The moderator role of intuitive versus deliberative decision making for the predictive validity of implicit and explicit measures

The Preference for Intuition and Deliberation (PID) scale aims at capturing stable general individual differences in terms of intuitive versus deliberative preferences in decision making. A study examined the psychometric properties of the English version of the PID, investigated whether the two subscales moderate the validity of implicit and explicit measures for incidental and deliberative evaluations and behaviours concerning fizzy soft drinks, and compared the predictive validity of two new implicit measures (ST‐IAT and ID‐EAST) and an explicit measure. Results showed an asymmetric weak double dissociation pattern only for behaviours. Additionally, a moderation effect suggested that the ST‐IAT better predicted sensory evaluation for people high in intuition and explicit attitudes better predicted benefit evaluation for people high in deliberation. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self–other differences in multiattribute decision making: Compensatory versus noncompensatory decision strategies

When making decisions where options involve multiple attributes, a person can choose to use a compensatory, utility maximizing strategy, which involves consideration and integration of all available attributes. Alternatively, a person can choose a noncompensatory strategy that extracts only the most important and reliable attributes. The present research examined whether other‐oriented decisions would involve greater reliance on a noncompensatory, lexicographic decision strategy than self‐oriented decisions. In three studies (Mturk workers and college students), the difference in other‐oriented versus self‐oriented decisions in a medical decision context was explained by a subsample of participants that chose the death minimizing operation on all 10 decisions (Study 1) and a subsample of participants who self‐reported that they used a strategy that minimized the chance of death on every decision (i.e., a lexicographic mortality heuristic; Study 2). In Study 2, tests of mediation found that self‐reported use of the mortality heuristic completely accounted for the self–other effect on decisions. In Study 3, participants were more likely to report prospectively that they would adopt the mortality heuristic when making decisions for others than for themselves, suggesting that participants were not mistakenly inferring a lexicographic decision strategy from their past behavior. The results suggest that self–other effects in multiattribute choice involve differential use of compensatory versus noncompensatory decision strategies and that beyond this group difference, individual differences in the use of these strategies also exist within self‐oriented and other‐oriented decisions.     

Emotion regulation and risk taking: Predicting risky choice in deliberative decision making

Only very recently has research demonstrated that experimentally induced emotion regulation strategies (cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression) affect risky choice (e.g., Heilman et al., 2010). However, it is unknown whether this effect also operates via habitual use of emotion regulation strategies in risky choice involving deliberative decision making. We investigated the role of habitual use of emotion regulation strategies in risky choice using the “cold” deliberative version of the Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner et al., 2009). Fifty-three participants completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) and—one month later—the CCT and the PANAS. Greater habitual cognitive reappraisal use was related to increased risk taking, accompanied by decreased sensitivity to changes in probability and loss amount. Greater habitual expressive suppression use was related to decreased risk taking. The results show that habitual use of reappraisal and suppression strategies predict risk taking when decisions involve predominantly cognitive-deliberative processes.     

Group versus individual decision making: An investigation of performance measures,decision strategies,and process losses/gains

The relative effectiveness of individual and group performance was investigated by employing three decision making strategies. Ignoring this consideration, group decisions were superior (p ⩽ .01) to individual averages, equal to the selected best individual decisions, and inferior to the actual best individual solutions (p ⩽ .05). The results indicated that the degree of process loss/gain and the relative performance of groups and individuals was significantly influenced by the dependent variable utilized and the decision making strategy employed.     

Recruitment of intuitive versus analytic thinking strategies affects the role of working memory in a gambling task

Previous studies found mixed results concerning the role of working memory (WM) in the gambling task (GT). Here, we aimed at reconciling inconsistencies by showing that the standard version of the task can be solved using intuitive strategies operating automatically, while more complex versions require analytic strategies drawing on executive functions. In Study 1, where good performance on the GT could be achieved using intuitive strategies, participants performed well both with and without a concurrent WM load. In Study 2, where analytical strategies were required to solve a more complex version of the GT, participants without WM load performed well, while participants with WM load performed poorly. In Study 3, where the complexity of the GT was further increased, participants in both conditions performed poorly. In addition to the standard performance measure, we used participants’ subjective expected utility, showing that it differs from the standard measure in some important aspects.     

