How do I appear to others? Social anxiety and processing of the observable self

Two information processing biases that could maintain social anxiety were investigated. High and low socially anxious individuals encoded positive and negative trait words in one of three ways: public self-referent, private self-referent, and other-referent. Half were then told they would soon have to give a speech. As predicted, compared to low socially anxious individuals, high socially anxious individuals recalled less positive public self-referent words, but only when both groups were anticipating giving a speech. No memory biases were observed for private self-referent or other-referent words. Next all participants gave a speech. Correlational analyses suggested that high socially anxious individuals may use the somatic concomitants of anxiety to overestimate how anxious they appear and underestimate how well they come across.     

Patterns of Metaperception in Adolescents with Social Anxiety: Mind Reading in the Classroom

Socially anxious adults display an interpretation bias toward anticipating threat such as a high probability of audience criticism even in nonthreatening social situations. They may also expect more negative audience reactions to self than to others acknowledging anxiety. Few studies have examined such biases in adolescents. We examined negative and positive metaperceptions (i.e., others’ perceived responses) in 13–16-year-old adolescents (n?=?655) with high vs. normal social anxiety in a hypothetical classroom scenario, in which the participants predicted the frequency of negative and positive classmate responses when imagining either themselves (self-referent metaperceptions) or a classmate (other-referent metaperceptions) with visible symptoms of social anxiety as the target persons giving a speech. We assessed social anxiety with the Social Anxiety Scale for Adolescents and metaperception using the Classroom Questionnaire of Social Anxiety and Interpersonal Cognition. Social anxiety was associated with negative self-referent metaperceptions to a greater degree than with negative other-referent metaperceptions. Compared with adolescents with normal social anxiety, those with high social anxiety (both boys and girls) predicted a broader range of negative classmate responses toward self, as compared with their predictions of negative responses toward a classmate. These group differences were observed specifically with regard to audience’s predicted covert negative responses (i.e., negative thoughts and feelings) toward self, indicating that socially anxious adolescents tend to mind-read. Minimal group differences in positive metaperceptions were observed. The results reveal target and content specificity in socially anxious adolescents’ negative metaperceptions.     

Cognitive specificity and positive-negative affectivity: complementary or contradictory views on anxiety and depression?

A principal factor analysis, conducted on a mixed psychiatric outpatient sample (N = 470), identified both common and specific dimensions underlying anxiety and depression. Although an initial single-factor extraction accounted for a significant proportion of variance in cognitive and symptom measures of anxiety and depression, a two-factor solution, in which anxiety and depression formed separate dimensions, proved to be the better solution. MANOVAS performed on pure depressed, pure anxious, and mixed anxious/depressed subgroups provided evidence of a specific cognitive profile for anxiety and depression. The mixed subsample evidenced greater severity, a mixed cognitive and symptom profile, and character traits that may indicate increased vulnerability to psychological disturbance. Results are discussed in terms of Beck's (1976) cognitive content-specificity hypothesis and the positive-negative affect model (Watson & Tellegen, 1985).     

Balanced states of mind in psychopathology and psychological well-being

The balanced states of mind (BSOM) model proposes that coping with stress and psychological well-being is a function of the BSOM ratio of positive thoughts to the sum of positive and negative thoughts. Based on different BSOM ratios, different BSOM categories are constructed to quantitatively differentiate levels of coping with stress and psychological well-being. The cognitive content-specificity hypothesis states that there are unique themes of semantic content in self-reported automatic thoughts particular to depression or anxiety. This study investigated the BSOM model and its cognitive content-specificity for depression, anxiety, anger, stress, life satisfaction, and happiness, based on negative and positive automatic thoughts. Three hundred and ninety-eight college students from Singapore participated in this study. First, BSOM ratio and positive automatic thoughts were positively correlated with life satisfaction and happiness, and negatively correlated with stress, anxiety, depression, and anger. In contrast, negative automatic thoughts were positively correlated with stress, anxiety, depression, and anger, and negatively correlated with life satisfaction and happiness. Second, levels of psychopathology and psychological well-being were statistically differentiable among the BSOM categories for depression, happiness, perceived stress, and life satisfaction; and less statistically differentiable among the BSOM categories for anxiety and anger, as expected based on the BSOM model and cognitive content-specificity hypothesis. Third, the results were more supportive of the BSOM model for depression, followed by happiness, perceived stress, life satisfaction, anxiety, and anger in terms of percentage of variance accounted for by BSOM categories, as expected based on the cognitive content-specificity hypothesis. Taken together, the results suggested that the more moderately positive thoughts one has (balanced by negative thoughts), the better mental health outcomes one has. Implications and limitations of these findings are discussed.     

