Betrayed? That’s Me: Implicit and Explicit Betrayed Self-Concept in Young Adults Abused as Children

Attenuated awareness of betrayal, or “betrayal blindness,” is a proposed survival mechanism in relationships where awareness of betrayal will mobilize confront-or-withdraw responses that jeopardize a needed relationship. Empirical tests of betrayal blindness and its effects are hampered by the methodological conundrum of how to measure an absence of awareness. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the validity of a novel empirical method to measure implicit betrayed self-concept, the first step in a long-term research aim to operationalize “betrayal blindness.” Informed by betrayal trauma theory, we hypothesized that a history of betrayal within close childhood relationships (but not recent close relationships or “not-close” relationships) would predict implicit betrayed-self associations in young adulthood. An adaptation of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and measured implicit and explicit betrayed-self associations and self-reported history of physical, sexual, and psychological abuse in 529 university undergraduates was designed. Internal consistency reliability of the betrayed self IAT was low but adequate. Hierarchical regression modeling revealed that history of abuse within close childhood relationships (but not recent close relationships or “not-close” relationships) predicted betrayed-self IAT scores. The effect size was small, β = .12, p < .05, 95% CI [.01, .07], R² = .12. In addition, history of betrayal by someone close (but not someone “not close”) at any age predicted increased explicit evaluations of the self as betrayed versus respected, a small effect size, R² = .16. Findings indicate that implicit betrayed self-concept can be measured empirically.     

Neurotic Nucleus and Test Anxiety

Undergraduate university students (N = 103) participated in a study of the relationship between test anxiety and the variables of trait anxiety, self-esteem, locus of control, mental ability, and gender. Results indicated bivariate associations between total test anxiety and the other measures except for mental ability. Further analyses revealed independent relationships between the “worry” component of test anxiety and the variables of trait anxiety, intemality, chance, and mental ability. We also found independent associations between the “emotionality” aspect of test anxiety and the measures of trait anxiety and chance.     

Depressive symptoms and use of perspective taking within a communicative context

Objective: The ability to take the perspective of one's conversational partner is essential for successful communication. We assessed whether individuals who report high levels of depressive symptoms have more difficulty with navigating this interpersonal task. Method: Undergraduate students participated in a computerised communication task that, on some trials, required perspective taking (N=125). Results: When participants were grouped according to their self-reported depressive symptoms, the “dysphoric group” (BDI ≥ 16, n=37) showed more errors than a “non-dysphoric group” (BDI ≤ 10, n=56) on trials requiring participants to use the perspective of the speaker, but not on control trials where perspective taking was not required. The dysphoric group demonstrated slower response times overall. Conclusions: Individuals with moderate to high levels of depressive symptoms are more challenged by using a speaker's perspective to interpret statements.     

Reporting tendencies underlie discrepancies between implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem

The assumption that implicit measures assess associations that are not accessible to consciousness abounds in current social cognition research. In the present report, we question this assumption, focusing on the construct of implicit self-esteem as a case in point. Although researchers often argue that implicitly measured self-esteem is unconscious, we provide evidence that it is not, and that discrepancies between implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem are the result of reporting tendencies. Study 1 demonstrated that individuals for whom explicitly measured self-esteem is relatively high and implicitly measured self-esteem is relatively low admit to overpresenting themselves. In Study 2, implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem were related when subjects were urged to avoid over- or underpresenting themselves when responding to the explicit measures. We discuss the critical distinction between awareness of one's attitudes and awareness of their influence.     

Self-compassion and verbal performance: Evidence for threat-buffering and implicit self-related thoughts

ABSTRACT

Threats to self-esteem can impair well-being directly, e.g., via negative affect, but also indirectly, by impacting performance in valued domains. The present study examined whether self-compassion buffered individuals’ academic task performance from the effects of a self-esteem threat. In addition, this study tested possible effects of self-compassion on implicitly measured self-related thoughts. Participants (N = 333) were randomly assigned to self-esteem threat or neutral conditions, and then either a self-compassion manipulation or an expressive writing (control) condition before completing a set of GRE analogy items. Threat impaired GRE performance in the expressive writing control condition, but not in the self-compassion condition. Moreover, self-compassion appeared to marginally impact implicit non-evaluative self-thoughts, but did not affect evaluative thoughts or implicit self-esteem. The results of this study suggest that self-compassion has benefits for performance and thereby well-being. Future research should further explore the effects of self-compassion on performance and refine understanding of implicit thoughts as possible mechanisms.     