Mental budgeting versus marginal decision making: training,experience and justification effects on decisions involving sunk costs

Many studies have shown that individuals make economically irrational decisions by using, rather than ignoring, sunk cost information. In this study, the effects of relevant academic training, financial experience and decision justification on investment decisions involving sunk costs were examined. Data on both the process (strategy) and outcome of the decisions were collected. The results indicate that practicing Certified Public Accountants (CPAs), Masters of Business Administration students (MBAs) and undergraduate accounting students perform better than undergraduate psychology students. The level of training, as measured by the number of college courses in managerial accounting, was found to be positively correlated with performance, while the level of experience, as measured by years of financially‐related work, was not. Justification was found to improve decisions only for those participants with significant work experience (MBAs and CPAs). Strategies used in this type of decision were examined with the surprising finding that economically rational decisions can be made even if sunk costs are not ignored. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Characterizing the intuitive representation in problem solving: Evidence from evaluating mathematical strategies

Two experiments were conducted to investigate the nature of the intuitive problem representation used in evaluating mathematical strategies. The first experiment tested between two representations: a representation composed of principles and an integrated representation. Subjects judged the correctness of unseen math strategies based only on the answers they produced for a set of temperature mixture problems. The distance of the given answers from the correct answers and whether the answers violated one of the principles of temperature mixture were manipulated. The results supported the principle representation hypothesis. In the second experiment we manipulated subjects’ understanding of an acid mixture task with a brief paragraph of instruction on one of the principles. Subjects then completed an estimation task intended to measure their understanding of the problem domain. The evaluation task from the first experiment was then presented, but with acid mixture instead of temperature mixture. The results showed that intuitive understanding of the domain mediates the effect of instruction on evaluating problems. Additionally, the results supported the hypothesis that subjects perform a mapping process between their intuitive understanding and math strategies.     

Predictors of suicidal thoughts: Mood instability versus neuroticism

The personality trait neuroticism predicts depression and suicidal thoughts. Neuroticism is also linked to mood instability (MI)¹ that is common in patients with depression. This study investigated (a) whether MI predicts suicidal thoughts in depressed patients and (b) the relationship of MI to neuroticism. All 129 patients with Major Depression (MINI interview) were assessed on MI (Affective Lability Scale), neuroticism (Short Eysenck Neuroticism Scale), depression (Beck Depression Inventory), and suicidal thoughts (Beck Scale for Suicidal Ideation). Participants also completed the Perceived Stress Scale, Mood Disorder Questionnaire and five clinical questions on MI. Factor analysis of the Eysenck Neuroticism Scale revealed unstable moods as one of three main factors. Only depression severity and MI predicted suicidal thoughts once other variables including neuroticism were controlled. Mediation analyses showed that MI mediated the relationship between neuroticism and suicidal thoughts. These results suggest that MI as measured by the Affective Lability Scale typifies the type of depression that predicts suicidal thoughts and that MI may be more directly associated with suicidal thoughts than neuroticism. This demonstrates the clinical value of assessing MI rather than neuroticism in the treatment of patients with depression with suicidal thoughts.     

The aging decision maker: cognitive aging and the adaptive selection of decision strategies

Are older adults' decision abilities fundamentally compromised by age-related cognitive decline? Or can they adaptively select decision strategies? One study (N = 163) investigated the impact of cognitive aging on the ability to select decision strategies as a function of environment structure. Participants made decisions in either an environment that favored the use of information-intensive strategies or one favoring the use of simple, information-frugal strategies. Older adults tended to (a) look up less information and take longer to process it and (b) use simpler, less cognitively demanding strategies. In accordance with the idea that age-related cognitive decline leads to reliance on simpler strategies, measures of fluid intelligence explained age-related differences in information search and strategy selection. Nevertheless, both young and older adults seem to be equally adapted decision makers in that they adjust their information search and strategy selection as a function of environment structure, suggesting that the aging decision maker is an adaptive one.     

