The role of interpersonal harm in distinguishing regret from guilt

Regret and guilt are emotions that are produced by negative outcomes for which one is responsible. Both emotions have received ample attention in the psychological literature; however, it is still unclear to what extent regret and guilt represent distinct psychological processes. We examined the extent to which the distinction between interpersonal harm (negative outcomes for others) and intrapersonal harm (negative outcomes for self) is crucial in differentiating these two emotions. In a series of 3 studies we found that guilt is predominantly felt in situations of interpersonal harm, whereas regret is felt in both situations of interpersonal harm and intrapersonal harm. Moreover, the results show that in situations of interpersonal harm the phenomenology of regret shares many, but not all features with the phenomenology of guilt. We conclude that the emotion processes resulting from interpersonal and intrapersonal harm are clearly distinct, but that regret as an emotion label is applied to both types of processes whereas the emotion label guilt is primarily used to refer to experiences of interpersonal harm. Implications for emotion research are discussed.     

On the relationship between responsibility and guilt: antecedent appraisal or elaborated appraisal?

Three studies are reported in which we examined the relation between responsibility and guilt. Results from Study 1 suggested that responsibility increased as a function of guilt, but that the reverse relation did not emerge. In the second and third studies we primed either responsibility or guilt and examined how these primes influenced subsequent appraisals for novel events. We also used different manipulations of responsibility and guilt. In Study 2 guilt was operationalized as negative interpersonal consequences as evidenced by the reactions of others. Responsibility was varied by manipulating the controllability of negative outcomes. In Study 3 responsibility was manipulated in terms of the severity of negative consequences for oneself. Results of both studies showed that guilt primes gave rise to perceptions of responsibility but that responsibility primes did not affect perceptions of guilt. We conclude that responsibility is best regarded as an elaborated appraisal generated by guilt, rather than an antecedent of guilt. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Counterfactuals,emotions, and context

Participants recalled either a negative academic or interpersonal experience, and the relations among counterfactual thinking, negative emotions, and attributions of blame and control were examined. Situational context effects on attribution, counterfactual thinking, and emotion were observed, indicating a greater tendency toward self-focused cognition and emotion in the academic context than in the interpersonal context. Consistent with recent theorising, upward counterfactual thinking was associated with negative emotions of guilt, shame, regret, disappointment, and sadness. However, there was no indication that downward counterfactual thinking regulated emotion as previous literature suggests. Implications for functional and process theories of counterfactual thinking are discussed.     

Moral affect: the good, the bad, and the ugly

The relations among 3 moral affective personality characteristics--shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and empathic responsiveness--were examined in 4 independent studies of undergraduates. Results indicate that shame and guilt are distinct affective experiences that have important and quite different implications in the interpersonal realm. There was a substantial positive correlation between shame-proneness and guilt-proneness. Nonetheless, as predicted, other-oriented empathic responsiveness was negatively related to proneness to shame but positively correlated with proneness to guilt. In contrast, an index of more self-oriented personal distress was positively linked to shame-proneness. Taken together, these results add a new dimension to the ugliness of shame but suggest that guilt may not be that bad after all, at least in the interpersonal domain.     

A shared past and a common future: the Portuguese colonial war and the dynamics of group-based guilt

In the present study we examine feelings of group-based guilt among Portuguese people in relation to the Portuguese colonial war, and their consequences for social behaviour. Specifically, we focus on the way Portuguese university students identify with their national group and the outgroup and their feelings of group-based guilt regarding their group's past misdeeds during the colonial period. The consequences of group-based guilt are also analyzed. 130 Portuguese university students answered a questionnaire and results show that students feel low levels of group-based guilt in relation to this period. Our results show that ingroup glorification is positively related with the use of cognitions to justify the ingroup's behaviour, presumably to avoid responsibility for the harm committed by the ingroup. Outgroup identification correlates with compensatory behavioural intentions and openness to negative information about the colonial war. As expected, feelings of group-based guilt show a significant correlation with compensatory behavioural intentions. Links between political orientation, ingroup attachment and glorification, exonerating cognitions and group-based guilt are analyzed and their implications for intergroup relations are discussed.     

