Conjunction in the Language of Emotions

Abstract

Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987) have proposed a cognitive theory of emotion. According to this theory, there are five basic emotions. A major prediction of the theory is that it should permit satisfactory definitions for all the emotion words in a language, and this was essayed for the English language by Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989). The theory proposes that only one emotional state can be operative at a time, and therefore words referring to mixed emotions were defined by Johnson-Laird and Oatley as disjunctions of basic emotions. Two experiments are reported which com pared these disjunctive definitions with conjunctive definitions (i.e. definitions inconsistent with the theory). For a number of words, conjunctive definitions tended to be preferred. This tendency was increased when the disjunctions and conjunctions were made more explicit. This finding sug gests that Oatley and Johnson-Laird's theory should be modified so as to embrace the conjunction of emotion. That is, it should allow that two or more emotions can be exnerienced in parallel.     

Semantic primitives for emotions: A Reply to Ortony and Clore

Abstract

We respond to four criticisms by Ortony and Clore (1989) of our semantic analysis of English emotion terms (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989). We clarify how our theory enables people to speak of certain emotions that they experience without knowing their cause. We explain why emotions are best regarded as mental states with distinctive phenomenal tones—not “just” feelings, and how emotion terms can relate to terms denoting moods. Finally, we discuss an issue that distinguishes our theory from other contemporary cognitive theories: We claim that there is a small number of discriminably different basic emotions, and that the semantics of English emotion terms is comprehensible if these basic states are taken as unanalysable primitives.     

On the influence of affective states on intuitive coherence judgements

Recent research has shown that coherence judgements of semantically related word triads are facilitated by a subtle positive response triggered by their increased fluency of processing. Such positive affective response serves as a cue indicating semantic coherence. However, we argue that the fluency of processing is not the only source of affective response that can influence intuitive judgements. The present study investigated differential influences of mood and affective valence of solution words on intuitive coherence judgements. We show that affective cues resulting from processing fluency can be strengthened or weakened by inducing positive or negative affective response through the activation of solutions to semantically coherent triads. Also, mood is shown to impact the breadth of activated associations therefore affecting not only judgements of semantic coherence but also solvability of word triads. We discuss the implications of our findings for how people might form intuitive judgements of semantic coherence.     

On the influence of affective states on intuitive coherence judgements

Recent research has shown that coherence judgements of semantically related word triads are facilitated by a subtle positive response triggered by their increased fluency of processing. Such positive affective response serves as a cue indicating semantic coherence. However, we argue that the fluency of processing is not the only source of affective response that can influence intuitive judgements. The present study investigated differential influences of mood and affective valence of solution words on intuitive coherence judgements. We show that affective cues resulting from processing fluency can be strengthened or weakened by inducing positive or negative affective response through the activation of solutions to semantically coherent triads. Also, mood is shown to impact the breadth of activated associations therefore affecting not only judgements of semantic coherence but also solvability of word triads. We discuss the implications of our findings for how people might form intuitive judgements of semantic coherence.     

Interaction of semantic and perceptual processes in repetition blindness

Two experiments examined the effect of activation of higher-level semantic representations on lower-level perceptual representations. A forced-choice discrimination paradigm was used, a method known to produce repetition blindness (RB) for words unconfounded by memory demands or response bias. In Experiment 1, equivalent reductions in RB (as measured by omission error rate and by d') occurred when successive word pairs were identical in: (1) form, pronunciation, and meaning (both uppercase versions of the same word); (2) pronunciation and meaning but not form (lowercase versus uppercase; lexical identity); and (3) pronunciation, but not form or meaning (homonyms; phonological identity), relative to when the words were unrelated on all dimensions. The RB effect was markedly attenuated, but not eliminated, when the words were semantically related. Similar results were obtained in Experiment 2 using a larger group of subjects. These findings show that higher-order semantic representations can have a top-down influence on judgements based on lower-order perceptual representations. The results are discussed within the framework of a cascade model of object processing in the human brain.     

How do valence and meaning interact? The contribution of semantic control

The hub-and-spoke model of semantic cognition proposes that conceptual representations in a heteromodal ‘hub’ interact with and emerge from modality-specific features or ‘spokes’, including valence (whether a concept is positive or negative), along with visual and auditory features. As a result, valence congruency might facilitate our ability to link words conceptually. Semantic relatedness may similarly affect explicit judgements about valence. Moreover, conflict between meaning and valence may recruit semantic control processes. Here we tested these predictions using two-alternative forced-choice tasks, in which participants matched a probe word to one of two possible target words, based on either global meaning or valence. Experiment 1 examined timed responses in healthy young adults, while Experiment 2 examined decision accuracy in semantic aphasia patients with impaired controlled semantic retrieval following left hemisphere stroke. Across both experiments, semantically related targets facilitated valence matching, while related distractors impaired performance. Valence congruency was also found to facilitate semantic decision-making. People with semantic aphasia showed impaired valence matching and had particular difficulty when semantically related distractors were presented, suggesting that the selective retrieval of valence information relies on semantic control processes. Taken together, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that automatic access to the global meaning of written words affects the processing of valence, and that the valence of words is also retrieved even when this feature is task-irrelevant, affecting the efficiency of global semantic judgements.     

