Beyond the emotional event: Six studies on the social sharing of emotion

Abstract

We argue that emotion cannot only be conceived of as a short-lived and intrapersonal phenomenon. Rather, based on five theoretical arguments, we propose that the social sharing of an emotional experience forms an integral part of the emotional processes. A series of six studies investigated different aspects of this hypothesis. Study 1 showed that an overwhelming majority of people reported sharing their emotional experiences and that the memories of these experiences tended to come back spontaneously to their consciousness. No difference was found among emotions. Using a different procedure, Studies 2 and 3 replicated these findings in two different populations. In addition, these studies provided indications that women share their experiences with a wider array of individuals than do men. The first three studies did not find any differences among emotions, but they did not include shame. It could be argued that people are less inclined to socially share shame experiences which are typically elicited by breaking social rules. Study 4 specifically investigated this hypothesis. No differences among shame and other emotions were found except for the delay of the first sharing of the experience. Study 5 constituted a first investigation of whether the social sharing of emotion is also a significant process in now Western cultures. A comparison between Dutch and Surinamese people failed to reveal any significant difference. Based on the findings of the first five studies, a correlational model was designed in Study 6. It tested the interrelationships among disruptiveness of the emotion, social sharing, mental rumination, and recovery from the emotion disruption. A coherent pattern of findings emerged, showing that social sharing can be conceived as a bi-dimensional concept defined by features of amount and delay of sharing. In addition, both social sharing and mental rumination varied according to the disruptiveness of the emotion. Surprisingly, however, recovery could not be related to social sharing, mental rumination, or to the time elapsed since the episode.     

I hear you (not): sharers’ expressions and listeners’ inferences of the need for support in response to negative emotions

When in emotional distress, people often turn to others for support. Paradoxically, even when people perceive social support to be beneficial, it often does not result in emotional recovery. This paradox may be explained by the fact that the sharing process disproportionately centres on support that is not helpful in the long run. A distinction has been made between two types of support that are differentially effective: Whereas socio-affective support alleviates momentary emotional distress, cognitive support fosters long-term recovery. But can listeners tell what support the sharer needs? The present study examines the hypothesis that sharers communicate their support goals by sharing in such a way that it allows listeners to infer the sharer’s needs. In Experiment 1, we manipulated participants’ support goals, and showed that socio-affective support goals led participants to express more emotions, whereas cognitive support goals resulted in greater use of appraisals. In Experiments 2 and 3, we tested whether these differential expressions would affect the support goals that listeners inferred. We found no evidence for such an effect: Listeners consistently perceived the sharer to predominantly want socio-affective support. These findings help explain why many social sharing instances revolve around socio-affective support, leading to subjectively experienced benefits, but not to genuine recovery.     

Exposure to the social sharing of emotion: Emotional impact,listener responses and secondary social sharing

In line with evidence showing that emotion involves a social sharing process in which the subject communicates about emotional experience, this article examines the impact of being exposed to such communications. First, it was predicted that being exposed to the social sharing of an emotion is emotion-inducing. Second, it was reasoned that if this holds true, then the listener should later engage in socially sharing with other persons the emotional narrative heard. Thus, a process of ‘secondary social sharing’ was predicted. In two independent studies subjects recalled a situation in which someone had shared an emotional experience with them. They then rated emotions felt while exposed to the narrative, responses adopted toward the sharing person, and extent of secondary social sharing. The predictions were supported. Exposure to a social sharing situation was confirmed as itself emotion-inducing. Secondary social sharing was recorded in 66 per cent of the cases in Study 1 and in 78 per cent in Study 2. Both studies also showed that exposure to the sharing of highly intense emotional episodes elicited more repetitive secondary social sharing and a superior number of target persons than exposure to episodes of low or of moderate emotional intensity. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rumination,emotional intensity and emotional clarity

It has been suggested that a high tendency to ruminate presents a deficient emotion regulation. Past research found that people with high tendency to ruminate show sustained attention for negative stimuli and increased negative thinking, which may result in intensified experiences of negative emotions. Moreover, high level of rumination was associated with low emotional understanding. Accordingly, we hypothesized (1) high ruminators (HR) experience more intense emotional reactions than low ruminators (LR) for negative but not positive emotions, (2) LR have higher emotional clarity than HR, and (3) there would be the same pattern of results for brooding but not for reflective pondering. Participants completed a demographic questionnaire, a rumination response style questionnaire, and the Beck Depression Inventory-II. They also rated emotional intensity and identified emotion type for scene pictures from the CAP-D (Categorized Affective Pictures Database). The highest (HR) and lowest (LR) quarters of ruminators were compared on levels of emotional intensity and emotional clarity. We found HR experienced negative emotions more intensely than LR, with no difference for positive emotions. In contrast to our hypothesis, the two groups did not differ in their emotion understanding. This pattern of results was found for brooding but not for reflective pondering. Our research sheds light on the mechanism underlying rumination and emotion regulation.     

