The FLOSS alternative: TRIPs, non-proprietary software and development

In this article I examine the relationship between the global governance of intellectual property rights and the deployment of FLOSS in both the public and private sectors of developing economies. I suggest that the support for non-proprietary software (collectively FLOSS) allows developing countries to comply with their multi-lateral commitments and support the potential development of local software development. Because of the General Public License’s dependence on copyright law, the deployment of FLOSS allows compliance with the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement, while at the same time facilitating the development of a local software ‘community’. Linux has propelled the development of computer science and engineering in the poorer nations. Linux is the only way most developing nations have to legally access modern and sophisticated software tools, compilers, and programming environments (Bokhari and Rehman, 1999, p. 63). He is the co-editor of the IPE Yearbook series, and has published widely on intellectual property rights, and the information society. His publications include Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical History (co-authored with Susan Sell) (Lynne Rienner 2005) and The Information Society: A Sceptical View (Polity Press 2002).     

The Expansion and Restructuring of Intellectual Property and Its Implications for the Developing World

In this paper we begin with a reference to the work of Hernando de Soto The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, and his characterization of the Western institution of formal property . We note the linkages that he sees between the institution and successful capitalist enterprise. Therefore, given the appropriateness of his analysis, it would appear to be worthwhile for developing and less developed countries to adjust their systems of ownership to conform more closely to the Western system of formal property. However, we go on to point out that property relationships within the Western system have become subject to redefinition through the expansion of Intellectual Property (IP) rights in ways that ultimately work to the disadvantage of the developing and less developed countries. We point out that this restructuring has been given global application through the implementation of the TRIPS agreement by the WTO. In the final section of the paper I suggest ways in which IP rights and relevant institutions can be reformed in order to avoid the disadvantages to the developing and less developed countries.

Descartes and some predecessors on the divine conservation of motion

Here I reexamine Duhem's question of the continuity between medieval dynamics and early modern conservation theories. I concentrate on the heavens. For Aristotle, the motions of the heavens are eternally constant (and thus mathematizable) because an eternally constant divine Reason is their mover. Duhem thought that impetus and conservation theories, by extending sublunar mechanics to the heavens, made a divine renewer of motion redundant. By contrast, I show how Descartes derives his law of conservation by extending Aristotelian celestial dynamics to the earth. Descartes argues that motion is intrinsically linear, not circular. But he agrees that motion is mathematically intelligible only where divine Reason moves bodies in a constant and eternal motion. Descartes strips bodies of active powers, leaving God as the only natural mover; thus both celestial and sublunar motions are constant, and uniformly mathematizable. The law of conservation of the total quantity of motion is an attempt to harmonize the constancy derived a priori with the phenomenal inconstancy of sublunar motions.I would like to thank Daniel Garber, Alison Laywine, and Ian Mueller for their comments. Since I have not seen a text of Professor Westman's remarks, either before or after he delivered them, I cannot respond to his criticisms.     

Property rights, genes, and common good

This paper applies aspects of Hugo Grotius's theologically informed theory of property to contemporary issues concerning access to the human DNA sequence and patenting practices. It argues that Christians who contribute to public debate in these areas might beneficially employ some of the concepts with which he worked--notably "common right," the "right of necessity," and "use right." In the seventeenth century, wars were fought over trading rights and access to the sea. In the twenty-first century, information and intellectual property are the issues of the day. Grotius's writings serve to correct the overemphasis in modern liberalism on individual rights, and have practical application to the debate concerning the reduction of the human genome to the status of private property.     

