996 ), and speech production (Dell, 1986 ) might hold the key for solving these two important ‘second‐generation’ research problems. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What is learning? On the nature and merits of a functional definition of learning

Learning has been defined functionally as changes in behavior that result from experience or mechanistically as changes in the organism that result from experience. Both types of definitions are problematic. We define learning as ontogenetic adaptation—that is, as changes in the behavior of an organism that result from regularities in the environment of the organism. This functional definition not only solves the problems of other definitions, but also has important advantages for cognitive learning research.