Sense or sensibility? Social sharers’ evaluations of socio-affective vs. cognitive support in response to negative emotions

When in emotional distress, people often turn to others for social support. A general distinction has been made between two types of support that are differentially effective: Whereas socio-affective support temporarily alleviates emotional distress, cognitive support may contribute to better long-term recovery. In the current studies, we examine what type of support individuals seek. We first confirmed in a pilot study that these two types of support can be reliably distinguished. Then, in Study 1, we experimentally tested participants’ support evaluations in response to different emotional situations using a vignette methodology. Findings showed that individuals perceived any type of reaction that included socio-affective support as preferable. The evaluation of cognitive support, however, was dependent on the specific emotion: Unlike worry and regret, anger and sadness were characterised by a strong dislike for purely cognitive support. Using different materials, Study 2 replicated these findings. Taken together, the findings suggest that individuals evaluate different types of support in a way that is unlikely to benefit emotional recovery in the long run.     

Intensity of positive and negative emotions: Explaining the association between personality and depressive symptoms

The aim was to examine to what extent emotional intensity accounted for associations between the Big Five personality dimensions and depressive symptoms. Study 1 tested the model cross-sectionally, using survey data of 266 Dutch social science students. Study 2 experimentally examined how personality dimensions were related to emotional reactivity after exposure to various emotional stimuli. Dutch psychology students (N = 130) reported on their personality and viewed an amusing or sad film clip, after which the change in intensity of experienced positive and negative emotions was assessed. Individuals scoring higher on neuroticism generally experienced more intense negative emotions, through which they experienced a higher level of depressive symptoms. Individuals who were more agreeable experienced a lower level of depressive symptoms indirectly through higher general intensity of positive emotions. More agreeable individuals showed stronger increase in negative emotions and stronger decrease in positive emotions, though after exposure to the sad stimulus only. Although replication is needed, our results offer empirical support for a more taylor-made approach in decreasing nonclinical depressive symptoms taking into account both personality characteristics and emotion regulation.     

Emotion regulation and the temporal dynamics of emotions: Effects of cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression on emotional inertia

The tendency for emotions to be predictable over time, labelled emotional inertia, has been linked to low well-being and is thought to reflect impaired emotion regulation. However, almost no studies have examined how emotion regulation relates to emotional inertia. We examined the effects of cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression on the inertia of behavioural, subjective and physiological measures of emotion. In Study 1 (N = 111), trait suppression was associated with higher inertia of negative behaviours. We replicated this finding experimentally in Study 2 (N = 186). Furthermore, in Study 2, instructed suppressors and reappraisers both showed higher inertia of positive behaviours, and reappraisers displayed higher inertia of heart rate. Neither suppression nor reappraisal were associated with the inertia of subjective feelings in either study. Thus, the effects of suppression and reappraisal on the temporal dynamics of emotions depend on the valence and emotional response component in question.     

Age and emotional experience during mutual reminiscing

In the present article, the authors examined age differences in the emotional experiences involved in talking about past events. In Study 1, 129 adults in an experience-sampling study reported whether they were engaged in mutual reminiscing and their concurrent experience of positive and negative emotion. Their experiences of positive and negative emotion during mutual reminiscing were compared with emotional experience during other social activities. Age was associated with increasing positive emotion during mutual reminiscing. In Study 2 (n = 132), the authors examined emotions during reminiscing for specific positive and negative events. In this case, age was associated with improved emotional experiences but only during reminiscing about positive experiences. Findings are discussed in terms of socioemotional selectivity theory and the literature on reminiscence and life review.     

The relation between event processing and the duration of emotional experience

An emotional experience can last for only a couple of seconds up to several hours or even longer. In the present study, we examine to which extent covert intrapersonal actions (cognitions both related and unrelated to the emotion-eliciting stimulus) as well as overt interpersonal actions (social sharing) account for this variability in emotion duration. Participants were asked to report the duration of their anger, sadness, joy, and gratitude episodes on a daily basis during five days. Furthermore, information was collected with regard to their cognitions during the episodes and their social sharing behavior. Discrete-time survival analyses revealed that for three of the four emotions under study, stimulus-related cognitions with the same valence as the emotion lead to a prolongation of the episode; in contrast, both stimulus-related and stimulus-unrelated cognitions with a valence opposite to the emotion lead to a shortening. Finally, for the four emotions under study, social sharing was associated with a prolongation. The findings are discussed in terms of a possible process basis underlying the time dynamics of negative as well as positive emotions.     

