“No More” leads to “Want More,” but “No Less” leads to “Want Less”: Consumers' counterfactual thinking when faced with quantity restriction discounts

The current research examines the impact of point‐of‐purchase (POP) discounts on consumers' counterfactual thinking (CFT). Study 1 reveals that consumers tend to engage in upward CFT (what might have been better) rather than downward CFT (what might have been worse) in response to POP discounts. Study 2 shows that upward CFT depends on how the discount information is framed. A discount with a lower‐quantity restriction (e.g., “X % off if you buy at least Y items”) leads consumers to counterfactually wish to buy more, but a discount with an upper‐quantity restriction (“X % off – limit Y items per customer”) leads consumers to wish to buy less. Study participants in both conditions report they would buy the same POP‐suggested amount, but for completely opposite reasons. In Study 3, this convergence effect in purchase quantity disappears when the maximum and minimum restrictions are lifted, suggesting that quantity restrictions in POP discounts guide quantity decisions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When 90% confidence intervals are 50% certain: on the credibility of credible intervals

Estimated confidence intervals for general knowledge items are usually too narrow. We report five experiments showing that people have much less confidence in these intervals than dictated by the assigned level of confidence. For instance, 90% intervals can be associated with an estimated confidence of 50% or less (and still lower hit rates). Moreover, interval width appears to remain stable over a wide range of instructions (high and low numeric and verbal confidence levels). This leads to a high degree of overconfidence for 90% intervals, but less for 50% intervals or for free choice intervals (without an assigned degree of confidence). To increase interval width one may have to ask exclusion rather than inclusion questions, for instance by soliciting ‘improbable’ upper and lower values (Experiment 4), or by asking separate ‘more than’ and ‘less than’ questions (Experiment 5). We conclude that interval width and degree of confidence have different determinants, and cannot be regarded as equivalent ways of expressing uncertainty. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Attentional and anatomical considerations for the representation of simple stimuli in visual short-term memory: evidence from human electrophysiology

Observers encoded the spatial arrangement of two or three horizontal line segments relative to a square frame presented for 150 ms either in left or right visual field and either above or below the horizontal midline. The target pattern was selected on the basis of colour (red vs. green) from an equivalent distractor pattern in the opposite left–right visual hemifield. After a retention interval of 450 or 650 ms a test pattern was presented at fixation. The task was to decide whether the test was the same as the encoded pattern or different. Selection of the to-be-memorised pattern produced an N2pc response that was not influenced by the number of line segments nor by the length of the retention interval, but that was smaller in amplitude for patterns presented in the upper visual field compared with patterns presented in the lower visual field. A sustained posterior contralateral negativity (SPCN) followed the N2pc. The SPCN was larger for patterns with three line segments than for two, was larger for patterns encoded from lower visual field than from upper visual field, and returned to baseline sooner for the shorter retention interval than for the longer interval. These results, and others, provide an interesting and complex pattern of similarities and differences between the N2pc and SPCN, consistent with the view that N2pc reflects mechanisms of attentional selection whereas the SPCN reflects maintenance in visual short-term memory.     

More than 50% or Less than 70% Chance: Pragmatic Implications of Single‐Bound Probability Estimates

Probability estimates can be given as ranges or uncertainty intervals, where often only one of the interval bounds (lower or upper) is specified. For instance, a climate forecast can describe La Niña as having “more than 70% chance” or “less than 90% chance” of occurring. In three experiments, we studied how research participants perceived climate‐related forecasts expressed with lower‐bound (“over X% chance”) or upper‐bound (“under Y% chance”) probability statements. Results indicate that such single‐bound statements give pragmatic information in addition to the numeric probabilities they convey. First, the studies show that these statements are directional, leading the listeners' attention in opposite directions. “Over” statements guide attention towards the possible occurrence of the event and are explained by reasons for why it might happen, while “under” statements direct attention to its possible non‐occurrence and are more often explained by reasons for why the target event might not appear, corresponding to positive (it is possible) versus negative (it is uncertain) verbal probabilities. Second, boundaries were found to reveal the forecaster's beliefs and could be perceived as indicative of an increasing or a decreasing trend. Single‐bound probability estimates are therefore not neutral communications of probability level but might “leak” information about the speaker's expectations and about past and future developments of the forecast. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Laterality effects in the spinning dancer illusion: The viewing‐from‐above bias is only part of the story

