The consequences of abortion legislation

This article examines the consequences of the 1973 US Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion as well as potential implications of proposed legilation aimed at nullifying this decision. In addition to giving women the right to determine their own reproduction, legal abortion had had beneficial health effects for both mothers and infants. The partial reversal of abortion gains due to restrictions on public funding and limitations on how and where abortions can be performed has produced a slight increase in abortion mortality, but the impact has not been dramatic. Moreover, each year since 1973, women have been obtaining abortions earlier in pregnancy. Abortion may be experienced as a loss by the mother, but there is no evidence of serious psychological sequelae. In contrast, a large body of evidence supports the physical, psychological, and social benefits of legal abortion to women, children, and families. However, proponents of the proposed Human Life Amendment place protection of the rights of the fetus over all other considerations. Their antiabortion actions have challenged the medical tradition of privacy and the confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship. Most supporters of legal abortion would prefer that there be fewer abortions; such a decrease is more likely as a result of better education and contraceptive methods rather than coercion.     

Abortion, Time-Relative Interests, and Futures Like Ours

Don Marquis (1989) has argued most abortions are immoral, for the same reason that killing you or me is immoral: abortion deprives the fetus of a valuable future (FLO). Call this account the FLOA. A rival account is Jeff McMahan’s (2002), time-relative interest account (TRIA) of the wrongness of killing. According to this account, an act of killing is wrong to the extent that it deprives the victim of future value and the relation of psychological unity would have held between the victim at the time of death and herself at a later time if she had lived. The TRIA supposedly has two chief advantages over Marquis’s FLOA. First, unlike the FLOA, the TRIA does not rely on the controversial thesis that identity is what matters in survival. Second, the TRIA yields more plausible verdicts about cases. Proponents of the TRIA use the account to argue that abortion is generally permissible, because there would be little to no psychological unity between the fetus and later selves if it lived. I argue that advocates of the TRIA have failed to establish its superiority to the FLOA, for two reasons. First, the two views are on a par with respect to the thesis that identity is what matters in survival. Second, Marquis’s FLOA does not yield the counterintuitive implications about cases that advocates of the TRIA have attributed to it, and the TRIA yields its own share of implausible judgments about cases.     

Autonomous abortions: the inhibiting of women's autonomy through legal ultrasound requirements

Recently, we have seen various proposed laws that would require that women considering abortions be given ultrasounds along with explanations of these ultrasounds. Proponents of these laws could argue that they are assisting with autonomous abortion choices by providing needed information, especially about the ontological status of the fetus. Arguing against these proposed laws, I first claim that their supporters fail to appreciate how personalized an abortion choice must be. Second, I argue that these laws would provide the pregnant woman no control over when and to what extent emotion is inserted into her deliberation. This unjustly inhibits her autonomy, making these ultrasound laws unjustified.     

Unplanned pregnancies and abortion counselling. Some thoughts on unconscious motivations

In a climate where the numbers of abortions and repeat abortions are increasing, it is necessary to improve our understanding of the dynamics that motivate the behavior of abortion seekers. While genuine contraceptive failures do exist, many unwanted pregnancies result from unresolved conflicts carried over from the woman's early relationship with her mother. The management of any pregnancy is often accompanied by feelings of ambivalence, and abortion itself is an expression of ambivalence reflecting a previously unconscious wish for a baby and a conscious wish to end the pregnancy. How these issues are handled also reflects the position the woman occupies in her life cycle. Examination of the early mother-child relationship may shed light on what unconscious needs are being expressed through the "acting out" mechanism of repeat abortion. If the mother-child relationship failed to establish an internal representation of a caretaking function, the child will lack the capacity for self-care and may seek abortion as a deliberate mechanism of self harm. Until such conflicts are resolved, abortions may be repeated. The abortion experience may also reflect a desire for a woman to individuate from her mother. Abortion counseling offers women an opportunity to understand and work through the damage resulting from their relationship with their own mothers. One case study, of a 25-year-old undergoing her fifth abortion, provides an example of acting out psychic pain resulting from a damaging maternal relationship. This woman lacked the capacity for self-care and could only tolerate counseling sessions until she overcame the acute vulnerability imposed by her most recent abortion. Another case study, of a 27-year-old seeking counseling after experiencing overwhelming feelings of guilt, shame, and inadequacy, provides an example of a woman seeking individuation and unconditional love. This woman used counseling successfully to develop a better understanding of herself and a certainty that she could be loved despite her flaws. Such dynamics do not always inform the abortion experience, but abortion is always a distressing experience, and counseling should always be available. Abortion counselors must come to terms with their own ambivalent feelings and unconscious conflicts in order to serve their clients.     

Compulsory Schooling as Preventative Defense

The question whether compulsory schooling is justifiable or not has been treated at considerable length by critics, defenders, and positions in-between. What these treatments—about paternalism and autonomy and institutionalization and more—have not directly analyzed is a question that precedes the issue of overall justification: the preliminary question of time. Does it matter when compulsion takes place? Furthermore, does the timing of compulsion matter to the question of overall justification? I will argue that it does matter, but for reasons not directly related to the question of overall justification.     