Emotion regulation choice: the role of environmental affordances

Which emotion regulation strategy one uses in a given context can have profound affective, cognitive, and social consequences. It is therefore important to understand the determinants of emotion regulation choice. Many prior studies have examined person-specific, internal determinants of emotion regulation choice. Recently, it has become clear that external variables that are properties of the stimulus can also influence emotion regulation choice. In the present research, we consider whether reappraisal affordances, defined as the opportunities for re-interpretation of a stimulus that are inherent in that stimulus, can shape individuals’ emotion regulation choices. We show that reappraisal affordances have stability across people and across time (Study 1), and are confounded with emotional intensity for a standardised set of picture stimuli (Study 2). Since emotional intensity has been shown to drive emotion regulation choice, we construct a context in which emotional intensity is separable from reappraisal affordances (Study 3) and use this context to show that reappraisal affordances powerfully influence emotion regulation choice even when emotional intensity and discrete emotions are taken into account (Study 4).     

Mood-congruent false memories persist over time

There are two contrasting hypotheses that attempt to explain how emotion perception might be organised in the brain. One suggests that all emotions are lateralised to the right hemisphere whereas the other suggests that emotions may be differently lateralised according to valence. Here these two theories are contrasted, in addition to considering the role of emotional intensity in explaining possible differences in strength of lateralisation across emotions. Participants completed a Chimeric Faces Test for each of the six basic emotions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise. All emotions showed significant lateralisation to the right hemisphere, however, differences in strength of lateralisation within the right hemisphere were found. Stronger patterns of right hemisphere lateralisation were found for positive emotions and for emotions of higher intensity. The results support the right-hemisphere hypothesis, but suggest that there may be variability in organisation within the right hemisphere across different types of emotion.     

The role of motion and intensity in deaf children’s recognition of real human facial expressions of emotion

There is substantial evidence to suggest that deafness is associated with delays in emotion understanding, which has been attributed to delays in language acquisition and opportunities to converse. However, studies addressing the ability to recognise facial expressions of emotion have produced equivocal findings. The two experiments presented here attempt to clarify emotion recognition in deaf children by considering two aspects: the role of motion and the role of intensity in deaf children’s emotion recognition. In Study 1, 26 deaf children were compared to 26 age-matched hearing controls on a computerised facial emotion recognition task involving static and dynamic expressions of 6 emotions. Eighteen of the deaf and 18 age-matched hearing controls additionally took part in Study 2, involving the presentation of the same 6 emotions at varying intensities. Study 1 showed that deaf children’s emotion recognition was better in the dynamic rather than static condition, whereas the hearing children showed no difference in performance between the two conditions. In Study 2, the deaf children performed no differently from the hearing controls, showing improved recognition rates with increasing rates of intensity. With the exception of disgust, no differences in individual emotions were found. These findings highlight the importance of using ecologically valid stimuli to assess emotion recognition.     

Attitudes toward emotions

The present work outlines a theory of attitudes toward emotions, provides a measure of attitudes toward emotions, and then tests several predictions concerning relationships between attitudes toward specific emotions and emotional situation selection, emotional traits, emotional reactivity, and emotion regulation. The present conceptualization of individual differences in attitudes toward emotions focuses on specific emotions and presents data indicating that 5 emotions (anger, sadness, joy, fear, and disgust) load on 5 separate attitude factors (Study 1). Attitudes toward emotions predicted emotional situation selection (Study 2). Moreover, attitudes toward approach emotions (e.g., anger, joy) correlated directly with the associated trait emotions, whereas attitudes toward withdrawal emotions (fear, disgust) correlated inversely with associated trait emotions (Study 3). Similar results occurred when attitudes toward emotions were used to predict state emotional reactivity (Study 4). Finally, attitudes toward emotions predicted specific forms of emotion regulation (Study 5).     

