Daniel Stern: Microanalysis and the Empirical Infant Research Foundations

ABSTRACT

Daniel Stern changed the face of psychoanalysis, as well as that of infant research. He was a brilliant, innovative, and playful thinker. Psychoanalysis particularly values his contributions on the relevance of infant research to adult clinical practice and theory, for which he is best known. But this work has its foundation in his early empirical infant research, which is less well known. I believe that a better appreciation of the original empirical basis of his work using microanalysis will deepen our appreciation of his later thinking.

In this article I return to the beginning of his work, using frame-by-frame microanalysis of film and, particularly, his first paper published in 1971. I sketch out some of the important findings and ideas emerging from this paper that continued to influence his thinking throughout his career. This research was conducted in the 1970s, the period in which I worked with him directly.     

A Heideggerian Phenomenology Approach to Higher Education as Workplace: A Consideration of Academic Professionalism

Heidegger’s early works provide his most important contribution to our understanding of being, while his discussion of the effects of technology on that being in his later works is one of his best known contributions. I use his phenomenological approach to understanding the workplace and then, from a range of potential applications, choose to describe the functioning of higher education as a workplace for academic professionals. Heidegger seemingly fails to offer a subtle approach to what is labouring, or to whether there is a substantive difference between labouring and working. To find such approaches I draw upon work of both Marcuse and Arendt which specifically relates to these distinctions.     

Donald C. Williams’s defence of real metaphysics

In the middle of last century metaphysics was widely criticized, ridiculed, and committed to the flames. During this period a handful of philosophers, against several anti-metaphysical trends, defended metaphysics and articulated novel metaphysical doctrines. Donald C. Williams was one of these philosophers. But while his contributions to metaphysics are well known his defence of metaphysics is not and yet it played a key part in the development and revival of metaphysics. In this paper I present his defence of metaphysics in its historical context. I also show how his defence is relevant in response to recent attacks on metaphysics.     

A child of a Lesser God

This paper describes work with a man who was severely disabled physically. It taught me the profound emotional effects of such disability; but the effects of his feeling that he had not been loved because of his disability seemed even more important and farreaching. Everything was much worse because of the development stage at which it had all occurred. It is important to make known the use which he made of analytical psychotherapy, for others like him could be helped.

I refer to some of the psychoanalytical literature which proved relevant to my work with this patient, give a report of his case, and describe the incidence of his sessions. After describing the beginning stage, I write selectively of work around the two main themes which can be identified: one, when he seemed locked in the closed system which constituted his inner world (Fairbairn 1958) from which he could gain relief only by sabotaging himself and the therapy; the other, when little by little the system began to open and gradually some investment in life began to emerge. There is then a brief account of the ending planned to a known date. The paper ends with some reflections on the work.     

Use It—and Keep It, Longer, Probably: A Reply to Salthouse (2006)

ABSTRACT— In this article, I call into serious question Salthouse's (2006) conclusions evaluating and disparaging the validity of the "use it or lose it" hypothesis regarding mental exercise and mental aging. I do so, in some part, by using data not discussed by Salthouse. The core of my argument relies heavily on a critical assessment of the conclusions that Salthouse derived from both his theoretical reasoning and his review of the literature. The more judicious conclusion I reach is that, although the whole story regarding cognitive function and aging is not known, at some level and to some degree, "using" it often delays the eventuality of "losing" it.     

Peter McHugh’s Late Work

I focus on some of Peter McHugh’s most recent papers. This is work that is not yet widely known, some of which has not even been published as yet. I try to show that while the work does not in any way contradict his life-long commitments, it still has the capacity to be not at all predictable.     

Logic and Ontology in Hegel's Theory of Predication

In this paper I sketch some arguments that underlie Hegel's chapter on judgment, and I attempt to place them within a broad tradition in the history of logic. Focusing on his analysis of simple predicative assertions or ‘positive judgments’, I first argue that Hegel supplies an instructive alternative to the classical technique of existential quantification. The main advantage of his theory lies in his treatment of the ontological implications of judgments, implications that are inadequately captured by quantification. The second concern of this paper is the manner in which Hegel makes logic not only dependent on ontology generally, but also variant in regard to domains of objects. In other words, he offers a domain‐specific logical theory, according to which the form of judgment or inference is specific to the subject of judgment. My third concern lies with the metaphilosophical consequences of this theory, and this includes some more familiar Hegelian themes. It is well known that Hegel frequently questioned the adequacy of the sentential form for expressing higher order truths. My reading of his theory of predication explains and contextualizes this tendency by demystifying notions like the so‐called speculative proposition.     