The role of semantically related distractors during encoding and retrieval of words in long-term memory

We examined the influence of divided attention (DA) on recognition of words when the concurrent task was semantically related or unrelated to the to-be-recognised target words. Participants were asked to either study or retrieve a target list of semantically related words while simultaneously making semantic decisions (i.e., size judgements) to another set of related or unrelated words heard concurrently. We manipulated semantic relatedness of distractor to target words, and whether DA occurred during the encoding or retrieval phase of memory. Recognition accuracy was significantly diminished relative to full attention, following DA conditions at encoding, regardless of relatedness of distractors to study words. However, response times (RTs) were slower with related compared to unrelated distractors. Similarly, under DA at retrieval, recognition RTs were slower when distractors were semantically related than unrelated to target words. Unlike the effect from DA at encoding, recognition accuracy was worse under DA at retrieval when the distractors were related compared to unrelated to the target words. Results suggest that availability of general attentional resources is critical for successful encoding, whereas successful retrieval is particularly reliant on access to a semantic code, making it sensitive to related distractors under DA conditions.     

False memories for script actions in a mugging account

Abstract

A number of cross-language priming experiments are reported that evaluate whether word meanings in the first and second language are represented in common or separate systems. A masked priming procedure was used on the assumption that when prime awareness is limited, any priming effects directly reveal the underlying structure of the semantic system. Primes were presented in the subjects' first language, while targets were in their second language. Priming effects were obtained for word pairs that were semantically highly similar but not translation equivalents, for example fence-haie (= hedge in French), suggesting that words in the two languages share common elements of semantic code. Priming was also obtained between translation equivalents which, in conjunction with the results for semantically similar pairs, is most naturally interpreted in terms of partially shared semantic representations. However, no masked priming effects were obtained between associated pairs of relatively low semantic similarity, for example shoe-pied (= foot in French), whereas such pairs did produce an effect when primes were unmasked. The results are discussed in terms of limitations on the semantic activation produced by masked words, and the role of collocational relationships in priming between associated words in the same language.     

Emotion concepts and emotional states in social judgment and categorization

An objection to conclusions of research investigating effects of emotions on cognitive processes is that the effects are due to the activation of semantic concepts rather than to emotional feelings. A sentence unscrambling task was developed to prime concepts of happiness, sadness, or neutral ideas. Pilot studies demonstrated that unscrambling emotional sentences did not affect emotional state but did prime semantically related words. Experiment 1 showed that the induction of emotional state but not the sentence unscrambling task produced emotion-congruent judgments. Results of Experiment 2 showed that individuals in emotional states categorized according to emotional equivalence more often than participants in a neutral state. Sentence unscrambling had no effect on emotional response categorization. The influences of emotions and emotion knowledge in cognition and emotion are discussed.     

Mental representations of affect knowledge

The circumplex structure derived from similarity ratings of affect words is assumed to be a conceptual representation of affect anchored in semantic knowledge. Recently, it been suggested that this structure is not based on semantic knowledge at all, but may instead reflect a type of episodic knowledge: The degree to which emotions covary in everyday life. In two experience-sampling studies, we compared the semantic and the episodic hypotheses by comparing participants' similarity ratings to the observed covariations in their own affective experience computed from their momentary reports. In Study 2, participants also provided estimates of the degree to which their emotions covaried. Evidence from both studies indicate that similarity judgements are related both to semantic and episodic information, indicating that a pure episodic account of similarity ratings, and the mental representation of affect that they reflect, is untenable.     