The ‘silhouette illusion’, representing the silhouette of a female dancer pirouetting about her vertical axis, is a bistable stimulus created by Japanese web designer Nobuyuki Kayahara. Although the dancer can be perceived as spinning either clockwise or counterclockwise, the clockwise rotation is usually preferred. Troje and McAdam (i‐Perception, 2010, 1, 143) showed that this clockwise bias can be attributed to the tendency to assume a viewpoint from above rather than from below, given that the dancer is portrayed from a vantage point that is not perpendicular to the axis of rotation. Here, we tested whether another possible factor contributing to the observers’ interpretation of this bistable stimulus might be the tendency to perceive movements of the right rather than the left foot. We confirmed both the viewing‐from‐above bias and our hypothesis. The bias to perceive movements of the right leg might be a generalization to lower limbs of a perceptual frequency effect already observed for upper limbs. Such a perceptual and attentional bias towards the right hand/foot could account for the greater ability to predict the outcome of sport actions when observing right‐ rather than left‐limbed movements, and thus the left‐handers' and left‐footers' advantage observed in a variety of interactive sports.     

More than,less than,or minimum,maximum: how upper and lower bounds determine subjective interval estimates

Uncertain quantities can be described by single‐point estimates of lower interval bounds (X₁), upper interval bounds (X₂), two‐bound estimates (separate estimates of X₁ and X₂), and by ranges (X₁?X₂). A price estimation task showed that single‐bound estimates phrased as “T costs more than X₁” and “T costs less than X₂,” yielded much larger intervals than “minimum X₁” and “maximum X₂.” This difference can be attributed to exclusive interpretations of X₁ and X₂ in the first case (X₁ and X₂ are unlikely values), and inclusive interpretations in the second (X₁ and X₂ are likely values). This pattern of results was replicated in other domains where participants estimated single targets. When they estimated a distribution of targets, the pattern was reversed. “Minimum” and “maximum” values of variable quantities (e.g., flight prices) were found to delimit larger intervals than “more than” and “less than” estimates. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Long-term maintenance of immediate or delayed extinction is determined by the extinction-test interval

Short acquisition-extinction intervals (immediate extinction) can lead to either more or less spontaneous recovery than long acquisition-extinction intervals (delayed extinction). Using rat subjects, we observed less spontaneous recovery following immediate than delayed extinction (Experiment 1). However, this was the case only if a relatively long extinction-test interval was used; a relatively short extinction-test interval yielded the opposite result (Experiment 2). Previous data appear consistent with this observation suggesting that, although delayed extinction appears more beneficial in the short term, immediate extinction may have more favorable long-term effects. These observations may have important implications for attenuation of relapse in clinical situations.     

Vertical meridian asymmetry in spatial resolution: Visual and attentional factors

We investigated whether spatial resolution would be the same in the lower and upper halves of thevertical meridian (VM) of our visual field and whether attention would affect them differentially. It has been reported that (1) attending to the target’s location improves performance in a texture segregation task when the observer’s spatial resolution is too low (peripheral locations) but impairs it when resolution is already too high (central locations) for the task. This finding indicates an enhanced spatial resolution at the attended location (Yeshurun & Carrasco, 1998, 2000), (2) observers’ contrast sensitivity is higher in the lower than in the upper VM, a phenomenon known asvertical meridian asymmetry (VMA), an asymmetry determined by visual rather than by attentional factors (Carrasco, Talgar, & Cameron, 2001). In the present texture segregation task, performance was assessed under neutral- and peripheralcue conditions. Transient covert attention was systematically manipulated by using a peripheral cue that indicated the target’s location and its onset. Observers reported the interval containing a target patch appearing at one of a number of eccentricities in a large texture pattern along the VM. We found that (1) performance peaked at farther eccentricities in the lower than in the upper visual VM, indicating that resolution was higher in the lower half, and (2) the peripheral cue affected performance along the VM uniformly, indicating that the degree of enhanced resolution brought about by transient attention was constant along the VM. Thus, we conclude that the VMA for spatial resolution is determined by visual, not transient covert attentional, constraints.     

