What Are You Really Saying? Associations between Shyness and Verbal Irony Comprehension

Verbal irony exploits the ambiguity inherent in language by using the discrepancy between a speaker's intended meaning and the literal meaning of his or her words to achieve social goals. Irony provides a window into children's developing pragmatic competence. Yet, little research exists on individual differences that may disrupt this understanding. For example, verbal irony may challenge shy children, who tend to interpret ambiguous stimuli as being threatening and who have difficulty mentalizing in social contexts. We examined whether shyness is related to the interpretation of ironic statements. Ninety‐nine children (8–12 year olds) listened to stories wherein one character made either a literal or ironic criticism or a literal or ironic compliment. Children appraised the speaker's belief and communicative intention. Shyness was assessed using self‐report measures of social anxiety symptoms and shy negative affect. Shyness was not related to children's comprehension of the counterfactual nature of ironic statements. However, shyness was related to children's ratings of speaker meanness for ironic statements. Thus, although not related to the understanding that speakers intended to communicate their true beliefs, shyness was related to children's construal of the social meaning of irony. Such subtle differences in language interpretation may underlie some of the social difficulties facing shy children. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A microgenetic investigation of stability and continuity in theory of mind development

The processes behind the transition from consistently failing tests of false belief understanding to consistently passing the tests was investigated by tracking changes in children's mental state understanding. Participants were 42 children (aged 3;1 to 4;3). There were two conditions; an experimental condition in which children were tested on a battery of eight theory of mind tests every four weeks for six phases of testing, and a control condition in which children only completed the battery of tests at the first and last testing phases. The profiles of performance showed that an understanding of false beliefs develops gradually and the development is relatively stable. An examination of the types of explanation children give on tests of false belief understanding showed that initially they rely on reality, then they progress through a period of confusion, where they do not provide an explanation, to a final stage in which they are able to explain behaviour by referring to an individual's false belief. Further analyses examined practice effects, construct validity, and the role of verbal ability on the development of mental state understanding.     

The impact of verbal feedback about blushing on social discomfort and facial blood flow during embarrassing tasks

To investigate whether verbal feedback about blushing influences subsequent social discomfort or blushing itself, changes in facial blood flow and ratings of blushing and embarrassment were investigated in high (N=28) and low scorers (N=28) on the Blushing Propensity scale while singing and reading aloud, and while listening to audiotapes of their performance. After each task half of the participants were told that they had blushed, and the rest were told that they had not blushed. Blood flow increased progressively in participants with high blushing propensity scores who were given "blushing" feedback, but not in the other participants. This finding suggests that expecting to blush may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Verbal feedback about blushing strongly influenced subsequent social discomfort, and mimicked the effects of blushing propensity on ratings of embarrassment and blushing intensity. In sum, the findings support the view that preconceptions about blushing propensity are shaped by past learning experiences, that concern about blushing is a major source of discomfort in embarrassing situations, and that these concerns are often unrelated to the actual intensity of blushing.     

False-belief understanding in 2.5-year-olds: evidence from two novel verbal spontaneous-response tasks

Recent research indicates that toddlers and infants succeed at various non-verbal spontaneous-response false-belief tasks; here we asked whether toddlers would also succeed at verbal spontaneous-response false-belief tasks that imposed significant linguistic demands. We tested 2.5-year-olds using two novel tasks: a preferential-looking task in which children listened to a false-belief story while looking at a picture book (with matching and non-matching pictures), and a violation-of-expectation task in which children watched an adult 'Subject' answer (correctly or incorrectly) a standard false-belief question. Positive results were obtained with both tasks, despite their linguistic demands. These results (1) support the distinction between spontaneous- and elicited-response tasks by showing that toddlers succeed at verbal false-belief tasks that do not require them to answer direct questions about agents' false beliefs, (2) reinforce claims of robust continuity in early false-belief understanding as assessed by spontaneous-response tasks, and (3) provide researchers with new experimental tasks for exploring early false-belief understanding in neurotypical and autistic populations.     

Children's emotional false memories

Eight- and 12-year-old children were presented with neutral and negative emotional Deese-Roediger-McDermott lists equated on familiarity and associative strength. Both recall and recognition (A') measures were obtained. Recall measures exhibited the usual age increments in true and false recollection. True neutral items were better recalled and recognized than true negative emotional items. Although the children showed more false recall for neutral than for negative emotional lists, false recognition was higher for negative emotional than for neutral items. A' analyses also showed that whereas true neutral information and false neutral information were easily discriminated by children regardless of age, the same was not the case for true and false negative emotional information. Together, these results suggest that although children may be able to censor negative emotional information at recall, such information promotes relational processing in children's memory, making true and false emotional information less discriminable overall.     