Friendly drug-dealers and terrifying puppies: Affective primacy can attenuate the N400 effect in emotional discourse contexts

Words that are semantically congruous with their preceding discourse context are easier to process than words that are semantically incongruous with their context. This facilitation of semantic processing is reflected by an attenuation of the N400 event-related potential (ERP). We asked whether this was true of emotional words in emotional contexts where discourse congruity was conferred through emotional valence. ERPs were measured as 24 participants read two-sentence scenarios with critical words that varied by emotion (pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral) and congruity (congruous or incongruous). Semantic predictability, constraint, and plausibility were comparable across the neutral and emotional scenarios. As expected, the N400 was smaller to neutral words that were semantically congruous (vs. incongruous) with their neutral discourse context. No such N400 congruity effect was observed on emotional words following emotional discourse contexts. Rather, the amplitude of the N400 was small to all emotional words (pleasant and unpleasant), regardless of whether their emotional valence was congruous with the valence of their emotional discourse context. However, consistent with previous studies, the emotional words produced a larger late positivity than did the neutral words. These data suggest that comprehenders bypassed deep semantic processing of valence-incongruous emotional words within the N400 time window, moving rapidly on to evaluate the words’ motivational significance.     

Suppositions, extensionality, and conditionals: a critique of the mental model theory of Johnson-Laird And Byrne (2002)

P. N. Johnson-Laird and R. M. J. Byrne proposed an influential theory of conditionals in which mental models represent logical possibilities and inferences are drawn from the extensions of possibilities that are used to represent conditionals. In this article, the authors argue that the extensional semantics underlying this theory is equivalent to that of the material, truth-functional conditional, at least for what they term "basic" conditionals, concerning arbitrary problem content. On the basis of both logical argument and psychological evidence, the authors propose that this approach is fundamentally mistaken and that conditionals must be viewed within a suppositional theory based on what philosophical logicians call the Ramsey test. The Johnson-Laird and Byrne theory is critically examined with respect to its account of basic conditionals, nonbasic conditionals, and counterfactuals.     

Developmental and gender differences in the language for emotions across the adolescent years

Most information about the development of emotion language comes from studies of the early acquisition of terms for emotions. This study examined emotion language in 303 adolescents aged between 12 and 18 years. It used a theoretically derived classification model to describe and examine age‐dependent changes and gender differences in the semantic, referential, and causal structure of their language for emotions in response to vignette material containing the prototypical condition for anger and fear. The semantic profiles of emotion terms produced emphasise the nonuniqueness of “theoretical” emotional conditions with blends and combination of emotion terms typical in the linguistic representation of emotions of these adolescents. The results demonstrate continuity in the development of adolescent emotion language with more differentiated, broader, and less semantically specific emotion referents being produced with older age. However, the results also show a shift with age in the representation of emotions toward a more externalised focus at the expense of a subjectivist/experiential focus. Boys showed a relative preference for expressive/behavioural referents while girls produced more inner directed and less semantically specified referents. However, girls' expected relative preference for referents with a cognitive focus was not confirmed. Overall, the results indicate that the structure of emotion language in adolescents is age‐dependent and sensitive to gender‐related “display rules” for talking about emotions and their causes. The implications of the results for advancing the study of the language of emotions are discussed within the limitations and constraints imposed by studying experimentally elicited language.     

What's basic about basic emotions?

A widespread assumption in theories of emotion is that there exists a small set of basic emotions. From a biological perspective, this idea is manifested in the belief that there might be neurophysiological and anatomical substrates corresponding to the basic emotions. From a psychological perspective, basic emotions are often held to be the primitive building blocks of other, nonbasic emotions. The content of such claims is examined, and the results suggest that there is no coherent nontrivial notion of basic emotions as the elementary psychological primitives in terms of which other emotions can be explained. Thus, the view that there exist basic emotions out of which all other emotions are built, and in terms of which they can be explained, is questioned, raising the possibility that this position is an article of faith rather than an empirically or theoretically defensible basis for the conduct of emotion research. This suggests that perhaps the notion of basic emotions will not lead to significant progress in the field. An alternative approach to explaining the phenomena that appear to motivate the postulation of basic emotions is presented.     

Encoding specificity revisited: the role of semantics.

Three experiments examined the effects of semantic characteristics of word pairs on memory using the encoding specificity paradigm. The paradigm involved four phases: (a) an encoding phase to relate cues and targets, (b) a phase in which words were generated to new cues, (c) a phase for recognition of generated targets, and (d) a cued-recall phase using the original encoding cues. Encoding pairs were classified a priori as either semantically similar (e.g., alluring-PRETTY), semantically contrasting (e.g., drab-PRETTY), or semantically unrelated (e.g., sore-PRETTY). Generation pairs were classified a priori as either semantically similar (e.g., beautiful-PRETTY) or semantically contrasting (e.g., ugly-PRETTY). For recall, the results showed that both the semantic relations between the encoding cue and target and the reprovision of the encoding cue at retrieval were important factors. In the case of recognition, however, both the semantic congruence between the encoding and generation contexts and the amount of semantic elaboration provided by the encoding context were important factors.     

