Darwin's lost theory and its implications for the 21st century

This paper reports the reconstruction of the long ignored “second half” or human level completion for Darwin's theory of evolution. Pursuing the striking contradictions between what has been attributed to Darwin by his neo‐Darwinian and sociobiological heirs and what he actually said, in ignored sections of The Descent of Man and Darwin's long unpublished notebooks it uncovers a three‐level theory of the moral agent that foreshadows the emergence of 20th century social science and the late 20th century rise of the fields of systems science and humanistic psychology. Implications for a joint venture of natural science and social science in the completion of the humanistic and action‐oriented theory of evolution called for by the species‐threatening challenges of the 21st century are considered.     

The Toronto Manifesto

Within the past century there were two major ventures to advance the building of a scientific theory of evolution. The first was the building of the neoDarwinian paradigm during the early part of the century. The second was the sociobiological paradigm late in the century. Both made important contributions to science, but at the same time both shared the same monumental blind side. Claiming the Darwinian heritage exclusively for themselves, they rigorously excluded everything that both in Darwin earlier and throughout the 20th century in the whole of science-particularly among creative evolution theorists across the full spectrum of science, that is in many fields linked together by a meeting ground in systems science-sought to expand evolution theory to capture the heights as well as the depths embraced by the actuality of humanity, as our species' potential, and of nature.     

Development and learning: An historical perspective on acquisition of motor control

A historical overview on infant motor development is provided, using the concepts of learning and development as a vehicle to travel from Darwin, through the 20th century till today. The different theoretical perspectives are highlighted with attention to how the two concepts are treated.     

Expanding the study of U.S. religion: Reflections on the state of a subfield

The study of U.S. religion, which dates from the 19th century, expanded its sources, methods, and scope during the last quarter of the 20th century, as specialists offered more inclusive historical narratives. That methodological expansion never went far enough, however, and the impulse toward narrative inclusiveness has been restrained in recent years. The subfield, I argue, now faces a number of challenges that also confront other specializations in the study of religiondcontraction, overspecialization, fragmentation, and parochialism. After a focused overview of the subfield's history, I discuss those challenges. Proposing a tentative response, I suggest that specialists celebrate methodological diversity and theoretical sophistication, encourage comparative and translocative studies, and increase collaboration across disciplinary boundaries and national borders. Finally, I suggest that we expand the subfield's temporal span and geographical scope and reframe the study of U.S. religion in terms of the Atlantic World, the Pacific World, and the Western Hemisphere     

Expanding the study of U.S. religion: Reflections on the state of a subfield

The study of U.S. religion, which dates from the 19th century, expanded its sources, methods, and scope during the last quarter of the 20th century, as specialists offered more inclusive historical narratives. That methodological expansion never went far enough, however, and the impulse toward narrative inclusiveness has been restrained in recent years. The subfield, I argue, now faces a number of challenges that also confront other specializations in the study of religion—contraction, overspecialization, fragmentation, and parochialism. After a focused overview of the subfield’s history, I discuss those challenges. Proposing a tentative response, I suggest that specialists celebrate methodological diversity and theoretical sophistication, encourage comparative and translocative studies, and increase collaboration across disciplinary boundaries and national borders. Finally, I suggest that we expand the subfield’s temporal span and geographical scope and reframe the study of U.S. religion in terms of the Atlantic World, the Pacific World, and the Western Hemisphere.     

JOHN LOCKE: BETWEEN CHARITY AND WELFARE RIGHTS

In the past quarter century C. B. MacPherson's reading of Locke has enjoyed a wide appeal. We are all by now familiar with Locke as the ardent proponent of possessive individualism, with its accompanying acquisitive tendencies and egoism. To be sure, MacPherson's interpretation has not gone unopposed. Of late it has been challenged in all its fundamentals by the scholarly and ingenious work of James Tully. Far from seeing Locke as providing the theoretical underpinnings for unbridled capitalism, Tully puts forward the view that Locke was sympathetic to the possibility of radical redistributive measures. That is, that he was not in principle opposed to rights to welfare.     