Defending the “private” in constitutional privacy

Conclusion Suppose we agree to reject the view that privacy has narrow scope and consequently is irrelevant to the constitutional privacy cases. We then have (at least) these two options: (1) We might further emphasize and draw out similarities between tort and constitutional privacy claims in order to develop a notion of privacy fundamental to informational and Fourth Amendment privacy concerns as well as the constitutional cases. We can cite examples indicating this is a promising position. Consider consenting homosexuality conducted in one's home, for instance. We view it as a private matter, whether the state is seeking to regulate the behavior, or if others are attempting to gain or exploit information about it. I believe basic conceptual similarities between tort and constitutional interests can be identified by showing that there is a range of similar reasons for protecting both tort and constitutional privacy concerns. We might worry, however, that a comprehensive concept of privacy may be too general to be very useful, given that privacy violations can be so diverse, and can arise, for example, from misuse of confidential information, from conduct that is intrusive even if no information is gained or disclosed, from disturbance of an intimate relationship, or from disruption of various other important aspects of one's life.(2) We could concede that whatever privacy means in the tort and Fourth Amendment cases, it means something different in the constitutional cases. Nevertheless, we might take that something else seriously as a distinct but legitimate use of the term which is not spurious but is reflected in our ordinary language. This appears to me to be a fruitful alternative. After all, contrary to Henkin's view that tort privacy is what most people mean by privacy, the term is often used in contexts beyond informational privacy and clearly related to the interests at stake in the constitutional cases. Thus, for example, in a pamphlet explaining how to protect children by teaching them how to say No! to strangers without making them paranoid or antisocial, parents and teachers are told, Children have a right to privacy. Teach it. Reinforce it. One of the ways to help children prevent sexual assault is to encourage them to develop a sense of physical integrity. A sense that they have a right to their own body space and privacy. Just as we allow them to close the door when they use the bathroom, we must allow them to say no to any unwanted physical affection and touch. Unfortunately, the most obvious starting point for identifying the sense of private relevant to the constitutional cases is extremely worrisome. The Court itself has said ... only personal rights that can be deemed fundamental...are included in this guarantee of personal privacy...the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage...procreation...contraception...family relationships... and child rearing and education. The difficulty, of course, is that little more is offered by way of explanation of which rights are personal or fundamental or both. Focusing on marriage makes Roe v. Wade difficult to understand given that Ms. Roe was unmarried, and attending only to family issues does not help us make sense of the Stanley case protecting one's right to view pornography in one's home. It is perhaps more problematic that decisions such as what color shoes to wear are reasonably viewed as personal, yet are far from fundamental enough to warrant protection. And regulations governing the draft and employment, for example, are not viewed as privacy invasions although they might be said to interfere with matters of one's life that are both fundamental and personal in the vague sense described.Before we give up in frustration, however, I would urge that we recall that even in tort law the notion of privacy has been evolving through a constellation of judgments. Although there is no fixed way of using the term which we then proceed to analyze, the concept of privacy has not in those cases been taken to be meaningless or empty. Similarly, there is reason to believe that the scope of a personal and fundamental notion of privacy relevant to the constitutional cases can be further delineated through a consideration of cases, especially since it seems to me that in many cases application of the term is clear and unproblematic. A decision to have a vasectomy, for example, can uncontroversially be said to be a personal and fundamental one, and it is in that sense private. We fail to acknowledge the personal significance in an individual's life of forcing or refusing him the operation if we deny that this important sense of privacy is relevant to such a decision merely because an interest in determining for oneself what one ought to do is also at risk.Of course, once it is settled that something is a private matter, it is a separate issue to decide whether or not, in some social context, an invasion of it can be justified. Thus, I would claim, a mandatory sterilization program for male recidivists or for those in a country suffering grave poverty and overpopulation does invade privacy, and the social or legal question is whether or not the invasion can, in the particular circumstances, be justified. Although all will agree that both individual and social interests must be balanced by moral philosophers as well as the courts, in conflicts we will not always agree on the weight to be accorded individual claims.I have not provided a constitutional defense for citing privacy as one right at stake in the constitutional privacy cases. Nor have I attempted to enter the debate about how strictly to interpret the Constitution. But if I am correct, then we can agree there is an important interest in privacy at issue in those cases without merely conflating privacy and autonomy or liberty, and can continue the process of marking out its boundaries. If we reach such agreement, we will have made considerable progress. Moreover, the implications of this view are significant. Current constitutional standards, controversial though they may be, require strict scrutiny for cases concerning fundamental values, and privacy has been judged to be one such value. Thus these privacy claims have a greater chance of being protected when they conflict with other rights or general interests than they would have if only liberty, or freedom from governmental interference, were involved.

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Government Surveillance and Why Defining Privacy Matters in a Post‐Snowden World

There is a long‐running debate as to whether privacy is a matter of control or access. This has become more important following revelations made by Edward Snowden in 2013 regarding the collection of vast swathes of data from the Internet by signals intelligence agencies such as NSA and GCHQ. The nature of this collection is such that if the control account is correct then there has been a significant invasion of people's privacy. If, though, the access account is correct then there has not been an invasion of privacy on the scale suggested by the control account. I argue that the control account of privacy is mistaken. However, the consequences of this are not that the seizing control of personal information is unproblematic. I argue that the control account, while mistaken, seems plausible for two reasons. The first is that a loss of control over my information entails harm to the rights and interests that privacy protects. The second is that a loss of control over my information increases the risk that my information will be accessed and that my privacy will be violated. Seizing control of another's information is therefore harmful, even though it may not entail a violation of privacy. Indeed, seizing control of another's information may be more harmful than actually violating their privacy.     

