Cognitive and social consequences of exposure to emotional narratives: Two studies on secondary social sharing of emotions

People who listen to a narrative concerning another's experience feel the urge to share in turn their experience of listening. This phenomenon is called secondary social sharing of emotion and has been widely investigated in the last ten years (Christophe & Di Giacomo, 1995; Christophe & Rimé, 1997). The present two studies aimed to provide new evidence concerning secondary social sharing of emotion. In the first study, participants were asked to recall an emotional narrative they had been told no more than three months before and to specify their social sharing about the narrative. In the second study, a diary strategy was used in order to encourage participants to recall an emotional narrative they had listened to during the day that had just elapsed. A follow‐up, three weeks after the completion of the diaries, was used to assess secondary social sharing over time. Results from both studies confirmed that secondary social sharing is a widespread phenomenon, involving many partners, mainly belonging to the circle of intimates, and affected by the intensity of listeners' emotional reactions. Adults exhibited significantly higher ratings of secondary social sharing than young people. In the first study, the valence (positive vs. negative) of the emotional experience affected secondary social sharing. However, no differences were found for sharing positive and negative experiences in the diary study.     

Exposure to the social sharing of emotion: Emotional impact,listener responses and secondary social sharing

In line with evidence showing that emotion involves a social sharing process in which the subject communicates about emotional experience, this article examines the impact of being exposed to such communications. First, it was predicted that being exposed to the social sharing of an emotion is emotion-inducing. Second, it was reasoned that if this holds true, then the listener should later engage in socially sharing with other persons the emotional narrative heard. Thus, a process of ‘secondary social sharing’ was predicted. In two independent studies subjects recalled a situation in which someone had shared an emotional experience with them. They then rated emotions felt while exposed to the narrative, responses adopted toward the sharing person, and extent of secondary social sharing. The predictions were supported. Exposure to a social sharing situation was confirmed as itself emotion-inducing. Secondary social sharing was recorded in 66 per cent of the cases in Study 1 and in 78 per cent in Study 2. Both studies also showed that exposure to the sharing of highly intense emotional episodes elicited more repetitive secondary social sharing and a superior number of target persons than exposure to episodes of low or of moderate emotional intensity. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From social talk to social action: shaping the social triad with emotion sharing

Seemingly trivial social talk provides fertile ground for emotion sharing (a narrator and audience's realization that they experience the same emotional response toward a target), which in turn creates a coalition between the narrator and the audience, configures the narrator and audience's relationship with the target, and coordinates their target-directed action. In this article, the authors use 4 studies to investigate this thesis. In Studies 1 and 2--where participants rated scenarios in which narrators told them anecdotes--the authors found that when there was emotion sharing (a) participants were more bonded with narrators, (b) the narrator and audience's relationship with the target (as reflected in action tendencies) was determined by the emotionality of the anecdotes, and (c) they coordinated their target-directed actions. Study 3 demonstrated that this effect was indeed due to emotion sharing. Study 4 provided behavioral evidence for the effects of emotion sharing using a 2-person trust game. Together, these studies reveal that the everyday act of social talk is a powerful act that is able to shape the social triad of the narrator, the audience, and the social target, with powerful consequences for social structure and group action.     

Beyond the myth of venting: Social sharing modes determine the benefits of emotional disclosure

When individuals experience an emotion, they talk about it afterwards. A popular ‘emotional venting’ belief claims that doing so dissolves the emotional impact. This study tested a model of when and how sharing emotions is beneficial. It predicts that benefits vary according to the listener's response mode. A socio‐affective (empathic) mode was expected to buffer emotional distress temporarily. A cognitive (reframing) mode was anticipated to grant emotional recovery. Participants viewed an aversive film and then talked about it with an intimate. The latter was instructed to adopt either cognitive or socio‐affective response modes in a 2 × 2 design (cognitive/non‐cognitive; socio‐affective/neutral). Emotional, cognitive and social benefits were assessed immediately afterwards and again 2 days later following re‐exposure to the film. As predicted, emotional recovery occurred exclusively when the listener stimulated the participant's cognitive work. Cognitive variables (basic assumptions) were also positively modified by these conditions. Listeners' socio‐affective responses entailed enhanced social integration (i.e. greater proximity to the listener; less loneliness) and an impression of feeling better. These results demonstrated that sharing emotions can lead to multiple benefits depending upon the listeners' response modes: emotional recovery, consolidation of shattered assumptions, social integration and temporary distress reduction. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The relation between social sharing and the duration of emotional experience

