Reasoning about highly emotional topics: Syllogistic reasoning in a group of war veterans

Previous studies have generally found that emotion impairs logical reasoning. However, laboratory experiments have typically involved relatively mild levels of emotion where affect is not linked to personal experience. In this study we examined how army veterans reasoned about syllogisms of three types: neutral, generally emotional, and combat-related emotional. We also measured intensity of combat experience. Veterans were more likely to provide logically accurate answers when reasoning about combat-related compared to neutral problems. Participants with more intense combat experiences showed a reduced advantage in reasoning about combat-related emotional problems.     

Dissociation between cognitive and affective empathy in youth with Asperger Syndrome

Autism spectrum conditions, among them Asperger Syndrome (AS), are generally described as entailing deficits in “cognitive empathy” or “theory of mind”. People with AS tend to have difficulties recognizing emotions, although the extent of these difficulties is still unclear. This study aimed to assess empathic profile in youth with AS (N = 38) and controls matched on age, sex and IQ. The study aimed to test if a dissociation between cognitive and affective empathy exists in AS. The study also aimed to explore emotion recognition in people with AS, and how it relates to emotional valence (positive, negative, and neutral emotions). The AS group scored lower than controls on cognitive empathy but scored within the average range on affective empathy. A deficit in emotion recognition was found in the AS group for positive emotions. These results confirm earlier findings in cognitive empathy and provide new insight about emotion recognition abilities in this population.     

问题类型和情绪状态对贝叶斯推理的影响

本研究以240名大学生为被试,探讨了问题类型和情绪状态对贝叶斯推理的影响。结果表明：(1)问题类型对贝叶斯推理有影响;(2)情绪状态对贝叶斯推理有影响;(3)问题类型与情绪状态对贝叶斯推理的影响存在交互作用。具体地,在经典乳癌问题中,被试在消极情绪状态下比在积极情绪状态下做出更高的概率估计,而在中彩问题中,被试在积极情绪状态下比在消极情绪状态下概率估计更高。     

The need to explain

How do reasoners deal with inconsistencies? James (1907) believed that the rational solution is to revise your beliefs and to do so in a minimal way. We propose an alternative: You explain the origins of an inconsistency, which has the side effect of a revision to your beliefs. This hypothesis predicts that individuals should spontaneously create explanations of inconsistencies rather than refute one of the assertions and that they should rate explanations as more probable than refutations. A pilot study showed that participants spontaneously explain inconsistencies when they are asked what follows from inconsistent premises. In three subsequent experiments, participants were asked to compare explanations of inconsistencies against minimal refutations of the inconsistent premises. In Experiment 1, participants chose which conclusion was most probable; in Experiment 2 they rank ordered the conclusions based on their probability; and in Experiment 3 they estimated the mean probability of the conclusions' occurrence. In all three studies, participants rated explanations as more probable than refutations. The results imply that individuals create explanations to resolve an inconsistency and that these explanations lead to changes in belief. Changes in belief are therefore of secondary importance to the primary goal of explanation.     

How to map the affective semantic space of scents

The investigation of the semantic space associated with subjective affective experiences or feelings linked to odour perception has recently emerged. Because of the specificity of the emotional effects of odours, the terms derived from traditional models of emotion are unlikely to optimally account for odour-associated feelings. In this study, sets of terms derived from two traditional models, basic emotions and valence by arousal by dominance dimensional emotions, were compared with a recently elaborated olfaction-specific set of terms (Geneva Emotion and Odour Scale; GEOS). Three main criteria were considered: (1) the feeling's intensity reported in response to odours; (2) the inter-rater agreement concerning the reported feelings; and (3) the power to discriminate feelings evoked by various odorous substances. The evidence strongly suggested that the set of terms proposed by GEOS outperformed the terms derived from the two classical models in measuring the subjective affective experience elicited by odours. These results are interpreted with respect to a good correspondence between the functions of olfaction and the meaning conveyed by GEOS terms.     

