Are implicit affective evaluations related to mental rotation performance?

Conscious and unconscious emotions are related to mental rotation. In this study, we investigated if also unconscious emotional evaluations of the stimuli are related to mental rotation performance. 114 students (39 men, 75 women) solved implicit and explicit affective evaluations and a psychometric mental rotation test with cube and pellet figures. Furthermore, the use of spatial toys, the stereotyping of spatial abilities, and the self-rating in spatial abilities were registered. The mental rotation test with pellet figures was more difficult than the one with cube figures. Mental rotation performance was predicted by the self-rating of spatial abilities. For the cube figures, it was additionally predicted by the implicit affective evaluation of those figures. The results did not differ between men and women. The study provides evidence for a relation between affective emotional evaluations and mental imagery processes, although this does not hold true for all stimulus types.     

Beyond positive psychology? Toward a contextual view of psychological processes and well-being

The field of positive psychology rests on the assumption that certain psychological traits and processes are inherently beneficial for well-being. We review evidence that challenges this assumption. First, we review data from 4 independent longitudinal studies of marriage revealing that 4 ostensibly positive processes-forgiveness, optimistic expectations, positive thoughts, and kindness-can either benefit or harm well-being depending on the context in which they operate. Although all 4 processes predicted better relationship well-being among spouses in healthy marriages, they predicted worse relationship well-being in more troubled marriages. Then, we review evidence from other research that reveals that whether ostensibly positive psychological traits and processes benefit or harm well-being depends on the context of various noninterpersonal domains as well. Finally, we conclude by arguing that any movement to promote well-being may be most successful to the extent that it (a) examines the conditions under which the same traits and processes may promote versus threaten well-being, (b) examines both healthy and unhealthy people, (c) examines well-being over substantial periods of time, and (d) avoids labeling psychological traits and processes as positive or negative.     

Where has hope gone? Toward an understanding of hope in pastoral care

This paper questions the lack of a conceptual model or psychology of hope for pastoral theology and proceeds to develop such a psychology by surveying the theology of hope, by reviewing the dynamics of hoping of some contemporary philosophers and psychologists, and by proposing a hypothesis that hope is difficult to conceptualize because the mode of hoping is nonabstract, relational, nonlinear, and imaginative, all right-lobe brain functions more characteristic of Eastern than Western consciousness. Six implications of this hypothesis for pastoral care are suggested.Research for this paper and work on hope as it relates to pastoral care and counseling was made possible by a year's sabbatical leave from St. Paul School of Theology.     

Constructive or cruel? Positive or patronizing? Reactions to expressions of positive and negative stereotypes of the mentally ill

Previous research has shown that people respond with greater sensitivity to negative stereotypical comments about a group that are made from someone outside the group in question than from someone who belongs to the group. In this paper, we investigated if the same effect occurs in response to comments made about stigmatized groups. Specifically, we examined how people react to comments made about the mentally ill. The conditions under which people accept or reject stereotypes of the mentally ill may shed light on the conditions necessary for effective anti-discrimination campaigns. In the current study, participants responded to positive or negative stereotypes of the mentally ill voiced by either someone who has, or has not, suffered from a mental illness. Participants were more sensitive, agreed less, and evaluated the speaker less favourably when comments came from the out-group rather than the in-group source. The effects were strongest for negative comments, however contrary to previous research participants also responded less favourably to positive comments from the out-group source. These reactions were mediated by the perceived constructiveness of the speaker's motives. Implications for the effectiveness of anti-discrimination campaigns are discussed.     

The differential similarity of positive and negative information – an affect-induced processing outcome?

People judge positive information to be more alike than negative information. This good-bad asymmetry in similarity was argued to constitute a true property of the information ecology (Alves, H., Koch, A., & Unkelbach, C. (2017). Why good is more alike than bad: Processing implications. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21, 69–79). Alternatively, the asymmetry may constitute a processing outcome itself, namely an influence of phasic affect on information processing. Because no research has yet tested whether phasic affect influences perceived similarity among stimuli, we conducted 5 Experiments that also tested whether phasic affect can account for the higher judged similarity among positive compared to negative stimuli. In three experiments, we affectively charged pictures of different Pokemon by pairing them with monetary gains and losses (Exp. 1a, 1b) as well as positive and negative trait words (Exp. 2); yet, the evaluative charge did not differentially influence perceived similarity among the Pokemon. Experiment 3 replicated the basic similarity asymmetry among positive and negative words, and found that it was unaffected by externally induced phasic affect. Experiment 4 showed that phasic affect had no influence on perceived similarity of non-evaluative words either. We conclude that albeit a weak influence of phasic affect on perceived similarity of stimuli cannot be ruled out entirely, it can most likely not account for the typically medium to large sized asymmetry in similarity among positive and negative stimuli.     

