The enduring impact of transient emotions on decision making

People often do not realize they are being influenced by an incidental emotional state. As a result, decisions based on a fleeting incidental emotion can become the basis for future decisions and hence outlive the original cause for the behavior (i.e., the emotion itself). Using a sequence of ultimatum and dictator games, we provide empirical evidence for the enduring impact of transient emotions on economic decision making. Behavioral consistency and false consensus are presented as potential underlying processes.     

Incidental sadness biases social economic decisions in the Ultimatum Game

Recent dual-process models of decision making have suggested that emotion plays an important role in decision making; however, the impact of incidental moods (i.e., emotions unrelated to the immediate situation) on decisions remains poorly explored. This question was investigated by inducing 2 basic emotional states (amusement or sadness) that were compared with a neutral-emotion control group. Decision making was assessed with a well-studied social task, the Ultimatum Game. In this task, participants had to make decisions to either accept or reject monetary offers from other players, offers that varied in their degree of unfairness. Emotion was induced with short movie clips. Induced sadness interacted with offer fairness, with higher sadness resulting in lower acceptance rates of unfair offers. Induced amusement was not associated with any significant biases in decision making. These results demonstrate that even subtle incidental moods can play an important role in biasing decision making. Implications of these results in regards to the emotion, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical literatures are discussed.     

Emotional Policy: Personal Sadness and Anger Shape Judgments about a Welfare Case

When making decisions about a welfare case, it is reasonable for one's thoughts and feelings about the potential welfare recipient to influence the decision. It is less reasonable for one's "incidental" feelings (e.g., sadness or anger arising from an event in one's personal life) to influence such decisions. In two studies, however, data reveal that incidental anger and sadness do in fact carry over, shaping welfare policy preferences. Study 1 found that incidental anger decreased the amount of welfare assistance participants recommended providing relative to neutral emotion, whereas sadness increased the amount recommended. Study 2 replicated the results and found that limiting participants' cognitive resources eliminated the difference between sadness and anger, thus implying that differences in depth-of-thought drove the effects. In sum, the results reveal ways in which: (a) personal emotions carry over to shape preferences for public policies, (b) emotions of the same valence have opposing effects, and (c) differential depth-of-cognitive-processing contributes to such effects.     

Moving beyond categorization to understand affective influences on real world health decisions

This paper provides an overview of affect and health decision‐making research, with a focus on identifying gaps, opportunities, and challenges to guide future research. We begin by defining common categorical distinctions of affective processes that influence health decisions: integral (i.e., related to the decision) and incidental (i.e., normatively unrelated to the decision) influences, and current (experienced in the moment) and anticipated (“cognitive representations” of future affect) affect. We then summarize key discoveries within the most common categories of affective influences on health decision making: current integral affect, current incidental affect, and anticipated integral affect. Finally, we highlight research gaps, challenges, and opportunities for future directions for research aimed at translating affective and decision science theory to improve our understanding of, and ability to intervene upon, health decision making.     

Motivational intensity modulates the effects of positive emotions on set shifting after controlling physiological arousal

Recent research on the construct of emotion suggests the integration of a motivational dimension into the traditional two‐dimension (subjective valence and physiological arousal) model. The motivational intensity of an emotional state should be taken into account while investigating the emotion‐cognition relationship. This study examined how positive emotional states varying in motivational intensity influenced set shifting, after controlling the potential confounding impacts of physiological arousal. In Experiment 1, 155 volunteers performed a set‐shifting task after being randomly assigned to five states: high‐ vs. low‐motivating positive affect (interest vs. serenity), high‐ vs. low‐motivating negative affect (disgust vs. anxiety), and neutral state. Eighty‐five volunteers participated in Experiment 2, which further examined the effects of higher vs. lower degree of interest. Both experiments measured and compared participants' physiological arousal (blood pressure and pulse rate) under the normal and experimental conditions as the covariate. Results showed no difference in switching performance between the neutral and serenity groups. As compared with the neutral state, the high‐motivating positive affect significantly increased set‐switching reaction time costs, but reduced error rate costs; the higher the motivational intensity, the greater the time‐costs impairment. This indicates a role of the high‐motivating positive affect in regulating the balance between the flexible and stable cognitive control. Motivational intensity also modulated the effects of negative emotional states, i.e., disgust caused a larger increase in time costs than anxiety. Further exploration into neurobiological mechanisms that may mediate the emotional effects on set shifting is warranted.     

