Tacit coordination in monozygotic twins, dizygotic twins and virtual twins: Effects and implications of genetic relatedness

Game theorists have long been interested in why some partners are more successful at achieving mutual goals than others. The present study was conducted to determine if tacit coordination (non-negotiated consensus) varies as a function of genetic relatedness between social partners. The sample included 7–13-year-old monozygotic (MZ) twin pairs (n = 53), dizygotic (DZ) twin pairs (n = 85) and virtual twin (VT) pairs (n = 42; same-age unrelated siblings). Co-twin agreement on questions completed under individual and coordination conditions was compared across the three groups. MZ twins showed significantly greater overall agreement than DZ twins and VTs, using multiple criteria. The implications of these findings are considered with reference to behavioral-genetic and evolutionary theories of behavior.     

How language relates to belief,desire, and emotion understanding

Two experiments examined syntax and semantics as correlates of theory-of-mind (ToM). In Experiment 1 children’s language was examined at 3 years of age in relation to ToM at 3, 3.5, 4, and 5.5 years. Semantics predicted unique variance in later belief understanding but not desire understanding. Syntax did not explain unique variance in belief or desire. In Experiment 2 two measures of syntax and a measure of semantics were used with 65 3–5-year-olds. The syntax measures tested children’s understanding of word order and embedded clauses. They were related to false belief, but contrary to some predictions, were also related to emotion recognition. Performance on language control tasks with low syntactic demands correlated equally well with false belief. In both experiments performance on the syntax and semantics tasks was highly inter-correlated. We argue that ToM is related to general language ability rather than syntax or semantics per se.     

False belief and language comprehension in Cantonese-speaking children

The current research compared two accounts of the relation between language and false belief in children, namely that (a) language is generally related to false belief because both require secondary representation in a social-interactional context and that (b) specific language structures that explicitly code metarepresentation contribute uniquely to the language-false belief relation. In three studies, attempts were made to correlate Cantonese-speaking children's false belief with their general language comprehension and understanding of certain structures that explicitly express metarepresentational knowledge. Results showed that these structures failed to predict false belief after age, nonverbal intelligence, and general language comprehension were considered. In contrast, general language remained predictive of false belief after controlling for age, nonverbal intelligence, and language structures. The current findings are more consistent with a general language account than a language structure account.     

False belief understanding: The influence of person,grammatical mood,counterfactual reasoning and working memory

The present study had two major goals. The first goal was to assess the relative difficulty among different versions of the unexpected contents task by systematically varying the dimensions of grammatical mood (indicative vs. subjunctive) and person (self vs. other), and to examine the correlational pattern between these different versions of the unexpected contents task and the unexpected locations task. The second goal was to examine the specificity of the relation between false belief understanding and counterfactual reasoning after controlling for age and working memory ability. One hundred, 3‐ to 6‐year‐old, children were administered two measures of false belief understanding (two versions of the unexpected contents task and two versions of the unexpected locations task), two measures of counterfactual reasoning and a working memory measure. Results showed that performance on the unexpected contents task did not significantly differ across conditions. However, only the conditions of the unexpected contents task that concerned another person's false belief correlated significantly with the unexpected locations task. Moreover, counterfactual reasoning was found to explain a significant amount of variance in the unexpected locations task, even after controlling for age and working memory performance. Findings are discussed in the context of different accounts of the development of theory of mind, and in the context of different interpretations of the relation between false belief understanding and counterfactual reasoning.     

Differential behavior in monozygotic twins

The Psychological Record -     

Anorexia nervosa masculina--concordance in monozygotic twins

The case report presents the courses of the disease of an infantile-juvenile masculine monozygotic pair of twins suffering from anorexia nervosa. Beginning, therapy and result turned out differently in spite of a commonly suffered disease. Already the importance of smaller differences in their personality development as well as the merit of the intrageminate dynamic of parts are worked out.     