On the evolution of handedness: a speculative analysis of Darwin's views and a review of early studies of handedness in "the nearest allies of man"

Scientists today who seek clues into the evolutionary origins of human handedness make extensive use of evidence from comparative studies, that is, studies that ask whether handedness occurs in other species, especially apes and monkeys, as the Darwinian principle of continuity would seem to imply, or whether it is uniquely human. Early investigations had the same goal and drew on much the same kind of evidence. In this article, I review studies of animal handedness in the period before 1859, when Darwin published On the Origin of Species, and afterward, through the 1st decade of the 20th century. Inasmuch as Darwin's published writings contain hardly any statements about handedness and none at all about its evolution and continuity across species, I also speculate about what Darwin himself might have said on the subject. To do this, I draw on his statements on related matters, such as the form and structure of the hand and the transition from a quadrupedal to bipedal stance, on other writers' reports and opinions about handedness with which he was familiar or likely to have been familiar, and finally, on clues from his own and only statement about animal handedness in an unpublished letter. I conclude by asking whether and how early investigators, lacking any statement by Darwin on the evolution of handedness, invoked his theory of evolution and his views on related matters in the interpretation of their findings.     

Darwin's mistake: explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds

Over the last quarter century, the dominant tendency in comparative cognitive psychology has been to emphasize the similarities between human and nonhuman minds and to downplay the differences as "one of degree and not of kind" (Darwin 1871). In the present target article, we argue that Darwin was mistaken: the profound biological continuity between human and nonhuman animals masks an equally profound discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. To wit, there is a significant discontinuity in the degree to which human and nonhuman animals are able to approximate the higher-order, systematic, relational capabilities of a physical symbol system (PSS) (Newell 1980). We show that this symbolic-relational discontinuity pervades nearly every domain of cognition and runs much deeper than even the spectacular scaffolding provided by language or culture alone can explain. We propose a representational-level specification as to where human and nonhuman animals' abilities to approximate a PSS are similar and where they differ. We conclude by suggesting that recent symbolic-connectionist models of cognition shed new light on the mechanisms that underlie the gap between human and nonhuman minds.     

History and future directions of human brain mapping and functional neuroimaging

It has long been known that there is some degree of localisation of function in the human brain, as indicated by the effects of traumatic head injury. Work in the middle of the 20th century, notably the direct cortical stimulation of patients during neurosurgery, suggested that the degree and specificity of such localisation of function were far greater than had earlier been imagined. One problem with the data based on lesions and direct stimulation was that the work depended on the study of what were, by definition, damaged brains. During the second half of the 20th century, a collection of relatively non-invasive tools for assessing and localising human brain function in healthy volunteers has led to an explosion of research in what is often termed "Brain Mapping". The present article reviews some of the history associated with these tools, but emphasises the current state of development with speculation about the future.     

“Stand Up Straight”: Notes Toward a History of Posture

The essay presents a set of interlinked claims about posture in modern culture. Over the past two centuries it has come to define a wide range of assumptions in the West from what makes human beings human (from Lamarck to Darwin and beyond) to the efficacy of the body in warfare (from Dutch drill manuals in the 17th century to German military medical studies of soldiers in the 19th century). Dance and sport both are forms of posture training in terms of their own claims. Posture separates ‘primitive’ from ‘advanced’ peoples and the ‘ill’ from the ‘healthy.’ Indeed an entire medical sub-specialty developed in which gymnastics defined and recuperated the body. But all of these claims were also part of a Western attempt to use posture (and the means of altering it) as the litmus test for the healthy modern body of the perfect citizen. Focusing on the centrality of posture in two oddly linked moments of modern thought—modern Zionist thought and Nationalism in early 20th century China—in terms of bodily reform, we show how “posture” brings all of the earlier debates together to reform the body.     

Apperception in primed problem solving

Mental representation is a central theoretical concept in modern cognitive psychology. However, its investigation has been predominantly based on inapt perceptualist concepts, which presume that information contents in them, i.e., mental contents, solely arise from stimulus. This is in spite of the evidence that much in human thought does not have any sensory equivalence. Consequently, we make a difference between perception and apperception, as e.g., Kant and Wundt did, and argue in favor of a detailed analysis of this mental process that is responsible for the construction of representations. We present here five primed problem solving experiments. The basic idea was to demonstrate that depending on priming information people represent perceptually identical stimuli very differently, i.e., they ascribe different uses and meanings to objects and they integrate them differently to compose distinct solutions. In this vein, we demonstrate that people regularly rely on information, which is not or cannot be perceived in principle. On the ground of our empirical findings, we resurrect the issue on why the difference between perception and apperception is theoretically adequate and introduce some central concepts for the theoretical analysis of apperception such as "seeing as" and functional binding.     

