Emotional mood states and retrieval in episodic memory

The effect of an experimentally induced depressed mood state on recall of target words embedded in sentences was examined. The objective was to determine if the induction of a depressed mood can affect output or retrieval from episodic memory. The experimental sequence was as follows: All subjects studied a list of either elaborated or base sentences, rating them for complexity, in an incidental retention paradigm; this was followed by the induction of a depressed or neutral (control) mood, using a standard and a short form of the Velten mood induction procedure; finally, subjects were given an unanticipated cued recall test of the target adjectives. In all tests, subjects showed a reduction in recall owing to the depressed mood, which provided evidence for retrieval effects of the mood state. Elaboration led to superior recall of target items, and there was no effect of delayed recall. The results are briefly discussed within the framework of a resource allocation theory.     

Mood, memory, and social judgments in children

The influence of positive and negative moods on children's recall and recognition memory and impression-formation judgments was investigated in a two-list experimental design. A total of 161 schoolchildren, 8 to 10 years old, were presented with audiovisual information containing positive and negative details about 2 target children. Each presentation was preceded by happy or sad mood manipulations. One day later, the children were again placed in a happy or sad mood, and their recall and recognition memory and impression-formation judgments were assessed. Results showed that memory was better when (a) the children felt happy during encoding, retrieval, or both; (b) the material was incongruent with learning mood; (c) the 2 target characters were encountered in contrasting rather than in matching mood states; and (d) recall mood matched encoding mood. A happy mood increased the extremity of both positive and negative impression-formation judgments. Results are contrasted with experimental data obtained with normal or depressed adults, and implications are considered for contemporary theories of mood effects on cognition and for social-developmental research.     

Mood-related self-schemata and mood-congruity effects in autobiographical memory: A study of women with premenstrual syndrome

Everyday autobiographical memory and mood interactions were explored in a small clinical sample of women with premenstrual syndrome (PMS) and a matched control group. Subjects kept daily records of memorable events for two consecutive menstrual cycles. Two recognition memory tests were given after a one-cycle delay. Mood, or affect, was self-assessed retrospectively over a week, at the end of each day during data collection and at testing, and when events occurred. Women with PMS were more depressed and more negative (angry) than positive (experiencing bursts of energy) in their daily moods than controls. Memory accuracy was poorer overall for PMS than control subjects, although no direct effects of menstrual cycle phase on memory were found. Instead, mood affected memory indirectly through moodrelated self-schemata which subsequently mediated mood-congruity effects. Memory accuracy for events experienced in negative mood states and associated with negative affective reactions was higher for PMS subjects when tested in negative mood states than for controls. No group differences were found on events associated with positive affect or positive daily moods when mood state at the time of testing was also positive. Women with PMS processed information selectively from negative events and events experienced in negative moods compared to controls. Negative events and negative moods appeared to interfere with remembering for control subjects. Women in the control group appeared to be biased towards selectively remembering positive events and events experienced on days when their mood states were relatively positive.     

Automatic processing influences free recall: converging evidence from the process dissociation procedure and remember-know judgments

Dual-process theories of retrieval suggest that controlled and automatic processing contribute to memory performance. Free recall tests are often considered pure measures of recollection, assessing only the controlled process. We report two experiments demonstrating that automatic processes also influence free recall. Experiment 1 used inclusion and exclusion tasks to estimate recollection and automaticity in free recall, adopting a new variant of the process dissociation procedure. Dividing attention during study selectively reduced the recollection estimate but did not affect the automatic component. In Experiment 2, we replicated the results of Experiment 1, and subjects additionally reported remember–know–guess judgments during recall in the inclusion condition. In the latter task, dividing attention during study reduced remember judgments for studied items, but know responses were unaffected. Results from both methods indicated that free recall is partly driven by automatic processes. Thus, we conclude that retrieval in free recall tests is not driven solely by conscious recollection (or remembering) but also by automatic influences of the same sort believed to drive priming on implicit memory tests. Sometimes items come to mind without volition in free recall.     

Irrelevant thoughts,emotional mood states,and cognitive task performance

In two experiments, we investigated the relationship shared by irrelevant thoughts, emotional mood states, and cognitive task performance. At an empirical level, irrelevant thoughts were defined as thoughts that did not facilitate successful task performance. We used the same general procedure for both experiments: three groups of college students received happy-, neutral-(control), or sad-mood inductions and performed a memory task. The procedure for obtaining thoughts varied between experiments. The subjects in Experiment 1 listed their thoughts after the memory recall task. In Experiment 2, the subjects were tape-recorded while performing a memory task and producing concurrent verbal protocols. The subjects in both experiments then judged their thoughts in terms of frequency, intensity, and irrelevance. We found a similar pattern of results in both experiments: (1) The proportions of irrelevant thoughts and recall performance were negatively related, and (2) happy and sad students produced reliably greater proportions of irrelevant thoughts than did neutral (control) students.     