Visual capture of touch: out-of-the-body experiences with rubber gloves

When the apparent visual location of a body part conflicts with its veridical location, vision can dominate proprioception and kinesthesia. In this article, we show that vision can capture tactile localization. Participants discriminated the location of vibrotactile stimuli (upper, at the index finger, vs. lower, at the thumb), while ignoring distractor lights that could independently be upper or lower. Such tactile discriminations were slowed when the distractor light was incongruent with the tactile target (e.g., an upper light during lower touch) rather than congruent, especially when the lights appeared near the stimulated hand. The hands were occluded under a table, with all distractor lights above the table. The effect of the distractor lights increased when rubber hands were placed on the table, 'holding' the distractor lights, but only when the rubber hands were spatially aligned with the participant's own hands. In this aligned situation, participants were more likely to report the illusion of feeling touch at the rubber hands. Such visual capture of touch appears cognitively impenetrable.     

Optimal temporal differentiation

In order to illuminate a light signaling a correct response, adult humans had to space their button presses according to a range of time requirements. In some conditions, the spacing needed only to exceed a minimum duration; in others, it had to fall between lower and upper bounds. Mean interresponse times always exceeded the lower limit, and decreased the more stringent were the upper bounds. Variability of interresponse times increased with larger lower bounds, but was unaffected by the size of the upper bound. Feedback about the direction of errors in conditions involving both upper and lower bounds did not affect the means, but it did reduce variability. Predictions were derived from optimality theory, based on the assumption that the critical factor was minimization of the time between correct responses. Without upper bounds, the theory overestimated the mean interresponse times by about 10%; with upper bounds, the theoretical predictions corresponded closely to the actual data. The results did not appear to reflect a scalar timing process. Optimality theory, in contrast to Weber's law, correctly predicted the variety of curves relating sensitivity to duration requirements.     

Thirty years on – a large anti‐Flynn effect/ (II): 13‐ and 14‐year‐olds. Piagetian tests of formal operations norms 1976–2006/7

Background Shayer, Ginsburg, and Coe (2007) showed that children leaving primary school in Y6 entered secondary school with much lower levels of understanding of the physical conservations than in 1976. It seemed desirable to investigate cognitive development in the first three years of secondary education. Aims By using two Piagetian tests of formal operations, one of which had been used in the 1976 CSMS survey, the performance of Y8 and Y9 pupils would be compared with the survey results published in 1978. Sample Eight schools were selected as willing to test their Y9 or Y8 classes on either the Pendulum (in 2007) or the Equilibrium in the Balance tests (in 2006), giving 39 classes on which to make the comparison with 1976 performance. Method Regression of the pupils' class mean on each formal test on either the class's 2004 MidYIS or nferCAT standardized scores, and computing the regression at IQ = 100 allows comparison with that found in 1976. Results On Equilibrium in the Balance the Y8 pupils were down on the proportion at the early formal level or above by ?0.61 standard deviations (SD) for boys and ?0.63 SD for girls on the 1976 results. On the Pendulum the Y9 boys were down by ?0.49 SD and the girls by ?0.48 SD on the proportion at the early formal level or above. Conclusion The negative Flynn‐effect found on Volume & Heaviness for Y7 pupils is paralleled by a similar negative effect on attainment of formal operations by Y8 and Y9, compared with 1976. Yet at the same time the proportion of pupils using the top level of concrete operational thinking has increased on both tests. It seems that there has been a change either in general societal pressures on the individual or in the style of teaching in schools – or both – favouring a lower level of processing of reality.     

A priori tests in repeated measures designs: Effects of nonsphericity

The validity conditions for univariate repeated measures designs are described. Attention is focused on the sphericity requirement. For av degree of freedom family of comparisons among the repeated measures, sphericity exists when all contrasts contained in thev dimensional space have equal variances. Under nonsphericity, upper and lower bounds on test size and power of a priori, repeated measures,F tests are derived. The effects of nonsphericity are illustrated by means of a set of charts. The charts reveal that small departures from sphericity (.97 <1.00) can seriously affect test size and power. It is recommended that separate rather than pooled error term procedures be routinely used to test a priori hypotheses.Appreciation is extended to Milton Parnes for his insightful assistance.     