The phenomenological-existential comprehension of chronic pain: going beyond the standing healthcare models

A distinguishing characteristic of the biomedical model is its compartmentalized view of man. This way of seeing human beings has its origin in Greek thought; it was stated by Descartes and to this day it still considers humans as beings composed of distinct entities combined into a certain form. Because of this observation, one began to believe that the focus of a health treatment could be exclusively on the affected area of the body, without the need to pay attention to patient’s subjectivity. By seeing pain as a merely sensory response, this model was not capable of encompassing chronic pain, since the latter is a complex process that can occur independently of tissue damage. As of the second half of the twentieth century, when it became impossible to deny the relationship between psyche and soma, the current understanding of chronic pain emerges: that of chronic pain as an individual experience, the result of a sum of physical, psychological, and social factors that, for this reason, cannot be approached separately from the individual who expresses pain. This understanding has allowed a significant improvement in perspective, emphasizing the characteristic of pain as an individual experience. However, the understanding of chronic pain as a sum of factors corresponds to the current way of seeing the process of falling ill, for its conception holds a Cartesian duality and the positivist premise of a single reality. For phenomenology, on the other hand, the individual in his/her unity is more than a simple sum of parts. Phenomenology sees a human being as an intending entity, in which body, mind, and the world are intertwined and constitute each other mutually, thus establishing the human being’s integral functioning. Therefore, a real understanding of the chronic pain process would only be possible from a phenomenological point of view at the experience lived by the individual who expresses and communicates pain.     

Cultural continuity and cultural hegemony: Italian Catholics in New Jersey and New York, 1880–1940

In this essay I trace the theological continuity evident in Italian Catholic traditions. This line of continuity has its immediate historical origins in the religious forms of Italian rural folk. Those practices were then taken to New Jersey and New York in the closing decades of the 19th century, where they remained in evidence until well into the 20th century. The emotional configuration of the peasant in a traditional society remained as the emotional configuration of the Italian-American worker. The way in which peasants contextualized their theological lives in rural Italy was similar to the way they did so in America, for in the latter, as in the former, class subordination remained a central reality of daily life. Despite that subordination, peasants and workers achieved an air of dignity through the construction of Catholic practices which served to undermine further attempts to implement ideological domination.     

Does Animal Ethics Need a Darwinian Revolution?

A frequent argument is that Darwin’s theory of evolution has or should revolutionize our conception of the relation between humans and animals, though society has yet to take account of that revolution in our treatment of animals. On this view, after Darwin demonstrated the essential continuity of humans and animals, traditional morality must be rejected as speciesist in seeing humans as fundamentally distinct from other animals. In fact, the argument is of dubious merit. While there is plenty of room for improving our treatment of animals, it is unlikely that these shortcomings can be blamed on scientific ignorance, or that knowledge of the theory of evolution has any clear moral implications for our treatment of animals.     

Mathematics in Economics: An Austrian Methodological Critique

Even the briefest and most superficial perusal of leading mainstream economics journals will attest to the degree that mathematical formalism has captured the economics profession. Whereas up to the early 20th century virtually all of the output of the dismal scientists was in the literary format, by the early 21st century this is not at all any longer the case. Mathematical formalism is supposed to serve economics, and yet now true economic insight has been crowded out by the math. If mainstream neoclassical economics is to come back to its proper path, a far less central role for mathematical economics, statistics and econometrics will have to be fashioned.     

Response

The theme of love has long been neglected in studies on African myths. The often-heard explanation is that African myths and folktales do not tell stories about love because they primarily express social interests and obligations while love ‐ intended as both emotional imperative and biological drive ‐ is an individual need and feeling. This latter definition relies on a very specific understanding of ‘love’: the Romantic love of 19th century European novels. This paper argues that when love means attraction, affection, passion, and necessity, it turns up as liaisons dangereuses in many African narratives. Love becomes a driving force that generates gender constructions by reinforcing the unity of the couple or by fuelling the struggle between partners. In the case of Kabyle narratives (Algeria),1 conceptualisations of love as well as the relationships between myths and folktales are explored by analyzing formula tales2 and the only known collection of Kabyle Berber myths: those collected by Leo Frobenius, ethnologist and historian of religion, at the beginning of the 20th century and published in the first volume of his Volksmarchen der Kabylen in 1921. The discussion of the relationship between Kabyle myths and folktales touches upon a well-known interpretative problem in the study of religion: the articulation of myth and ritual with history as communities respond to sweeping social, political, and religious changes, such as the coming of Islam, colonization, decolonization, and globalization.     