Depression and Anxiety: Integrating the Tripartite and Cognitive Content-Specificity Assessment Models

The cognitive content-specificity hypothesis proposes that depression and anxiety can be discriminated on the basis of unique cognitive profiles. Alternatively, the Tripartite model suggests that, although depression and anxiety share a general distress factor, anhedonia is a characteristic of depression with anxious arousal a characteristic of anxiety. Past research devoted to integrating these two models has been limited in a number of ways. To remedy these limitations, this study attempted to assess the complete Tripartite model and used a multidimensional cognitive assessment tool to handle the heterogeneity of anxious cognitive content. Results on data collected from 411 clients seeking services at a university counseling center suggested that a one-to-one mapping between Tripartite dimensions and cognitive content was possible. Further, variables from each model simultaneously explained unique variance in depression and anxiety ratings.     

Attentional biases for negative interpersonal stimuli in clinical depression

An information-processing paradigm was used to examine attentional biases in clinically depressed participants, participants with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), and nonpsychiatric control participants for faces expressing sadness, anger, and happiness. Faces were presented for 1000 ms, at which point depressed participants had directed their attention selectively to depression-relevant (i.e., sad) faces. This attentional bias was specific to the emotion of sadness; the depressed participants did not exhibit attentional biases to the angry or happy faces. This bias was also specific to depression; at 1000 ms, participants with GAD were not attending selectively to sad, happy, or anxiety-relevant (i.e., angry) faces. Implications of these findings for both the cognitive and the interpersonal functioning of depressed individuals are discussed and directions for future research are advanced.     

Information processing and cognitive organization in unipolar depression: specificity and comorbidity issues

This study investigated information processing and cognitive organization in clinical depression. The specificity of various cognitive mechanisms to depression was also examined. Twenty-six depressed/anxious individuals, 24 pure depressives, 25 never-depressed anxious controls, and 25 nonpsychiatric controls completed a modified Stroop task, the Self-Referent Encoding Task, and two tasks designed to assess cognitive structure. Comorbid depressed/anxious, depressed, and anxious groups performed similarly to one another but differed significantly from nonpsychiatric controls, on the processing and organization of negative content. Specificity to depression was also obtained, as both depressed groups endorsed and recalled less positive information and organized positive self-relevant information with less interconnectedness than anxious individuals and nonpsychiatric controls. These results suggest that depressed individuals have an interconnected negative self-representational system and lack a well-organized positive template of self. These findings are discussed in terms of cognitive models of depression and the tripartite model of depression and anxiety.     

The effects of depression and cognitive vulnerability to depression on judgments of similarity between self and other

The present research was conducted to investigate the effects of mild levels of depression, and cognitive vulnerability to depression, on people's perceptions of their similarity to others. Depression level was assessed using the Beck Depression Inventory, and cognitive vulnerability was measured with the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale. Subjects rated their similarity to others on a 7-point scale and also generated a list of attributes thought to typify the average other person. In terms of similarity judgments, individuals perceived themselves to be less similar to others as depression level increased. Furthermore, and also as predicted, only individuals scoring high on the vulnerability measure exhibited this pattern. Given the consistently positive view of others expressed by all subjects, this latter finding suggests that vulnerable individuals saw themselves as increasingly distinctive with respect to their own negative attributes, as depression level increased. This social comparison interpretation is consistent with previous research indicating that vulnerable individuals change from a focus on self-referent positive traits when nondepressed to a focus on negative traits when depressed. This pattern is also identified as a possible contributor to the social isolation and interpersonal difficulties characteristic of depression.     

The self and recollective experience

Three experiments investigated the hypothesis that self-reference at encoding increases the probability of recollective experience in recognition memory. In all three experiments separate groups of subjects studied words naming personality traits. One group judged the self-relevance of the traits, the other groups performed orientating tasks low in self-reference. In a recognition test subjects first identified old items and then indicated which of these were accompanied by recollective experience ('remember' responses) and which were recognized on some other basis ('know' responses). No reliable differences in overall recognition performance between self-referent and semantic encoding tasks were observed. However, subjects who encoded trait adjectives with reference to the self produced reliably more remember responses and few know responses than subjects who had encoded the items in the low self-referent tasks. Experiment 1 demonstrated a self-reference effect in recognition accompanied by recollective experience after 1-hour retention interval, while Experiment 2 found this effect to persist over a 24-hour retention interval. Experiment 3 demonstrated that this self-reference effect is obtained under incidental as well as under intentional learning conditions. Taken together these findings demonstrate the importance of self-reference as a factor in determining the likelihood that recognition judgements will be accompanied by recollective experience.     