But I Still Feel Guilt: A Test of a Moral Disengagement Propensity Model

ABSTRACT

We explored the impact of moral disengagement on individual experiences of guilt. We modeled three forms of workplace deviance (withdrawal, interpersonal deviance, and work-family deviance) as mediators between the propensity to morally disengage and guilt, and also includes the moderating effects of perceived work hours culture. Data were collected from 226 employees matched with a colleague and spouse. Results demonstrated that moral disengagement released individuals who engaged in interpersonal and work-family deviance from subsequent feelings of guilt, but only reduced feelings of guilt for those who withdrew. We also found an interactive effect of perceived work hours culture on the relationships between moral disengagement propensity and all three forms of deviance. The indirect effect from moral disengagement propensity to guilt through withdrawal was stronger when perceived work hours was high.     

The exemplary social emotion guilt: Not so relationship-oriented when another person repairs for you

Guilt is considered by many researchers to be the hallmark social emotion. Guilt theories perceive guilt to be a negative emotion with positive interpersonal consequences, and empirical research has shown guilt to motivate prosocial behaviours aimed at restoring the relationship with one's victims. The current research questions the relationship-oriented nature of this emotion. Five experiments reveal that when a person repairs the transgressor's damage caused to a victim, the transgressor's guilt feelings, reparative intentions, and prosocial behaviour decrease. These findings suggest that it is not the relationship with the victim that is important in the regulation of guilt feelings, but rather the reparative actions that have been undertaken. Implications for theory and behavioural research on guilt are discussed.     

Emotions associated with counterfactual comparisons drive decision-making in Footbridge-type moral dilemmas

Based on the dual-process theory of moral judgment, it has been suggested that in Footbridge-type dilemmas the anticipation of the emotional consequences of causing intentional harm might contribute to the decision of rejecting utilitarian resolutions. However, no empirical data have been reported on the emotions felt by participants after their decisions, and the role played by emotions in Trolley-type dilemmas remains to be determined. The present study investigated the specific emotions engaged both after decision choices and after the generation of the counterfactual scenario in Trolley- and Footbridge-type dilemmas. The results support the idea that in Footbridge-type dilemmas decision-making is driven by the attempt to minimize the aversive emotional state evoked by the decision outcome. A greater increase in emotional intensity was found overall for Footbridge-type than Trolley-type dilemmas after the counterfactual generation following typical (non-utilitarian) choices, with guilt, regret, and shame being the emotions that increased most. Critically, in Footbridge-type dilemmas only, typical choices were predicted by the increase in regret intensity experienced after counterfactual generation.     

The exemplary social emotion guilt: Not so relationship-oriented when another person repairs for you

Guilt is considered by many researchers to be the hallmark social emotion. Guilt theories perceive guilt to be a negative emotion with positive interpersonal consequences, and empirical research has shown guilt to motivate prosocial behaviours aimed at restoring the relationship with one's victims. The current research questions the relationship-oriented nature of this emotion. Five experiments reveal that when a person repairs the transgressor's damage caused to a victim, the transgressor's guilt feelings, reparative intentions, and prosocial behaviour decrease. These findings suggest that it is not the relationship with the victim that is important in the regulation of guilt feelings, but rather the reparative actions that have been undertaken. Implications for theory and behavioural research on guilt are discussed.     

Forgive them for I have sinned: The relationship between guilt and forgiveness of others' transgressions

We propose that guilt leads to forgiveness of others' transgressions. In Study 1, people prone to experience guilt (but not shame) were also prone to forgive others for past misdeeds. In Study 2, we manipulated harm‐ and inequity‐based guilt; both increased forgiveness of others' transgressions. Further, the effect of guilt on forgiveness was mediated by identification with the transgressor. In Study 3, we replicated the guilt–forgiveness relationship and examined three other plausible mediators: capability for similar wrongdoing, empathic understanding, and general identification; only identification with the transgressor satisfied the criteria for mediation. In Study 4, we induced guilt by asking participants to harm a friend or stranger. Guilt induced by harming a friend led to greater forgiveness of third‐party transgressors, and again, identification with the transgressor mediated the effect. We discuss the implications of these results for understanding how the prosocial effects of guilt extend beyond the boundaries of a single interpersonal relationship.     