On interpreting the relationship between remember–know judgments and confidence: The role of instructions

Two experiments were designed to test the hypothesis that the nature of the remember–know instructions given to participants influences whether these responses reflect different memory states or different degrees of memory confidence. Participants studied words and nonwords, a variable that has been shown to dissociate confidence from remember–know judgments and were given a set of published remember–know instructions that either emphasized know judgments as highly confident (Experiment 1) or as less confident (Experiment 2) states of recognition. Experiment 1 replicated the standard finding showing that remembering and knowing were differently influenced by the word–nonword variable, whereas confidence responses were not. By contrast, Experiment 2 showed a similar pattern of data for remember–know and sure–unsure responses, thus demonstrating the importance of the instructions for interpreting the relationship between remembering and knowing and confidence.     

Predicting depression using earliest childhood memories

In order to investigate the utility of earliest childhood memories (EMs) in clinical assessment, this study investigated the value of EMs in predicting naturally occurring depressive mood states. Of interest were those features of EMs that discriminate depressed from nondepressed individuals. Subjects were 212 undergraduate volunteers who completed the Beck Depression Inventory, the Profile of Mood States, and a self-administered EM questionnaire. Utilizing thematic predictors derived from cognitive and psychodynamic theories of depression, depressed subjects were differentiated from nondepressed subjects at a rate significantly greater than chance, p less than .001, with a highly respectable estimate of cross-validation shrinkage. The findings demonstrate the phenomenon of mood dependent recall in autobiographical memory, namely, that memory attributes are strongly influenced by current mood state. Consistent with psychodynamic theories of depression and in contrast to cognitive theory, depressive mood states appear to facilitate retrieval of memory schemas involving deprivation and disturbing human interaction. Schemas involving loss of control, failure, or reactions to noncontingent reinforcement (perceptions of the self as agent) appear less salient than relationship schemas (perceptions of the self as related) in depressive experience.     

What kind of mood influences what kind of memory: The role of arousal and information structure

Mood-congruent memory was investigated as a function of the structure of the information to be remembered (categorical vs. isolated) and the participant’s arousal (stimulating drug vs. placebo). Free recall of photographs showing either pleasant or unpleasant scenes was assessed for subjects under positive or neutral mood states, induced by the imagination of emotional experiences under relaxation. Although the arousal manipulation did not affect the recall performance, the findings highlight the importance of the information structure: a mood-congruency effect was obtained for the isolated pictures; however, the effect did not appear for categorical material, suggesting that structural constraints on the recall process can override the influence of mood on memory. Interestingly, the subject’s evaluations of the pictures also shifted toward their mood states. A general recall advantage of positive mood was observed.     

Mood and memories of parental rearing styles: A comparison of mood effects on questionnaire-cued and free recall of autobiographical memories

The relationship between memories of childhood experiences (e.g., adverse parenting) and adult depression often found raises questions of interpretation. On the one hand, both laboratory studies and clinicians' experiences suggest that subjects in a depressed mood frequently show a negative bias in perceptions and memories. Negative childhood memories in depressed persons might, therefore, be interpreted as epiphenomena of depressed mood instead of etiological factors. On the other hand, memories of childhood experiences seem remarkably stable across changes in depressed mood, especially when memories are elicited by means of standardized questionnaires. In the mood and memory literature several explanations for this stability are offered. For one thing, highly structured cues to elicit memories (such as in questionnaires) are hypothesized to be less susceptible to mood bias than unstructured memory cues (such as in free recall procedures). On the other hand, resource allocation theorists suggest that childhood memories, being well established and rehearsed, are relatively impervious to mood bias no matter how they are elicited. In this study we examined whether different methods of eliciting childhood memories (i.e., free recall and questionnaire-cued) are differentially susceptible to mood bias. To this aim, we used a mood induction procedure to induce depressed, neutral, and elated mood and assessed childhood memories both before and after the mood induction using both questionnaires and free recall to elicit memories. Results suggested that memories elicited by means of free recall as well as by means of questionnaire-cued recall were susceptible to depressed and elated mood bias. The implications for research addressing the link between childhood experiences and depression are discussed.     

Working memory load differentially affects tip-of-the-tongue states and feeling-of-knowing judgments

Tip-of-the-tongue states (TOTs) are judgments of the likelihood of imminent retrieval for items currently not recalled, whereas feeling-of-knowing judgments (FOKs) are predictions of successful recognition for items not recalled. The assumption has been that similar metacognitive processes dictate these similar judgments. In Experiment 1, TOTs and FOKs were compared for general information questions. Participants remembered four digits (working memory load) during target retrieval for half of the questions, and there was no memory load for the other questions. Working memory did not affect recall but decreased the number of TOTs and increased FOKs. In Experiment 2, participants maintained six digits during retrieval. TOTs decreased in the working memory condition, but FOKs remained constant. Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 2 while asking for FOKs for recall. In each of the first three experiments, positive metacognitive judgments also affected working memory performance, supporting the idea that working memory and metamemory use similar monitoring processes. In Experiment 4, visual working memory did not affect TOTs or FOKs. The data support a view that TOTs and FOKs are separable metacognitive entities.     