A DILEMMA FOR SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG'S MODERATE PYRRHONIAN MORAL SCEPTICISM

In order for us to have epistemic justification, Sinnott-Armstrong believes we do not have to be able to rule out all sceptical hypotheses. He suggests that it is sufficient if we have 'modestly justified beliefs', i.e., if our evidence rules out all non-sceptical alternatives. I argue that modest justification is not sufficient for epistemic justification. Either modest justification is independent of our ability to rule out sceptical hypotheses, but is not a kind of epistemic justification, or else modest justification is a kind of epistemic justification, but is not truly independent of our ability to rule out sceptical hypotheses.     

妊娠期肝内胆汁淤积症研究中的认识论

妊娠期肝内胆汁淤积症是一种常见的妊娠晚期并发症,临床上以皮肤瘙痒和黄疸为特征,伴有胆汁酸、肝酶等生化指标的异常。其对母体影响较小,但可以引起早产、胎窘和不明原因的死胎,对围生儿的严重危害使其受到了产科医生的重视。因此,有必要通过回顾妊娠期肝内胆汁淤积症的认识过程来看医学认识发展中所体现的哲学观点。     

Prenatal diagnosis, personal identity, and disability

A fascinating criticism of abortion occasioned by prenatal diagnosis of potentially disabling traits is that the complex test-and-abortion sends a morally disparaging message to people living with disabilities. I have argued that available versions of this "expressivist" argument are inadequate on two grounds. The most fundamental is that, considered as a practice, abortions prompted by prenatal testing are not semantically well-behaved enough to send any particular message; they do not function as signs in a rule-governed symbol system. Further, even granting, for the sake of argument, the expressive power of testing and aborting, it would not be possible, contra the argument's proponents, to distinguish between abortions undertaken because of beliefs about the disabling conditions the fetus might face as a child and abortions undertaken for many other possible reasons -- e.g., because of the poverty the fetus would face or the increase in family size that the birth of a new child would occasion. Here, I respond to criticisms of those arguments, and propose and defend another: the expressivist argument cannot, in general, distinguish successfully between abortion and therapy as modalities for responding to disabilities.     

Pregnancy and stroke

The risks of ischemic stroke, intracerebral hemorrhage, and subarachnoid hemorrhage are not increased in the 9 months of gestation except for a high risk in the 2 days prior and 1 day postpartum. The remaining 6 weeks postpartum also have an increased risk of ischemic stroke and intracerebral hemorrhage, though less than the peripartum period. Although there are some rare causes of stroke specific to pregnancy and the postpartum period, eclampsia, cardiomyopathy, postpartum cerebral venous thrombosis, and, possibly, paradoxical embolism warrant special consideration. The diagnostic and therapeutic approaches to stroke during pregnancy and the postpartum period are similar to the approaches in the nonpregnant woman with some minor modifications based on consideration of the welfare of the fetus. There is a theoretical risk of magnetic resonance imaging exposure during the first and second trimester but the benefit to the mother of obtaining the information may outweigh the risk. Available evidence suggests that low-dose aspirin (<150 mg/day) during the second and third trimesters is safe for both mother and fetus. Postpartum use of low-dose aspirin by breast-feeding mother is also safe for infant. While proper counseling is imperative, a history of pregnancy-related stroke should not be a contraindication for subsequent pregnancy.     

Abortion: identity and loss

The fetus is characterized as a "human organism" which, according to both the "stage" and "process" ontological theories, is a partly but not fully real individual human being. Abortion deprives the fetus of a future full-fledged human life, and this susceptibility to loss entitles it to certain moral rights, though not to the entire range of rights accorded a fully human being. Therefore, as the fetus becomes more fully human, the seriousness of abortion approaches that of infanticide.     

What philosophy of mind can tell us about the morality of abortion: personhood, materialism, and the existence of self

I attempt to show that, under materialist assumptions about the nature of mind, it is a necessary condition for fetal personhood that electrical activity has begun in the brain. First, I argue that it is a necessary condition for a thing to be a moral person that it is (or has) a self--understood as something that is capable of serving as the subject of a mental experience. Second, I argue that it is a necessary condition for a fetus to be (or have) a self that some form of electrical brain activity occurs. Third, I argue that since the beginning of brain activity typically occurs at around 10 weeks of gestational age, most fetuses are not persons during the first 10 weeks of pregnancy and hence that abortion of most fetuses during this period does not rise to the moral level of murder.     

Theoretical and practical problems with wide reflective equilibrium in bioethics

Various theories have been put forward in an attempt to explain what makes moral judgments justifiable. One of the main theories currently advocated in bioethics is a form of coherentism known as wide reflective equilibrium. In this paper, I argue that wide reflective equilibrium is not a satisfactory approach for justifying moral beliefs and propositions. A long-standing theoretical problem for reflective equilibrium has not been adequately resolved, and, as a result, the main arguments for wide reflective equilibrium are unsuccessful. Moreover, practical problems that arise in using the method of wide reflective equilibrium undermine the idea that it is a viable approach for justifying moral judgments about cases and policies. Given that wide reflective equilibrium is the most prominent version of coherentism, these considerations call into question the coherentist approach to justification in bioethics.     

Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do

While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that’s notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridge-principles will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won’t lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay.     

What Do Gestational Mothers Deserve?

This paper analyzes the following question: What do women deserve, ethically speaking, when they agree to gestate a fetus on behalf of third parties? I argue for several claims. First, I argue that gestational motherhood’s moral significance has been misunderstood, an oversight I attribute to the focus in family ethics on the conditions of parenthood. Second, I use a less controversial version of James Rachels’s account of desert to argue that gestational mothers deserve a parent-like voice as well as significant care and support, conclusions that have implications for commercial surrogacy. Finally, I argue that we should not make requests of others when fulfilling them will lead others to deserve goods we cannot reasonably expect them to receive, and I conclude based on this thesis, what I call the “strings attached thesis,” that pro-life arguments in support of prohibitions on abortion commit their proponents to policies which they may not be willing to support.     

Locus of control and decision to abort

The relationship of locus of control to deciding on an abortion was investigated by administering Rotter's Locus of Control Scale to 118 women immediately prior to abortion and 2 weeks and 3 months following abortion. Subjects' scores were compared across the 3 time periods, and the abortion group's pretest scores were compared with those of a nonpregnant control, group. As hypothesized, the aborting group scored significantly more internal than the general population but no differences in locus of control were found across the 3 time period. The length of delay in deciding to abort an unwanted pregnancy following confirmation was also assessed. Women seeking 1st trimester abortions were divided into internal and external groups on the Rotter Scale and the lengths of delay were compared. The hypothesis that external scores would delay the decision longer than internal ones was confirmed. The results confirm characteristics of the locus of control construct and add information about personality characteristics of women undergoing abortion.     

Abortion: A Jewish view

A practicing physician reviews the contribution of Jewish ethics, as it relates to the structure of Jewish law, to the issue of abortion. The topics approached include the status of the fetus, the relationship of fetus to mother, abortion and murder, therapeutic abortion, and the rights of the mother. The discussion describes rabbinic answers to abortion requests and is followed by a summary of the Jewish attitudes toward termination of fetal life. An appendix is provided, dealing with central aspects of Jewish ethics, the structure of Jewish law, their relationship, and a note on abortion legislation in Israel.     

Referral in the Wake of Conscientious Objection to Abortion

Currently, the preferred accommodation for conscientious objection to abortion in medicine is to allow the objector to refuse to accede to the patient's request so long as the objector refers the patient to a physician who performs abortions. The referral part of this arrangement is controversial, however. Pro‐life advocates claim that referrals make objectors complicit in the performance of acts that they, the objectors, find morally offensive. McLeod argues that the referral requirement is justifiable, although not in the way that people usually assume.     

Abortion,Killing, and Maternal Moral Authority

A threat to women is obscured when we treat “abortion‐as‐evacuation'’ as equivalent to “abortion‐as‐killing.'’ This holds only if evacuating a fetus kills it. As technology advances, the equivalence will fail. Any feminist account of abortion that relies on the equivalence leaves moral room for women to be required to give up their fetuses to others when it fails. So an account of the justification of abortion‐as‐killing is needed that does not depend on the equivalence.     

The Moral Significance of Birth

Does birth make a difference to the moral rights of the fetus /infant? Should it make a difference to its legal rights? Most contemporary philosophers believe that birth cannot make a difference to moral rights. If this is true, then it becomes difficult to justify either a moral or a legal distinction between late abortion and infanticide. I argue that the view that birth is irrelevant to moral rights rests upon two highly questionable assumptions about the theoretical foundations of moral rights. If we reject these assumptions, then we are free to take account of the contrasting biological and social relationships that make even relatively late abortion morally different from infanticide.     

Reliabilism,scepticism, and evidentia in Ockham

The aim of this paper is to challenge the reliabilist interpretation of William Ockham (ca. 1287–1347)'s epistemology. The discussion proceeds as follows. First, I analyse the reliabilist interpretation into two theses: (1) a negative thesis I call the Anti-Internalism Thesis, according to which, for Ockham, epistemic justification does not depend on any internal factors that are accessible by reflection; (2) a positive thesis I call the Reliability Thesis, according to which epistemic justification in Ockham depends on the reliability of a causal process through which a given judgment is produced. Secondly, I argue that the Anti-Internalism Thesis fails since Ockham's notion of evidentness (evidentia), which is at the heart of his theory of justification, strongly suggests that he posits an indispensable, internalist element of justification. Lastly, I argue that the Reliability Thesis also fails since not only can there be a reliable but inevident judgment in Ockham's framework, his emphasis on causality is best read not as talk of reliability, but as his emphasis on the relation between reason (or evidence) and what is based on reason.