情绪对延迟折扣的影响：现状、机制与展望

延迟折扣研究领域日益重视情绪的影响作用。本文基于三类研究取向对情绪与延迟折扣关系研究进行了回顾。情绪效价和唤醒度均影响延迟折扣,但是研究结果并不一致;具体情绪类型不同,其对延迟折扣影响也存在差异。除此之外,本文就情绪信息理论、情绪动机维度理论和评估倾向理论如何解释延迟折扣进行了详细阐述。未来的研究需要进一步深入考察情绪影响延迟折扣的认知神经机制,从而为延迟折扣的负性情绪效应的干预提供可靠的科学依据。     

Controlling the integration of emotion and cognition: the role of frontal cortex in distinguishing helpful from hurtful emotional information

Emotion has been both lauded and vilified for its role in decision making. How are people able to ensure that helpful emotions guide decision making and irrelevant emotions are kept out of decision making? The orbitofrontal cortex has been identified as a neural area involved in incorporating emotion into decision making. Is this area's function specific to the integration of emotion and cognition, or does it more broadly govern whether emotional information should be integrated into cognition? The present research examined the role of orbitofrontal cortex when it was appropriate to control (i.e., prevent) the influence of emotion in decision making (Experiment 1) and to incorporate the influence of emotion in decision making (Experiment 2). Together, the two studies suggest that activity in lateral orbitofrontal cortex is associated with evaluating the contextual relevance of emotional information for decision making.     

On motivational influences,moving beyond valence,and integrating dimensional and discrete views of emotion

ABSTRACT

The field of cognition and emotion has grown considerably over the past 30 years, with an increased emphasis on the relationships between emotional and motivational components and how they contribute to basic perceptual, cognitive, and neural processes. For instance, research has revealed that emotion often influences these processes via emotion’s relationship with motivational dimensions, as when positive emotions low versus high in approach motivational intensity have different influences on attentional and other cognitive processes. Research has also revealed that motivational direction (approach vs. withdrawal) and affective valence (positive vs. negative) are not as closely related as once was theorised; that is, positive affect is not inevitably associated with approach motivation and negative affect is not inevitably associated with withdrawal motivation. These and other lines of research with anger have suggested that the field needs to move beyond a focus on affective valence and it needs to consider an integration of dimensional and discrete models of emotion. The article also includes some suggestions for improving methods of measuring and inducing emotions and some recommendations for future researchers.     

The role of motivation and volition in economic decisions: Evidence from eye movements and pupillometry

Economic decisions usually involve high stakes, real consequences, and some degree of personal risk. This article explores the impact of motivational and volitional states on economic decision processes in an incentivized lottery choice task. We investigated the patterns of decision time, choice, information search, and pupil dilation dependent on an experimental manipulation of motivation and volition, that is, the deliberative and the implemental mindset. The results indicated that choice preferences in economic decisions were robust and remained unaffected by motivational and volitional states, but decision processes were notably impacted. Decision makers in a deliberative state of mind searched for information more extensively and made slower decisions than the baseline. The implemental mindset was associated with more attention paid to the probability attributes of the gambles relative to the deliberative mindset. Furthermore, we observed that gamble outcomes that entailed no win at all (i.e., zero outcomes) played an important role for information search. These outcomes were largely disregarded in terms of predecisional information search but elicited pupillary responses similar to very high outcome lotteries. These results inform the current debate about the zero effect in risky choice. We also discuss the potential of eye-tracking studies of risky choice to dissolve ambiguities concerning the contributions of effort and arousal to modulating pupillary response. Implications for theoretical advances in decision research are discussed.     

Affect regulation and temporal discounting: interactions between primed, state, and trait affect

Previous research has largely focused on the influence of experienced affect on decision making; however, other sources of affective information may also shape decisions. In two studies, we examine the interacting influences of affective information, state affect, and personality on temporal discounting rates (i.e., the tendency to choose small rewards today rather than larger rewards in the future). In Study 1, participants were primed with either positive or negative affect adjectives before making reward choices. In Study 2, participants underwent either a positive or negative affect induction before making reward choices. Results in both studies indicate that neuroticism interacts with state unpleasant affect and condition (i.e., positive or negative primes or induction) to predict discounting rates. Moreover, the nature of the interactions depends on the regulatory cues of the affective information available. These results suggest that irrelevant (i.e., primes) and stable (i.e., personality traits) sources of affective information also shape judgments and decision making. Thus, current affect levels are not the only source of affective information that guides individuals when making decisions.     