Emotion and intuition

We investigated effects of emotional states on the ability to make intuitive judgments about the semantic coherence of word triads. Participants were presented word triads, consisting of three clue words that either were weakly associated with a common fourth concept (coherent triads) or had no common associate (incoherent triads). In Experiment 1, participants in a neutral mood discriminated coherent and incoherent triads reliably better than chance level even if they did not consciously retrieve the solution word. In Experiment 2, the induction of a positive mood reliably improved intuitive coherence judgments, whereas participants in a negative mood performed at chance level. We conclude that positive mood potentiates spread of activation to weak or remote associates in memory, thereby improving intuitive coherence judgments. By contrast, negative mood appears to restrict spread of activation to close associates and dominant word meanings, thus impairing intuitive coherence judgments.     

Mood, recall, and selectivity effects in normal college students

In three experiments we explored the relation between normal variation in depressed mood and memory in college students. Subjects read and subsequently recalled stories whose protagonists experienced good, bad, and neutral events. Contrary to predictions arising independently from capacity theory and from schema theory, the recall of depressed and nondepressed subjects did not differ in either overall level or in affective content. The results are not easily handled by a conceptualization of depression, tied to schema theory, which proposes that negative cognitions are important for the initiation and maintenance of depression. The general usefulness of induction procedures in research on the depressive syndrome is discussed.     

Is retrieving positive self-concordant specific memory beneficial to mood repair? The moderation effect of depressive symptoms

The present study examined whether positive specific memory recall improves mood more than overgeneral memory recall. Moreover, this study examined the mood contrast effect in subclinically depressed participants. The mood contrast effect refers to when people ruminate on discrepancies between the current self and a past ideal self by recall of positive self-discrepant (low self-concordant) memories and thereby, fall into a negative mood. Undergraduate students (N?=?161) underwent a negative mood induction, and then concentrated on positive specific memory recall, positive overgeneral memory recall, or distraction. Results showed that there were no group differences in mood repair. Nevertheless, recalled memory self-concordance was associated with sad mood repair in the specific memory group, and moreover, this effect was not significant in people high in depressive symptoms. We discussed the results of mood repair effect from the perspective of baseline negative mood in subclinical depression.     

Mood and the impact of category membership and individuating information

We investigated how individuals in different mood states are influenced by category membership information, by individuating information, and by the relation of the two in an impression formation task. Subjects in different mood states received positive or negative individuating information and positive or negative category information about a target person. Experiment 1 indicates that sad subjects were influenced by individuating but not by category membership information. In contrast, happy subjects' judgments reflected the implications of the category information as long as the individuating information was not inconsistent with the category, replicating previous research. This pattern was eliminated, however, when category-inconsistent information was provided, suggesting that happy subjects related the individuating information to the category membership information. Additional experiments show that instructing neutral mood subjects to relate category and individuating information or to focus on the individuating information result in patterns that parallel the judgments of happy and sad subjects, respectively, and that these effects are only obtained when the category information precedes (rather than follows) the individuating information. Extending previous theorizing, we conclude that being in a happy mood increases the likelihood that information is processed in the light of pre-existing general knowledge structures.     

Feeling good and feeling close: Affective influences on the perception of intimate relationships

Two experiments investigated the role of short-term affective states on the way people perceive various aspects of their personal relationships. Using an unobtrusive mood induction in a field setting, Experiment 1 found significant mood congruency in evaluative judgments about well-established intimate relationships. Experiment 2 used a controlled laboratory procedure and found that evaluations of the relationship and the partner, as well as preferred styles of conflict resolution were all significantly affected by the respondents' transient mood state. Increasing relationship longevity did not reduce affective influences on judgments in either study. The results arc discussed in terms of the role of affective states in cognition and judgments, and the influence of affect on everyday judgments about personal relationships is considered.     

Affective valence influences participant's susceptibility to false memories and illusory recollection

This study examined the influence of emotional valence on the production of DRM false memories (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Participants were presented with neutral, positive, or negative DRM lists for a later recognition (Experiment 1) or recall (Experiment 2) test. In both experiments, confidence and recollective experience (i.e., "Remember-Know" judgments; Tulving, 1985) were also assessed. Results consistently showed that, compared with neutral lists, affective lists induced more false recognition and recall of nonpresented critical lures. Moreover, although confidence ratings did not differ between the false remembering from the different kinds of lists, "Remember" responses were more often associated with negative than positive and neutral false remembering of the critical lures. In contrast, positive false remembering of the critical lures was more often associated with "Know" responses. These results are discussed in light of the Paradoxical Negative Emotion (PNE) hypothesis (Porter, Taylor, & ten Bricke, 2008).