Pleasures and subjective well‐being

In two daily diary studies we examined the moderating role of sensation seeking in the patterns of relations between physical pleasure and life satisfaction. In study 1 (a 52‐day daily diary study), daily physical pleasure was a significantly stronger predictor of daily social satisfaction among high sensation seekers than among low sensation seekers. We extended the finding of study 1 to more general daily satisfaction in study 2 (a 23‐day diary study). The present findings indicate that physical pleasure is associated with daily satisfaction to the degree that one seeks for such an experience. In addition, we tested whether the association between physical pleasure and daily satisfaction would be moderated also by other facets of extraversion and extraversion as a whole. With the exception of the positive emotion facet in study 1, no facet or extraversion as a whole moderated the relation between physical pleasure and daily satisfaction. The present studies show specificity and replicability of the role that sensation seeking plays in understanding the link between daily physical pleasure and daily satisfaction. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pleasures of the brain

How does the brain cause positive affective reactions to sensory pleasure? An answer to pleasure causation requires knowing not only which brain systems are activated by pleasant stimuli, but also which systems actually cause their positive affective properties. This paper focuses on brain causation of behavioral positive affective reactions to pleasant sensations, such as sweet tastes. Its goal is to understand how brain systems generate 'liking,' the core process that underlies sensory pleasure and causes positive affective reactions. Evidence suggests activity in a subcortical network involving portions of the nucleus accumbens shell, ventral pallidum, and brainstem causes 'liking' and positive affective reactions to sweet tastes. Lesions of ventral pallidum also impair normal sensory pleasure. Recent findings regarding this subcortical network's causation of core 'liking' reactions help clarify how the essence of a pleasure gloss gets added to mere sensation. The same subcortical 'liking' network, via connection to brain systems involved in explicit cognitive representations, may also in turn cause conscious experiences of sensory pleasure.     

The influence of sphincter control and genital sensation on body image and gender identity in women.

The development of one aspect of feeling female is hypothesized to account for certain phenomena in the treatment of young women patients. Fear of loss of genital pleasure experienced as contractions of the anal and genital-urinary sphincters is seen as the central issue in conflicts manifested in genital, oral, and anal modalities. It is suggested that the female's awareness of her genital arises from the generalization of sphincter sensation in the little girl, which is then represented in the body image. The body image is postulated as a link between genital pleasure and the valuing of femininity.     

The authority of pleasure

The aim of the paper is to reassess the prospects of a widely neglected affective conception of the aesthetic evaluation and appreciation of art. On the proposed picture, the aesthetic evaluation and appreciation of art are non‐contingently constituted by a particular kind of pleasure. Artworks that are valuable qua artworks merit, deserve, and call for a certain pleasure, the same pleasure that reveals (or at least purports to reveal) them to be valuable in the way that they are, and constitutes their aesthetic evaluation and appreciation. This is why and how art is non‐contingently related to pleasure. Call this, the Affective View. While I don't advance conclusive arguments for the affective view in this paper, I aim to reassess its prospects by (1) undermining central objections against it, (2) dissociating it from hedonism about the value of artworks (the view that this value is grounded in, and explained by, its possessors’ power to please), and (3) introducing some observations on the practice of art in support of it. Given that the objections I discuss miss their target, and given the observations in support of it, I conclude that the affective view is worth serious reconsideration.     

Deprivation and the See-saw of Death

Abstract

Epicurus argued that death can be neither good nor bad because it involves neither pleasure nor pain. This paper focuses on the deprivation account as a response to this Hedonist Argument. Proponents of the deprivation account hold that Epicurus’s argument fails even if death involves no painful or pleasurable experiences and even if the hedonist ethical system, which holds that pleasure and pain are all that matter ethically, is accepted. I discuss four objections that have been raised against the deprivation account and argue that this response to Epicurus’s argument is successful once it has been sufficiently clarified.     

Hedonism and Happiness

Hedonism is a way of life, characterised by openness to pleasurable experience. There are many qualms about hedonism. It is rejected on moral grounds and said to be detrimental to long-term happiness. Several mechanisms for this 'paradox of hedonism' have been suggested and telling examples of pleasure seekers ending up in despair have been given. But is that the rule? If so, how much pleasure is too much? An overview of the available knowledge is given in this paper. The relation between hedonism and happiness has been studied at two levels: that of the nation and the individual. At the national level average happiness is correlated with moral acceptance of pleasure and with active leisure. At the individual level it is similarly linked with hedonistic attitudes and also correlated with hedonistic behaviours such as frequent sex and use of stimulants. In most cases the pattern is linearly positive. The relation between happiness and consumption of stimulants follows an inverted U-curve, spoilsports and guzzlers are less happy than modest consumers. Yet, these data cannot settle the issue, since the observed relations may be spurious or due to the effects of happiness on hedonism rather than the reverse. Even if we can prove a positive effect of (mild) hedonism on happiness, there is still the question of how that gains balances against a possible loss of health. A solution is to assess the effect of hedonistic living on the number of years lived happily.     

Discriminative touch and emotional touch.

