The Progression and regression of slave morality in Nietzsche''s Genealogy: The moralization of bad conscience and indebtedness

With the advent of slave morality and the belief system it entails, human beings alone begin to advance to a level beyond that of simple, brute, animal nature. While Christianity and its belief system generate a progression, however, allowing human beings to become interesting for the first time, Nietzsche also maintains in the Genealogy that slave morality is a regression, somehow lowering or bringing them down from a possible higher level. In this paper I will argue that this is not a mere inconsistency in Nietzsche's writing, but is instead an important clue to a correct interpretation of the Genealogy.     

Freud's "bad conscience": The case of Nietzsche's Genealogy

This article develops the argument that Friedrich Nietzsche influenced several aspects of Freud's later writings by illustrating, in particular, the impact of Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals on Freud's Civilization and its Discontents. The theoretical and conceptual schemes represented in Freud's Discontents are found to bear a remarkable similarity to Nietzsche's Genealogy on a number of highly specific points. It is suggested that "DAS ES," "Uber-ich," and "bad conscience," concepts central to Freud's moral theory of mind, are at least partly derived from Nietzsche. Moreover, Freud's phylogenetic theory of guilt is based upon premises found in Nietzsche, as are specific details relating to ideas on human prehistory and the ancestral family. Based on this evidence, a re-examination of the moral and social dimensions of Freud's "structural" model may be in order.     

The Relation between Sovereignty and Guilt in Nietzsche's Genealogy

This paper interprets the relation between sovereignty and guilt in Nietzsche's Genealogy. I argue that, contrary to received opinion, Nietzsche was not opposed to the moral concept of guilt. I analyse Nietzsche's account of the emergence of the guilty conscience out of a pre‐moral bad conscience. Drawing attention to Nietzsche's references to many different forms of conscience and analogizing to his account of punishment, I propose that we distinguish between the enduring and the fluid elements of a ‘conscience’, defining the enduring element as the practice of forming self‐conceptions. I show that for Nietzsche, the moralization of the bad conscience results from mixing it with the material concepts of guilt and duty, a process effected by prehistoric religious institutions by way of the concept of god. This moralization furnishes a new conception of oneself as a responsible agent and holds the promise of sovereignty by giving us a freedom unknown to other creatures, but at the price of our becoming subject to moral guilt. According to Nietzsche, however, the very forces that made it possible have spoiled this promise and, under the pressures of the ascetic ideal, a harmful notion of responsibility understood in terms of sin now dominates our lives. Thus, to fully realize our sovereignty, we must liberate ourselves from this sinful conscience.     

Defense mechanisms and morality: a link between isolation and moralization

The relationship between morality and perceptual defense mechanisms was studied. Three new scales were constructed to measure different aspects of morality: moralism (the tendency to evaluate everything in terms of right and wrong), conscience (strength of feelings of right and wrong) and reparation (inclination to repair the damage one has caused). Perceptual defense mechanisms were measured with Kragh's Defense Mechanism Test (DMT). Three hypotheses about relationships between morality and defense mechanisms, derived from psychoanalytical literature, were tested on 54 male University students. Results show positive correlations between the defense mechanism isolation of affect and moralism, and between identification with the aggressor and reparation. Total amount of perceptual defense correlated positively with moralism. It is argued that the psychological study of morality should take unconscious processes into consideration.     

Possible and Questionable: Opening Nietzsche's Genealogy to Feminine Body

According to Kelly Oliver and Elizabeth Grosz, while Friedrich Nietzsche begins to open Western philosophy to the other, the body, he cuts off feminine body. Here I create a framework through which the possibility and questionably of a symbolically feminine body begins to emerge. I do this by using the metaphor of Indian curry. The metaphor works on two levels: 1) as a symbolically feminine body; 2) as Nietzsche's conception of subject-formation as a dynamic monism.     

The what,how, and why of moralization: A review of current definitions,methods, and evidence in moralization research

Moralization has major social and political implications. Although there is a depth of research on the nature and implications of moral attitudes and moral convictions, there has been less of a focus on the psychological processes by which actions, attitudes, or entities become moralized, or move from lesser to greater moral significance, and the research that does exist is highly fragmented. In the present paper, we provide a two‐factor structure for understanding the current state of research on moralization, categorizing extant moralization research by (1) whether it examines judgments of actions, attitudes, or entities and (2) whether it captures moral recognition (the shift from neutral to moral), or moral amplification. Using this framework, we then consider the various routes through which moralization may occur, discuss emerging research on the influence that social norms can have on this process, and address future areas of research. Overall, we hope to provide some initial steps toward developing a more integrated framework for understanding moralization.     

The essential superficiality of the voluntary and the moralization of psychology

Philosophical Studies - Is the idea of the voluntary important? Those who think so tend to regard it as an idea that can be metaphysically deepened through a theory about voluntary action, while...     

