共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Carl Ginet 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2000,34(S14):267-277
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Strawsonians about moral responsibility often claim that our practices of holding morally responsible fix the facts of moral responsibility, rather than the other way round. Many have argued that such ‘reversal’ claims have an unwelcome consequence: If our practices of holding morally responsible fix the facts of moral responsibility, does this not imply, absurdly, that if we held severely mentally ill people responsible, they would be responsible? We provide a new Strawsonian answer to this question, and we explore the relation between reversal claims and (in)compatibilism. 相似文献
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Brandon Warmke 《Philosophia》2011,39(1):179-200
Moral responsibility invariantism is the view that there is a single set of conditions for being morally responsible for an
action (or omission or consequence of an act or omission) that applies in all cases. I defend this view against some recent
arguments by Joshua Knobe and John Doris. 相似文献
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J. Angelo Corlett 《Journal of social philosophy》2001,32(4):573-584
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Thomasma DC 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2000,21(3):235-260
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - 相似文献
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Stefaan E. Cuypers 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2013,16(1):173-188
In the debate on free will and moral responsibility, Saul Smilansky is a hard source-incompatibilist who objects to source-compatibilism for being morally shallow. After criticizing John Martin Fischer’s too optimistic response to this objection, this paper dissipates the charge that compatibilist accounts of ultimate origination are morally shallow by appealing to the seriousness of contingency in the framework of, what Paul Russell calls, compatibilist-fatalism. Responding to the objection from moral shallowness thus drives a wedge between optimists and fatalists within the compatibilist camp. 相似文献
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Jeremy Fischer 《Ratio》2017,30(2):181-196
Having the emotion of pride requires taking oneself to stand in some special relation to the object of pride. According to agency accounts of this pride relation, the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one is morally responsible for the existence or excellence of the object of one's pride. I argue that agency accounts fail. This argument provides a strong prima facie defence of an alternate account of pride, according to which the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one's relation to the object of pride indicates that one's life accords with some of one's personal ideals. I conclude that the pride relation, though distinct from the relation of moral responsibility, is nonetheless a relation of philosophical interest that merits further attention. 1 … the objects which excite these passions [pride and humility], are very numerous, and seemingly very different from each other. Pride or self‐esteem may arise from the qualities of the mind; wit, good‐sense, learning, courage, integrity: from those of the body; beauty, strength, agility, good mien, address in dancing, riding, fencing: from external advantages; country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths. [I] afterwards proceed to find out that common circumstance, in which all these objects agree, and which causes them to operate on the passions. —David Hume 2 相似文献
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ZHANG Ke 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2018,13(3):420
In section 1, I will describe how moral responsibility requires normative competence. In section 2, I will introduce an influential social psychology experiment and consider one of its philosophical interpretations, situationism. In section 3, I will discuss the possession response in defense of normative competence. This is an approach to save normative competence via possession, and in turn the concept of the morally responsible agent, by relinquishing the need for exercising normative competence. After discussing its pros and cons, section 4 will focus on the exercise response, which emphasizes each singular exercise of normative competence. Given these two responses, I will argue that we are faced with a dilemma. If we admit that the concept of the morally responsible agent is grounded in the mere possession of normative competence, then the concept becomes useless in a practical sense, forcing us to embrace a concept that is tied to the exercise of normative competence. If we admit that the morally responsible agent is grounded in only the exercise of normative competence, the concept of the morally responsible agent no longer aligns with common sense. 相似文献
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Fischer on Moral Responsibility 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
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《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(2):240-241
Book Information Suffering and Moral Responsibility. Suffering and Moral Responsibility Meyerfeld Jamie New York Oxford University Press ix + 237 Hardback £35 By Meyerfeld Jamie. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. ix + 237. Hardback:£35, 相似文献
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The self‐deceived are usually held to be moral responsible for their state. I argue that this attribution of responsibility makes sense only against the background of the traditional conception of self‐deception, a conception that is now widely rejected. In its place, a new conception of self‐deception has been articulated, which requires neither intentional action by self‐deceived agents, nor that they posses contradictory beliefs. This new conception has neither need nor place for attributions of moral responsibility to the self‐deceived in paradigmatic cases. Accordingly, we should take the final step toward abandoning the traditional conception, and drop the automatic attribution of responsibility. Self‐deception is simply a kind of mistake, and has no more necessary connection to culpability than have other intellectual errors. 相似文献
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A. P. Duggan 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2018,21(2):291-309
It is often alleged that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves a negative interpersonal response for that transgression, blaming responses such as resentment and indignation being paradigms. Aside from a few exceptions, guilt is cited in recent discussions of moral responsibility, if at all, as merely an effect of being blamed, or as a reliable indicator of moral responsibility, but not itself an explanation of moral responsibility. In this paper, I argue that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves to feel moral guilt for that transgression. I argue that this alternative view offers all that the predominant blame-focused view offers, while also solving some puzzling features of moral responsibility. Specifically, it offers a compelling way to reconcile conflicting intuitions about the suberogatory, and allows those who do not understand what Darwall calls ‘second-personal’ reasons to be morally responsible for their immoral acts. 相似文献