People often socially share their emotions to regulate them. Two-mode theory of social sharing states that cognitive sharing will contribute to emotional recovery, whereas socio-affective sharing will only temporarily alleviate emotional distress. Previous studies supporting this theory, measured emotional recovery in terms of residual emotional intensity. Until now, another important time-dynamic aspect of emotions, emotion duration, has been largely ignored. In two experience sampling studies we addressed this gap. In Study 1, participants reported on the duration of anger, fear, and sadness episodes; additionally time-varying information on the occurrence and mode of sharing was collected. This study revealed that sharing led to a shortening in emotion duration, in particular when it was socio-affective in nature. In Study 2 we investigated whether this result could be interpreted in terms of our measure of duration primarily reflecting emotional relief rather than recovery. In this study, the same method as in Study 1 was used; additionally, residual emotional intensity was measured three days after emotion onset. Study 2 largely replicated the findings from Study 1. Furthermore, duration appeared to be empirically distinct from residual intensity. Finally, no relation between sharing and residual intensity was found, even when considering the sharing mode.     

Changing emotion dynamics: individual differences in the effect of anticipatory social stress on emotional inertia

Emotional inertia-the degree to which people's feelings carry over from one moment to the next-is an important property of the temporal dynamics of emotions. Thus far, emotional inertia has only been examined as a stable, trait-like characteristic. However, internal or external events (e.g., stress) may trigger changes in people's emotion dynamics, particularly among individuals with heightened sensitivity to such events. The current study investigated how emotional inertia is influenced by the anticipation of social stress, and how this effect is moderated by individual differences in depression, self-esteem, and fear of negative evaluation. We measured participants' (n = 71) emotional inertia in daily life using experience sampling before and after experimentally manipulating anticipatory social stress. Consistent with previous research, psychological maladjustment was associated with higher emotional inertia during "normal" daily life. However, when anticipating a socially stressful event, levels of emotional inertia dropped, particularly among participants scoring high on depression and fear of negative evaluation and low on self-esteem. These results demonstrate that emotion dynamics can vary as a function of contextual factors and identify moderators of such variation.     

Desire for emotional closeness moderates the effectiveness of the social regulation of emotion

The present study examined whether individual differences in the desire for emotional closeness moderate the effectiveness of the social regulation of emotion. Using a within-subjects design, 195 undergraduates viewed strongly negative images in two conditions: (a) when holding the hand of an anonymous research assistant seated behind a curtain; and (b) when alone. Participants reported and exhibited less affect to the negative slides when holding hands than when seated alone. Moreover, desired emotional closeness moderated the effectiveness of handholding, as measured by facial expressivity, such that the effectiveness of handholding was positively associated with desired emotional closeness. The moderating role of desired emotional closeness remained when accounting for attachment style and the need for affiliation. This finding indicates that the effectiveness of the social regulation of emotion is moderated by the degree to which individuals desire emotional closeness. Thus, examining individual differences in the desire for emotional closeness may be helpful when investigating emotional responses to social interactions, such as the social regulation of emotion.     

Unfinished business: How completeness affects the impact of emotional states and emotion concepts on social judgment

In two studies, we compared the impact of cold emotion concept primes with induced hot emotional states on subsequent social judgments. We hypothesized that the completeness of the prime episode is an important determinant of whether accessible information will lead to emotionally congruent or incongruent judgments. We extend previous research on knowledge and emotion accessibility effects by demonstrating that the effects of incomplete versus completed prime episodes are independent of whether we prime emotion states or emotion concepts. That is, our results show that both hot and cold affective information activated by incomplete prime episodes leads to assimilation, whereas information activated by completed prime episodes leads to contrast effects. Implications for accessibility research are discussed.     