Paul Meehl as methodologist-philosopher of science: the formulation of metascience

Paul Meehl's contributions to methodology and the philosophy of science extend well beyond his widely known writings in such areas as construct validity and statistical significance testing. I describe one of Meehl's less well-known, but potentially most important, methodological undertakings: his work on metascience, or the science of science. Metascience could ultimately revolutionize our conceptualizations and understanding of science and provide considerable help to practicing scientists and scientific endeavors, including efforts to advance the development and appraisal of theories in psychology.     

Perception and practical knowledge

According to G.E.M. Anscombe, an agent's knowledge of his own intentional actions differs from his knowledge of his unintended behaviors as well as the knowledge others can have of what he intentionally does, in being known “without observation”. I begin by posing a problem for any conception of this theory according to which non-observational knowledge must be independent of sense perception, and criticize several recent attempts to get around the problem. Having done this, I develop an alternative account of non-observational knowledge according to which it consists in the particular causal role of an agent's self-awareness in bringing his intentional actions about.     

MICHAEL POLANYI'S DEFENSE OF SPONTANEOUS ORDER

Michael Polanyi is best known for his work in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Less frequently discussed, but still a significant aspect of his work, is his political theory. He is an advocate of a free society which is based on "spontaneous order." This concept is apparent in an early collection of essays entitled The Logic of Liberty , and is emphasized again in his last book, Meaning. In the latter work, Polanyi's method of argumentation involves citing three objections to the endorsement of spontaneous order, and then offering a rebuttal to each. His discussion in this regard, while brief, provides an excellent opportunity for insight into a pivotal topic in his politics. In what follows here I will offer first a brief summary of Polanyi's position on spontaneous order and certain related concepts. Then I will examine his responses to the three objections he poses, and point out their deficiencies. Involved are a commonplace logical fallacy, the tendency to underestimate the power of economic interests and egoistic motivations, and, ultimately, an overstated and untenable epistemological position which does not adequately support, but instead undermines, his political position.     

A Life with Roots: Narrative Pastoral Care and Communities of Identity in the Parable of the “Good Soil”

This article interprets the parable traditionally known as the parable of the sower by arguing that it is actually a parable focusing on good soil. It analyzes the parable??s placement next to Gospel narratives in which Jesus redefines his kin network and maintains that the good soil metaphor suggests ideal conditions of growth in which persons surround themselves with consciously chosen communities of support that help them to live out God??s purposes in their lives. Using Michael White??s re-membering conversations, I indicate how pastoral caregivers and psychotherapists can help persons use their previous mentorship relationships as a source of support and motivation. Finally, I argue, using Donald Capps??s psychological reconstructions based on historical Jesus scholarship, that Jesus?? emphasis on his new relationships in the Kingdom of God is best understood in relationship to his struggles with father absence.     

Identification and Quasi-Desires

Abstract

Although the standard objections to Harry Frankfurt's early hierarchical analysis of identification and its variants are well known, more recent work on identification has yet to be subjected to the same degree of scrutiny. To remedy this I develop in this paper objections to Frankfurt's most recent analysis of identification as satisfaction that he first outlined in his paper ‘The Faintest Passion’. With such objections in place I show that they demonstrate that Frankfurt's analysis fails because it is based on the attitudes that the person whose identification with his desires is in question adopts towards them. I then develop a new (objective and cognitive) analysis that avoids the difficulties that Frankfurt's subjective approach is prey to. I conclude by considering and rebutting some preliminary objections to this new analysis.     

