Cognitive bias,emotion, and somatic complaints in a normal sample

Cognitive bias (Stroop interference and implicit memory bias) for masked and unmasked threat words (illness words and negative emotion words) was investigated for its associations with emotion (anxiety, anger/aggression, and positive affect) and somatic complaints in a randomly selected community sample of 138 individuals. Because measures of cognitive bias are inherently bipolar, the data were tested for both linear and curvilinear trends. Cross-sectional analysis showed that the associations between somatic anxiety and Stroop interference for unmasked threat words were better described in terms of curvilinear than linear models, and that degree of somatic complaints was associated with Stroop facilitation for masked threat words. Longitudinal analysis showed that Stroop interference for masked threat words predicted lack of positive affect during an ensuing eight weeks daily recording period. Implicit memory bias was found to be negatively associated with measures of anger/aggression, both in the cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses. We suggest that: (a) cognitive bias should be treated as a bipolar construct in future research; (b) the phenomenon of Stroop facilitation for threat words deserves further exploration; and (c) more research should address the question about the relationship between cognitive bias and other emotions than anxiety (e.g., positive affect and anger).     

Alteration of expected hemispheric asymmetries: valence and arousal effects in neuropsychological models of emotion

The relative advantage of the left (LH) over the right hemisphere (RH) in processing of verbal material for most individuals is well established. Nevertheless, several studies have reported the ability of positively and negatively valenced stimuli to enhance and reverse, respectively, the usual LH>RH asymmetry. These studies, however, have used baseline stimuli that differed from emotional stimuli on two dimensions (i.e., valence and verbal/nonverbal nature), creating interpretive difficulties as to whether differences across these conditions are due to differences in valence or the verbal/nonverbal nature of the primes used in the baseline condition. In addition, these studies, along with many others in the literature, have failed to control for potential confounding effects of arousal. Emotional stimuli vary on dimensions of valence as well as arousal and arousal may be asymmetrically presented in the brain therefore contributing to observed asymmetries. Taken together, these considerations underscore the importance of controlling for both valence as well as arousal in any investigation of the effects of emotional stimuli. The objectives of the present study were twofold: (1) to employ an appropriate baseline condition to render emotional stimuli vs. baseline stimuli comparisons meaningful and (2) to examine the extent to which emotional verbal stimuli, equated for arousal level, alter the expected LH>RH asymmetry in a consonant trigram task. Results demonstrated that when LH lateralized consonant trigram presentations were preceded by a positive prime, an enhancement of the expected LH>RH asymmetry was observed. In contrast, when trigram presentations lateralized to the RH were preceded by a negative prime, a complete reversal of the typical asymmetry was found with RH>LH performance. These results are analogous to the pattern of relative hemispheric activations observed for various mood states. Controlling for arousal in studies investigating asymmetries associated with emotional processing may allow more clear interpretation of data intended to test predictions of neuropsychological models of emotion. Moreover, equating stimuli on the dimension of arousal as well as valence may shed more light on conflicting findings with regard to perception vs. expression of emotion.     

The neuropsychological profile in unipolar depression

There is a wealth of empirical data pertaining to the issue of neuropsychological impairment in depression. However, a coherent and comprehensive framework for understanding the disorder remains elusive. This review will briefly consider some of the important issues on which recent research has focused. It would be premature to derive firm conclusions in an area characterized by considerable confusion, so the aim of this review is to highlight the key areas that must be addressed. Three distinct questions are considered. The first concerns the neuropsychological specificity of the deficits associated with depression; whether they represent selective deficits or a more general profile of impairment. The second question is to determine how cognitive deficits might relate to clinical and demographic factors, including symptom severity, hospitalization, medication and ageing. Finally, a comprehensive theory of depression must also relate impairments to neuropathology, and evidence is now available from imaging studies that have attempted to elucidate neural substrates of neuropsychological deficits.     

情绪调节中的认知重评创造力

情绪调节能力是维护个体心理健康和生活幸福的基本能力。认知重评创造力是个体面对负性情境时能够自发产生多种认知重评策略的能力,是情绪调节任务中的创造性行为。研究表明,认知重评创造力与发散性思维和开放性正相关,与神经质、特质愤怒无关;创造性的认知重评策略或运用隐喻和类比的高水平认知重构更有利于负性情绪的调节;创造性的认知重评可以通过基于杏仁核的显著情绪唤醒,基于海马的新联想形成和基于纹状体的精神奖赏的中介来调节情绪,从而产生可以保存在长时记忆中的新颖的、积极的情绪体验。上述结果支持认知重评的创造性重构理论。认知重评创造过程需要自上而下的认知控制和情绪表征的特定执行功能。未来研究可以扩大被试群体,完善认知重评创造力的测量方法,探索影响认知重评创造力的情境因素和内在因素,以及进一步揭示认知重评创造力区别于传统创造力的特别加工或反应机制的神经机制。     