Influence of children's emotional states on the recognition of emotion in peers and social motives to change another's emotional state

This experiment addressed the question of whether children's own emotional states influence their accuracy in recognizing emotional states in peers and any motives they may have to intervene in order to change their peers' emotional states. Happiness, sadness, anger, or a neutral state were induced in preschool children, who then viewed slides of other 4-year-old children who were actually experiencing each of those states. Children's own emotional states influenced only their perception of sadness in peers. Sad emotional states promoted systematic inaccuracies in the perception of sadness, causing children to mislabel sadness in peers as anger. Children had high base rates for using the label “happy,” and this significantly enhanced their accuracy in recognizing that state. Low base rates for labeling others as in a neutral state reduced accuracy in recognizing neutrality. Children were generally motivated to change sad, angry, and neutral states in peers, and they were most motivated to change a peer's state if they were to be the agent of such change. The results are discussed in terms of the limited role of children's own emotional states in their recognition of emotion in others or motives to intervene and in terms of factors influencing the perception of emotion, such as base rate preferences for labeling others as experiencing, or not experiencing, particular emotional states.     

Beyond arousal and valence: The importance of the biological versus social relevance of emotional stimuli

The present study addressed the hypothesis that emotional stimuli relevant to survival or reproduction (biologically emotional stimuli) automatically affect cognitive processing (e.g., attention, memory), while those relevant to social life (socially emotional stimuli) require elaborative processing to modulate attention and memory. Results of our behavioral studies showed that (1) biologically emotional images hold attention more strongly than do socially emotional images, (2) memory for biologically emotional images was enhanced even with limited cognitive resources, but (3) memory for socially emotional images was enhanced only when people had sufficient cognitive resources at encoding. Neither images’ subjective arousal nor their valence modulated these patterns. A subsequent functional magnetic resonance imaging study revealed that biologically emotional images induced stronger activity in the visual cortex and greater functional connectivity between the amygdala and visual cortex than did socially emotional images. These results suggest that the interconnection between the amygdala and visual cortex supports enhanced attention allocation to biological stimuli. In contrast, socially emotional images evoked greater activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and yielded stronger functional connectivity between the amygdala and MPFC than did biological images. Thus, it appears that emotional processing of social stimuli involves elaborative processing requiring frontal lobe activity.     

The structure of emotional expressivity: each emotion counts

Several models of the dimensionality of emotional expressivity were examined in a multitrait-multimethod study. Targets and peer raters completed measures of the target's emotional expressivity (Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire. BEQ; J. J. Gross & O. P. John, 1995; and a measure of emotion-specific expression) and the Big 5 personality dimensions. The results of structural equation modeling and analysis of variance revealed that an emotion-specific model was superior to models of valence-specific or unidimensional expressivity. The distinct emotions differed in their relations with the dimensions of the 5-factor model. These results were corroborated by self- and other reports. Finally, the degree of convergence between self- and other ratings differed between emotions, demonstrating the multidimensional character of emotional expressivity.     

Distinct emotional abilities converge: Evidence from emotional understanding and emotion recognition through the voice

One key criterion for whether Emotional Intelligence (EI) truly fits the definition of “intelligence” is that individual branches of EI should converge. However, for performance tests that measure actual ability, such convergence has been elusive. Consistent with theoretical perspectives for intelligence, we approach this question using EI measures that have objective standards for right answers. Examining emotion recognition through the voice—that is, the ability to judge an actor’s intended portrayal—and emotional understanding—that is, the ability to understand relationships and transitions among emotions—we find substantial convergence, r = .53. Results provide new data to inform the often heated debate about the validity of EI, and further the basis of optimism that EI may truly be considered intelligence.     