The role of peripheral and central visual information for the directional control of manual aiming movements.

Seeing one's hand in visual periphery has been shown to optimize the directional accuracy of a sweeping hand movement, which is consistent with Paillard's (1980; Paillard & Amblard, 1985) two-channels model of visual information processing. However, contrary to this model, seeing one's hand in central vision, even for a brief period of time, also resulted in optimal directional accuracy. One goal of the present study was to test two opposing hypotheses proposed to explain the latter finding. As a second goal, we wanted to determine whether additional support could be found for the existence of a visual kinetic channel. The results indicated that seeing one's hand in central vision, even for a very short delay, resulted in the same accuracy as being permitted to see one's hand for the duration of the whole movement. This suggests that seeing one's hand around the target might enable one to code its location and that of the target within a single frame of reference and, thus, facilitate movement planning. In addition, the results of the present study indicated that seeing one's hand in motion while in visual periphery permitted a better directional accuracy than when this information was not available. This suggests that the movement vector, which is planned prior to movement initiation, can be quickly updated following movement initiation.     

In Search of a Conceptualization of Multiple Sclerosis: A Historical Perspective

A thorough understanding of Multiple Sclerosis (MS) is necessary to offer individuals informed options for treatment and planning. To assist in this quest, the following historical analysis examined how MS has been conceived from the 14th century through the early 20th century. Primary sources were consulted whenever possible, and many of the original archival materials were accessed by the first author (MB) during an on-site visit to the Rare Book Room of the New York Academy of Medicine. There is a striking similarity between how MS symptoms have presented throughout history compared with the 21st century. Sensorimotor and cognitive sequelae have been observed in patients since the 1800s. Cognitive symptoms were acknowledged in the 1800s, but disregarded in the early 1900s and were not given recognition again until the latter part of the 20th century. If conceptualizations of MS are inaccurate, patients will not be served well. In contrast to the shared symptomatology across time, early conceptualizations of etiology and treatment choices differed dramatically from today, a genuine reflection of the times in which they were created.     

The embodiment of reconciliation: order and change in the work of Frederic Bartlett

Frederic Bartlett (1886-1969) was one of the most prominent figures in British academic psychology during the 20th century. His psychological work has had a mixed reception, but there is no doubt that it continues to be much cited. Bartlett and his work have also attracted considerable historical attention both within history of ideas accounts and in attempts to understand the establishment of British academic psychology. The present article argues that new light can be shed on Bartlett's writings by seeing them as repeatedly grappling with 2 interrelated themes: the preservation of order and the adjustment to changing conditions. The article illustrates the ways in which these themes ran through his major works and informed some of his key theoretical concepts before going on to examine some of the potential sources for these themes.     

Toward a Science of Other Minds: Escaping the Argument by Analogy

Since Darwin, the idea of psychological continuity between humans and other animals has dominated theory and research in investigating the minds of other species. Indeed, the field of comparative psychology was founded on two assumptions. First, it was assumed that introspection could provide humans with reliable knowledge about the causal connection between specific mental states and specific behaviors. Second, it was assumed that in those cases in which other species exhibited behaviors similar to our own, similar psychological causes were at work. In this paper, we show how this argument by analogy is flawed with respect to the case of second‐order mental states. As a test case, we focus on the question of how other species conceive of visual attention, and in particular whether chimpanzees interpret seeing as a mentalistic event involving internal states of perception, attention, and belief. We conclude that chimpanzees do not reason about seeing in this manner, and indeed, there is considerable reason to suppose that they do not harbor representations of mental states in general. We propose a reinterpretation model in which the majority of the rich social behaviors that humans and other primates share in common emerged long before the human lineage evolved the psychological means of interpreting those behaviors in mentalistic terms. Although humans, chimpanzees, and most other species may be said to possess mental states, humans alone may have evolved a cognitive specialization for reasoning about such states.