The “Healthy Person”: A Review

Two general approaches in the analysis of a “healthy” person were identified as (1) operational and (2) conceptual. Criterion problems seem crucial in the former, while in the latter, semantic and value problems are to be resolved. Consideration might profitably be given to, first, the concept of dynamic equilibrium or active adaptation (assimilation and accommodation) and, second, to that of developmental mastery of tasks along the “dimension of depth” and toward discovery of the meaning of life and of man's position in the universe. Such a model implies client's exploration of his existence in the world in the perspective of a continuous life process. Both being and becoming can and should be of legitimate concern to mental health workers.     

“Anxious Suicidality”: A New Subtype of Childhood Suicide Ideation?

The current study examined the presence of anxiety in children with suicide ideation. From a sample of 100 inpatients, children who displayed suicide ideation (n = 27) were selected and divided into two groups, high and low anxiety. Findings indicated that children with suicide ideation and anxiety were less happy and satisfied, experienced more negative life events, and were more distractible and intense than children with suicide ideation only. Additionally, according to their self-reports, parents of children with high anxiety reported more obsessive-compulsive and anxiety symptoms as well as greater hostility than parents of children with low anxiety. The authors have identified a subgroup of children with suicide ideation who are highly anxious and can be termed as experiencing “anxious suicidality.”     

“PURE” VERSUS “PRACTICAL” EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract: In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is “epistemic” in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and “practical” in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of “inner epistemic virtue” to the “outer risks” implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.     

Theoretical Grounding: The “Missing Link” in Suicide Research

This article discusses the strengths and limitations of the current pragmatic focus of research in suicidology and presents an argument for theoretical grounding as a precursor for continued advancement in this area. An existential‐constructivist framework of “meaning creation” is presented as a theoretical heuristic for understanding suicide. This formulation focuses on the basic human quest for meaning and connectedness as the underlying motivations for individual constructions of reality. Finally, the model outlines general areas of challenge and stress that may provide pathways to suicide and provides a general discussion of the implications of the model for research and practice.     

The Evolving “D” in “BASIC ID”

The multimodal counseling model is based on the notion that a client's concerns can be dealt with most successfully when the counselor or therapist treats several aspects of a client's functioning. The multimodal model uses the acronym BASIC ID to identify the areas of client functioning that frequently need to be treated. These areas include behavior, affect, sensation, imagery, cognition, interpersonal relations, and drugs. The D mode, which represents drugs, is a misunderstood aspect of the BASIC ID partly because it does not seem to parallel other aspects of the model. Over the past few years the D mode has been expanded to include more than drugs, in particular, to include diet and other physiological factors. This article describes the evolution of the D mode and attempts to show the importance of a physiological dimension to the multimodal counseling approach.     

“SECOND-GUESSING”

Messages received from other social actors cannot always be taken at face value. When people have reason to question such messages, it is hypothesized that they engage in a cognitive process called “second-guessing,” wherein they reevaluate the literal interpretation of the message to determine its veridicality. Should they determine that it is not veridical, they generate an alternative, potentially more plausible interpretation. We assessed the frequency and importance of situations that might provoke reinterpretation of messages. Such situations were seen as occurring frequently and were of some importance. Social actors revealed sophisticated knowledge concerning the strengths and weaknesses of information obtained about people or events outside their direct experience. They also claimed to be able to “debias”such information, winnowing a “correct” interpretation from one judged to be “incorrect.” Preliminary data suggest that naive social actors are quite good at delecting scientifically documented sources of bias and making reasonable adjustments in their judgments to correct for those biases when plausibly present.     

INVESTIGATING THE “SCIENCE” IN “EASTERN RELIGIONS”: A METHODOLOGICAL INQUIRY

This article explores some of the understandings of “science” that are often employed in the literature on “science and Eastern religions.” These understandings crucially shape the raging debates between the avid proponents and the keen detractors of the thesis that Eastern forms of spirituality are uniquely able to subsume the sciences into their metaphysical–axiological horizons. More specifically, the author discusses some of the proposed relations between “science” and “Eastern religions” by highlighting three themes: (a) the relation between science and metaphysics, (b) the relation between science and experience, and (c) the European origins of science. The analysis of these relations requires a methodological inquiry into some of the culturally freighted valences of “science,” “metaphysics,” and “experience.”     

Can Shneidman's “Ten Commonalities of Suicide” Accommodate Rational Suicide?

Shneidman's (1985 ) commonly reproduced “Ten Commonalities of Suicide” cannot accommodate rational suicide, as the concept has been defined in recent literature, and therefore are not “commonalities” of all suicides. Quotes from Shneidman describing the “commonalities” are provided and selected items are briefly examined in light of one set of criteria for rational suicide. It is suggested that Shneidman's list, which is inherently biased against allowing for the possibility of rational suicide, be renamed so that its contents will not continue to be inappropriately used as evidence that suicide cannot be rational.