Personality and emotional memory: How regulating emotion impairs memory for emotional events

In everyday life, individuals actively regulate their emotions in a variety of ways. One common form of emotion regulation is expressive suppression, which entails inhibiting outward signs of emotion. Although expressive suppression is often undertaken with an eye to looking calm despite feeling emotional, an analysis of its self-regulatory demands suggests that this form of emotion regulation may come at a cognitive price. We tested this hypothesis in two studies. In Study 1, we measured spontaneously occurring expressive suppression during a film that depicted a surgical procedure, and then assessed memory for the film. Greater use of suppression predicted worse memory. In Study 2, we examined expressive suppression during a film that depicted a conflictual conversation, and we measured memory for what was said during the conversation. To gauge the magnitude of any cognitive costs, we compared expressive suppression with self-distraction, which entails intentionally trying not to think about something. Both spontaneously occurring and experimentally induced suppression were associated with worse memory. Strikingly, these effects were comparable to the effects of spontaneously occurring and experimentally induced distraction. These studies suggest that “simply” keeping a stiff upper lip during an emotional event exacts a cognitive toll that is as great as intentional cognitive avoidance. We argue that efforts to understand links between emotion and memory must consider emotion regulation.     

Trait emotional intelligence: behavioural validation in two studies of emotion recognition and reactivity to mood induction

This paper presents two experiments concerning trait emotional intelligence (‘trait EI’). In study 1, ten high and ten low trait EI individuals were selected from a sample of 85 persons to participate in a computerized experiment involving the recognition of morphed emotional expressions. As hypothesized, high trait EI participants were faster at identifying the expressions than their low trait EI counterparts. In study 2, trait EI scores from 102 persons were residualized on the Big Five and subsequently 15 high and 15 low trait EI individuals were selected to participate in a mood induction experiment. As hypothesized, high trait EI participants exhibited greater sensitivity to the mood induction procedure than their low trait EI counterparts. The findings are discussed in terms of the construct validity of trait EI, with particular emphasis on the issue of incremental validity vis‐à‐vis broad personality traits. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Beyond the double-jeopardy hypothesis: Assessing emotion on the faces of multiply-categorizable targets of prejudice

Prior research has shown that race influences perceptions of facial expressions, with hostility detected earlier on young male Black than White faces. This study examined whether the interplay of race and age would moderate perceptions of hostility by having participants evaluate facial expressions of multiply-categorizable targets. Using a facial emotion change-detection task, we assessed evaluations of onset/offset of anger and happiness on faces of young and old Black and White men. Significant age by race interactions were observed: while participants perceived anger as lasting longer and appearing sooner on old compared to young White faces, this relationship was reversed for Black faces, with participants perceiving anger lasting longer and appearing sooner on young compared to old Black faces. Similar results were found for perceived happiness. These results suggest that perception during cross-categorization may be more complex than the simple additive function proposed by the double-jeopardy hypothesis, such that co-activation of other stereotypes may sometimes confer a protective benefit against bias.     

Cross-modal evaluative priming: emotional sounds influence the processing of emotion words

Cross-modal priming occurs when a prime presented in one sensory modality influences responses to a target in a different sensory modality. Currently, demonstrations of cross-modal evaluative priming have been sparse and limited. In the present study, we seek to partially rectify this state of affairs by examining cross-modal evaluative priming from auditory primes to visual targets. Significant cross-modal priming effects were found, but only for negative primes. Results are discussed in terms of the negativity bias, and several suggestions are provided for using cross-modal evaluative priming to address theoretically important questions about emotion and cognition.     

Beyond valence in the perception of likelihood: the role of emotion specificity

Positive and negative moods have been shown to increase likelihood estimates of future events matching these states in valence (e.g., E. J. Johnson & A. Tversky, 1983). In the present article, 4 studies provide evidence that this congruency bias (a) is not limited to valence but functions in an emotion-specific manner, (b) derives from the informational value of emotions, and (c) is not the inevitable outcome of likelihood assessment under heightened emotion. Specifically, Study 1 demonstrates that sadness and anger, 2 distinct, negative emotions, differentially bias likelihood estimates of sad and angering events. Studies 2 and 3 replicate this finding in addition to supporting an emotion-as-information (cf. N. Schwarz & G. L. Clore, 1983), as opposed to a memory-based, mediating process for the bias. Finally, Study 4 shows that when the source of the emotion is salient, a reversal of the bias can occur given greater cognitive effort aimed at accuracy.