The cathedral and the bazaar

I anatomize a successful open-source project, fetchmail, that was run as a deliberate test of some theories about software engineering suggested by the history of Linux. I discuss these theories in terms of two fundamentally different development styles, the "cathedral" model, representing most of the commercial world, versus the "bazaar" model of the Linux world. I show that these models derive from opposing assumptions about the nature of the software-debugging task. I then make a sustained argument from the Linux experience for the proposition that "Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow," suggest productive analogies with other self-correcting systems of selfish agents, and conclude with some exploration of the implications of this insight for the future of software. Eric Raymond is the co-founder of the Chester County InterLink (CCIL), which provides free Internet access to the residents of Chester County, Pennsylvania. He is the editor of The New Hacker’s Dictionary (MIT, 1991, 1993) and the author of a book of essays The Cathedral and the Bazaar. He is a member of the Merrill Lynch Technology Advisory Board and has hacked much widely used open source software. He has pursued undergraduate studies in philosophy and mathematics at the University of Pennsylvania but has never had a course in computer stuff.     

Abortion and the human animal.

I discuss three topics. First, there is a philosophical connecting thread between several recent trends in the abortion discussion, namely, the issue of our animal nature, and physical embodiment. The philosophical name given to the position that you and I are essentially human animals is "animalism." In Section II of this paper, I argue that animalism provides a unifying theme to recent discussions of abortion. In Section III, I discuss what we do not find among recent trends in the abortion discussion, namely "the right to privacy." I suggest some reasons why the right to privacy is conspicuous by its absence. Finally, I address Patrick Lee's claim that the evil of abortion involves "the moral deterioration that the act brings to those who are complicit in it, and to the culture that fosters it."     

Positive Rights and the Cosmopolitan Community: A Rights-Centered Foundation for Global Ethics

The recent transnational wave of destruction that was caused by the earthquake-induced tsunamis in South East Asia has raised the issue of global justice in terms of the rights of victims to expect aid relief and the moral responsibility of the rest of the world to provide it. In this paper I will discuss the issue of global ethics in terms of positive rights that people have to assistance from others when they cannot provide such assistance themselves. The main object of the paper is to demonstrate that positive rights are universal and global in scope and cannot therefore be restricted by any national, religious, cultural or other social boundaries. Such rights provide a rational and ethical foundation for global justice that is cosmopolitan. The argument for the position offered in the paper will be broadly based on the moral philosophy of Alan Gewirth.1 1. The sources referred to in this paper with regard to Gewith's moral philosophy will, in the main, be: Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) and Alan Gewirth, The Community of Rights (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). For ease of reference, Reason and Morality will be referred to in the body of the paper as RM and Community of Rights as CR.      

Privacy as a value and as a right

Conclusions Knowledge of others, then, has value; so does immunity from being known. The ability to extend one's knowledge has value; so does the ability to limit other's knowledge of oneself. I have claimed that no interest can count as a right unless it clearly outweighs opposing interests whose presence is logically entailed. I see no way to establish that my interest in not being known, simply as such, outweighs your desire to know about me. I acknowledge the intuitive attractiveness of such a position; but my earlier discussion concluded that the value of privacy is ease, and the value of knowledge is understanding - and it's not obvious that either outweighs the other. Nor is it obvious that the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to limit what others know is more significant than the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to extend one's knowledge. I believe the intuitive attractiveness of the belief that privacy values outweigh knowledge values lies in the entirely correct belief that a society without any privacy would be unpleasant. But a society without mutual knowledge would be impossible.I conclude therefore that there is no right to privacy nor to control over it. Nevertheless, each of these things is a good, and a good made possible (given the presence of other people) by social structures. A desirable society will provide both privacy and control over privacy to some extent. Nothing in my analysis helps determine what the proper extent is, nor what areas of life particularly deserve protection. Those who would argue that privacy and control over it are entailed by respect for persons should, I think, choose instead some particular areas central to being a person, to counting as a person, and then show how one is less likely to exercise one's capacities there fully without privacy or without control over it. Although Gerstein's attempt fails because he inaccurately defines intimacy as a kind of absorption and incorrectly opposes absorption with publicity, I think it is the kind of attempt which must be made. Furthermore, he has probably chosen the right area of life - if anything has a special claim to privacy it is probably the union between people who care for one another. The value of being together alone may be more significant than the value of being alone, if only because words and actions are public while thoughts are not. But I will not try to develop that argument here.In any case both privacy and control over it are social goods; on egalitarian grounds they should, ceteris paribus, be equally available to everyone. This helps explain the dehumanizing effect of institutions which provide no privacy at all- prisons and some mental institutions. It is not so much that the inmates are totally known; it is rather that those who know them are not so fully known by them; further, that the staff has a great deal of control over what they disclose of themselves, and the inmates very little. The asymmetry of knowledge in those institutions is one aspect of the asymmetry of power; the completely powerless are likely to feel dehumanized.My analysis also helps account for the wrongness of covert observation. It is not simply that the observer violates the wishes of the observed, for the question is whose wishes trump. The observer is violating the justified expectations of the observed: expectations supported by weighty social conventions. These have more moral weight than simple desires do. The peeping torn is violating a convention which structures the distribution of knowledge, a convention from which he benefits. Without it his own activities might well be impossible. He might be more easily caught; or his victim, less trusting, might choose houses without windows. More deeply, the thrill of what he is doing depends on the existence of the convention. Even morally permissible excitement - the suggestiveness of some clothing- would disappear without conventions about nudity. Presumably, too, there are elements of his own personal life for which he values his privacy. He is on grounds of justice obligated to observe the rule which makes his benefits possible.(Some claims to privacy result from personal predilections, rather than from convention. Parent describes a person who is extremely sensitive about being short, for instance, and does not want his exact height to be common knowledge. The grounds for these claims are obviously different from those I've been discussing. The grounds are the moral obligation not to cause needless pain, or, if the information was given in confidence, to keep one's promises.)Although there is no right to privacy or to control over it as such, there is a right to equality of consideration and to a just distribution of benefits and burdens. To put it another way: there is no natural human right to privacy or to control over it; but a good society will provide some of each, and justice requires that the rules of a good society be observed.