Intuitive (in)coherence judgments are guided by processing fluency, mood and affect

Recently proposed accounts of intuitive judgments of semantic coherence assume that processing fluency results in a positive affective response leading to successful assessment of semantic coherence. The present paper investigates whether processing fluency may indicate semantic incoherence as well. In two studies, we employ a new paradigm in which participants have to detect an incoherent item among semantically coherent words. In Study 1, we show participants accurately indicating an incoherent item despite not being able to provide an accurate solution to coherent words. Further, this effect is modified by affective valence of solution words that are not retrieved from memory. Study 2 replicates those results and extend them by showing that mood moderates incoherence judgments independently of affective valence of solutions. The results support processing fluency account of intuitive semantic coherence judgments and show that it is not fluency per se but fluency variations that drive judgments.     

Sensory generalization and learning about novel colours by poultry chicks

Previous research has shown semantic influence from irrelevant peripheral cues on the spatial allocation of covert visual attention. The present study explored whether the task set determines the extent of such semantic influence. A spatial cueing paradigm with strict eye movement control was used, where cues were either first names (male or female) or emotionally charged words (positive or negative) followed by a face target. Participants discriminated either the gender (male or female) or the emotion (positive or negative) of the face. When there was high information overlap between cue and task set, responses were faster when the cue and target value were semantically congruent than when they were incongruent. It was concluded that the semantically related cues primed a task-influencing response independently of spatial attention allocation processes, showing that semantic influences from brief peripheral cues depend on the degree of information overlap between cue and task set.     

Visual information for categorizing facial expression of emotions

Two experiments were conducted to reveal the visual information from the face utilized for the categorization of its expression of emotions. In Experiment 1 the subjects produced six schematic faces expressing six basic emotions by using a computer graphics system. By a series of factor analyses on the variables of displacements of feature points for deforming a neutral schematic face to produce the six expressional ones, two factors of ‘curvedness/openness’ and ‘slantedness’ of facial elements were obtained. In Experiment 2 another group of subjects made category judgements of emotions for 72 of the total 216 schematic faces produced in Experiment 1. The relationship between the displacements of feature points in Experiment 1 and subjects' categorical responses in Experiment 2 were examined by canonical discriminant analysis. It was found that the categorical judgements were well explained by two canonical variables whose structures were quite similar to those of factors obtained in Experiment 1. These results indicated that we extract the information of changes in curvedness/openness and slantedness of facial elements among other information on the face for categorizing its expressions of emotions. Lastly, the relationship between the dimensions of visual information obtained here and those of semantic affective meanings found in earlier research was discussed.     

Is guilt an emotion?

Abstract

When unequivocal examples of emotion adjectives occur in the linguistic context of “being” (e.g. being angry) they can be seen to refer to emotions as readily as when they occur in the linguistic context of “feeling” (e.g. feeling angry). This is not true of poor 'or non-examples of emotion words. A psycholinguistic analysis of this phenomenon is proposed, in the light of which it is suggested that words such as “abandoned” and “guilty” do not refer to emotions. The possibility that the word “guilty” has a distinct emotional sense meaning “feeling guilty” is discussed, and the implications of this proposal for theories of emotions are examined. Also discussed are the implications of the inclusion of poor or non-examples of emotions in lists of “basic” emotions. Data are presented indicating that many of the states that emotion theorists have included as emotions, and in some cases as “basic” emotions, are not generally rated as such, and that they fail to exhibit the patterns using the feel-be test that characterise unequivocal examples. It is suggested that a problem in delimiting the domain of theories of emotions may reside in a confusion between emotions on the one hand, and their typical causes and concomitants on the other.     

Proud Americans and lucky Japanese: cultural differences in appraisal and corresponding emotion

Appraisal theories of emotion propose that the emotions people experience correspond to their appraisals of their situation. In other words, individual differences in emotional experiences reflect differing interpretations of the situation. We hypothesized that in similar situations, people in individualist and collectivist cultures experience different emotions because of culturally divergent causal attributions for success and failure (i.e., agency appraisals). In a test of this hypothesis, American and Japanese participants recalled a personal experience (Study 1) or imagined themselves to be in a situation (Study 2) in which they succeeded or failed, and then reported their agency appraisals and emotions. Supporting our hypothesis, cultural differences in emotions corresponded to differences in attributions. For example, in success situations, Americans reported stronger self-agency emotions (e.g., proud) than did Japanese, whereas Japanese reported a stronger situation-agency emotion (lucky). Also, cultural differences in attribution and emotion were largely explained by differences in self-enhancing motivation. When Japanese and Americans were induced to make the same attribution (Study 2), cultural differences in emotions became either nonsignificant or were markedly reduced.