Somatic sensation comprises four main modalities, each relaying tactile, thermal, painful, or pruritic (itch) information to the central nervous system. These input channels can be further classified as subserving a sensory function of spatial and temporal localization, discrimination, and provision of essential information for controlling and guiding exploratory tactile behaviours, and an affective function that is widely recognized as providing the afferent neural input driving the subjective experience of pain, but not so widely recognized as also providing the subjective experience of affiliative or emotional somatic pleasure of touch. The discriminative properties of tactile sensation are mediated by a class of fast-conducting myelinated peripheral nerve fibres--A-beta fibres--whereas the rewarding, emotional properties of touch are hypothesized to be mediated by a class of unmyelinated peripheral nerve fibres--CT afferents (C tactile)--that have biophysical, electrophysiological, neurobiological, and anatomical properties that drive the temporally delayed emotional somatic system. CT afferents have not been found in the glabrous skin of the hand in spite of numerous electrophysiological explorations of this area. Hence, it seems reasonable to conclude that they are lacking in the glabrous skin. A full understanding of the behavioural and affective consequences of the differential innervation of CT afferents awaits a fuller understanding of their function.     

The distinctive feeling theory of pleasure

In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. Second, by showing how it can answer two important objections that have been made to it. First, the famous worry that there is no felt similarity to all pleasant (or unpleasant) experiences (sometimes called ‘the heterogeneity objection’). Second, what I call ‘Findlay’s objection’, the claim that it cannot explain the nature of our attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain.     

神经美学视角的审美愉悦加工机制

审美对象特有的刺激属性会唤起观赏者特定的情绪或情感反应。个体在欣赏自然、艺术品和其他人类作品时会产生审美愉悦体验。审美愉悦-兴趣模型(PIA)认为, 审美愉悦体验包含审美过程中自动化加工阶段的审美愉悦和控制加工阶段的审美兴趣。近年来, 神经美学研究表明, 负责愉悦和奖赏的眶额叶皮层在审美过程中广泛激活, 是自动化加工阶段初级审美愉悦奖赏的神经基础, 而审美过程中纹状体亚回路中不同的连接和功能作用与两个阶段中审美愉悦的产生都有关联; 上述结果支持了审美愉悦-兴趣模型。但审美高峰体验时默认模式网络(DMN)相关脑区的激活和负责控制与理性思维的外侧前额叶皮层等脑区的失活, 提示在PIA模型强调的自动化加工阶段审美愉悦和控制加工阶段审美兴趣之上, 还有整合升华阶段的审美沉浸愉悦, PIA模型需得到进一步的扩展。未来研究应进一步检验审美愉悦认知加工模型及神经机制, 探索审美对创造力的影响机制和神经基础, 探讨不同审美经验愉悦机制的异同。     

From the Heterogeneity Problem to a Natural-Kind Approach to Pleasure

The heterogeneity problem, which stems from the alleged difficulty of finding out what all pleasant experiences have in common, is largely considered as a substantial issue in the philosophy of pleasure, one that is usually taken as the starting point for theorizing about the essence of pleasure. The goal of this paper is to move the focus away from the heterogeneity problem and toward an alternative approach to pleasure. To do this, I first show that, although the approach stemming from the heterogeneity problem has led to an interesting discussion about the essence of pleasure, it has usually endorsed an introspectionist methodology and other problematic assumptions that have led to doubtful results. I thus propose a natural-kind approach to pleasure, which seeks to determine what, if any, the natural kind of pleasure would consist in. This approach broadens the investigation of pleasure by enabling the use of a larger range of methodological tools, thus opening new promising directions for research.     

音乐愉悦体验的神经机制

愉悦情绪体验是音乐活动中最普遍的心理现象。通过系统回顾相关的神经科学研究, 认为音乐愉悦体验与大脑奖赏系统的活动有关, 并涉及伏隔核与听觉皮层等其他脑区的交互。在这个过程中, 多巴胺的传递与音乐愉悦体验存在因果联系。基于预期视角, 奖赏预测误差理论和音乐信息理论模型可以解释音乐愉悦体验的产生机制。未来研究应进一步检验伏隔核及各皮层在音乐愉悦体验中的功能, 并整合不同的预期理论。     

Life satisfaction and perception of happiness among university students

The aim of this essay has been the evaluation of three orientations towards happiness: pleasure, meaning and engagement, as well as their relation to life satisfaction and the perception of happiness in a sample of 320 university students. The results show that the most used kind of orientation towards happiness is pleasure, followed by meaning, and finally engagement. It has also been found that pleasure is the orientation most closely associated to happiness while engagement seems to be more related to life satisfaction. These findings aim to the distinction between the concepts of happiness and life satisfaction and lead the attention to the actions which can improve the levels of happiness.     