Feeling Controlled and Drinking Motives Among College Students: Contingent Self-Esteem as a Mediator

This article presents an examination of college student drinking motives from a self-determination perspective. We predicted positive associations between controlled orientation (a chronic orientation toward pressures and experiencing a lack of choice in one's behaviors), and drinking as a means of regulating affect (enhancement and coping motives) and social approval (social rewards and conformity motives). Contingent self-esteem involves deriving self-worth from meeting expectations and was expected to mediate the relation between controlled orientation and drinking motives, which were in turn expected to predict alcohol consumption and related consequences. College students' (N?=?204) controlled orientation, contingent self-esteem, motives for drinking, and patterns of alcohol use were assessed. Mediation analyses provided support for our theoretical framework. Results suggest that “controlled” individuals drink to regulate affect and social approval in part because they have a greater tendency to base self-worth on contingencies.     

Motor Imagery Shapes Abstract Concepts

The concepts of “good” and “bad” are associated with right and left space. Individuals tend to associate good things with the side of their dominant hand, where they experience greater motor fluency, and bad things with their nondominant side. This mapping has been shown to be flexible: Changing the relative fluency of the hands, or even observing a change in someone else's motor fluency, results in a reversal of the conceptual mapping, such that good things become associated with the side of the nondominant hand. Yet, based on prior studies, it is unclear whether space–valence associations were determined by the experience of fluent versus disfluent actions, or by the mere expectation of fluency. Here, we tested the role of expected fluency by removing motor execution and perceptual feedback altogether. Participants were asked to imagine themselves performing a psychomotor task with one of their hands impaired, after which their implicit space–valence mapping was measured. After imagining that their right hand was impaired, right‐handed participants showed the “good is left” association typical of left‐handers. Motor imagery can change people's implicit associations between space and emotional valence. Although asymmetric motor experience may be necessary to establish body‐specific associations between space and valence initially, neither motoric nor perceptual experience is needed to change these associations subsequently. The mere expectation of fluent versus disfluenct actions can drive fluency‐based effects on people's implicit spatialization of “good” and “bad.” These results suggest a reconsideration of the mechanisms and boundary conditions of fluency effects.     

Stereotypes,Prejudice, and the Taxonomy of the Implicit Social Mind1

How do cognition and affect interact to produce action? Research in intergroup psychology illuminates this question by investigating the relationship between stereotypes and prejudices about social groups. Yet it is now clear that many social attitudes are implicit (roughly, nonconscious or involuntary). This raises the question: how does the distinction between cognition and affect apply to implicit mental states? An influential view—roughly analogous to a Humean theory of action—is that “implicit stereotypes” and “implicit prejudices” constitute two separate constructs, reflecting different mental processes and neural systems. On this basis, some have also argued that interventions to reduce discrimination should combat implicit stereotypes and prejudices separately. We propose an alternative (anti‐Humean) framework. We argue that all putative implicit stereotypes are affect‐laden and all putative implicit prejudices are “semantic,” that is, they stand in co‐activating associations with concepts and beliefs. Implicit biases, therefore, consist in “clusters” of semantic‐affective associations, which differ in degree, rather than kind. This framework captures the psychological structure of implicit bias, promises to improve the power of indirect measures to predict behavior, and points toward the design of more effective interventions to combat discrimination.     

Self-esteem and the Dual Processing of Interpersonal Contingencies

Social cognitive research has shown that individuals with low self-esteem exhibit contingency expectations involving interpersonal acceptance and rejection (e.g., If I fail, then I will be rejected). We examined whether the processing differences between low and high self-esteem individuals would be evident in their most spontaneous reactions, or only in relatively deliberate responses. A lexical decision task measured people's reaction times to positive or negative interpersonal words, following success or failure primes. The stimulus onset asynchrony was manipulated to allow spontaneous or deliberate processing. Individuals with low self-esteem exhibited contingencies at the spontaneous level. These contingencies were not evident in individuals with high self-esteem. The findings support interpersonal models of self-esteem, and confirm that controlled, deliberate thought is not required for the activation of relational expectations.     

Decomposing implicit associations about life and death improves our understanding of suicidal behavior

The Death/Suicide Implicit Association Test (IAT) is effective at detecting and prospectively predicting suicidal thoughts and behaviors. However, traditional IAT scoring procedures used in all prior studies (i.e., D-scores) provide an aggregate score that is inherently relative, obfuscating the separate associations (i.e., “Me = Death/Suicide,” “Me = Life”) that might be most relevant for understanding suicide-related implicit cognition. Here, we decompose the D-scores and validate a new analytic technique called the Decomposed D-scores (“DD-scores”) that creates separate scores for each category (“Me,” “Not Me”) in the IAT. Across large online volunteer samples (N > 12,000), results consistently showed that a weakened association between “Me = Life” is more strongly predictive of having a history of suicidal attempts than is a stronger association between “Me = Death/Suicide.” These findings replicated across three different versions of the IAT and were observed when calculated using both reaction times and error rates. However, among those who previously attempted suicide, a strengthened association between “Me = Death” is more strongly predictive of the recency of a suicide attempt. These results suggest that decomposing traditional IAT D-scores can offer new insights into the mental associations that may underlie clinical phenomena and may help to improve the prediction, and ultimately the prevention, of these clinical outcomes.     