Can the uncertainty appraisal associated with emotion cancel the effect of the hunch period in the Iowa Gambling Task?

Research has given little attention to the influence of incidental emotions on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), in which processing of the emotional cues associated with each decision is necessary to make advantageous decisions. Drawing on cognitive theories of emotions, we tested whether uncertainty-associated emotion can cancel the positive effect of the hunch period, by preventing participants from developing a tendency towards advantageous decisions. Our explanation is that uncertainty appraisals initiate deliberative processing that is irrelevant to process emotional cues, contrary to intuitive processing (Kahneman, 2003; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). As expected, uncertainty-associated emotion cancelled the positive effect of the hunch period in the IGT compared to certainty-associated emotion: disgusted participants (certainty-associated emotion) and sad participants induced to feel certainty developed a stronger tendency towards advantageous decisions than sad participants induced to feel uncertainty. We discuss the importance of the core components that trigger incidental emotions to predict decision making.     

Selective Visual Attention and Motivation: The Consequences of Value Learning in an Attentional Blink Task

ABSTRACT— Learning to associate the probability and value of behavioral outcomes with specific stimuli (value learning) is essential for rational decision making. However, in demanding cognitive conditions, access to learned values might be constrained by limited attentional capacity. We measured recognition of briefly presented faces seen previously in a value-learning task involving monetary wins and losses; the recognition task was performed both with and without constraints on available attention. Regardless of available attention, recognition was substantially enhanced for motivationally salient stimuli (i.e., stimuli highly predictive of outcomes), compared with equally familiar stimuli that had weak or no motivational salience, and this effect was found regardless of valence (win or loss). However, when attention was constrained (because stimuli were presented during an attentional blink, AB), valence determined recognition; win-associated faces showed no AB, but all other faces showed large ABs. Motivational salience acts independently of attention to modulate simple perceptual decisions, but when attention is limited, visual processing is biased in favor of reward-associated stimuli.     

On the dynamics of implicit emotion regulation: Counter-regulation after remembering events of high but not of low emotional intensity

Valence biases in attention allocation were assessed after remembering positive or negative personal events that were either still emotionally hot or to which the person had already adapted psychologically. Differences regarding the current state of psychological adjustment were manipulated experimentally by instructing participants to recall distant vs. recent events (Experiment 1) or affectively hot events vs. events to which the person had accommodated already (Experiment 2). Valence biases in affective processing were measured with a valence search task. Processes of emotional counter-regulation (i.e., attention allocation to stimuli of opposite valence to the emotional event) were elicited by remembering affectively hot events, whereas congruency effects (i.e., attention allocation to stimuli of the same valence as the emotional event) were obtained for events for which a final appraisal had already been established. The results of our study help to resolve conflicting findings from the literature regarding congruent vs. incongruent effects of remembering emotional events on affective processing. We discuss implications of our findings for the conception of emotions and for the dynamics of emotion regulation processes.     

Religiosity enhances emotion and deontological choice in moral dilemmas

While early psychological theories debated the relation between religiosity and moral decision making, more recent work approached this relation on empirical grounds using multidimensional measures of religiosity and moral dilemmas. The present study investigated the influence of individual differences in religious thoughts and feelings, social desirability and mood on emotions and decisions in moral dilemmas that pit social welfare against harming another person. In order to increase emotional salience, moral dilemmas were framed as personal choices. Results indicated that the tendency to seek religious guidance in everyday life, and social desirability positively predicted deontological choices (i.e., refusing to harm one person in order to save several people). In addition, individual differences in religious feelings positively predicted negative emotion presence in these moral dilemmas. These results highlight the motivational and emotional dimensions of religiosity that influence moral choice and emotional experience in moral dilemmas.     