Causal agency and the perception of force

In the Michotte task, a ball (X) moves toward a resting ball (Y). In the moment of contact, X stops und Y starts moving. Previous studies have shown that subjects tend to view X as the causal agent (“X launches Y”) rather than Y (“Y stops X”). Moreover, X tends to be attributed more force than Y (force asymmetry), which contradicts the laws of Newtonian mechanics. Recent theories of force asymmetry try to explain these findings as the result of an asymmetrical identification with either the (stronger) agent or the (weaker) patient of the causal interaction. We directly tested this assumption by manipulating attributions of causal agency while holding the properties of the causal interaction constant across conditions. In contrast to previous accounts, we found that force judgments stayed invariant across conditions in which assignments of causal agency shifted from X to Y and that even those subjects who chose Y as the causal agent gave invariantly higher force ratings to X. These results suggest that causal agency and the perception of force are conceptually independent of each other. Different possible explanations are discussed.     

Multiple reference points in satisfaction and fairness assessment

Most studies of reference point effects have used a single referent, such as a price, a salary, or a target. There is considerable evidence that the judged fairness of, or satisfaction with, an outcome is significantly influenced by discrepancies from such single referents. In many settings, however, more than one reference point may be available, so the subject may be confronted simultaneously with some referents above, some at, and some below the focal outcome. Little is known about the simultaneous impact of such multiple reference points. We examine here the effects of two referents on ratings of salary satisfaction and fairness. Subjects were presented with a series of scenarios that described a salary offer made to a hypothetical MBA graduate and provided information about the salary offers made to either one or two other similar graduates. For each scenario, subjects judged how fair the focal graduate would feel the offer to be, and how satisfied he or she would be with it. Satisfaction ratings displayed asymmetric effects of comparisons: the pain associated with receiving a salary lower than another MBA is greater than the pleasure associated with a salary higher than the other student by the same amount. Fairness ratings showed a different pattern of asymmetric effects of discrepancies from the reference salaries: the focal graduate's salary was judged somewhat less fair when others received lower offers, and much less fair when others received higher offers. The asymmetric effects occurred for both reference points, suggesting that the focal salary was compared separately to each of the referents rather than to a single reference point formed by prior integration of the referents. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of experience in web-building spiders (Araneidae)

A typical feature of vertical orb-webs is the ‘top/bottom’ asymmetry, where the lower web region is larger than the upper web region. This asymmetry may improve prey capture success, because, sitting in the hub of the web, a spider can reach prey entangled below the hub faster than prey entangled in the area above the hub. While web asymmetry is known to vary intraspecifically, we tested if this variation also exists at the individual level and whether it is the result of experience, using two orb-web spider species, Argiope keyserlingi and Larinioides sclopetarius. The results reveal that experienced web-building spiders constructed more asymmetric webs than conspecifics deprived of any prior building experience over a period of several months. Experienced individuals invested more silk material into the web region below the hub, which covered a larger area. Moreover, web asymmetry was also influenced by previous prey capture experiences, as spiders increased the lower region of the web if it intercepted the most prey over a period of 6 days. Consequently, spiders may be able to use long-term web-building experience as well as short-term prey capture experience to build better traps. In contrast to previous views of spiders, experience can contribute to intraspecific as well as to individual variations in web design. Received: 1 March 1999 / Accepted after revision: 18 August 1999     

Maximum vs. minimum values: Preferences of speakers and listeners for upper and lower limit estimates

Estimates about uncertain quantities can be expressed in terms of lower limits (more than X, minimum X), or upper limits (less than Y, maximum Y). It has been shown that lower limit statements generally occur much more often than upper limit statements (Halberg & Teigen, 2009). However, in a conversational context, preferences for upper and lower limit statements will be moderated by the concerns of the interlocutors. We report three studies asking speakers and listeners about their preferences for lower and upper limit statements, in the domains of distances, durations, and prices. It appears that travellers prefer information about maximum distances and maximum durations, and buyers (but not sellers) prefer to be told about maximum prices and maximum delivery times. Mistaken maxima are at the same time regarded as more “wrong” than mistaken minima. However, this preference for “worst case” information is not necessarily shared by providers of information (advisors), who are also concerned about being blamed if wrong.     