忧乐圆融：儒家忧乐思想的核心特质

儒家肯定感性忧乐的自然合理性,但是认为感性忧乐有待于外,陷溺于感性忧乐,容易使人流于以物役心的异化状态。儒家忧乐思想的根本形态是德性忧乐,德性忧乐的根据是本心自足之德性。儒家以德性之忧作为德行修养的内在心理动力,德性之乐是在德性彰明过程中本心情感的自然涌现,可以统摄和超越感性忧乐,实现忧乐圆融。     

PLEASURE AS THE STANDARD OF VIRTUE IN HUME's MORAL PHILOSOPHY1

Abstract: David Hume provides several accounts of moral virtue, all of which tie virtue to the experience of pleasure in the spectator. Hume believed that the appropriate pleasure for determinations of virtue was pleasure corrected by “the general point of view.” I argue that common ways of spelling this out leave the account open to the charge that it cannot account adequately for mistaken judgments of virtue. I argue that we need to see Hume as offering both a metaphysics and an epistemology of virtue, and that Hume's account of virtue can adequately account for mistakes if he is understood as offering a definition of virtue tied to pleasure, but pleasure understood externally.     

Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism

Hedonism and the desire-satisfaction theory of welfare (“desire satisfactionism”) are typically seen as archrivals in the contest over identifying what makes one’s life go best. It is surprising, then, that the most plausible form of hedonism just is the most plausible form of desire satisfactionism. How can a single theory of welfare be a version of both hedonism and desire satisfactionism? The answer lies in what pleasure is: pleasure is, in my view, the subjective satisfaction of desire. This thesis about pleasure is clarified and defended only after we proceed through the dialectics that get us to the most plausible forms of hedonism and desire satisfactionism.     

I Was Pleased a Moment Ago: How Pleasure Varies with Background and Foreground Reference Points

The pleasure of an outcome is often evaluated relative to salient reference points. In the background, increasing sequences of positive outcomes are more enjoyable than decreasing sequences. In the foreground, outcomes that could have been worse are often more enjoyable than those that could have been better. How does pleasure vary when both background and foreground reference points are salient? Using a repeated gambling task in which participants make a choice, learn the outcome, watch their cumulative earnings change, and rate the pleasure of the outcome, we explore this question. Pleasure depends on background and foreground reference points, but the immediate events tend to dominate. The relatively narrow focus on the most recent reference points leads to myopic pleasure. We offer a modified version of decision affect theory to account for the results and explore the implications for consumer satisfaction.     

舌尖上的“自虐”——食辣中的心理学问题

吃辣产生灼痛感, 却成为享乐。纯粹接触效应、良性自虐说等可诠释食辣的原因。食辣与感觉寻求、冒险、奖励敏感度、攻击和易怒的特质和心理状态密切相关。具身隐喻理论认为食辣的心理效应可能具身于身体的生理体验之中。食辣的脑基础涉及脑岛的岛短回和下丘脑, 但尚未发现更高级功能脑区的激活。未来研究可进一步挖掘食辣的心理根源, 深入探究食辣心理效应的具身隐喻机制和脑机制, 并开展食辣心理在感官营销和饮食文化营销领域的应用。     

The Amenability of Pleasure and Pain to Aggregation

According to several prominent philosophers, pleasure and pain come in measurable quantities. This thesis is controversial, however, and many philosophers have presented or felt compelled to respond to arguments for the conclusion that it is false. One important class of these arguments concerns the problem of aggregation, which says that if pleasure and pain were measurable quantities, then, by definition, it would be possible to perform various mathematical and statistical operations on numbers representing amounts of them. It is sometimes argued that such operations cannot be sensibly applied to pleasure and pain, and that sentences expressing such operations must be false or meaningless. The purpose of this paper is to present, explain, and rebut several versions of this argument. In the first section, I present a generic version of the argument. In the second section, I present a defense of its key premise based on a case involving comparisons of relief from pain, and explain why I think it fails. In the third section, I present and rebut another defense, based on a pair of analogies with temperature. In the final section, I present a third defense, based on an analogy with spatial distances. I then present my reasons for rejecting it. Along the way, I explain my reasons for thinking that pleasure and pain are amenable to interval measurement.     

Critique,Finitude and the Importance of Susceptibility: A Rossian Approach to Interpreting Kant on Pleasure

In this paper, I take Philip Rossi’s robust interpretation of critique as an interpretive guide for thinking generally about how to interpret Kant’s texts. I reflect first upon what might appear to be a minor technical issue: how best to translate the term Fähigheit when Kant utilizes it in reference to the human experience of pleasure and displeasure. Reflection upon this technical issue will, however, end up being a case study in how important it is when we are interpreting Kant’s texts to have Rossi’s focus on human finitude in the background. The terrain for these reflections on human finitude will be the realm of feelings of pleasure and displeasure. And the result will be that, counter to recent interpreters, like Elizondo (2014), who have suggested that Kant could welcome a thoroughly active conception of rational feeling, we must instead, as guided by Kant’s commitment to human finitude (and really his commitment to Transcendental Idealism itself), remember that every feeling for Kant—even the most rational of feelings, like the moral feeling of respect, or the pleasure he notes that we take in the proper functioning of one’s virtuous rational self—must be understood within the purview and constraints of the finite and sensibly-affected human being. I hope, then, that this brief reflection can be taken as one small piece of that larger story Rossi so aptly describes in his book, the story which answers the question of “What is critique?” in a way that insists upon but also simultaneously celebrates the centrality of finitude in human existence.