Differentiating cognitive content between depressed and anxious outpatients

Quantitative research suggests that depressed and anxious patients can be differentiated based on their cognitive content. This study used qualitative research methods to separate the specific components of open-ended depressive and anxious thought content in 79 psychiatric outpatients. Patients with major depressive disorder (MDD; n = 36), generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; n = 10), and other psychiatric disorders (PC; n = 33) were instructed to (a) describe their most bothersome problem; (b) imagine the worst possible negative outcome followed by the best possible positive outcome; and (c) describe associated thoughts and emotions for each scenario. The content of patients' responses were coded to examine (a) the types and severity of problems; (b) the presence or absence of hopelessness, catastrophizing, hopefulness, and unrealistic positive expectations; and (c) the presence or absence of particular emotions associated with imagined worst and best outcomes. More GAD patients than MDD and PC patients indicated anticipated anxious emotions associated with imagined worst outcomes, and fewer MDD patients than GAD and PC patients indicated anticipated happiness associated with imagined best outcomes. No group differences emerged for the other variables considered. These findings suggest that depressed and anxious patients differ in their cognitive expectancies about future life events in terms of their own anticipated emotional reactions.     

Specificity of Information Processing Styles to Depressive Symptoms in Youth Psychiatric Inpatients

Although information processing has been widely studied with depressed adults, little emphasis has been placed on the specificity of resultant findings to depression, as opposed to other psychological disorders. Analogously, even less effort has been directed toward examining the information processing styles of depressed children and adolescents. The present study investigated the specificity of information processing styles to depression and anxiety among 58 youth psychiatric inpatients. To assess information processing, we used a self-referent encoding task, in which participants were presented with positive and negative adjectives; participants were asked whether these adjectives described them or not, and were then tested on recall of the adjectives. After controlling for age and gender, lower rates of positive adjective endorsement and lower rates of positive adjective recall were found to be associated with depression, but not anxiety. Additionally, negative adjective endorsement was associated with anxiety symptoms. These results suggest specific cognitive features of depressive symptoms.     

Judgment of contingency: cognitive biases in depressed and nondepressed subjects

In this research I investigated whether the use of relevant affective outcomes influences depressed and nondepressed subjects' judgment of contingency. Similar to previous studies (Alloy & Abramson, 1979, Experiments 1 and 2), Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed that when the outcome is affectively neutral (i.e., the onset of a light) depressed subjects make accurate judgments of contingency, whereas nondepressed subjects show (in noncontingent situations) a significant illusion of control. In Experiments 3 and 4 (a contingency situation and a noncontingency situation, respectively) different types of sentences (negative self-referent, negative other-referent, positive self-referent, positive other-referent) were used as outcomes. Although depressed subjects were more reluctant to show biased judgments than were the nondepressed subjects, in noncontingency situations depressed subjects made overestimated judgments of contingency when the outcomes were negative self-referent sentences. Results are discussed with regard to current cognitive theories of depression, particularly the learned helplessness model.     

Self-schemas,depression, and the processing of personal information in children

Recent research in information processing has yielded evidence supporting the self-as-schema model with adults. Further self-schema research with depressed and nondepressed persons has suggested the existence of negative self-schemas in depression, lending support to a content-specificity self-schema model. The present studies were designed to investigate the applicability of the self-as-schema model to children and to examine the extent of negative self-schemas in relatively depressed children. A depth-of-processing incidental recall memory paradigm was employed with two groups of normal third- to sixth-grade children. Results supported the self-as-schema model as applied to children, even the youngest group, by indicating superior recall for words encoded under self-reference instructions, compared to semantic or structural orienting instructions. The content-specificity hypotheses were tested with relatively depressed and nondepressed children, and were supported only for the nondepressed children, who recalled mostly positive content words. The relatively depressed children did not demonstrate content specificity in their recall, showing a more “confused” pattern, and the results were discussed in terms of a developmental model of acquisition of depression vulnerability requiring repeated depressive experiences over time. Although the results were consistent with a self-schema approach, current controversies over the implications of depth-of-processing methods require further research to clarify mechanisms of enhanced self-reference recall.     