Theory of Mind and Children's Trait Attributions about Average and Typically Stigmatized Peers

Previous research indicates that children hold negative beliefs about peers with foreign accents, physical disabilities, and people who are obese. The current study examined skills associated with individual differences in children's social judgements about these typically stereotyped groups. Theory of mind, memory, and cognitive inhibition were assessed in 3‐ to 6‐year‐olds. Then, children were asked to make trait attributions and behavioural predictions about story characters' willingness to help a peer. Results indicated that better theory of mind skills were related to greater positive trait attributions and behavioural predictions about typically stereotyped characters. Younger children made fewer positive behavioural predictions as compared to older children, but both age groups made positive trait attributions. Overall, memory and inhibition had little to no influence on children's responses, although the results varied by story type. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

3~5岁儿童对同伴侵害归因的特征研究

以济南市一所普通公立幼儿园的284名3~5岁儿童为被试,采用访谈法考察了儿童对同伴侵害的归因。研究结果表明:(1)3~5岁儿童对同伴侵害的归因包括敌意归因、自责归因、中立归因和无归因四种情况。(2)总体而言,自责归因随年龄增长逐渐增多,无归因逐渐减少,4~5岁是转折期。(3)儿童自责归因和无归因人数比例在财物侵害中最低,中立归因人数比例在财物侵害中最高;无归因人数比例在言语侵害中最高,中立归因人数比例在言语侵害中最低。     

Operant measurement of subjective visual acuity in non-verbal children

The present experiment sought to develop a reliable procedure for measuring visual acuity in non-verbal retarded children. Five non-verbal retarded children and two literate adults were examined. The two adults were included in the experiment so that verbal communication with them could validate certain assumptions regarding the experimental procedures. By utilizing a lever press as the criterion response signifying a visual discrimination and employing the Snellen "E" discriminanda, a reliable subjective measure was obtained, not unlike those measures taken from verbal adults. Contrary to several antecedent procedures, a relatively precise measurement of subjective acuity was shown to be obtainable from non-verbal retarded children. Additionally, the procedure was successful in evaluating the effectiveness of prosthetic lenses previously prescribed for two of the children.     

A lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution in young children: Relationships with linguistic ability and mothers' mental‐state language

This study examines the contribution of children's linguistic ability and mothers' use of mental‐state language to young children's understanding of false belief and their subsequent ability to make belief‐based emotion attributions. In Experiment 1, children (N = 51) were given three belief‐based emotion‐attribution tasks. A standard task in which the protagonist was a story character and the emotional outcomes were imagined, and two videos in which the story protagonist was a real infant and the emotional outcomes were observable (high and low expressed emotion conditions). Children's verbal ability (semantic competence) was also measured. In Experiment 2, children (N = 75) were given two belief‐based emotion tasks: the standard story task and the high expressed emotion video. In addition, children's verbal ability (syntactic competence) and mothers' use of mental‐state attributes when describing their children were also measured. The results showed that: (1) the lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution was a stable feature of children's reasoning across the three tests; and (2) children who were more linguistically advanced and whose mothers' described them in more mentalistic terms were more likely to understand the association between false belief and emotion. The findings underline the continuing importance of verbal ability and linguistic input for children's developing theory‐of‐mind understanding, even after they display an understanding of false belief.     

Attachment and preschool children's understanding of maternal versus non‐maternal psychological states

There is growing evidence that insecurely attached children are less advanced in their social understanding than their secure counterparts. However, attachment may also predict how individual children use their social understanding across different relationships. For instance, the insecure child's social‐cognitive difficulties may be more pronounced when the psychological states of an attachment figure are being considered. In the current study, forty‐eight 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children were asked about their mothers' emotions and false beliefs, as well as those of non‐attachment figures. The Separation Anxiety Test (SAT) was administered to assess children's attachment representations. Children's SAT scores predicted their overall performance on the false belief and causes of emotion tasks, even after controlling for age and verbal ability. More interestingly, however, children with high scores on the Avoidance dimension of the SAT experienced greater difficulty understanding maternal false beliefs relative to those of an unfamiliar adult female. Thus, although attachment insecurity may hinder social‐cognitive development in general, the findings suggest that there are more specific effects as well. Attachment representations that are characterized by high levels of avoidance appear to interfere with children's ability to fully engage their social‐cognitive skills when reasoning about maternal mental states.     