Relations between mental verb and false belief understanding in Cantonese-speaking children

Previous research has shown that linguistic forms that codify mental contents bear a specific relation with children’s false belief understanding. These forms include mental verbs and their following complements, yet the two have not been considered separately. The current study examined the roles of mental verb semantics and the complement syntax in children’s false belief understanding. Independent tasks were used to measure verb meaning, complements, and false belief understanding such that the verbs in question were present only in the verb meaning test, and no linguistic devices biased toward false belief were used in the false belief test. We focused on (a) some mental verbs that obligatorily affirm or negate what follows and (b) sentential complements, the content of which is to be evaluated against the mind of another person, not reality. Results showed that only (a) predicted false belief understanding in a group of Cantonese-speaking 4-year-olds, controlling for nonverbal intelligence and general language ability. In particular, children’s understanding of the strong nonfactive semantics of the Cantonese verbs /ji5-wai4/ (“falsely think”) predicted false belief understanding most strongly. The current findings suggest that false belief understanding is specifically related to the comprehension of mental verbs that entail false thought in their semantics.     

Contributions of emotion understanding to narrative comprehension in children and adults

This study examined to what extent children and adults differ in how they process negative emotions during reading, and how they rate their own and protagonists’ emotional states. Results show that both children’s and adults’ processing of target sentences was facilitated when they described negative emotions. Processing of spill-over sentences was facilitated for adults but inhibited for children, suggesting children needed additional time to process protagonists’ emotional states and integrate them into coherent mental representations. Children and adults were similar in their valence and arousal ratings as they rated protagonists’ emotional states as more negative and more intense than their own emotional states. However, they differed in that children rated their own emotional states as relatively neutral, whereas adults’ ratings of their own emotional states more closely matched the negative emotional states of the protagonists. This suggests a possible difference between children and adults in the mechanism underlying emotional inferencing.     

A lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution in young children: Relationships with linguistic ability and mothers' mental‐state language

This study examines the contribution of children's linguistic ability and mothers' use of mental‐state language to young children's understanding of false belief and their subsequent ability to make belief‐based emotion attributions. In Experiment 1, children (N = 51) were given three belief‐based emotion‐attribution tasks. A standard task in which the protagonist was a story character and the emotional outcomes were imagined, and two videos in which the story protagonist was a real infant and the emotional outcomes were observable (high and low expressed emotion conditions). Children's verbal ability (semantic competence) was also measured. In Experiment 2, children (N = 75) were given two belief‐based emotion tasks: the standard story task and the high expressed emotion video. In addition, children's verbal ability (syntactic competence) and mothers' use of mental‐state attributes when describing their children were also measured. The results showed that: (1) the lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution was a stable feature of children's reasoning across the three tests; and (2) children who were more linguistically advanced and whose mothers' described them in more mentalistic terms were more likely to understand the association between false belief and emotion. The findings underline the continuing importance of verbal ability and linguistic input for children's developing theory‐of‐mind understanding, even after they display an understanding of false belief.     

Children's understanding of promising, lying, and false belief

Understanding promising and lying requires an understanding of intention and the ability to interpret mental states. The author examined (a) the extent to which 4- to 6-year-olds focus on the sincerity of the speaker's intention when the 4-to 6-year-olds make judgments about promises and lies and (b) whether false-belief reasoning skills are related to understanding promising and lying. Participants watched videotaped stories and made promise and lie judgments from their own perspective and from the listener-character's perspective. Children also completed false-belief reasoning tasks. Older children made more correct promise judgments from both perspectives. All children made correct lie judgments from the listener's perspective. The author found that Ist-order false-belief reasoning was related to making judgments from the participant's perspective; 2nd-order false-belief reasoning was related to making judgments from the listener-character's perspective. Results suggest that children's understanding of promising and lying moves from a focus on outcome toward a focus on the belief that each utterance is designed to create.     