When representations conflict with reality: the preschooler's problem with false beliefs and "false" photographs

It has been argued that young preschoolers cannot correctly attribute a false belief to a deceived actor (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Some researchers claim that the problem lies in the child's inadequate epistemology (Chandler & Boyes, 1982; Wellman, 1988); as such, it is specific to the child's theory of mind and no such problem should appear in reasoning about nonmental representations. This prediction is tested below in the "false photograph" task: here an actor takes a photograph of an object in location X; the object is then moved to location Y. Preschool subjects are asked: "In the picture, where is the object?" Results indicate that photographs are no easier to reason about than are beliefs. Manipulations to boost performance on the photograph task proved ineffective. Further, an explanation of the failure as a processing limitation having nothing to do with the representational nature of beliefs or photographs was ruled out. It is argued that young children's failure on the false belief task is not due to an inadequate epistemology (though they may have one) and is symptomatic of a larger problem with representations.     

Early locus of a linguistic variable in a fast priming task

The syllable and the morpheme are known to be important linguistic variables, but is such information involved in the early stages of word recognition? Syllable‐morpheme information was manipulated in the early stage of word naming by means of the fast priming paradigm. The letters in the prime were printed in a mixture of lower‐ and upper‐case letters. The change from lower to upper case occurred either at a syllable‐morpheme boundary, before the boundary, or after it (e.g., reTAKE, rETAKE, or retAKE) creating either an intact pair or a broken one. The target was always in lower case (e.g., retake). The results of Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that intact syllable and morpheme information facilitated word naming at a short Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (below awareness) but not at a long SOA, suggesting that the use of such information is automatic. A second set of experiments attempted to determine if syllable information alone could facilitate word processing. In Experiments 3 and 4, monomorphemic words were divided either at, before, or after the syllable boundary (e.g., rePEL, rEPEL, or repEL). The primes were all pseudomorphemic in the sense that the initial syllables could appear as a morpheme in other words (e.g., restate) but were not morphemic in the target words (e.g., repel). The second syllable was neither morphemic nor pseudomorphemic. Using the same SOAs as in Experiments 1 and 2, intact syllables were found to be facilitative at the short SOA, but not at the long SOA. Thus, the syllable plays a role in an early stage of word recognition. Whether morphemes that are not syllables are facilitative is still to be determined in this paradigm.     

Reducing probabilistic weather forecasts to the worst-case scenario: anchoring effects

Many weather forecast providers believe that forecast uncertainty in the form of the worst-case scenario would be useful for general public end users. We tested this suggestion in 4 studies using realistic weather-related decision tasks involving high winds and low temperatures. College undergraduates, given the statistical equivalent of the worst-case scenario (1 boundary of the 80% predictive interval), demonstrated biased understanding of future weather conditions compared with those given both bounds or no uncertainty information. We argue that this was due to an anchoring effect on numeric estimates, which were closer to the worst-case scenario than was warranted and increased linearly as the anchor became more extreme. In many situations tested here, anchoring in numeric estimates also extended to subsequent binary decisions, leading participants with the worst-case scenario to take action more often than did other participants. These results suggest that worst-case scenario forecasts can mislead the user. They appear to convince people that wind speeds will be higher and temperatures will be lower than what are indicated by the forecast. In addition, participants systematically "corrected" the forecast they were given. This effect was most prominent in the condition in which no uncertainty was provided, suggesting that people feel compelled to take uncertainty into account, even when it is not acknowledged by the forecast. Both the anchoring and correction biases were least evident when both bounds were provided, suggesting that balanced uncertainty leads to the best understanding of future weather conditions.     

Eye movement suppression interferes with construction of object-centered spatial reference frames in working memory

The brain’s frontal eye fields (FEF), responsible for eye movement control, are known to be involved in spatial working memory (WM).In a previous fMRI experiment (Wallentin, Roepstorff & Burgess, Neuropsychologia, 2008) it was found that FEF activation was primarily related to the formation of an object-centered, rather than egocentric, spatial reference frame. In this behavioral experiment we wanted to demonstrate a causal relationship between eye movement control and manipulation of spatial reference frames. Sixty-two participants recalled either spatial (“Was X in front of Y?”) or non-spatial (“Was X darker than Y?”) relations in a previously shown image containing two to four objects, each with an intrinsic orientation and unique luminance. During half of all recall trials a moving visual stimulus was presented, which participants had to ignore, thus suppressing eye movement. Response times were significantly slower for spatial relations with distraction while there was no effect on non-spatial relations. There was no effect on accuracy, i.e. WM maintenance. This is consistent with the hypothesis that in spatial representations the FEFs are involved in WM content manipulation, such as establishing an object-centered spatial frame of reference.