Influence of motivation,self-beliefs,and instructional practices on science achievement of adolescents in Canada

This study examined the effects of motivation to learn science, science self-beliefs, and science instructional practices on science achievement of 13,985 15-year-old students from 431 schools across Canada. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) analyses, while controlling for student- and school-level demographic characteristics, revealed the substantial predictive effects of motivation to learn science, science self-beliefs, and science instructional practices on science achievement of adolescents. Motivational beliefs—self-efficacy and self-concept—and enjoyment of science had substantial positive predictive effects on science achievement. In contrast, general interest in science had a negative predictive effect on science achievement in the context of other variables. Whereas science teaching using hands-on activities had a substantial positive predictive effect on science achievement, science teaching using student investigations had a substantial negative predictive effect in the context of other variables. The final HLM model indicated that only 8% of the variance in science achievement was between schools and 92% of the variance involved students within schools.     

Leading with ethics,aiming for policy: new opportunities for philosophy of science

The goal of this paper is to articulate and advocate for an enhanced role for philosophers of science in the domain of science policy as well as within the science curriculum. I argue that philosophy of science as a field can learn from the successes as well as the mistakes of bioethics and begin to develop a new model that includes robust contributions to the science classroom, research collaborations with scientists, and a role for public philosophy through involvement in science policy development. Through an analysis of two case studies, I illustrate how philosophers of science can make effective and productive contributions to science education as well as to interdisciplinary scientific research, and argue for the essential role of philosophers of science in the realm of science policy.     

初二学生的科学观及其与科学发现学习的关系

该研究旨在通过问卷法和实验法考察初二学生在自然科学领域中的认识论观念及其对学习过程和策略的影响.研究一发现,在科学的动态性、有限性、客观性、理论价值取向、公众性以及对科学的态度兴趣等六种基本观念上,初二学生总体上持有较混合的看法;对科学的积极态度与学习者的物理学习成绩相关显著.研究二考察了科学观对科学发现学习的影响.科学的公众性观念与灵活应用测验成绩相关显著,科学的客观性观念及智力水平对科学发现学习中的控制性实验策略有重要影响.     

Descartes as critic of Galileo's scientific methodology

Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science. However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science — one's general philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode, together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.     

关于另类科学哲学的思考

A prominent phenomenon in contemporary philosophy of science has been the unexpected rise of alternative philosophers of science. This article analyses in depth such alternative philosophers of science as Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, and Michel Foucault, summarizing the similarities and differences between alternative philosophies of science and traditional philosophy of science so as to unveil the trends in contemporary philosophy of science. With its different principles and foundation, alternative philosophy of science has made breakthroughs in terms of its field of vision, scope, and methodology, and its relationship with science has become more humanistic and pluralistic. Attention should be given to alternative perspectives in the contemporary philosophy of science, and research should be expanded into the fields of the epistemology of science and cognitive science, the sociology of scientific knowledge and scientific anthropology, the scientific cultural philosophy, and scientific ethics.     

当今医学科技的发展趋势及我国的发展战略

作为生命科学最重要组成部分的医学科学走向科技发展的新时代。在下个世纪,科研重点将向生命科学和生命医学转移。充分认识医学科学技术的地位和作用,及当代医学科技发展的主要趋势和特点,制定我国医学科学的发展战略,加强医学高技术的发展,对我国的医学科技发展将具有十分重要的意义。     

History,philosophy and science teaching what can be done in an undergraduate course?

This paper describes an attempt to introduce philosophy and history of science to pre-service science teachers. I argue briefly for the view that science in the schools cannot be taught without implicitly assuming a particular philosophy of science. Therefore, both philosophy and history of science are necessary components of undergraduate science education courses.     

Do gender–science stereotypes predict science identification and science career aspirations among undergraduate science majors?

The present research examined whether gender–science stereotypes were associated with science identification and, in turn, science career aspirations among women and men undergraduate science majors. More than 1,700 students enrolled in introductory science courses completed measures of gender–science stereotypes (implicit associations and endorsement of male superiority in science), science identification, and science career aspirations. Results were consistent with theoretically based predictions. Among women, stronger gender–science stereotypes were associated with weaker science identification and, in turn, weaker science career aspirations. By contrast, among men stronger gender–science stereotypes were associated with stronger science identification and, in turn, stronger science career aspirations, particularly among men who were highly gender identified. These two sets of modest but significant findings can accumulate over large populations and across critical time points within a leaky pipeline to meaningfully contribute to gender disparities in STEM domains.     