Nominalism and Realism. How Not to Read the Tractatus' Conception of a Name

This paper focuses on a central aspect of the “picture theory” in the Tractatus – the “identity requirement” – namely the idea that a proposition represents elements in reality as combined in the same way as its elements are combined. After introducing the Tractatus' views on the nature of the proposition, I engage with a “nominalist” interpretation, according to which the Tractatus holds that relations are not named in propositions. I claim that the nominalist account can only be maintained by rejecting the “identity requirement.” I then consider an opposite – “realist” – interpretation, according to which Tractarian names include names of properties and relations. I argue that, although it can accommodate the “identity requirement,” the realist interpretation falls short of providing a correct interpretation of the Tractatus' conception of a name. I conclude by presenting an alternative account (to both nominalism and realism) of the Tractatus' conception of a name.     

人格特质与外显自尊和内隐自尊的关系

自尊被认为与人格特质之间存在紧密的联系。近年来社会认知研究领域发现,在传统“外显自尊”以外,个体还存在一个“内隐自尊”结构。由于中国人格结构与西方“大五”人格结构存在系统性的差异,本研究试图考察在中国文化下个体的人格特质与自尊水平之间的关系。结果发现,外显自尊主要与中国人人格结构中的“自我指向”的人格特点关系紧密;内隐自尊作为一个独立于外显自尊的内隐态度结构,与各个人格特质不存在显著的相关     

“I Believe in Cusk”: The Effect of Explicit Belief Statements on Children’s Reality Status Judgments and Beliefs about Consensus

Children learn about the world through others’ testimony, and much of this knowledge likely comes from parents. Furthermore, parents may sometimes want children to share their beliefs about topics on which there is no universal consensus. In discussing such topics, parents may use explicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution is real”) or implicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution happened over millions of years”). But little research has investigated how such statements affect children’s beliefs. In the current study, 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 102) were shown videos of their parent providing either Explicit (“Cusk is real”) or Implicit (“I know about cusk”) belief testimony about novel entities. Then, children heard another speaker provide either Denial (“Cusk isn’t real”) or Neutral (“I’ve heard of cusk”) testimony. Children made reality status judgments and consensus judgments (i.e., whether people agree about the entity’s existence). Results showed that explicit and implicit belief statements differentially influenced children’s beliefs about societal consensus when followed by a denial: explicit belief statements prevented children from drawing the conclusion that there is societal consensus that the entity does not exist. This effect was not related to age, indicating that children as young as 4 use these cues to inform consensus judgments. On the reality status task, there was an interaction with age, showing that only 4-year-olds were more likely to believe in an entity after hearing explicit belief statements. These findings suggest that explicit belief statements may serve as important sources of both children’s beliefs about novel entities and societal consensus.     

Effects of opportunity to reciprocate and self-esteem on help-seeking behavior

The present investigation explored the link between an individual's self-esteem and willingness to seek help under conditions in which future reciprocity is, or is not, expected Based on past research on (a) the effects of perceived opportunity to reciprocate on help seeking, and (b) the effects of self-esteem on help-seeking and receiving, it was expected that relative to low self-esteem individuals, high self-esteem individuals would be more committed to the norm of reciprocity in interpersonal helping, and be more reluctant to seek help which cannot be reciprocated Two studies were conducted In the first it was observed that the higher the level of self-esteem the more the expressed commitment to the norm of reciprocity as measured by scores on an especially designed scale The second study assessed actual help-seeking behavior, and found that least help was sought by high self-esteem individuals who did not foresee an opportunity for future reciprocity The conceptual and applied implications of these findings are discussed     

Burnout and psychiatric “cases”: Early evidences of an association

This exploratory study extends the phase model of burnout in a critical direction by assessing whether individuals assigned to eight progressive phases will present escalating mental health symptoms. Despite the small convenience population (N = 161), the present affirmative results encourage early replications for three basic reasons. Thus the associations with mental health reported here are consistent with numerous other tests of the concurrent validity of the phase model. Moreover, substantial proportions of the variance are explained here by data supporting the view that the progressive phases are associated with accelerating proportions of “cases,” here defined as respondents to the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) who report four or more non-psychotic psychiatric symptoms. The GHQ form used here is modified for U.S. contexts. In addition, this basic conclusion is reinforced in three ways: by factor analysis of GHQ items; by rejecting several variables alternative to the phases as GHQ variants; and by using canonical discriminant functions to compare phase assignments with the actual group memberships of “normals” and “cases” assigned by the GHQ.     