Placebo, belief, and health. A cognitive–emotion model

The present paper reviews empirical research on placebo effects, and presents a cognitive–emotional model of the psychological mechanisms involved. It is argued that illness often involves psychological aspects; people not only sense their signs of physical illness, but also interpret these signs, and respond emotionally to their interpretations. Cognitions of danger (e.g. fear of dying) produce anxiety, whereas cognitions of loss (e.g. loss of one's health) produce sadness or depression. It is argued that an important part of the placebo effect is due to the development of placebo beliefs (beliefs of the form "This treatment is going to cure me"), which may counteract the kind of cognitions that produce anxiety and depression; placebo beliefs produce emotional responses (hope, calm, etc.), which are antagonistic to depression and anxiety. Further, if anxiety and depression tend to affect a person's physical health negatively, placebo beliefs may be expected to have a positive influence on physical health. Placebo effects may occur not only with pure placebos (e.g. sugar pills), but with all kinds of medical and psychological treatments; even treatments that contain active ingredients of a non-placebo nature may involve important placebo components. Placebo effects may vary in strength, depending on the therapist's behaviour (verbal information to the patient, enthusiasm, optimism, interest, etc.), and on the patient's idiosyncratic meaning structures (which invest various kinds of treatment with different placebo value).     

False belief in infancy: a fresh look

Can infants appreciate that others have false beliefs? Do they have a theory of mind? In this article I provide a detailed review of more than 20 experiments that have addressed these questions, and offered an affirmative answer, using nonverbal ‘violation of expectation’ and ‘anticipatory looking’ procedures. Although many of these experiments are both elegant and ingenious, I argue that their results can be explained by the operation of domain‐general processes and in terms of ‘low‐level novelty’. This hypothesis suggests that the infants' looking behaviour is a function of the degree to which the observed (perceptual novelty) and remembered or expected (imaginal novelty) low‐level properties of the test stimuli – their colours, shapes and movements – are novel with respect to events encoded by the infants earlier in the experiment. If the low‐level novelty hypothesis is correct, research on false belief in infancy currently falls short of demonstrating that infants have even an implicit theory of mind. However, I suggest that the use of two experimental strategies – inanimate control procedures, and self‐informed belief induction – could be used in combination with existing methods to bring us much closer to understanding the evolutionary and developmental origins of theory of mind.     

Pathways to behavior problems in Norwegian kindergarten children: The role of parent emotion socialization and child emotion understanding

More than two decades of research have shown that parental emotion-related socialization behaviors (ERSBs) significantly predict child emotion understanding and externalizing behavior problems. This study aimed to replicate these findings in a sample of 40 Norwegian preschool children and to test whether the effect of parental ERSBs on externalizing child behavior problems was mediated through child emotion understanding. Parental report on ERSBs was obtained using the Coping with Children’s Negative Emotions Scale (CCNES) questionnaire. Child emotion understanding was assessed directly using the Test of Emotion Comprehension (TEC). The results showed that parental distress reactions and externalizing child behavior problems were significantly correlated and that parental expressive encouragement was significantly correlated with child emotion understanding. Estimation of indirect effects was conducted using process analysis and showed that parental expressive encouragement was indirectly related to externalizing child behavior problems (b = −0.17) via child emotion understanding. The results suggest that better child emotion understanding, and lower parental distress are related to lower levels of behavior problems in preschool children. These findings provide support for the Parental Meta-Emotion Philosophy (PMEP) model, where the effect of parental emotion socialization on externalizing child behavior problems is mediated through emotion understanding.     

Anatomical correlates of normal and impaired language in a set of dizygotic twins

This report presents findings for a set of dizygotic twins at age 4 years 9 months. The male was diagnosed as specifically language impaired. For both children, the left-right perisylvian configuration was atypical. Only the male's configuration was symmetrical, a finding in line with autopsy data reported for subjects with "developmental dyslexia" who also may have had a form of language impairment. In addition, the male had an atypical (L greater than R) configuration of the cerebral hemispheres, a finding not seen in his twin, or in a series of volunteers without a history of developmental language impairment. The in utero effects of gonadal hormones that may account for these findings are discussed.     