"科技的人性化"辨义

科技的人性化近两年来成了学术界讨论的重要问题,但有关“科技的人性化”的含义却较模糊和混乱。对“科技的人性化”进行了概念上的疏理,“科技的人性化”有三层含义：复归科技固有的人性、限定科技的非人性属性的范围、赋予科技以人性关怀。理清“科技的人性化”,将有助于为科技异化的消除寻求到具体途径,有利于科技的健康发展。     

SCIENCE AND PSEUDO-SCIENCE: THE CASE OF CREATIONISM

Abstract. The paper reviews criteria which have been used to distinguish science from nonscience and from pseudo–science, and it examines the extent to which they can usefully be applied to "creation science." These criteria do not force a clear decision, especially as creation science resembles important eighteenth–century forms of orthodox science. Nevertheless, the proponents of creation science may be accused of pious fraud in failing to concede in their political battles that their "science" is tentative and tendentious and will continue to be so while it remains archaic and poorly integrated into the rest of science.     

The misrepresentation of science by philosophers and teachers of science

In education there is a concern that science teachers misrepresent the nature of science to students. An assumption that is implicit in this concern is that science teachers should be teaching the philosophy of science as it is understood by philosophers. This paper argues that both philosophers and science teachers misrepresent science when they engage in their respective disciplines, and it is evident the two misrepresentations are of different types. In philosophy, the misrepresentation is of a philosophical-epistemological nature where advocates of particular views maintain that advocates of other views misinterpret the nature of science. In education, the misrepresentation is of a cognitive, teaching nature where teachers' practical interpretations are not congruent with philosophers' interpretations of science. The discrepancy that exists between the two misrepresentations is due to the intentions of the two disciplines, and assuming that science teachers should teach a philosophically coherent interpretation of the nature of science is an over-simplification of the problem. The concepts of espoused theories and theories-in-use are used to link the two interpretations of science and provide suggestions for future research that may help clarify misrepresentations of science in science education.     

Good science and good philosophy of science

I argue against the assumption that the influence of non-cognitive values must lead to bad science, opening the way for the thesis that non-cognitive values are compatible with good science. This, in turn, allows us to answer feminist questions, principally, How do gender politics influence science? without (1) having to reject the question a priori because theories of science assume that political values cannot influence good scientific work and (2) having made a case for the influence of gender politics upon a particular bit of scientific work, being put into the ludicrous position of saying that it is bad science after all, even though the relevant community of scientists say it is good. Nevertheless, moral and political neutrality is held to be a norm of good science and a tacit metaphilosophical norm governing good philosophy of science, viz., a good philosophy of science reveals and analyzes the morally and politically neutral production of good science. This metaphilosophical norm insures that the philosophy of science (1) is blind to the influence of non-cognitive values on good science if and when these are present and so (2) acquiesces in the moral or political arrangements supported by the science in question.     

Engagement for progress: applied philosophy of science in context

Philosophy of science was once a much more socially engaged endeavor, and can be so again. After a look back at philosophy of science in the 1930s–1950s, I turn to discuss the current potential for returning to a more engaged philosophy of science. Although philosophers of science have much to offer scientists and the public, I am skeptical that much can be gained by philosophers importing off-the-shelf discussions from philosophy of science to science and society. Such efforts will likely look like efforts to do applied ethics by merely applying ethical theories to particular contexts and problems. While some insight can be gained by these kinds of endeavors, the most interesting and pressing problems for the actual practitioners and users of science are rarely addressed. Instead, I recommend that philosophers of science engage seriously and regularly with scientists and/or the users of science in order to gain an understanding of the conceptual issues on the ground. From such engagement, flaws in the traditional philosophical frameworks, and how such flaws can be remedied, become apparent. Serious engagement with the contexts of science thus provides the most fruit for philosophy of science per se and for the practitioners whom the philosophers aim to assist. And if one focuses on contexts where science has its most social relevance, these efforts can help to provide the thing that philosophy of science now lacks: a full-bodied philosophy of science in society.     

