Selecting people randomly

This article considers what justification can be found for selecting randomly and in what circumstances it applies, including that of selecting patients to be treated by a scarce medical procedure. The author demonstrates that balancing the merits of fairness, common good, equal rights, and equal chance as they apply in various situations frequently leads to the conclusion that random selection may not be the most appropriate mode of selection. Broome acknowledges that, in the end, we may be forced to conclude that the only merit of random selection is the political one of guarding against partiality and oppression.     

Harming future people

Hanser examines Derek Parfit's contention in his treatise on rationalism, Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press; 1984) that acts that are not reproductive in nature can nonetheless predictably affect the identities of future people, and that this fact has unexpected and important consequences for ethical theory. Hanser argues tht this fact is not as significant as Parfit believes it to be. The arguments of both scholars concern the morality of choices that, while causing future persons to be badly off, do not make them worse off than they would have been if the choices had not been made. Hanser concludes his essay with a discussion of responsibility for acts that will affect the health of future offspring.     

Very happy people

A sample of 222 undergraduates was screened for high happiness using multiple confirming assessment filters. We compared the upper 10% of consistently very happy people with average and very unhappy people. The very happy people were highly social, and had stronger romantic and other social relationships than less happy groups. They were more extraverted, more agreeable, and less neurotic, and scored lower on several psychopathology scales of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. Compared with the less happy groups, the happiest respondents did not exercise significantly more, participate in religious activities significantly more, or experience more objectively defined good events. No variable was sufficient for happiness, but good social relations were necessary. Members of the happiest group experienced positive, but not ecstatic, feelings most of the time, and they reported occasional negative moods. This suggests that very happy people do have a functioning emotion system that can react appropriately to life events.     

Recognizing famous people

In daily life, face identification requires that the observer select a single representation from hundreds if not thousands in memory. This breadth of choice is nearly impossible to replicate in the laboratory using newly learned faces, especially in the context of a Bubbles experiment (Gosselin & Schyns, 2001). In this study, we obviated this concern by studying the performance of observers in a face-naming task using 210 faces of celebrities. On each trial, we presented a face randomly sampled with Bubbles. We performed least-square multiple linear regressions on the location of the samples and on accuracy to pinpoint the facial features that were used effectively in this task. Correct face identification relied primarily on the eye areas in spatial frequency bands ranging from 4.37 to 70 cycles per face (cpf) and on the mouth and the nose in a spatial frequency band ranging from 8.75 to 17.5 cpf. A comparison with other studies (Caldara et al., 2005; Schyns, Bonnar, & Gosselin, 2002) in which Bubbles was used with a set of 10 newly learned faces revealed that although the eye areas were useful across studies, the mouth area and higher spatial frequencies gained in importance when few newly learned faces were used.     

Sad people are more accurate at face recognition than happy people

Mood has varied effects on cognitive performance including the accuracy of face recognition (Lundh & Ost, 1996). Three experiments are presented here that explored face recognition abilities in mood-induced participants. Experiment 1 demonstrated that happy-induced participants are less accurate and have a more conservative response bias than sad-induced participants in a face recognition task. Using a remember/know/guess procedure, Experiment 2 showed that sad-induced participants had more conscious recollections of faces than happy-induced participants. Additionally, sad-induced participants could recognise all faces accurately, whereas, happy- and neutral-induced participants recognised happy faces more accurately than sad faces. In Experiment 3, these effects were not observed when participants intentionally learnt the faces, rather than incidentally learnt the faces. It is suggested that happy-induced participants do not process faces as elaborately as sad-induced participants.     

Affiliation motivation: people who need people ... but in different ways

The Interpersonal Orientation Scale was developed to focus on four dimensions assumed to underlie affiliation motivation: social comparison, emotional support, positive stimulation, and attention. Factor analyses basically supported the proposed multidimensional construct. Evidence for the validity of the four dimensions was provided by their correlations with measures of constructs conceptually related to affiliation motivation and their lack of correlation with measures conceptually unrelated to affiliation motivation. Moreover, in a laboratory study, each motivational subscale tended to correlate most highly with role-played responses in a situation affording the relevant incentive type. Future research on social motivation and interaction will profit from identifying the particular incentives that are salient in a giving setting.     

Bad people doing good things: Attributions about people with immoral traits

Current Psychology - Perfect duties are those required by moral individuals, whereas imperfect duties, although not required, are expected of moral individuals. Previous research suggests it takes...     

Why people self-verify.

Why do people choose interaction partners who see them as they see themselves? Self-verification theorists propose that a desire to bolster perceptions of predictability and control underlies such activities. In contrast, advocates of positivity strivings argue that people choose such interaction partners in the hope of making themselves feel good. Two studies tested these competing explanations by examining the spontaneous verbalizations of participants as they chose interaction partners. The results suggested that positivity as well as self-verification strivings caused participants with positive self-views to choose partners who appraised them favorably. The epistemic considerations underlying self-verification processes, however, best explained why people with negative self-views chose partners who appraised them unfavorably.     

How to count people

How should we count people who have two cerebral hemispheres that cooperate to support one mental life at the level required for personhood even though each hemisphere can be disconnected from the other and support its “own” divergent mental life at that level? On the standard method of counting people, there is only one person sitting in your chair and thinking your thoughts even if you have two cerebral hemispheres of this kind. Is this method accurate? In this paper, I argue that it is not, and I advocate an alternative I call the Multiple Person View.     

Recurrent involuntary imagery in people who stutter and people who do not stutter

Objective

To compare intrusive memories in groups of people who do (PWS), and who do not (PWNS), stutter.

Method

Twenty-one participants who stuttered and 21 matched controls were given a semi-structured interview which explored imagery in speaking situations. The data were analyzed using a Content Analysis approach. Other outcome measures were the Beck Anxiety Inventory, the Beck Depression Inventory, the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, PTSD, Symptom Scale: Self-Report Version.

Results

Significantly more stuttering participants than control participants indicated both recurrent imagery and associated memories. Content Analysis revealed themes of disfluency, anxiety, negative social evaluation, self-focus and pressure to speak that were common to both groups’ reports. Additional themes of helplessness, shame, sadness and frustration were found only in the images and memories of the stuttering group. No group differences were evident for the number of sensory modalities involved in images and memories, or for ratings of their vividness or strength of associated emotions, or on self-reports of depression, anxiety and trauma.

Conclusions

Recurrent imagery about events in childhood is a potent factor in the memories of PWS. It is worth modifying interventions that have been successfully applied for treating social anxiety for use with people who stutter.Educational objectives: After reading this article, participants will be able to: (a) identify the role of intrusive memories in psychiatric disorders and stuttering; (b) investigate how DSM criteria can be employed with people who stutter; (c) employ anxiety instruments used for assessing psychiatric disorders for stuttering; (d) distinguish between the intrusive memories experienced by people who stutter, and people who do not stutter; (e) apply treatments for intrusive memories in psychiatric disorders to work with people who stutter.     

Counseling young people contemplating intermarriage

Pastoral Psychology -