Are strategy shifts caused by data-driven processes or by voluntary processes?

The present research investigates the role of voluntary, conscious processing in strategy change. In 2 experiments, we address whether the switch to a new strategy is the result of data-driven, automatic processes or of voluntary processes. Experiment 1 demonstrates that participants performing an alphabet verification task are able to (a) transfer a newly adopted strategy to dissimilar information never encountered before, (b) verbally describe the task regularity that allows for the generation and application of the new strategy immediately after the strategy was adopted. Using the same experimental task, Experiment 2 shows that participants, and (c) decide against adopting a new strategy when the available evidence suggests that the new strategy cannot be used for the entire range of problems encountered. Overall, the obtained results support the view that strategy change is mediated by voluntary controlled processing. They do not support the view that strategy change is an inevitable, automatic consequence of task practice. The present research thus highlights a potential function of conscious human processing.     

Toward an understanding of students’ allocation of study time: Why do they decide to mass or space their practice?

Two recent studies have led to discrepant findings regarding students’ decisions to mass or space practice of to-be-learned items: Son (2004) reported that participants chose to mass practice of difficult items more than that of easy items, whereas Benjamin and Bird (2006) reported the opposite. To resolve this apparent discrepancy, we had participants study items during an initial trial and then decide whether the next study trial would be massed or spaced. Across three experiments, we systematically varied factors that differed across these studies. In general, the participants more often chose to space than to mass practice, but they did favor massed practice when items were very difficult to learn. Moreover, although previous hypotheses implicated metamemory causes for these effects, the present results indicate that nonmetamemory causes are also responsible, such as using spaced practice as a default and deciding to mass practice for items that had not been fully perceived during an initial study trial.     

Gamers just want to have fun? Toward an understanding of the online game acceptance

This study sought to examine the factors affecting the acceptance of an entertainment medium, particularly online games, by expanding the technology acceptance model. To measure factors affecting the acceptance of online games, we fielded a survey with 244 gamers serving as respondents. Perceived usefulness, enjoyment, and economic value were found to have a positive influence on attitude toward gaming, whereas perceived ease of use was not a significant predictor. In addition, we found that gender and game type (multiplayer or not) showed differing patterns of results. Interestingly, perceptions of mass acceptance of gaming were found to have a negative effect on attitude toward online games. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Toward an understanding of the influence of affective states on attentional tuning: comment on Friedman and Förster (2010)

Friedman and F?rster (2010) reviewed an extensive program of research that was consistent with the view that positive affective states broaden, whereas negative affective states narrow, the scope of attention. We applaud their creative investigations into these important psychological questions and appreciate their thorough review. However, recent evidence strongly suggests that the conclusions drawn by Friedman and F?rster need to be tempered, for the recent evidence suggests that motivational intensity rather than affective valence causes the modulations of attentional tuning. That is, affective states of low motivational intensity (e.g., sadness, postgoal positive affect) broaden attention, whereas affective states of high motivational intensity (e.g., disgust, pregoal positive affect) narrow attention. Our viewpoint is that attentional narrowing occurs during affective states of high motivational intensity to aid organisms in acquiring desirable objects and avoiding aversive ones. Attentional broadening occurs during affective states of low motivational intensity to open organisms to new opportunities.     

Are good salespeople born or made? A new perspective on an age-old question: implicit theories of selling ability

Considering implicit theories in a sales context can provide a framework for better understanding salesperson motivation and behavior. The current research develops, tests, and examines the relevance of an Implicit Theories of Selling Ability (ITSA) measure, which measures the extent to which a person believes selling is an incremental (made) ability versus an entity (born) ability. After pre-testing the ITSA measure, two studies found an unfavorable pattern of outcomes associated with an entity belief of selling ability, consistent with research in other domains. Experimental validity for ITSA is demonstrated, thus supporting a direct relationship between ITSA and sales-relevant constructs, and suggesting manipulation of ITSA as a potential training intervention. This research extends past sales research on implicit theories by developing a sales-specific implicit theories measure and by examining goal orientations and behavior within the social-cognitive model (SCM). Conceptualizing sales performance behaviors from this SCM perspective reveals important considerations for both researchers and practitioners regarding salesperson hiring, training, and placement.     