Cognitive bias in symptomatic and recovered agoraphobics

Symptomatic agoraphobics, recovered agoraphobics, and normal control subjects completed a series of sentence stems that had either ambiguous or unambiguous meanings, and had either a potentially threatening or a nonthreatening connotation. The written completions made by subjects to these stems were classified as indicating either a biased (i.e. threat-related) or unbiased interpretation of the meaning of the stem, and if a biased interpretation was made, whether the subject indicated efforts at adaptive coping with the perceived threat. Results indicated that symptomatic agoraphobics exhibited strong biases for interpreting information as threatening, relative to normal control subjects. Moreover, recovered agoraphobics resembled symptomatic agoraphobics more than normal control subjects, thus indicating that cognitive biases may persist following cessation of panic attacks and reductions in avoidance behavior. However, recovered agoraphobics also exhibited tendencies to cope adaptively with perceived threats whereas symptomatic agoraphobics did not.     

Connectionist models of neuropsychological disorders

Artificial neural networks ('connectionist models') embody aspects of real neuronal systems. But does studying the breakdown of performance in such models help us to understand cognitive impairments in humans following brain damage? Here we review recent attempts to capture different neuropsychological disorders using connectionist models with simulated lesions. We show how such lesion studies can be used to evaluate some of the standard assumptions made in neuropsychological research, concerning both double dissociations and associations between patterns of impairment. We also illustrate how lesioned models, like humans, can sometimes be more impaired on the easier of two tasks and demonstrate that connectionist models can incorporate forms of internal structure. Finally we discuss the utility of the models for understanding and predicting the effectiveness of different rehabilitation strategies. Future questions concern the role and possible development of internal structure within these models, whether the models can be generalized to larger-scale simulations, and whether they can accommodate higher-order linguistic disorders.     

Cognitive bias in acute stress disorder

Cognitive bias was investigated in survivors of motor vehicle accidents with either acute stress disorder (ASD; n=17) or no ASD (n=17). Participants completed the acute stress disorder interview, the Beck depression inventory, the Beck anxiety inventory, the impact of event scale, and a probability questionnaire (PQ) and a cost questionnaire (CQ) within four weeks of their accident. ASD participants exaggerated both the probability of negative events occurring, and the adverse cost of those events more than non-ASD participants. IES-Avoidance scores were the only significant predictors of both PQ and CQ scores. Findings are discussed in terms of the role of cognitive errors in posttraumatic adjustment.     

Cognitive biases and depression

Compared symptomatically depressed, clinically remitted, and normal controls using cognitive measures designed to be traitlike and statelike in cross-sectional and longitudinal designs, respectively. Remitted depressives and normal subjects did not differ in their attributional biases, endorsement of dysfunctional attitudes, or interpretation of schema-relevant ambiguous events, but both groups differed from symptomatic depressives. Depressive episodes thus affect cognition, but cognitions measured by self-reports are more statelike than traitlike.     

Convergent validity of and bias in maternal reports of child emotion

This study examined the convergent validity of maternal reports of child emotion in a sample of 190 children between the ages of 3 and 6. Children completed a battery of 10 emotion-eliciting laboratory tasks; their mothers and untrained na?ve observers rated child emotions (happiness, surprise, fear, sadness, and anger) following each task, and trained coders rated videotapes of each task for the same emotions. Consistent with studies using other designs, maternal reports demonstrated weak to moderate convergence with the other rating methods. Extending prior research, a number of maternal characteristics (particularly lifetime psychiatric diagnoses and personality traits) were associated with their reports of child emotions in the lab, above and beyond the effects of objective coding and observer reports of child emotions. For some emotions, mothers' mental health and dispositional variables were more strongly related to their reports of the child's emotions than were objective indices of the child's observable emotional behavior.     

Cognitive inhibition in depression

Cognitive inhibition is a key mechanism in the regulation of emotion. There is emerging evidence that depression is characterized by deficits in the inhibition of mood-congruent material. These deficits could result in prolonged processing of negative, goal-irrelevant aspects of presented information thereby hindering recovery from negative mood and leading to the sustained negative affect that characterizes depressive episodes. Indeed, it has been suggested that deficits in cognitive inhibition lie at the heart of memory and attention biases in depression, and set the stage for ruminative responses to negative events and negative mood states. A ruminative response style results in a heightened vulnerability to experience episodes of major depression. Recent research has demonstrated that deficient inhibition of negative material is associated with heightened rumination. In this article, we review the depression literature with a focus on studies that investigate cognitive inhibition in depressed participants and in participants who report a history of major depressive episodes. In addition, we summarize neurobiological findings that indicate a strong relation between depression and deficits in inhibition and we take a closer look at the relation of inhibition, rumination and mood regulation.     