Belief bias is stronger when reasoning is more difficult

Three studies examine the influence of varying the difficulty of reasoning on the extent of belief bias, while minimising the possibility that the manipulation would influence the way participants approach the task. Specifically, reasoning difficulty was manipulated by making variations in problem content, while maintaining all other aspects of the problems constant. In Study 1, 191 participants were presented with consistent and conflict problems varying in two levels of difficulty. The results showed a significant influence of problem difficulty on the extent of the belief bias, such that the effect of belief was more pronounced for difficult problems. This effect was stronger in Study 2 (73 participants) where the difference in the difficulty of the problems was purposely accentuated. The results of both studies stress the importance of controlling for problem difficulty when studying belief bias. Study 3 examined one consequence of this, i.e., the classic belief vs. logic interaction could be eliminated by manipulating problem difficulty. Theoretical implications for dual-process accounts of belief bias are also discussed.     

Qualitative elicitation of affective beliefs related to physical activity

ObjectivesBased on previous research that has identified affective attitude as a distinct predictor of physical activity (PA) behavior, the purpose of this pilot study was to elicit affective beliefs toward physical activity using qualitative data generated through specific open-ended questions.MethodsA sample of 126 undergraduate students participated in this study. Four open-ended questions based on the theory of planned behavior were posed to elicit affective beliefs. A content analysis was used to categorize and code data by theme based on common responses that emerged in the elicitation. A frequency count of the responses falling into each category was then conducted to establish which affective beliefs were the most common. The themes were established by two researchers and reviewed for internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity by a third party.ResultsThe results highlight key beliefs related to affective attitude. In descending rank order; Social Involvement, Pleasant Body States, Esteem, Improved Psychological Outcome, and General Enjoyment were the most common affective beliefs for PA involvement. Feelings arising from Time Issues/Conflict, Physical Unpleasantness, PA Environment, and Necessity/Obligation were the most common negative affective beliefs.ConclusionsThe results suggest that promoting enjoyment rather than necessity of PA and encouraging variety in PA may be effective. Addressing the importance of aesthetically pleasing environments and highlighting social interaction as a strategy rather than merely a norm or a form of support in behavioral research may be important.     

Judging the implications of a concession: Conversational distance and belief bias effects

An arguer's position at a given point in an argument can be characterized as a set of commitments. The present study considers the perceptions of ordinary language users about the implications of making a concession for the contents of the conceder's commitment set. In particular, we examine two sources of influence on such lay perceptions—conversational distance (i.e., the number of turns separating the concession from commitments incurred earlier in the argument) and an individual's prior beliefs regarding the content of the argument. Across two studies, college students were administered an argument task assessing the extent to which a concession by the protagonist of an argument on the last move indicated changes to other commitments incurred earlier in the argument. Results indicated that participants were more likely to judge a concession as indicating a change in prior commitments if (a) the commitment was incurred later in the argument than earlier, and (b) the participant disagreed with the protagonists’ thesis in the argument. In addition, performance on deductive reasoning tasks predicted individual differences in the conversational distance effect, but not the belief bias effect.     

Alexithymia and the automatic processing of affective information: Evidence from the affective priming paradigm

In Study 1, we examined the moderating impact of alexithymia (i.e., a difficulty identifying and describing feelings to other people and an externally oriented cognitive style) on the automatic processing of affective information. The affective priming paradigm was used, and lower priming effects for high alexithymia scorers were observed when congruent (incongruent) pairs involving nonverbal primes (angry face) and verbal target were presented. The results held after controlling for participants' negative affectivity. The same effects were replicated in Studies 2 and 3, with trait anxiety and depression entered as additional covariates. In Study 3, no moderating impact of alexithymia was found for verbal-facial pairs suggesting that the results cannot be merely explained in terms of transcoding limitations for high alexithymia scorers. Overall, the present results suggest that alexithymia could be related to a difficulty in processing and automatically using high arousal emotional information to respond to concomittant behavioural demands.     

