International school psychology: psychology's worldwide portal to children and youth

International school psychology is discussed in reference to scholarly and professional development within psychology, the emergence of an international association of school psychology, its efforts to promote school psychology, prevailing characteristics of school psychologists, and additional efforts needed to further enhance its development. Nine issues that will help shape the future of international school psychology are also identified. The importance of psychology, including school psychology, in promoting children's needs and rights is underscored.     

Personality psychology's comeback and its emerging symbiosis with social psychology

Psychology's early allegiance to behaviorism and experimental methods led many to disparage personality approaches throughout much of last century. Doubts about personality psychology's viability culminated in Mischel's assertion that measures of personality account for modest amounts of variance in behavior. In the years immediately following this critique, interest in personality research waned and many psychology departments dropped their training programs in personality. Throughout the past two decades, however, personality psychology has enjoyed a resurgence. The authors discuss several possible explanations for personality's comeback and then describe the emergence of a promising symbiosis between personality psychology and its sister discipline, social psychology. The article concludes by noting that although this emerging symbiosis is likely to continue bearing considerable theoretical fruit, the traditional distinction between personal, situational, and interactional determinants of behavior continues to be useful within appropriate contexts.     

Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience

According to Bayesian theories in psychology and neuroscience, minds and brains are (near) optimal in solving a wide range of tasks. We challenge this view and argue that more traditional, non-Bayesian approaches are more promising. We make 3 main arguments. First, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in psychology is weak. This weakness relates to the many arbitrary ways that priors, likelihoods, and utility functions can be altered in order to account for the data that are obtained, making the models unfalsifiable. It further relates to the fact that Bayesian theories are rarely better at predicting data compared with alternative (and simpler) non-Bayesian theories. Second, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in neuroscience is weaker still. There are impressive mathematical analyses showing how populations of neurons could compute in a Bayesian manner but little or no evidence that they do. Third, we challenge the general scientific approach that characterizes Bayesian theorizing in cognitive science. A common premise is that theories in psychology should largely be constrained by a rational analysis of what the mind ought to do. We question this claim and argue that many of the important constraints come from biological, evolutionary, and processing (algorithmic) considerations that have no adaptive relevance to the problem per se. In our view, these factors have contributed to the development of many Bayesian "just so" stories in psychology and neuroscience; that is, mathematical analyses of cognition that can be used to explain almost any behavior as optimal.     

Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

We sketch a framework for building a unified science of cognition. This unification is achieved by showing how functional analyses of cognitive capacities can be integrated with the multilevel mechanistic explanations of neural systems. The core idea is that functional analyses are sketches of mechanisms, in which some structural aspects of a mechanistic explanation are omitted. Once the missing aspects are filled in, a functional analysis turns into a full-blown mechanistic explanation. By this process, functional analyses are seamlessly integrated with multilevel mechanistic explanations.     

Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience

How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases--when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority--and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is "Yes," then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is "Yes"? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.     

The institution of the institutional practice of psychology: health care reform and psychology's future workforce

Implications for the future of professional psychology are discussed and related to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, patient-centered health care homes and accountable care organizations, and the growing importance of interprofessional competencies in health care. The need for increased information about the psychology workforce is related to the history of the institutional practice of psychology and how that data must be used to plan for the supply of psychologists required to meet the service demands of the changing health care system. Several challenges to the field of psychology are offered, along with steps that must be taken by the profession to prepare for increased institutionally based health care services in the future. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).     

Re-imagining motor imagery: building bridges between cognitive neuroscience and sport psychology

One of the most remarkable capacities of the mind is its ability to simulate sensations, actions, and other types of experience. A mental simulation process that has attracted recent attention from cognitive neuroscientists and sport psychologists is motor imagery or the mental rehearsal of actions without engaging in the actual physical movements involved. Research on motor imagery is important in psychology because it provides an empirical window on consciousness and movement planning, rectifies a relative neglect of non-visual types of mental imagery, and has practical implications for skill learning and skilled performance in special populations (e.g., athletes, surgeons). Unfortunately, contemporary research on motor imagery is hampered by a variety of semantic, conceptual, and methodological issues that prevent cross-fertilization of ideas between cognitive neuroscience and sport psychology. In this paper, we review these issues, suggest how they can be resolved, and sketch some potentially fruitful new directions for inter-disciplinary research in motor imagery.     