The role of egocentrism and focalism in the emotion intensity bias

People sometimes judge their emotions, preferences, and attitudes to be more intense than those of other people. Two experiments tested whether this emotion intensity bias in direct comparisons results from two non-motivated cognitive processes—egocentrism and focalism. In Study 1, the intensity bias was found even when comparing a friend’s preferences to peers. In Study 2, attention given to own versus other’s preferences, and the referent of the comparison (self or others) were manipulated. Results indicated that attention to others reduced the bias, presumably by reducing egocentrism. Consistent with focalism, the bias also emerged when a friend was the target of comparison, and the bias was eliminated when the self was the referent rather than the target of comparison. In the discussion, we evaluate these accounts in light of some alternative explanations for the intensity bias.     

Cognitive and marital factors in depression

The current investigation examines three groups of wives: (1) a group of nondepressed, nondiscordant community wives; (2) a group of nondepressed, discordant clinic wives; and (3) a group of depressed, discordant clinic wives. Groups were formed on the basis of structured interview responses and responses to a self-report inventory of depressive symptomatology. To be classified as depressed, wives were required to meet DSM III criteria for depression according to interview data and to exceed a Beck Depression Inventory score of 14. Both clinic groups showed equal levels of marital discord. Both nondepressed groups showed equally few cognitive errors. Accordingly, comparisons of these three groups allow us to test current interpersonal and cognitive theories of depression. The level of closeness in the marriage differentiated the depressed, discordant from the nondepressed, discordant wives despite their equal levels of overall marital discord. The level of depressive symptomatology was greater for the nondepressed clinic wives than it was for the community wives despite their equal levels of cognitive errors. Both closeness in the marriage and cognitive errors accounted for the unique variance in level of depression. Implications for current interpersonal and cognitive accounts of depression are discussed.Support for this research came in part from NIMH Grant 38390-02. Portions of this paper were presented at the 25th Annual Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Behavior Therapy.     

Visual-field bias in the judgment of facial expression of emotion

The left and right hemispheres of the brain are differentially related to the processing of emotions. Although there is little doubt that the right hemisphere is relatively superior for processing negative emotions, controversy exists over the hemispheric role in the processing of positive emotions. Eighty right-handed normal male participants were examined for visual-field (left-right) differences in the perception of facial expressions of emotion. Facial composite (RR, LL) and hemifacial (R, L) sets depicting emotion expressions of happiness and sadness were prepared. Pairs of such photographs were presented bilaterally for 150 ms, and participants were asked to select the photographs that looked more expressive. A left visual-field superiority (a right-hemisphere function) was found for sad facial emotion. A hemispheric advantage in the perception of happy expression was not found.     

Cognitive structure of emotion terms in Indonesia and The Netherlands

The rapid detection of facial expressions of anger or threat has obvious adaptive value. In this study, we examined the efficiency of facial processing by means of a visual search task. Participants searched displays of schematic faces and were required to determine whether the faces displayed were all the same or whether one was different. Four main results were found: (1) When displays contained the faces, people were slower in detecting the absence of a discrepant face when the faces displayed angry (or sad/angry) rather than happy expressions. (2) When displays contained a discrepant face people were faster in detecting this when the discrepant face displayed an angry rather than a happy expression. (3) Neither of these patterns for same and different displays was apparent when face displays were inverted, or when just the mouth was presented in isolation. (4) The search slopes for angry targets were significantly lower than for happy targets. These results suggest that detection of angry facial expressions is fast and efficient, although does not “pop-out” in the traditional sense.     

Perceptual asymmetries reflect developmental changes in the neuropsychological mechanisms of emotion recognition

To study how perceptual asymmetries in the recognition of emotion reflect developmental changes in processing affective information, a fused rhyming dichotic word test with positive, negative, and neutral stimuli was administered to adults and children. Results suggested that the hemisphere in which affective information is initially processed affects the strength of perceptual asymmetry and that children's perceptual processing of emotional information is constrained by limited computational resources. Another experiment ruled out effects of volitional shifting of attention to emotional stimuli. These data further confirm that emotional processing involves integration of neural systems across brain regions, including distributed systems that support arousal and recognition. General developmental factors, such as processing capacity, contribute to the coordination of multiple systems responsible for processing emotional information.