What Makes People Revise Their Beliefs Following Contradictory Anecdotal Evidence?: The Role of Systemic Variability and Direct Experience

The extent to which belief revision is affected by systematic variability and direct experience of a conditional (if A then B) relation was examined in two studies. The first used a computer generated apparatus. This presented two rows of 5 objects. Pressing one of the top objects resulted in one of the bottom objects being lit up. The 139 adult participants were given one of two levels of experience (5 or 15 trials) and one of two types of apparatus. One of these was completely uniform, while the other had an element that randomly alternated in its result. Following the testing of the apparatus, participants were asked to rate their certainty of the action of the middle element, which was always uniform (the AB belief). Then they were told of an observation inconsistent with this belief. Participants were then asked whether they considered the AB belief or the anecdotal observation to be more believable. Results showed that increased experience decreased the tendency to reject the AB belief, when the apparatus did not have any randomness. However, the presence of a single element showing random variation in the system strongly increased rejection of this belief. A second study looked at the effect of a single random element on a mechanical system as well as an electronic system using graphical representations. This confirmed the generality of the effect of randomness on belief revision, and provided support for the effects of embedding a belief into a system of relations. These results provide some insight into the complex factors that determine belief revision.     

The Selective Laziness of Reasoning

Reasoning research suggests that people use more stringent criteria when they evaluate others' arguments than when they produce arguments themselves. To demonstrate this “selective laziness,” we used a choice blindness manipulation. In two experiments, participants had to produce a series of arguments in response to reasoning problems, and they were then asked to evaluate other people's arguments about the same problems. Unknown to the participants, in one of the trials, they were presented with their own argument as if it was someone else's. Among those participants who accepted the manipulation and thus thought they were evaluating someone else's argument, more than half (56% and 58%) rejected the arguments that were in fact their own. Moreover, participants were more likely to reject their own arguments for invalid than for valid answers. This demonstrates that people are more critical of other people's arguments than of their own, without being overly critical: They are better able to tell valid from invalid arguments when the arguments are someone else's rather than their own.     

Motor,affective and cognitive empathy in adolescence: Interrelations between facial electromyography and self-reported trait and state measures

This study examined interrelations of trait and state empathy in an adolescent sample. Self-reported affective trait empathy and cognitive trait empathy were assessed during a home visit. During a test session at the university, motor empathy (facial electromyography), and self-reported affective and cognitive state empathy were assessed in response to empathy-inducing film clips portraying happiness and sadness. Adolescents who responded with stronger motor empathy consistently reported higher affective state empathy. Adolescents' motor empathy was also positively related to cognitive state empathy, either directly or indirectly via affective state empathy. Whereas trait empathy was consistently, but modestly, related to state empathy with sadness, for state empathy with happiness few trait–state associations were found. Together, the findings provide support for the notion that empathy is a multi-faceted phenomenon. Motor, affective and cognitive empathy seem to be related processes, each playing a different role in the ability to understand and share others' feelings.     

High‐Stakes Decision‐Making Within Complex Social Environments: A Computational Model of Belief Systems in the Arab Spring

People experiencing similar conditions may make different decisions, and their belief systems provide insight about these differences. An example of high‐stakes decision‐making within a complex social context is the Arab Spring, in which large numbers of people decided to protest and even larger numbers decided to stay at home. This study uses qualitative analyses of interview narratives and social media addressing individual decisions to develop a computational model tracing the cognitive decision‐making process. The model builds on work by Abelson and Carroll (1965), Schank and Abelson (1977), and Axelrod (1976) to systematically trace the inferences connecting beliefs to decisions. The findings show that protest decisions were often based on positive emotions such as pride, hope, courage, and solidarity, triggered by beliefs about successful protest and self‐sacrifice. By contrast, decisions to stay at home were triggered by beliefs about safety, state approval, and living conditions. As one participant said, “When I heard about the revolution in Tunisia, my heart was filled with solidarity for the people.” In the words of a non‐participant: “When people are killed, we must be careful. There are more important things than protest: safety and stability.” This study of individual explanations about events identifies the role of emotions in high‐stakes decision‐making within complex social environments.     

Updating beliefs in light of uncertain evidence: Descriptive assessment of Jeffrey's rule

Jeffrey (1983) proposed a generalisation of conditioning as a means of updating probability distributions when new evidence drives no event to certainty. His rule requires the stability of certain conditional probabilities through time. We tested this assumption (“invariance”) from the psychological point of view. In Experiment 1 participants offered probability estimates for events in Jeffrey's candlelight example. Two further scenarios were investigated in Experiment 2, one in which invariance seems justified, the other in which it does not. Results were in rough conformity to Jeffrey's (1983) principle.     