Exploring alternative deterrents to emotional intensity: Anticipated happiness,distraction, and sadness

A recent theory of emotional intensity (Brehm, 1999) argues that emotions are functionally identical to motivational states. Like motivational states, the intensity of an emotion should be a joint function of the importance of instigating events and the magnitude of deterrence to the emotion. “Deterrence” is definable as impediments or forces that interfere with the experience or expression of the emotion?reasons for not feeling what one is feeling. When experiencing an emotion, a person will feel it more intensely as the reasons for not feeling that emotion increase, up to a point. When great enough, the reasons for not feeling the emotion overwhelm it and reduce it to a low level. The deterrents investigated thus far have all involved events whose valence opposes the emotion's valence. Two experiments explore the breadth of events that have deterrent power. The first was designed to see if merely anticipating an event of opposite valence has a deterrent effect on an emotion. The second explored whether an affectively neutral stimulus (background noise) would also have deterrent effects. The results of the first experiment partially supported the theory, whereas the results of the second provided complete support.     

Global processing fosters donations toward charity appeals framed in an approach orientation

People are often influenced by how persuasive appeals are framed. While decisions and preferences seem dependent on the effects of a fit between one’s regulatory focus and the motivational orientation of a message, specific cognitive mechanisms involved are not yet clear. This study investigated how perceptual processing styles (global vs local) linked with the scope of attention (broad vs narrow) influence decisions depending on motivation-dependent framing (approach vs avoidance). We found that a global processing style fits approach-oriented message appeals and fosters monetary allocation toward charities framed in eager motivational terms. We discuss implications of the findings on processing styles in relation to affective versus deliberate modes of processing and the need to address in detail the role of attentional scope-dependent processing styles in decision making.     

Repulsed by violence: disgust sensitivity buffers trait, behavioral, and daily aggression

Many models of aggression include negatively valenced emotions as common elicitors of aggressive behavior. Yet, the motivational direction of these emotions is not taken into account. The current work explored whether sensitivity to a negative emotion associated with behavioral avoidance-disgust-will predict lower levels of aggression. Five studies tested the hypothesis that disgust sensitivity predicts less aggression. In Study 1 (N = 92), disgust sensitivity predicted less trait physical and verbal aggression. In Study 2 (N = 268), participants high in disgust sensitivity were less likely to behave aggressively towards a stranger on a reaction-time task. In Study 3 (N = 51), disgust sensitivity was associated with less intimate partner violence inclinations. Study 4 (N = 247) replicated this effect longitudinally. In Study 5 (N = 166), each domain of disgust (i.e., moral, sexual, and pathogen disgust) had a buffering effect on daily aggression when daily experiences activated those specific domains. These results highlight the usefulness of considering the motivational direction of an emotion when examining its influence on aggression.     

Being Happy and Seeing 'Happy' ': Emotional State Mediates Visual Word Recognition

Lexical decision and word-naming experiments were conducted to examine influences of emotions in visual word recognition. Emotional states of happiness and sadness were induced with classical music. In the first two experiments, happy and sad participants (and neutral-emotion participants in Experiment 2) made lexical decisions about letter-strings, some of which were words with meanings strongly associated with the emotions happiness, love, sadness, and anger. Emotional state of the perceiver was associated with facilitation of response to words categorically related to that emotion (i.e. happy and sad words). However, such facilitation was not observed for words that were related by valence, but not category, to the induced emotions (i.e. love and anger words). Evidence for categorical influences of emotional state in word recognition was also observed in a third experiment that employed a word-naming task. Together the results support a categorical emotions model of the influences of emotion in information processing (Niedenthal, Setterlund, & Jones, 1994). Moreover, the result of the wordnaming experiment suggests that the effects of emotion are evident at very early stages in cognitive processing.     

情绪和任务框架对自我和预期他人决策时风险偏好的影响

两个实验考察了情绪和任务框架对自我和预期他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果表明:(1)获益框架下,悲伤情绪比愉悦情绪诱发更强的风险偏好,自我决策比预期他人决策表现出更强的风险偏好;(2)损失框架下,愉悦情绪比悲伤情绪诱发更强的风险偏好,预期他人决策比自我决策表现出更强的风险偏好;(3)在自我决策时,愉悦情绪在损失框架下比在获益框架下诱发了更强的风险偏好,悲伤情绪在获益框架下比在损失框架下诱发了更强的风险偏好;在预期他人决策时,无论是愉悦情绪还是悲伤情绪,损失框架均比获益框架诱发了更强的风险偏好。