Relationship between Chinese children's imaginary companions and their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions

We investigated relationship between Chinese children's imaginary companions (ICs) and their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions in 180 children, aged 5–6 years old. We examined the potential differences in second-order false belief understanding and emotion understanding between children with and without ICs, children with egalitarian IC relationships and hierarchical IC relationships, as well as children with invisible friends and personified objects. The results revealed that children with ICs had better second-order false belief understanding and emotion understanding than children without ICs. Compared with children with hierarchical relationships, children with egalitarian relationships had better second-order false belief understanding. However, children with invisible friends and personified objects did not differ on their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions. The results suggest that compared with IC types, IC status and child-IC relationship qualities may be more relevant to children's theory of mind. It will be interesting for the future researchers to investigate the underlying mechanism of the differences between children with egalitarian IC relationships and hierarchical IC relationships.     

Word,nonword, and visual paired associate learning in Dutch dyslexic children

Verbal and non-verbal learning were investigated in 21 8-11-year-old dyslexic children and chronological-age controls, and in 21 7-9-year-old reading-age controls. Tasks involved the paired associate learning of words, nonwords, or symbols with pictures. Both learning and retention of associations were examined. Results indicated that dyslexic children had difficulty with verbal learning of both words and nonwords. In addition, analysis of the errors made during nonword learning showed that both phonological errors and general learning errors were distributed similarly for the reading groups. This suggests that nonword learning in dyslexics is slower, but not qualitatively different from normal readers. Furthermore, no differences were found between the dyslexics and age-matched normal readers on non-verbal learning. Long-term retention of the learned visual-verbal associations (both words and nonwords) was not impaired in dyslexic children as compared to normal readers. Finally, phonological awareness ability was assessed. Dyslexics performed worse than age-matched normal readers, but similar to reading-age controls.     

幼儿心理状态术语的运用与心理理论的发展

本研究目的在于探讨幼儿在假装游戏中心理状态术语的应用,以及与错误信念的理解是否存在相关并具有一定的发展特征。57名3—5岁的幼儿参加了实验。研究程序包括两类标准错误信念任务及假装游戏的拍摄、麦卡锡幼儿言语智力测验。结果发现：(1)幼儿的一般言语能力与错误信念的理解存在显著相关;(2)幼儿心理状态术语的使用存在情境差异,且随年龄的增长具有“指向愿望一指向信念”的维度特征;(3)在控制相关因素之后,幼儿错误信念的理解与心理状态术语的应用及其特定范畴(习惯用语)之间仍然存在显著相关;与“真正涉及心理状态”之间的相关不再显著。     

The effects of verbal information on children's fear beliefs about social situations

Two experiments explored the role of verbal information in changing children's fear-related beliefs about social situations. In Experiment 1, 118 6- to 8- and 12- to 13-year-olds heard positive, negative, or no information about individuals' experiences of three social situations. Fear beliefs regarding each situation were assessed before and after this manipulation. Verbal information had no significant influence on children's fear beliefs. In Experiment 2, the same paradigm was used with 80 12- to 13-year-olds, but the information took the form of multiple attitude statements about the situations expressed by groups of peers, older children, or adults. An affective priming task of implicit attitudes was used to complement the explicit questions about fear beliefs. Negative information influenced both explicit and implicit fear beliefs. The source of information and the child's own social anxiety did not moderate these effects. Implications for our understanding of the socialisation of childhood fears are discussed.     

The communication of friendly and hostile attitudes by verbal and non-verbal signals

Two experiments are reported here in which Ss were asked to rate videotapes of a performer reading friendly, neutral and hostile messages in a friendly, neutral or hostile non-verbal style. These messages and non-verbal styles had previously been presented independently to a separate group of Ss jor rating, in order to obtain an estimate of their individual strengths in terms of six rating scales, and thus permit a matching of verbal (messages) and non-verbal (styles) cues in the experiment where both types of cues were presented in combination. The results of both experiments indicate that non-verbal cues had a greater effect on ratings made on 7-point scales, such as hostile-friendly, than verbal cues. The magnitude of this greater effect of non-verbal cues, however, was dependent on the relative strength of non-verbal as opposed to verbal cues. In the first experiment, both types of cues were approximately equal in strength when ruted alone; here non-verbal cues accounted for 12.5 times us much variance us verbal cues, and produced 5.7 times as much shift on the ratitig scales. In the second experiment the verbal cues were much stronger than the non-verbal cues when rated alone. Here the relative effect of non-verbal cues in the second experiment was diminished; the ratio of non-verbal : verbal variance was now 1.67:1. When verbal and non-verbal signals were inconsistent, the performance was rated as insincere, unstable and confusing - which was not found in earlier experiments on the superior-inferior dimension.     