I’m OK,I’m OK: Praise makes narcissists with low implicit self-esteem indifferent to the suffering of others

In two experiments (Ns = 105 and 49) the most grandiose individuals with the lowest implicit self-esteem became particularly callous toward their suffering peers after receiving praise about their own personality attributes. Self-reported grandiosity belied by low implicit self-esteem reflects the classic view of narcissism as defensive pride that masks less conscious shame or self-doubt (cf., Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003). Results support the classic view of narcissism and reveal that narcissistic disregard for others can be precipitated by praise.     

Defensive self-esteem impacts attention, attitude strength, and self-affirmation processes

Individuals with defensive self-esteem score low on implicit measures of self-esteem (ISE) and high on explicit measures of self-esteem (ESE). Although there is some evidence about the consequences of defensive self-esteem, much of it is indirect and open to alternative explanations. Here, we offer direct and novel evidence regarding the implications of defensive self-esteem. Using a standard visual attention paradigm, Study 1 revealed that defensive self-esteem is associated with enhanced attention to defensiveness-related words. Building upon these results, Study 2 found that defensive self-esteem individuals reported particularly strong attitudes, across different operationalizations of attitude strength as well as different attitude objects. Study 3 examined the sensitivity of defensive self-esteem individuals to self-affirmation effects. The results revealed that self-affirmation was particularly effective for defensive self-esteem individuals in reducing actual-ideal self-discrepancies. Overall, the results provide novel and firm evidence that the combination of simultaneously low ISE and high ESE elicits defensiveness.     

Do negative implicit associations indicate negative attitudes? Social explanations moderate whether ostensible “negative” associations are prejudice-based or empathy-based

The present work challenges the idea that implicit evaluative associations with outgroups necessarily provide information about negative or prejudiced attitudes. We argue that the manner in which one explains outgroup status and action shapes whether one's implicit “negative” associations are prejudice-based or empathy-based. Four studies are consistent with this possibility. Study 1 suggests that whereas implicit “negative” associations are predictive of negative explicit attitudes among those who reject external explanations for African American status and action, such implicit “negativity” predicts positive explicit attitudes among those who endorse external explanations. Study 2 provides experimental evidence that the provision of external explanations results in the formation of implicit “negative” associations that are predictive of compassionate responding. Study 3 provides more direct support for the idea that implicit “negative” associations are empathy-based among external explainers by showing that such “negative” associations are positively correlated with a measure of dispositional empathy-proneness. Finally, Study 4 demonstrates that IAT “negativity” is associated with automatic activation of empathy-related associations among those who strongly endorse external explanations. Discussion centers on the importance of considering factors—such as social explanations—that may moderate whether implicit “negativity” is prejudice-based or empathy-based.     

En Route to Depression: Self‐Esteem Discrepancies and Habitual Rumination

Dual‐process models of cognitive vulnerability to depression suggest that some individuals possess discrepant implicit and explicit self‐views, such as high explicit and low implicit self‐esteem (fragile self‐esteem) or low explicit and high implicit self‐esteem (damaged self‐esteem). This study investigated whether individuals with discrepant self‐esteem may employ depressive rumination in an effort to reduce discrepancy‐related dissonance, and whether the relationship between self‐esteem discrepancy and future depressive symptoms varies as a function of rumination tendencies. Hierarchical regressions examined whether self‐esteem discrepancy was associated with rumination in an Australian undergraduate sample at Time 1 (N = 306; M_age = 29.9), and whether rumination tendencies moderated the relationship between self‐esteem discrepancy and depressive symptoms assessed 3 months later (n = 160). Damaged self‐esteem was associated with rumination at Time 1. As hypothesized, rumination moderated the relationship between self‐esteem discrepancy and depressive symptoms at Time 2, where fragile self‐esteem and high rumination tendencies at Time 1 predicted the highest levels of subsequent dysphoria. Results are consistent with dual‐process propositions that (a) explicit self‐regulation strategies may be triggered when explicit and implicit self‐beliefs are incongruent, and (b) rumination may increase the likelihood of depression by expending cognitive resources and/or amplifying negative implicit biases.     

Compensatory nonconformity: Self-uncertainty and low implicit self-esteem increase adoption and expression of minority opinions

The present studies tested whether people, particularly those who are most vulnerable to self-threats as indicated by low implicit self-esteem, adopt and express minority opinions to compensate for self-uncertainty. In Studies 1 through 3, low implicit self-esteem participants who were made to feel uncertain about themselves as individuals (versus uncertain about a self-irrelevant issue in Study 1, certain about themselves in Study 2, or uncertain about their group memberships in Study 3) expressed more disagreement with others' opinions. Additionally, Study 3 demonstrated that this effect is specific to minority opinions and does not emerge on majority opinions. In Study 4, the relation between self-uncertainty and disagreement with others' opinions was strongest among participants with both low implicit and high explicit self-esteem, who respond to self-threats in particularly defensive ways.