The relation between rumination and temporal features of emotion intensity

Intensity profiles of emotional experience over time have been found to differ primarily in explosiveness (i.e. whether the profile has a steep vs. a gentle start) and accumulation (i.e. whether intensity increases over time vs. goes back to baseline). However, the determinants of these temporal features remain poorly understood. In two studies, we examined whether emotion regulation strategies are predictive of the degree of explosiveness and accumulation of negative emotional episodes. Participants were asked to draw profiles reflecting changes in the intensity of emotions elicited either by negative social feedback in the lab (Study 1) or by negative events in daily life (Study 2). In addition, trait (Study 1 & 2), and state (Study 2) usage of a set of emotion regulation strategies was assessed. Multilevel analyses revealed that trait rumination (especially the brooding component) was positively associated with emotion accumulation (Study 1 & 2). State rumination was also positively associated with emotion accumulation and, to a lesser extent, with emotion explosiveness (Study 2). These results provide support for emotion regulation theories, which hypothesise that rumination is a central mechanism underlying the maintenance of negative emotions.     

Knowing what you're feeling and knowing what to do about it: Mapping the relation between emotion differentiation and emotion regulation

Individuals differ considerably in their emotion experience. Some experience emotions in a highly differentiated manner, clearly distinguishing among a variety of negative and positive discrete emotions. Others experience emotions in a relatively undifferentiated manner, treating a range of like-valence terms as interchangeable. Drawing on self-regulation theory, we hypothesised that individuals with highly differentiated emotion experience should be better able to regulate emotions than individuals with poorly differentiated emotion experience. In particular, we hypothesised that emotion differentiation and emotion regulation would be positively related in the context of intense negative emotions, where the press for emotion regulation is generally greatest. To test this hypothesis, participants' negative and positive emotion differentiation was assessed using a 14-day diary protocol. Participants' regulation of negative and positive emotions was assessed using laboratory measures. As predicted, negative emotion differentiation was positively related to the frequency of negative emotion regulation, particularly at higher levels of emotional intensity.     

Focalism and the underestimation of future emotion: when it's worse than imagined

People typically exaggerate the emotional impact of future events. This occurs because of focalism, the tendency to focus on one event and neglect to consider how emotion will be mitigated by the surrounding context. Neglecting context, however, should lead people to underestimate future emotion when context focuses attention on the event. In Study 1, participants underestimated the intensity of their future negative emotions when they reported reactions to a romantic break-up on Valentine's Day versus 1 week before. This relationship was mediated by how frequently they thought about the break-up. In Study 2, participants underestimated the emotional impact of a lost prize when the experimental context forced them to focus on the prize versus when the prize was less evident. Thus, failing to account for the extent to which context would focus attention on the event, a form of focalism, led to underestimation of emotional reactions to a negative event.     

Empathy and emotion recognition in semantic dementia: A case report

Recent studies have demonstrated that patients suffering from frontotemporal lobar degeneration (FTLD) show impairments in empathy and emotional processing. In this study, we examined two different aspects of these abilities in a patient with semantic dementia (SD), a variant of FTLD. The first aspect was the assessment of the cognitive and emotional components of empathy through the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. The second was the naming and comprehension of emotions using the Ekman 60 Faces Test. The patient’s emotion word knowledge was spared and the emotional aspects of empathy preserved. Conversely, the patient performed below average for all of the basic emotions when an emotion word had to be matched with a picture. When picture-to-picture matching was tested, however, the patient was able to recognize happiness. This case is a good example of a dissociation of covert and overt emotional functioning in SD. Results are discussed in terms of the impaired empathic behavior and emotional functioning in FTLD.     

Développement et validation de l’échelle d’auto-efficacité émotionnelle chez les gestionnaires

This article presents the results of two studies designed to develop and validate the emotional self-efficacy scale (ESE). The emotional intelligence model of Mayer and Salovey (1997) and self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1997) are used in this study. The results of confirmatory analysis support the seven-factor structure: self-efficacy to perceive emotions in the self and others, self-efficacy to use emotion, self-efficacy to understand emotion in the self and others and self-efficacy to manage emotion in the self and others. In addition, results reveal that the ESE subscales display satisfactory internal consistency values. Furthermore, the construct validity is supported by correlations between the seven factors and between several variables associated with ESE (Big Five, the positive and negative affect and the alexithymia). Altogether, results provide preliminary support for the psychometric properties the ESE.     

情绪分享和感知恋人回应对亲密关系满意度的影响

研究通过问卷星收集了150对异性恋情侣的情绪分享、感知恋人回应、亲密关系满意度的数据,并采用行动者-对象互依模型进行统计分析。结果显示：（1）情绪分享通过感知恋人回应的中介作用影响亲密关系满意度。女性的积极情绪分享与男性的消极情绪分享直接正向影响自身亲密关系满意度。（2）男性的积极情绪分享正向影响女性的亲密关系满意度。研究揭示了亲密关系中情绪分享和感知恋人回应对关系满意度的影响特点。