A Meadian account of social understanding: Taking a non-mentalistic approach to infant and verbal false belief understanding

Performance on false belief tasks has long been considered a key indicator of the development of social understanding in young children. We consider the enabling conditions for performing non-verbal and verbal false belief tasks as well as a typical developmental path toward false belief understanding. We argue that, in early ontogenesis, children anticipate the coordination of activity with others rather than read, probe, or reflectively engage with the psychological states of others. As linguistically mediated reflective thought emerges, children gradually become able to parse and isolate the myriad of incipient somatic, affective, and intentional responses that arise in any given moment. With reflective thought, children also begin to develop distinct and temporally coherent understandings about the minds of self and other. We provide an account of how the reflective thought that facilitates false belief understanding emerges. Our account focuses on a gradually developing refinement of social coordination and the shared perspectival understandings inherent in social coordination.     

The relationship between speed of information processing and cognitive ability

Speed of information processing as measured by various reaction time and inspection tasks has been shown to correlate with psychometric intelligence, and it has been suggested that general intelligence (g) is determined to some degree by the speed that information is processed. If this is so, then various measures of speed of information processing should correlate substantially with each other, and each should also correlate with a wide range of psychometric tests that load on g. Alternatively, intelligence may be considered to be a multi-faceted complex of partially related abilities with specific abilities being dependent upon specific cognitive processes. If this is the case, it should be possible to discover independent cognitive processes, some of which correlate with one facet or broad ability and some with another. This paper presents three experiments in which the relationship between intellectual ability and four speed of information processing measures was examined. These were rate of memory scanning, rate of retrieval of information from long term memory, speed of stimulus-response mapping and inspection time (IT). Results showed that correlations between IT and most reaction time measures of speed of information processing were low, and that correlations between different versions of IT were negligible. In addition, some cognitive tasks with verbal material (memory scanning rate for digits and Posner letter matching IT) correlated most substantially with Verbal Reasoning whereas non-verbal (two-line) IT consistently correlated with tests loading on g. It was thus suggested that while non-verbal IT may be a measure of a perceptual speed attribute that contributes to mental functioning, other “speed of information processing” parameters may be more specific to a subset of abilities.     

An investigation of first‐order false belief understanding of children with congenital profound visual impairment

This study assessed theory of mind understanding in children with congenital profound visual impairment (CPVI): children who have had no access to visual information throughout development. Participants were 18 children with CPVI and no other impairments, aged between 5 and 11 years, and 18 children with normal vision, matched individually on chronological age, verbal IQ and verbal mental age. Three first‐order false belief tasks were presented twice each; the three tasks varied in the extent of deception and involvement of the child. Six of the children with CPVI failed one or more of the false belief tasks; all sighted children passed all of the tasks. The manipulations of deception and involvement did not influence the performance of the children with CPVI. Participant characteristics of the children with CPVI were examined in relation to their performance on the false belief tasks: chronological age and type of school attended were not found to be related to performance; verbal IQ and verbal mental age were found to differ in children with good and poor performance on the false belief tasks. The results are consistent with either a general pattern of delay in theory of mind development for children with CPVI, or with a subset of children who have longer‐term difficulties in this area.     

Effects of maternal negativity and of early and recent recurrent depressive disorder on children's false belief understanding

Research has shown that children of depressed mothers are at risk for problems in a variety of developmental domains; however, little is known about the effects of maternal depression on children's emerging understanding of false beliefs. In this study, 3 false belief tasks were administered to 5-year-old children whose mothers had either met criteria for major depressive disorder within the first 20 months of the child's life (n = 91) or had never been depressed (n = 50). Significant difficulties in performance were found among the children of depressed mothers, especially those whose mothers had experienced early and recent recurrent depressive disorder. Regardless of diagnostic status, children whose mothers exhibited negativity during problem-solving tasks administered at an earlier developmental period also were less likely to demonstrate false belief understanding. These effects remained even after child verbal ability was controlled.     

How do use and comprehension of mental-state language relate to theory of mind in middle childhood?

This study investigates the relationship between mental-state language and theory of mind in primary school children. The participants were 110 primary school students (mean age = 9 years and 7 months; SD = 12.7 months). They were evenly divided by gender and belonged to two age groups (8- and 10-year-olds). Linguistic, metacognitive and cognitive measures were used to assess the following competencies: verbal ability, use of mental-state terms, understanding of metacognitive language, understanding of second-order false beliefs, and emotion comprehension. Correlations between children’ use of mental-state language and their performance on theory-of-mind tasks were moderate, whereas correlations between children's comprehension of such language and ToM abilities were high. In addition, regression analyses showed that comprehension of metacognitive language was the variable which best explained children's performance on both false belief tasks and an emotion comprehension test when verbal ability and age were controlled for.