Two Portraits of the Humean Moral Agent

Among contemporary ethicists, Hume is perhaps best known for his views about morality's practical import and his spectator–centered account of moral evaluation. Yet according to the so–called "spectator complaint", these two aspects of Hume's moral theory cannot be reconciled with one another. I argue that the answer to the spectator complaint lies in Hume's account of "goodness" and "greatness of mind". Through a discussion of these two virtues, Hume makes clear the connection between his views about moral motivation and his understanding of moral evaluation by providing us with two portraits of the Humean moral agent.     

The rise and fall of Hugo Münsterberg

This article addresses the turbulent life of the German-American philosopher and psychologist Hugo Miinsterberg in Germany and his role in founding the psychological laboratories at Freiburg and Harvard. He is best known for his contributions to forensic, industrial, and the “new” experimental psychology. Over a span of twenty years (1897–1916), Miinsterberg rose to become the leading psychologist in the US. When he turned his attention to cultural and political issues, particulary his efforts on behalf of a mutual understanding between Germany and America, he had a serious break with the Harvard administration and later, his colleagues. An advocate for world peace, his final years were marred by World War I which left him embittered and socially isolated. Judged harshly at the time, he is now receiving the recognition that posterity did not tender him.     

INTEREST‐RELATIVE INVARIANTISM AND KNOWLEDGE FROM IGNORANCE

The principle of Counter‐Closure embodies the widespread view that when a proposition is believed solely as the conclusion of single‐premise deduction, it can be known only if the premise is also known. I raise a problem for the compatibility of Jason Stanley's Interest‐Relative Invariantism (IRI) with Counter‐Closure. I explore the landscape of options that might help Stanley resolve this tension and argue that a trilemma confronts Stanley: he must either (i) renounce a key intuition that lies at the foundation of his view; or (ii) admit into his epistemology an IRI‐specific novel brand of Gettier case; or (iii) abandon Counter‐Closure.     

The Duty of Self‐Knowledge

Kant is well known for claiming that we can never really know our true moral disposition. He is less well known for claiming that the injunction “Know Yourself” is the basis of all self‐regarding duties. Taken together, these two claims seem contradictory. My aim in this paper is to show how they can be reconciled. I first address the question of whether the duty of self‐knowledge is logically coherent (§1). I then examine some of the practical problems surrounding the duty, notably, self‐deception (§2). Finding none of Kant’s solutions to the problem of self‐deception satisfactory, I conclude by defending a Kantian account of self‐knowledge based on his theory of conscience (§3).     

HAUERWAS AMONG THE VIRTUES

Despite the fact that Stanley Hauerwas has not taken up many of the topics normally associated with virtue ethics, has explicitly distanced himself from the enterprise known as “virtue ethics,” and throughout his career has preferred other categories of analysis, ranging from character and agency to practices and liturgy, it is nevertheless clear that his work has had a deep and transformative impact on the recovery of virtue within Christian ethics, and that this impact has largely to do with the ways in which his thought resists normalization. This essay traces the evolution of Hauerwas's reflections on virtue and the virtues over the course of his career, with special attention to how this has been bound up with an increasingly emphatic theological particularism that has remained ambivalent between what I term “comprehensive” versus “exclusive” particularism. I argue that it is important to distinguish between these, and suggest that grasping the destructive tendencies of “exclusive” particularism should cement our commitment to shouldering the responsibilities associated with comprehensive particularism.     

Life Stories of Latvian Lutheran Pastors

I have interviewed leading Latvian pastors and present here a series of autobiographical tributes in grateful recognition of their work. When I look at the typed pages on my table, it seems strange to me that it could all fit on a few sheets of paper: the pain, the suffering, the love and the victory, many victories. These pages are the fruit of long conversations with people I had known for many years - now I think I had not really known them before. Their deepest thoughts and longings had been hidden from the casual enquirer. For the first time in my life I have played the part of the journalist, one who enquires with the purpose of understanding and communicating this knowledge to others. A mysterious, even sacramental world has revealed itself to me: the world of the human soul, the world of a pastor's soul as he leads his flock through vicissitudes to the green pastures of heavenly life here on earth. I asked myself whether the pastors had always known the way, whether they had always seen the mighty hand of God in action. I was reminded that these people are our neighbours too; that as human beings it is they who sometimes need our help. The Latvian people owe their freedom to their pastors. I would like this brief collection to be a gesture of thanks to all the other pastors whose stories have not been told.