Less negative=more positive? Social discrimination as avoidance or approach

A motivational approach to ingroup favoritism based on regulatory focus theory (RFT; Higgins, 1997) is introduced. RFT suggests that individual self-regulation is either more concerned with approaching positive events (promotion focus) or with avoiding negative events (prevention focus). It is suggested that if an individual self-categorizes as a group member, resource allocations to one’s group will be based on these mechanisms of self-regulation. Thus, a promotion focus should engender ingroup favoritism during the distribution of positive resources but not during the distribution of negative resources, whereas a prevention focus should engender ingroup favoritism for negative but not for positive resources. The results of two studies support this prediction based on momentary and chronic regulatory focus. The self-regulation approach to ingroup favoritism provides an explanation for social discrimination in the distribution of positive and negative resources.     

Toward an understanding of social consequences of “feminine immodesty” about personal achievements

Two studies examine the hypothesis that females who are immodest about their achievements are perceived more negatively than are males who are immodest. The assumptions that there are social consequences of immodesty, and that women and girls believe there to be such consequences, have been raised in self-presentational explanations of women's tendencies to undervaluate and underestimate their performances. This study provides a test of this assumption is a sample of 236 high school students and 144 teachers. Each judged the intelligence, personality, popularity, and adjustment of a very successful (hypothetical) high school student who was presented as male or female, mdoest or immodest. Two replications allowed this assumptions to be tested for diverse areas of success. Results showed consistent and negative social consequences of immodesty, which were, however, differentially worse for girls in only one of four tests. Other significant effects revealed that the characteristics of the judges was a factor. The findings are interpreted in the context of assumptions in both the popular culture and the research literature that feminine immodesty may be perceived differently than immodesty on the part of males. Directions for future research to elucidate these findings are offered.The help of Mr. W. Alden, Assistant Superintendent, and the teachers at Mt. Greylock High School is gratefully acknowledged. We would also like to thank the Massachusetts teachers who participated in the study during their annual convention, as well as the high school students who participated. This study was supported by research funds from the Bronfman Science Center, Williams College.     

Do negative implicit associations indicate negative attitudes? Social explanations moderate whether ostensible “negative” associations are prejudice-based or empathy-based

The present work challenges the idea that implicit evaluative associations with outgroups necessarily provide information about negative or prejudiced attitudes. We argue that the manner in which one explains outgroup status and action shapes whether one's implicit “negative” associations are prejudice-based or empathy-based. Four studies are consistent with this possibility. Study 1 suggests that whereas implicit “negative” associations are predictive of negative explicit attitudes among those who reject external explanations for African American status and action, such implicit “negativity” predicts positive explicit attitudes among those who endorse external explanations. Study 2 provides experimental evidence that the provision of external explanations results in the formation of implicit “negative” associations that are predictive of compassionate responding. Study 3 provides more direct support for the idea that implicit “negative” associations are empathy-based among external explainers by showing that such “negative” associations are positively correlated with a measure of dispositional empathy-proneness. Finally, Study 4 demonstrates that IAT “negativity” is associated with automatic activation of empathy-related associations among those who strongly endorse external explanations. Discussion centers on the importance of considering factors—such as social explanations—that may moderate whether implicit “negativity” is prejudice-based or empathy-based.     

Depression and selection of positive and negative social feedback: motivated preference or cognitive balance?

In this commentary we examine Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham's (1992) findings with respect to each of 5 central propositions in self-verification theory. We conclude that although the data are consistent with self-verification theory, none of the 5 components of the theory have been demonstrated convincingly as yet. Specifically, we argue that depressed subjects' selection of social feedback appears to be balanced or evenhanded rather than biased toward negative feedback and that there is little evidence to indicate that depressives actively seek negative appraisals. Furthermore, we suggest that the studies are silent with respect to the motivational postulates of self-verification theory and that a variety of competing cognitive and motivational models can explain Swann et al.'s findings as well as self-verification theory.     