Listening to your heart. How interoception shapes emotion experience and intuitive decision making

Theories proposing that how one thinks and feels is influenced by feedback from the body remain controversial. A central but untested prediction of many of these proposals is that how well individuals can perceive subtle bodily changes (interoception) determines the strength of the relationship between bodily reactions and cognitive-affective processing. In Study 1, we demonstrated that the more accurately participants could track their heartbeat, the stronger the observed link between their heart rate reactions and their subjective arousal (but not valence) ratings of emotional images. In Study 2, we found that increasing interoception ability either helped or hindered adaptive intuitive decision making, depending on whether the anticipatory bodily signals generated favored advantageous or disadvantageous choices. These findings identify both the generation and the perception of bodily responses as pivotal sources of variability in emotion experience and intuition, and offer strong supporting evidence for bodily feedback theories, suggesting that cognitive-affective processing does in significant part relate to "following the heart."     

Crisis decision theory: decisions in the face of negative events

How do people respond to negative life events? Crisis decision theory combines the strengths of coping theories with research on decision making to predict the responses people choose under negative circumstances. The theory integrates literatures on coping, health behavior, and decision making, among others, into 3 stages that describe the process of responding to negative events: (a) assessing the severity of the negative event, (b) determining response options, and (c) evaluating response options. The author reviews and organizes the relevant research on factors that shape information processing at each stage and that ultimately predict decisions in the face of negative events. Finally, the author presents a critique of crisis decision theory and discusses areas for future research.     

Identifying decision strategies: A process- and outcome-based classification method

This article presents a classification method that makes possible the detection of important decision strategies that people use in nonrisky multiattribute decision tasks. The classification method incorporates a multimethod approach that combines elements of both structural modeling and process tracing. We begin with a discussion of nine common characteristics of decision strategies and then classify 13 decision strategies on the basis of these characteristics. Next, we demonstrate that six of the characteristics can be used to develop one outcome-based and three process-based metrics. In addition, we present an algorithm that shows how to use the metrics. We demonstrate that using our metrics in conjunction with a measure for direction of search allows identification of most of the 13 decision strategies. Finally, we outline the potential of our research for the design of decision support systems such as online shops.     

It was intuitive,and it felt good: a daily diary study on how people feel when making decisions

ABSTRACT

In daily life, people make plenty of decisions, either intuitively or based on analysis. So far, research has examined when decision-making leads to correct or biased outcomes. In the present study, we adopted a different perspective and explored how decision-making is associated with how people feel. In an observational study, 134 healthy participants retrospectively reported on six evenings which decisions they had made during that day (total N?=?3,850 decisions). They were also asked to indicate how they had felt before/after each decision. Multilevel regression analyses revealed that (a) people reported having felt better prior to intuitive as compared to analytical decisions, (b) people reported having felt better after as compared to before the decision, and (c) this increase in positive feeling was more pronounced for intuitive decisions. The latter two associations were robust to statistically controlling for the life domain in which the decisions occurred, the decisions’ importance and ease, and daily mood. The retrospective design and the single-item measure of mood are among the limitations of this study. Altogether, the results are in line with the idea that making everyday life decisions intuitively makes people feel good.     