Temporal dynamics of guilt: changes in the role of interpersonal and intrapsychic factors

Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton (1994) argue that guilt serves primarily interpersonal functions and take issue with more traditional intrapsychic accounts of guilty feelings, in which causality, responsibility, and blame are emphasized. We examined the validity of these claims by asking 198 college students to imagine that they destroyed the valued property of either their best friend or mother, under each of three conditions of causal responsibility (accidental, foreseeable, unjustifiably intended). They then rated the reactions they anticipated from the victim (anger, disappointment; change in impression of the perpetrator), their perceived blameworthiness, aspects of causality, and how guilty they would feel immediately after perpetrating the harm as well as an entire day later. Imagined guilt was curvilinearly related to responsibility at time 1, but linearly at time 2. Results suggest that people only weigh interpersonal concerns more heavily after time has elapsed, but that both factors integrally affect feelings of guilt. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Guilt Signals a Crisis of Rejection: Two Types of Individual Differences Related to Social Rejection Have Dissimilar Effects on Guilt and Compensatory Behavior

We investigated whether feelings of guilt, which signal crises in interpersonal relationships (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994), are differently evoked by two types of individual differences in social rejection: rejection detection capability (Kawamoto, Nittono, & Ura, 2015) and rejection sensitivity (Downey & Feldman, 1996). Using the hypothetical scenario method, we found that in situations with a potential risk of being rejected as a consequence of causing another person harm (i.e., harm‐present condition), participants with higher rejection detection capability felt more guilt and engaged in more compensatory behavior towards the victims. In addition, guilt mediated the relationship between rejection detection capability and compensatory behavior. Conversely, in situations with no potential risk of being rejected (i.e., harm‐absent condition), participants with higher rejection sensitivity felt more guilt but did not engage in much compensatory behavior. These results suggest that individual differences in social rejection foster different responses to specific threats.     

Collective regret versus collective guilt: Different emotional reactions to historical atrocities

A distinction between guilt and regret in reactions to in‐group atrocities is proposed. Four studies (total N = 1249) support the notion that guilt and regret are distinct emotional reactions. Whereas guilt is a self‐focused, aversive emotional reaction following from appraisals of responsibility and associated with the intention to make amends, regret follows from an empathic victim perspective, is less aversive, and is more strongly associated with positive attitudes towards the victim groups and the intention to engage in intergroup contact. These findings suggest that less aversive emotions like regret are more likely to improve intergroup attitudes after a common history of conflict, but the aversive experience of guilt might be more potent in motivating reparations. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Behavioural consequences of regret and disappointment in social bargaining games

Previous research on the role of negative emotions in social bargaining games has focused primarily on social emotions such as anger and guilt. In this article, we provide a test for behavioural differences between two prototypical decision-related negative emotions-regret and disappointment-in one-shot social dilemma games. Three experiments with two different emotion-induction procedures (autobiographical recall and imagined scenarios) and two different games (the ultimatum game and the 10-coin give-some game) revealed that regret increased prosocial behaviour, whereas disappointment decreased prosocial behaviour. These results extend previous findings concerning differences between regret and disappointment to interdependent (social) situations.     

Cultural grounding of regret: regret in self and interpersonal contexts

The purpose of this study was to explore cultural similarities and differences in regret, focusing on distinctions between interpersonal and self-situations, and between action and inaction regrets. Japanese and American undergraduates were asked to describe regrets experienced in interpersonal and self-situations. We found that both situational and cultural contexts influenced the likelihood of regretting inactions over actions. Participants were more likely to recall inaction regrets in self-situations than in interpersonal situations, and that the likelihood of recalling inaction regrets was more pronounced for Americans than for Japanese. Furthermore, we examined the intensity of the regret. Whereas American students experienced regret as intense as that of Japanese students in self-situations, Japanese students experienced regret more strongly than American students in interpersonal situations. Detailed content analysis also showed that individuals experienced regret in ways consistent with cultural values. The situational and cultural grounding of regret is discussed.     

内疚的认知和情绪活动及其脑区调控

内疚是个体做出危害他人的行为或违反道德准则之后产生的良心上的反省, 对行为负有责任的一种负性体验。内疚在道德规范和人际社会中具有重要的作用。研究者主要采取自我报告范式、情境模拟范式、过失范式和经济博弈范式考察内疚的发生发展及其功能。近年来, 研究者尝试揭示内疚脑机制, 研究发现内疚主要激活前额叶皮层和脑岛等脑区, 前额叶可能与内疚的认知成分相关, 而脑岛主要与内疚的情绪成分相关。未来的研究需要采用多种技术手段进一步考察内疚的认知神经机制。     

Cultural grounding of regret: Regret in self and interpersonal contexts

The purpose of this study was to explore cultural similarities and differences in regret, focusing on distinctions between interpersonal and self-situations, and between action and inaction regrets. Japanese and American undergraduates were asked to describe regrets experienced in interpersonal and self-situations. We found that both situational and cultural contexts influenced the likelihood of regretting inactions over actions. Participants were more likely to recall inaction regrets in self-situations than in interpersonal situations, and that the likelihood of recalling inaction regrets was more pronounced for Americans than for Japanese. Furthermore, we examined the intensity of the regret. Whereas American students experienced regret as intense as that of Japanese students in self-situations, Japanese students experienced regret more strongly than American students in interpersonal situations. Detailed content analysis also showed that individuals experienced regret in ways consistent with cultural values. The situational and cultural grounding of regret is discussed.     