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Male/Male Sex in Hong Kong: Privacy,Please?

In August 2005, the age of consent for male/male sexual activity in Hong Kong was held to be arbitrarily and discriminatorily targeting gay men and thus in violation of an individual’s right to privacy and his right of equality on the basis of sexual orientation. While the decision has since been affirmed on appeal, it has been argued that judicial recourse to equality rights where privacy rights would have sufficed for the provisions to be struck down was a misguided, if not mistaken, effort that merely reinforced the stereotype that gay men are “hypersexualized” and was a setback for the gay rights movement in Hong Kong. This article examines whether the argument is a well-founded one and discusses the implications of confining a man’s right to have consensual sex with another man to his privacy rights alone.

Sex role conformity in homosexual and heterosexual males

Nine principal components were extracted from the scores of 26 homosexual and 26 heterosexual males matched on age, education, occupation status, and sampling frame on Adjective Check List, Bem Sex Role Inventory, Chapin Social Insight Test, Experience Inventory, and Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire scales selected to represent a variety of "masculine" and "feminine" sex role attributes. The four most general varimax factors, accounting for 48% of the total variance, were: I) "Feminine Openness," II) "Masculine Boldness," III) "Reflection," and IV) "Novelty Seeking." Factor scores were constructed and indicated that the homosexual sample was significantly more identified with Factor I (p < .00l; 17% of total variance). There was no significant difference between the samples on Factor II, nor on the remaining two general factors which were not sex typed.     

Dworkin and Casey on abortion

This article responds to two important recent treatments of abortion rights. I will mainly discuss Ronald Dworkin's recent writings concerning abortion: his article "Unenumerated rights: whether and how Roe should be overruled," and his book Life's Dominion. In these writings Dworkin presents a novel view of what the constitutional and moral argument surronding abortion is really about. Both debates actually turn, he argues, on the question of how to interpret the widely shared idea that human life is sacred. At the heart of the abortion debate is the essentially religious notion that human life has value which transcends its value to any particular person; abortion is therefore at bottom a religious issue. Dworkin hopes to use this analysis to show that the religion clauses of the First Amendment provide a "textual home" for a woman's right to choose abortion. I wish to scrutinize this suggestion here; I want to probe the precise consequences for abortion rights of such an understanding of their basis. I will argue that the consequences are more radical than Dworkin seems to realize. The other work I will examine here is the important 1992 Supreme Court decision on abortion, Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The controlling opinion in that case, written jointly by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter, strongly reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, but also upheld most of the provisions of a Pennsylvania statute that had mandated various restrictions on abortion. The justices' basis for upholding these restictions was their introduction of a new constitutional standard for abortion regulations, an apparently weaker standard than those that had governed previous Supreme Court abortion decisions. I think there is a flaw in Casey's new constitutional test for abortion regulations, and I will explain, when we turn to Casey, what it is and why it bears a close relation to Dworkin's reluctance to carry his argument as far as it seems to go.     