Selecting decision strategies: The differential role of affect

This experiment sought to clarify the potential role of emotional feelings in the systematic impact of implicitly processed affective stimuli on mental effort mobilisation. Participants worked on an attention task during which they were primed with suboptimally presented happiness versus sadness expressions. Before the task, half the participants received a cue for the possible affective influence of “flickers” to be presented during the task. This manipulation usually reduces the impact of conscious feelings on resource mobilisation. As anticipated, sadness primes resulted in higher experienced task demand and higher mental effort (stronger cardiac contractility assessed as shortened pre-ejection period) than happiness primes. Most importantly, instead of reducing the prime effects on mental effort, the cue manipulation significantly increased participants’ effort in general, reflecting additional cognitive demand. The results speak against the idea that affect primes influence effort mobilisation by eliciting conscious emotional feelings.     

Impulsive versus premeditated aggression: implications for mens rea decisions

Science can provide more information about the nature of aggressive acts, and therefore the mens rea of criminal offenses, than is commonly assumed. For example, progress has been made in classifying aggression as impulsive or premeditated within the context of the role of conscious experience in controlling behavior. This review of the status of the scientific ability to distinguish conscious from unconscious acts and more specifically impulsive from premeditated aggressive acts is organized around four themes: (i) How is aggression defined and measured in general? (ii) How does the distinction between impulsive and premeditated aggression relate to the legal concept of mens rea? (iii) How do various scientific disciplines contribute to the mind/body discourse? (iv) What risk factors are associated with impulsive and premeditated aggression respectively? The authors conclude that the most promising approach to researching the nature of behavioral intention and motivation is to apply a discipline neutral model that integrates the data from multiple disciplines, collectively designated the cognitive neurosciences.     

Effects of group decision rules on decisions involving continuous alternatives: The unanimity rule and extreme decisions in mock civil juries

Two experiments examined the effects of majority and unanimity decision rules on group decisions involving continuous alternatives. Each experiment used mock civil juries to test three hypotheses related to the claim that when the distribution of group members’ initial preferences is skewed, the group’s decision will be influenced more by the presence of outlier members under unanimity rule than under majority rule. Experiment 1 tested the hypotheses using a punitive damages case and positively skewed preference distributions. Experiment 2 tested the hypotheses using a compensatory damages case and manipulating the skewness of preference distributions in a 2 (group decision rule) × 2 (valence of skewness) factorial design. In both experiments, the extreme (outlier) member’s individual preference was significantly correlated with the group decision only under unanimity rule. A simple thought experiment based on the experimental results is suggested regarding the implications of using unanimity or majority rule for making decisions in civil juries.     

Taking the easy way out: preference diversity, decision strategies, and decision refusal in groups

It has often been argued and found that preference diversity is beneficial for the quality of group decisions. However, this literature has neglected the fact that in many situations, it is also possible not to choose. Further, preference diversity can be based on attractions, aversions, or both. The authors argue that some types of preference diversity can lead to biased discussions and choice refusal (i.e., the group refuses to choose any of the available options). In a laboratory experiment, three different patterns were observed. When group members held different aversions before discussion, discussions were aversion driven and group members quickly agreed to refuse all alternatives. When each alternative had both a proponent and an adversary, discussions were longer and unbiased but still often led to refusal, which was accompanied by relatively low levels of outcome satisfaction. Only when preference diversity was based only on attractions did it lead to unbiased discussion, low prevalence of refusal, and high outcome satisfaction. Implications for group decision making are discussed.     

Perceptions of accuracy and effort of decision strategies

A critical tenet of cost-benefit theories of decision strategy choice is that decision makers’ perceptions of accuracy and effort determine strategy selection. However, little research has been conducted on human perceptions of decision strategy accuracy and effort. Instead, researchers have substituted deductively derived inferences on strategy accuracy and effort for perceptions in interpreting decision processes. In this study, we used a survey to study perceptions of decision strategies. The results indicate that participants as a group understood the accuracy and effort dimensions of decision strategies. The participants’ perceptions of the accuracy and effort of various decision strategies largely agreed with researchers’ deductions. However, there was substantial variation across individuals in perceptions of various decision strategies and in the composition of efficient frontiers of decision strategies.