人心难读：冲突中的预测偏差及其心理机制

冲突事件是指当事某方采取的行动可能对另一方造成直接且明显的伤害、进而导致紧张关系的事件。拒绝他人请求、反驳他人观点、与他人一起参与竞争等皆有可能诱发冲突。有效的冲突管理有助于减少冲突带来的消极影响,发挥冲突潜在的积极影响。但是,广泛存在的预测偏差严重妨碍了冲突管理。因此,欲解决冲突管理的难题,必须探究人类在冲突中的预测偏差。现有研究多着眼于非冲突中的预测偏差,采取信息驱动的视角,将预测偏差的主要原因归结为人受限于认知上的不足,因而认为预测偏差是一种错误,主要关注其消极影响。然而,现有研究忽视了冲突中的预测偏差的独特性。冲突中,预测偏差可能受人的自我保护动机和避免人际伤害动机驱动自上而下地产生,并具有一定的适应性。 基于对现有研究的总结,本项目旨在突破当前的理论困境,探讨冲突事件中预测偏差的独特规律及其心理机制与后果,具体而言包括四大目标：(1)聚焦冲突事件中的预测偏差,并以对应的非冲突事件作为对照,揭示预测偏差在冲突中独特的表现形式,提出冲突事件的“偏差放大效应”,即与非冲突事件相比,在冲突事件中,预测偏差的程度会被放大,例如反驳他人者对他人的体验产生较大的错误预测,而赞同他人者则相对能更准确地预测他人的体验;(2)从动机性认知视角探讨“偏差放大效应”的心理成因,揭示“负性驱动机制”,即人因为担忧冲突事件的负性结果,出于自我保护的目的而在注意、知觉、思维等认知加工环节把冲突事件的潜在结果加工得更加消极,作最坏的打算以应对冲突;(3)考察“负性驱动机制”下预测偏差导致的后果,如使人采取回避行为,具体表现为人际退缩和不作为等;(4)设计有效的去偏差方案,以直接和间接两种方式改变预测者的动机,进而改变其认知加工,减弱预测偏差。 通过完成以上目标,本项目将构建解释冲突事件中预测偏差的理论模型。该理论模型立足于动机性认知的视角,从现象层面揭示“偏差放大效应”,将负性偏差理论拓展到人际过程中;从机制层面突破信息驱动视角的局限,揭示动机性认知在人际互动中的指导作用;从思想层面基于生态理性观辩证分析预测偏差的适应性作用,促使研究者重新审视“何为理性”。该模型弥补了以往研究忽视动机对预测偏差的影响这一不足,并将预测偏差和负性偏差、动机性认知等理论结合起来,形成了更完整的理论框架。本项目有助于推动对预测偏差的全面理解,发展行为决策理论,帮助公众和社会治理者准确预测他人,提升冲突管理能力,提高决策质量。     

Regulatory focus as a predictor of omission bias in moral judgment: Mediating role of anticipated regrets

Omission bias occurs when people are more reluctant to accept negative consequences caused by their actions than by their inaction. Recent research on omission bias in decision‐making has found evidence for individual differences, thus indicating that some people are more likely to show omission inclination than others. The present research aims to explore the role of regulatory focus as individual difference variables in omission bias. Moreover, we examine whether anticipated regret mediates the relationship between regulatory focus and moral judgement. Moral judgement tasks utilized include: (i) moral dilemma scenarios (Study 1); and (ii) ethical scenarios embracing apparent legal rule violations (Study 2). The results of both studies show that only prevention focus is significantly related to omission bias in moral judgement. Specifically, this relationship holds regardless of the nature of the ‘omission’ (whether they are deontological or utilitarian). In addition, anticipated regret/guilt for action was found to mediate the relationship between prevention focus and omission bias. Implications and limitations are discussed based on the results of the current study.