Moral reasoning,emotion understanding,and callous-unemotional traits in early-to-middle childhood

Relatively little is known about features of moral reasoning among young children with callous-unemotional (CU) traits (e.g., lack of guilt and empathy). This study tested associations between CU traits and emotion attributions (i.e., identification of others’ emotional states) and justifications (i.e., explanations for those emotional states), across social scenarios involving discreet versus salient distress cues. The participants were boys aged 6-to-10 years (N = 50; M_age = 7 years 7 months), who were interviewed about 12 hypothetical scenarios (eight with discreet and four with salient distress cues). Regression models indicated that CU traits, in interaction with high levels of antisocial behaviour, were associated with reduced emotion attributions of fear in discreet but not salient immoral scenarios. Higher CU traits were also associated with reduced justifications referencing others’ welfare in discreet scenarios, and increased references to action-orientated justifications in salient scenarios. These findings suggest that CU traits are associated with early moral reasoning impairments and that salience of distress may be important to these processes.     

Children's understanding of emotion in dance

This study investigated children's understanding of emotion in dance movements. Professional dancers were instructed to improvise on the emotions of joy, anger, fear, and sadness and to transform these improvisations into short solo dances, which were recorded on video. Eight performances were selected for use as stimuli. Children, aged 4, 5, and 8 years, and adults watched these performances and indicated which of the four emotions they perceived in the respective performance. All age groups achieved recognition scores well above chance level. As a rule, 4-year-olds' recognition was inferior to that of the other age groups, but in some cases either girls or boys of this age achieved as good a recognition as one or more of the other age groups. The 5-year-old children achieved recognition levels close to those obtained for 8-year-olds and adults. A cue analysis based on the Laban movement analysis suggested that force and tempo in movement were the key factors for emotion recognition.     

Associations among false belief understanding,counterfactual reasoning,and executive function

The primary purposes of the present study were to clarify previous work on the association between counterfactual thinking and false belief performance to determine (1) whether these two variables are related and (2) if so, whether executive function skills mediate the relationship. A total of 92 3‐, 4‐, and 5‐year‐olds completed false belief, counterfactual, working memory, representational flexibility, and language measures. Counterfactual reasoning accounted for limited unique variance in false belief. Both working memory and representational flexibility partially mediated the relationship between counterfactual and false belief. Children, like adults, also generated various types of counterfactual statements to differing degrees. Results demonstrated the importance of language and executive function for both counterfactual and false belief. Implications are discussed.     

"John thinks that Mary feels. . ." False belief in children across affective and physical domains

Children aged 5-8 years (N = 64) were given 3 first- and 3 second-order tasks testing their ability to represent false beliefs about physical facts, positive emotions, and negative emotions. The children were also asked to justify their responses to the test questions. Older children were more successful than younger children at both answering the test questions correctly and justifying their responses. On the first-order problems, performance was better on the physical fact task than on the emotions tasks; the reverse was true for the second-order problems. Children primarily used situational explanations to explain correct judgments on the physical problems, whereas mentalistic explanations were more common than situational explanations on 3 of the 4 emotions tasks. The results extend knowledge of false belief beyond the simple forms studied at the preschool level.     

Children''s understanding of belief and disconfirming visual evidence

Data from 3- to 5-year-old children show that even the youngest have an understanding that a story character cannot think an object is in a box when the character looks into the empty box. This understanding is, however, limited to the case where children share the same visual perspective with the character. When visual perspectives are different the relevant knowledge develops shortly after 4 years at about the time that children master the false belief task. These results are interpreted as young children using an implicit constraint that “think” cannot be applied in view of disconfirming visual evidence. This implicit knowledge becomes explicit and, thus, perspective independent with some delay.     

The relationship between emotional-state language and emotion understanding: A study with school-age children

We carried out an investigation with primary-school children on the relationship between both use and comprehension of emotional-state language and emotion understanding. Participants were 100 students between 7 and 10 years old (mean age=8 years and 10 months; SD=15.3 months), equally divided by gender. They completed four tests evaluating their language ability, use of emotional-state language, comprehension of emotional-state language and emotion understanding (EU) respectively. Significant correlations were found between both use and comprehension of emotional-state talk and children's EU. In addition, regression analyses showed that comprehension of emotional-state language, rather than its use, plays a significant role in explaining children's emotion understanding.