Does inconsistency always lead to negative affect? The influence of need for closure on affective reactions to cognitive inconsistency

We present an experiment showing that need for closure (NFC)—defined as the epistemic desire for certainty—can moderate individuals' affective reactions to cognitive inconsistency. Informed by Kruglanski and colleagues' new theory, that cognitive inconsistency elicits negative affect particularly under certain circumstances, we find that NFC (i.e. the desire for certain, stable and unambiguous knowledge) influences the strength of consistency effects and resulting negative affect. More specifically, we find that individuals who are high on NFC experience more negative affect upon encountering an inconsistent (vs. consistent) cognition. However, when individuals are low on NFC, inconsistency is irrelevant, and their affect depends on whether the ultimate outcome of the cognition is positive or negative. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this research.     

Acquisition of a unique cue in positive and negative patterning?

Forty college students received a classical differential conditioning procedure involving both positive and negative patterning, each of these being associated with a different pair of stimuli. In positive patterning, elemental stimuli, A and B, were presented without an unconditioned stimulus while their compound, AB, was paired with electric shock. In negative patterning, elemental stimuli, C and D, were paired with shock while their compound, CD, remained unpaired. Thirty of these subjects then received a negative patterning transfer test on new stimuli, while ten subjects received a positive patterning transfer test. First interval response (FIR) and second interval response (SIR) were measured. During initial acquisition, positive patterning occurred in both dependent measures, but negative patterning was present only in the SIR. The transfer tests showed almost significant transfer of positive patterning in FIR and SIR. Negative patterning showed significant transfer neither in FIR nor SIR. It was concluded that, although elementary models of conditioning can explain positive patterning on the basis of summation of excitation from the elements to the compound, the occurrence of negative patterning in the SIR and the almost significant transfer of positive patterning in FIR and SIR appear to require the additional assumption of a unique cue.     

Are correlated streams of information necessary for implicit sequence learning?

We investigated whether the existence of correlated streams of information is necessary for incidental sequence learning to occur. We ran three separate experiments with a total of 201 undergraduate students. Each experiment had at least one condition with two streams of sequenced information that were correlated. The correlations differed in terms of the kind of responses that were required, the kind of tasks and stimuli, the on-screen locations at which they occurred and how they were combined. Only in conditions with correlated sequences was implicit sequence learning found. Our results suggest that the presence of correlated streams of information may be the main pre-requisite for implicit sequence learning.     

Should persuasion be affective or cognitive? The moderating effects of need for affect and need for cognition

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that need for affect and need for cognition influence receptivity to affect- and cognition-based persuasive messages. Experiment 1 found that an affective message elicited more positive attitudes among individuals high in need for affect and low in need for cognition, whereas a cognitive message elicited more positive attitudes among individuals low in need for affect and high in need for cognition. Experiment 2 found that individual differences in need for affect influenced receptivity to an affect-based (but not cognition-based) message, whereas individual differences in need for cognition influenced receptivity to a cognition-based (but not affect-based) message. Experiment 3 found that individual differences in need for affect were associated with increased recognition of information from an affect-based (but not cognition-based) message, whereas individual differences in need for cognition were associated with increased recognition of information from a cognition-based (but not affect-based) message. Overall, the studies point to the importance of individual differences in need for affect and need for cognition in understanding how individuals respond to different types of persuasive messages.     

Are affective events richly recollected or simply familiar? The experience and process of recognizing feelings past

The author used the remember/know paradigm and the dual process recognition model of A. P. Yonelinas, N. E. A. Kroll, I. Dobbins, M. Lazzara, and R. T. Knight (1998) to study the states of awareness accompanying recognition of affective images and the processes of recollection and familiarity that may underlie them. Results from all experiments showed that (a) negative stimuli tended to be remembered, whereas positive stimuli tended to be known; (b) recollection, but not familiarity, was boosted for negative or highly arousing and, to a lesser extent, positive stimuli; and (c) across experiments, variations in depth of encoding did not influence these patterns. These data suggest that greater recollection for affective events leads them to be more richly experienced in memory, and they are consistent with the idea that the states of remembering and knowing are experientially exclusive, whereas the processes underlying them are functionally independent.     

Is an optimistic memory less easily influenced by negative than by positive emotions?

This work examines whether a positive personality trait, such as optimism, can reduce bias in differential words recalled after inducing a certain emotion. After showing a list of words with various emotional valences to a group of 59 subjects, a specific emotional state was induced. Subsequently, the subjects were asked to recall the list of words. The results obtained indicated that less optimistic subjects had a tendency to recall and recognize a greater number of negative words when in a negative emotional condition. Statistical significance was reached in the female group's negative word recognition when experiencing negative emotion.