Hegel on Private Property: A Contextual Reading

Hegel is often read as defending private property and property rights on the basis of the so‐called “developmental thesis,” which holds that the institution of private property is a necessary condition for individuals to develop the basic capabilities required for free choice. In this paper, I challenge the developmental thesis, and present my own interpretation of Hegel's justification of private property and theory of property rights. Reconstructing Hegel's theory requires that we read the Philosophy of Right as a whole and consider the role of property within the context of the political system that Hegel sketches there, rather than merely looking at the Property subsection of the work in isolation, as works that argue for the developmental thesis tend to do.     

Stem cell research: a target article collection: Part II--what's in a name: embryos,clones, and stem cells

In 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the "Human Cloning Prohibition Act" and President Bush announced his decision to allow only limited research on existing stem cell lines but not on "embryos." In contrast, the U.K. has explicitly authorized "therapeutic cloning." Much more will be said about bioethical, legal, and social implications, but subtleties of the science and careful definitions of terms have received much less consideration. Legislators and reporters struggle to discuss "cloning," "pluripotency," "stem cells," and "embryos," and whether "adult" are preferable to "embryonic" stem cells as research subjects. They profess to abhor "copying humans" or "killing embryos." Do they know what they are talking about? Do we? This paper explores the historical, philosophical, and scientific contexts that inform this heated discussion.     

Dianomy: understanding religious women's moral agency as creative conformity

This essay seeks to contribute to work on moral agency of religious women through the creative naming of a dynamic that is emerging in recent scholarship. Drawing on fieldwork in Iran in 2004, I argue that prominent models of agency based on autonomy, heteronomy, and theonomy are unable take into account both religious influence on and individual creativity of women's actions. I propose the neologism, "dianomy," meaning dual-sources of the moral law, to account for moral agency that relies neither exclusively upon the self as a source of moral authority nor exclusively upon religious traditions. Dianomy also attempts to comprehend creative ruptures in obedience to tradition, even when these innovations are unintentional. Such a concept is particularly important in order to correct past tendencies to ignore or even negate feminist politics that do not resist or strategically reform religious norms. With dianomy, tactical moves, actions that are not "freely chosen," and even happy accidents can be studied as productive within traditional religious communities. I call these types of actions, which confound the actions theorized by autonomy, heteronomy, and theonomy, "creative conformity."     

To Be Saved and Not Saved: The Ongoing Challenge of Working in the Depressive Position: Reply to Commentaries

In this response to the generative commentaries by Stefanie Solow Glennon and Steven Cooper, I address issues taken up by the two discussants, including the analyst’s challenges to both work in and help her patient work in the depressive position, and to envision a sense of psychic future. I also explore questions related to Relational notions of therapeutic action, in the context of a recent panel in Psychoanalytic Dialogues that considers whether Relational psychoanalysis has gone too far in the direction of relationality and away from privacy, contemplation, and reverie.     

THE SPECIAL COMPOSITION QUESTION IN ACTION

Abstract:  Just as we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of objects composes a single object, we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of actions composes a single action. In the material objects literature, this question is known as the "special composition question," and I take it that there is a similar question to be asked of collections of actions. I will call that question the "special composition question in action," and argue that the correct answer to this question depends on a particular kind of consequence produced by the individual constituent actions.     

Contributions of contingencies in modern societies to "privacy" in the behavioral relations of cognition and emotion

The aim of this paper is to examine specific features of modern individualistic societies that contribute to "emotions" and "cognitions" becoming a matter of privacy. Although some behavior analysts identify emotions and cognitions as "private events," we argue with Skinner (1945) that cognitions and emotions are relations among events and that their origin is in public events in the contingencies of reinforcement maintained by other people. Guided by Elias (1939/1996), we suggest that the shift from feudal economies to market economies involved the increasing individualization of society's members. This individualizing process includes the socially maintained contingencies that bring some verbal responses under control of private stimulation and reduce the magnitude of some verbal responses to a covert level. Behavioral relations in which either stimuli or responses (or both) cannot be observed by others set the stage for a concept of "privacy." Changes in societal contingencies that gave rise to individualization and the attribution of privacy to cognitions and emotions are suggested to include the following: (a) increasing frequency of individual consequences that have no apparent or direct relevance to the group; (b) increasing numbers of concurrent contingencies and choice requirements; (c) conflicts between immediate and delayed consequences for the individual; and (d) conflicts between consequences for the individual and for the group.