The seven sins of memory. Insights from psychology and cognitive neuroscience

Though often reliable, human memory is also fallible. This article examines how and why memory can get us into trouble. It is suggested that memory's misdeeds can be classified into 7 basic "sins": transience, absentmindedness, blocking, misattribution, suggestibility, bias, and persistence. The first three sins involve different types of forgetting, the next three refer to different types of distortions, and the final sin concerns intrusive recollections that are difficult to forget. Evidence is reviewed concerning each of the 7 sins from relevant sectors of psychology (cognitive, social, and clinical) and from cognitive neuroscience studies that include patients with focal brain damage or make use of recently developed neuroimaging techniques. Although the 7 sins may appear to reflect flaws in system design, it is argued instead that they are by-products of otherwise adaptive features of memory.     

Peer relationships in counseling psychology training

Twelve students from APA-accredited counseling psychology doctoral programs were interviewed about their experiences with peers in their program, and about their values and beliefs about peer relationships in graduate school. Interview data were analyzed using consensual qualitative research. Participants reported a wide range of positive (e.g. collaborative and supportive) and negative (e.g. competitive and hostile) interactions with peers inside and outside of the classroom, in research, and in clinical work. Compared to advisory and supervisory relationships, peer relationships were typically less formal and more open. The sharing of common training experiences generally facilitated mutual understanding among trainees. In addition, a visual analog scale, the peer relationship scale (PRS), was used to measure participants’ closeness with peers. Results from the PRS appeared to be useful in distinguishing participants with the most positive and negative peer relationships, warranting further investigation of its psychometric properties and application in program evaluation and research on training. Implications for training are discussed.     

BACS: The Brussels Artificial Character Sets for studies in cognitive psychology and neuroscience

Written symbols such as letters have been used extensively in cognitive psychology, whether to understand their contributions to written word recognition or to examine the processes involved in other mental functions. Sometimes, however, researchers want to manipulate letters while removing their associated characteristics. A powerful solution to do so is to use new characters, devised to be highly similar to letters, but without the associated sound or name. Given the growing use of artificial characters in experimental paradigms, the aim of the present study was to make available the Brussels Artificial Character Sets (BACS): two full, strictly controlled, and portable sets of artificial characters for a broad range of experimental situations.     

Social outcomes in childhood brain disorder: a heuristic integration of social neuroscience and developmental psychology

The authors propose a heuristic model of the social outcomes of childhood brain disorder that draws on models and methods from both the emerging field of social cognitive neuroscience and the study of social competence in developmental psychology/psychopathology. The heuristic model characterizes the relationships between social adjustment, peer interactions and relationships, social problem solving and communication, social-affective and cognitive-executive processes, and their neural substrates. The model is illustrated by research on a specific form of childhood brain disorder, traumatic brain injury. The heuristic model may promote research regarding the neural and cognitive-affective substrates of children's social development. It also may engender more precise methods of measuring impairments and disabilities in children with brain disorder and suggest ways to promote their social adaptation.     

Two concepts of adaptation: Darwin's and psychology's

The paper takes issue with the traditional view of Darwin's influence on psychology; namely, that it is he who passed on to psychology the concept of individual adaptation. Three arguments are presented: a) that Darwin, qua scientist, was only interested in species adaptation, an entirely different concept from that of individual adaptation, b) that Darwin's writings on individual adaptation are so unexceptional that it is inconceivable that psychologists should have been influenced by them, and c) that the two concepts are logically incompatible since species adaptation presupposes a strict hereditary determinism, while individual adaptation conceives of the organism either as free and undetermined or else as determined by the environment.     

Accommodating religion to modern neuroscience

Science and religion commonly reside in either an awkward peaceful co-existence or in bitter conflict. That conflict emerges especially in college students as they acquire knowledge about physical, biological, and social sciences. Most college students bring their shallow childhood religious instruction to their college classes. Neuroscience can help students realise how their religious views are affected by their biology, conditioning, experiences, culture, education, emotions, and cognitive processes. In turn, religion can provide world views that challenge neuroscience and remind us of how much remains unknown and may even be unknowable. This report summarises the author’s three semesters’ experience of teaching an upper-division undergraduate essay and discussion course in which students discover how neuroscience and religion inform each other.