Linking emotion regulation strategies to affective events and negative emotions at work

This study examined the use of specific forms of emotion regulation at work, utilizing Gross’s [Gross, J. J. (1998). The emerging field of emotion regulation: An integrative review. Review of General Psychology 2, 271–299] process-based framework of emotion regulation as a guiding structure. In addition to examining employee self-reported usage of these emotion regulation strategies, we assessed the types of discrete negative emotions and negative affective events associated with their use. Results demonstrated that employees reported using a wide variety of emotion regulation strategies, and that each strategy tended to align with a distinct set of discrete negative emotions and affective events. These findings support expanding the focus of emotion regulation strategies at work beyond the deep acting (i.e., changing feelings) and surface acting (i.e., changing expressions) distinction. The results also suggest that focusing on specific strategies, rather than categories of emotion regulation, could enhance understanding of how employees manage their emotions at work.     

Aerobic fitness moderates girls' affective and working memory responses to social exclusion

Because self-regulation skills are in development through adolescence, social exclusion can pose significant challenges to the well-being of young people. Thus, an understanding of factors that may ease the self-regulation demands of social exclusion is particularly important. One such factor is aerobic fitness. Using a quasi-experimental within-subject design in a sample of girls (N = 47, 10.4 ± 1.2 years), we examined whether affective and working memory changes following social exclusion differ by level of aerobic fitness. Overall, findings suggest that more aerobically fit girls may better regulate the demands of social exclusion than less aerobically fit girls. Specifically, girls with higher aerobic fitness evidenced smaller decreases in pleasant affect and larger increases in working memory performance following social exclusion than girls with lower aerobic fitness. This research extends understanding of how aerobic fitness may benefit well-being in young people.     

The content and structure of laypeople's concept of pleasure

Five studies were conducted to map the content and structure of laypeople's conceptions of pleasure. Instances of the pleasure concept collected in Study 1 consisted predominantly of objects, events or persons described as sources of pleasure. Content analysis suggested that the pleasure category, like emotional response categories, might be formed at an implicit level where various pleasure antecedents are grouped based on common phenomenological qualities of the affective experience. Studies 2 and 3a showed that the pleasure category possesses a graded structure and fuzzy boundaries. Results further revealed that, either when explicitly presented with labels (Study 3b) or left to their own implicit categories during a sorting task (Study 4), laypeople represented pleasure as a hierarchical concept in which differentiated pleasure types (i.e., intellectual, emotional, social and physical) were subsumed under a higher level unitary form of pleasure. In this structure, unitary and differentiated pleasures shared a set of common affective qualities but were also distinguishable by unique and distinctive affective characteristics (Study 5). Ties to prior theories of pleasure and implications for decision making and behavioural research are discussed.     

Emotion regulation in depression: Examining the role of cognitive processes

Sustained negative affect is a hallmark feature of depressive episodes. The ability to regulate emotional responses to negative events may therefore play a critical role in our understanding of this debilitating disorder. Individual differences in cognitive processes such as attention, memory, and interpretation may underlie difficulties in emotion regulation and numerous studies have identified cognitive biases and deficits that characterise depressed people. Few studies, however, have explicitly linked these biases to the difficulties in emotion regulation that are associated with depression. In this paper we discuss relations among cognitive processes and emotion regulation and review the depression literature to identify cognitive biases and deficits that may underlie maladaptive responses to negative events and mood states. Our review suggests that difficulties in the disengagement from negative material, memory biases, and deficits in cognitive control are frequently observed in depressive disorders and may be associated with the use of maladaptive emotion regulation strategies, such as rumination. These biases may also be related to difficulties implementing strategies that are effective for non-depressed people, such as recall of mood-incongruent material and reappraisal. Our review also suggests, however, that empirical studies linking cognitive biases and emotion regulation in depression are still largely missing and would present an important goal for future research in this area.