COMPREHENSION INSTRUCTION IN A READING CLINIC: COMPARISON OF CLINIC AND CLASSROOM PRACTICES

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to determine middle school students’ (grades 4 to 8) metacognitive knowledge about science reading, science text, and science reading strategies. The 52 subjects were selected from 532 students who completed a survey instrument designed to determine students’ knowledge about science reading, science text, and science reading strategies. The stratified randomly sampled students were interviewed using five structured protocols. The protocol items were based on 21 strategic characteristics of successful readers of science text and three domains of metacognitive knowledge: declarative, procedural, and conditional. Quantitative analyses reveal surface level metacognitive knowledge about 20 of 21 strategies explored and similar levels of knowledge across the three metacognitive domains. A qualitative analysis indicates that average middle school students’ metacognitive knowledge of science reading, science text, and science reading strategies is similar to that of younger and poorer readers of narrative text.     

医学本体论的当代转向——医学教育模式改革的前提性问题

医学本体论,是指“关于医学的”最根本的根据、本质和基础的理论,它是医学赖以存在的本质基础和逻辑根据。当代医学本体论的转向是从人体学本体论向人学本体论的转变。实现这一转变的主要途径在于医学教育模式的改革,而其前提性问题,则是建构人学本体论思想。     

医学家的博物学关怀与情怀

针对当下医学人文教育的缺失提出“博物情怀”应该成为医学家职业素养的基调。传统的博物情怀是一种人文情愫的熏陶教化,既有百科知识的杂合贯通,也有“亲近自然”、“师法自然”、“博物-格物-析物-惜物”等一系列观念养成。现代意识的博物观念是自然科学重归自然,与自然和解的精神路径,以便建立“人的科学”与“自然的科学”的必然联系,作为职业境界升华的共识,博物学情怀有助于发现医学的美学意义、社会责任,改造当下刻板的技术人格,重新获得技术与人性的平衡与张力。     

How Inclusive Is European Philosophy of Science?

The main question of this article is given by its title: how inclusive is European philosophy of science? Phrased in this way, the question presupposes that, as a mature discipline, philosophy of science should provide an inclusive account of its subject area. I first provide an explanation of the notion of an inclusive (in contrast to a restricted) philosophy of science. This notion of an inclusive philosophy of science is specified by discussing three general topics that seem to be missing from, or are quite marginal in, restricted philosophy of science. These topics are the philosophy of historical inquiry, the role of technology in science, and the socio-political and moral dimensions of science. On this basis, I address the question whether European philosophy of science qualifies as more inclusive as compared with Anglo-American philosophy of science.     

Stereotypes and crossed‐category evaluations: The case of gender and science education

A sample of UK adolescents (n = 1140), grouped by sex and liking of science, evaluated themselves, and girl and boy targets who did or did not like science, on masculine, feminine and gender non‐specific traits. Contrary to sociological concerns about the masculine image and appeal of science, those who liked science more rated themselves more positively on feminine and gender non‐specific—but not masculine—traits. The girl target was rated lower on feminine traits if she liked science, but the boy was rated higher on feminine traits if he liked science. Target ratings also showed in‐group enhancement based on liking of science, and a ‘black sheep’ effect: those who liked science less discriminated against the same‐sex target who liked science, especially on gender in‐group relevant traits. We argue that gender differences in science education should be attributed partly to subjective group dynamics and not solely to images of science.     

An investigation of Taiwanese early adolescents' views about the nature of science

This study developed a Pupils' Nature of Science Scale, including the subscales of the invented and changing nature of science, the role of social negotiation on science, and cultural context on science, to assess early adolescents' views about the nature of science. More than 6,000 fifth and sixth graders in Taiwan responded to the Scale. The study revealed that the adolescents had quite different perspectives toward different subscales of the nature of science. Moreover, male adolescents tended to express more constructivist-oriented views toward the nature of science than did their female counterparts. The adolescents of different grades and races also displayed varying views toward the nature of science.     

A Neurathian Conception of the Unity of Science

An historically important conception of the unity of science is explanatory reductionism, according to which the unity of science is achieved by explaining all laws of science in terms of their connection to microphysical law. There is, however, a separate tradition that advocates the unity of science. According to that tradition, the unity of science consists of the coordination of diverse fields of science, none of which is taken to have privileged epistemic status. This alternate conception has roots in Otto Neurath’s notion of unified science. In this paper, I develop a version of the coordination approach to unity that is inspired by Neurath’s views. The resulting conception of the unity of science achieves aims similar to those of explanatory reductionism, but does so in a radically different way. As a result, it is immune to the criticisms facing explanatory reductionism. This conception of unity is also importantly different from the view that science is disunified, and I conclude by demonstrating how it accords better with scientific practice than do conceptions of the disunity of science.