Differentiating anxious and depressive self-statements in youth: factor structure of the Negative Affect Self-Statement Questionnaire among youth referred to an anxiety disorders clinic

Conducted a factor analysis on the items from the Negative Affect Self-Statement Questionnaire (NASSQ; Ronan, Kendall, & Rowe, 1994). This analysis yielded 4 factors (Depressive Self-Statements, Anxiety/Somatic Self-Statements, Negative Affect Self-Statements, and Positive Affect Self-Statements) broadly consistent with both the content-specificity hypothesis (Beck & Clark, 1988) and L. A. Clark and Watson's (1991b) tripartite model of anxiety and depression. The association between children's self-talk and measures of trait anxiety and depression was also examined. Self-statements with content theoretically specific to depression were the best predictors of self-reported depressive symptoms, but the results were less clear for trait anxiety. Overall, these results provide evidence for the discriminability of anxious and depressive self-talk in youth and for the utility of the NASSQ as a cognitive assessment instrument.     

Neuroticism and the recall of positive and negative personality information

Recent investigations have shown that high-N scorers preferentially process negative information about themselves. The present experiment investigated: (1) whether this effect is related to, or independent of, the well-established effects of depressed mood on information processing; (2) whether the effect is specific to self-referent information or extends also to information about others; and (3) the mechanism by which the effect occurs. High-N scorers, compared to low-N scorers, recalled more negative information about themselves but not about others, and this effect was independent of depression. In addition, the positive self-referent, but not other-referent, personality information recalled by high-N scorers was more extremely positive than that recalled by low-N scorers. Detailed examination of the data provided evidence that the idiosyncracy in information processing associated with high neuroticism is one of selective attention. The findings are discussed in relation to cognitive vulnerability to depression, certain cognitive-therapy procedures and the effects that a therapeutically-induced change in neuroticism is likely to have on an individual's memory for past emotional experiences.     

Interpersonal perceptions and consequences of depressive-significant other relationships: a naturalistic study of college roommates

We investigated social perceptions and consequences of depression and anxiety in roommate relationships. Mildly depressed, anxious but nondepressed, and nondepressed-nonanxious students (targets) and normal, same-sex roommates (a) rated the interpersonal impact on themselves of typical associations with their roommates and (b) judged their own interpersonal impact. Only depressed men received negative evaluations and emotional reactions from their roommates. However, depressed women reported more negative reactions to their normal roommates than vice versa. Finally, depressed targets perceived their interpersonal impact negatively, whereas their normal roommates perceived their own interpersonal impact as overly positive. These findings suggest that negative relationships between depressives and nondepressed others may be attributable, at least in part, to both participants' misperceptions of their social behavior and its consequences.     

State and trait differences in depressive self-perceptions.

A number of investigators have interpreted a tendency for depressed people to recall more negative than positive self-referent adjectives as evidence for a depressive self-schema made up of predominantly negative characterological information. We sought to confirm this account by eliciting the subjective self-perceptions of the depressed. Depressed patients and controls were required to rate whether or not a series of positive and negative adjectives applied to them during the previous week, at any time, and generally. The depressed distinguished clearly between these questions and, although describing themselves currently in largely negative terms, described their general state as equally composed of positive and negative elements.     

Ego-involvement leads to positive self-schema activation and to a positivity bias in information processing

Study 1 examined the hypothesis that ego-involvement leads to positive self-schema activation. Ego-involvement was induced by having experimental subjects anticipate a difficult test of intelligence. Noninvolved control subjects did not anticipate the test. All subjects completed a depth-of-processing task, following which incidental recall was assessed. Ego-involved relative to noninvolved subjects tended to recall a greater number of positive and fewer negative words at both the self-referent and semantic processing levels. Study 2 was conducted to address further the self-schema hypothesis and to address the hypothesis suggested by the results of Study 1 that ego-involvement leads to a positivity bias in information processing. The design of Study 2 was similar to that of Study 1. Results revealed that the self-favorability of negative words recalled at the self-referent level was greater for ego-involved than for noninvolved subjects, suggesting positive self-schema activation. In addition, ego-involved subjects recalled a greater number of positive words at the semantic level, suggesting a positivity bias in information processing.Study 2 was conducted by Andrew Howell in partial fulfillment of the requirements of a Master of Arts degree at Concordia University, under the supervision of Michael Conway. The authors thank Karin Stiefenhofer for her work on the project. The research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Fonds pour la Formation de Chercheurs et l'Aide à la Recherche du Québec grants to Michael Conway.