The ontology and temporality of conscience

Philosophers have often posited a foundational calling voice, such that hearing its call constitutes subjects as responsive and responsible negotiators of normative claims. I give the name ldquo;transcendental conscience to that which speaks in this founding, constitutive voice. The role of transcendental conscience is not – or not merely – to normatively bind the subject, but to constitute the possibility of the subject's being bound by any particular, contentful normative claims in the first place. I explore the ontological and temporal status of transcendental conscience, using Heidegger's account of conscience in Being and Time as my textual touchstone. I ask what performative structure the call of conscience might have that would enable it to constitute normative responsiveness, and I raise some temporal conundrums surrounding this structure. I argue that it is incoherent to attempt to give a literal, chronological account of the origin of normative grip and response. I suggest that we can best understand the founding calls of conscience, not as literal events occurring in regular time, but as events that can only show up retrospectively, as occurring in an ever-receding, unlocalizable past, and that these calls can only be figured mythically and metaphorically. Appropriating a Derridean term, I claim that the voice of transcendental conscience must be that of a lsquo;ghost, whose call binds us by haunting us – a haunting that is no less transcendentally necessary for its inability to be translated into a literal historical event.     

Physical distancing during the COVID-19 crisis: The roles of threat and moralization

One reason why the COVID-19 pandemic presented a challenge to public health is that individuals struggled to adhere to virus protective behaviors, such as physical distancing. To aid understanding why people engaged in distancing practices, we investigated the role of threat perceptions and the moralization of physical distancing. We collected longitudinal data from 340 US citizens across five measurement waves from April 2020 to June 2021. Results showed that individuals who perceived COVID-19 as more threatening, and those who more strongly moralized physical distancing, were more likely to engage in physical distancing behavior. Moreover, the effect of threat perceptions on physical distancing behavior was mediated by moralization of physical distancing. These results provide new insights into the adherence to physical distancing behaviors during pandemics and underscore the importance of moralization in shaping behavior.     

Nietzsche and decadence: The revaluation of morality

The creation of moralities is necessary for the enhancement of the species, yet, the assigning of values is a sign of decadence. According to Nietzsche, this is the problem of decadence with which human beings (in particular philosophers) must contend: they must place a value on life, but placing a value on life (even on one's individual life) is problematic because it involves fracturing the whole of life into pieces. The primary objective in this paper is to address Nietzsche's own battle with the problem of decadence as it applies to individuals. I will argue that in this battle, Nietzsche carried out a revaluation of decadence and transformed himself into a strong decadent. In calling himself a strong decadent, Nietzsche not only admitted to his own decadence, but also provided himself as an example for how other strong types might contend with the problem of decadence.     

The conscience and convenience of sentencing reform in Indiana

Over the course of the past decade and a half, enormous energy and talent have been devoted to the issue of determinate sentencing. Yet today we know little about the values underlying this reform, and we know even less about the efficacy of determinate sentencing as a crime control policy. This article considers these issues in Indiana 10 years after the renovation of the state's Penal Code. Through a survey of state legislators, an examination of law, official statistics, and personal interview data, the analysis endeavors to understand the ideologies, pragmatics, and impacts of sentencing reform. It is suggested that the implementation of determinate sentencing represents a corruption of both good intentions (“conscience)” and policy objectives. Parenthetically, the article argues that the constructs known as the crime control model and the justice model both constitute a case of arid scholasticism. That is, sentencing reform can be more fully understood in terms of organizational “convenience”.     

The dilemma of conscience in Christian belief: A pastoral perspective

This article describes the crisis of integrity experienced by a trinitarian Christian attempting to take seriously the results of current Jesus scholarship. It explores a number of traditional methods for reconciling the Jesus of history with the Christ of faith, and proposes a different paradigm, based on the structure of kairos time and the psychological dynamics of friendship.     

The morality of vengeance: Confucianism and Tutuism in dialogue

This paper analyzes two main pro-vengeance Confucian arguments in light of Desmond Tutu's thinking. In the absence of just authority, Confucianism argues that carrying out blood vengeance is fulfillment of filial piety and fulfillment of moral duty for deterring crime and reforming the wrongdoer's character. Confucianism does not propose a systematic theory of blood vengeance after laws have been installed to prohibit act of revenge. As Confucian ethics focuses on virtue cultivation and advocates moral learning over punishment, it may find the Tutuist approach of addressing wrongdoing compatible and complementary. In line with Tutuism, we argue that revenge is not justified because engaging in vengeance fuels negative and obsessive emotions, which undermine virtue and may lead to undesirable results, such as escalation of violence and harming of the innocent. Moreover, we defend that more conditions need to be met than the ones enunciated by the pro-vengeance standpoint to justify an act of revenge.     

Walden two: The morality of anarchy

The utopian label is often pinned on calls for comprehensive change as a means of dismissing them from serious consideration.... [S]ocial orders come and go, and those who indulge in utopian thinking may be more prepared for... the inevitability of widespread societal transformation.... Keeping utopia in mind can prevent our settling for minor reforms when more significant change might be possible. (Fox, 1985, p. 55)When... I called myself a benign anarchist... someone said that that was not like the dictatorship of Walden Two. But Walden Two was anarchistic.... The functions delegated to [authority figures] in the world at large were performed by the people themselves through face-to-face commendation and censure. (Skinner, 1983, p. 426, emphasis his)The issue for anarchists is not whether there should be structure or order, but what kind there should be and what its sources ought to be. The individual or group which has sufficient liberty to be self-regulating will have the highest degree of order; the imposition of order from above and outside induces resentment and rebellion where it does not encourage childlike dependence and impotence, and so becomes a force for disorder. (Barclay, 1982, p. 17).     

The hedgehog and the Borg: Common morality in bioethics

In this commentary, I critically discuss the respective views of Gert and Beauchamp–Childress on the nature of so-called common morality and its promise for enriching ethical reflection within the field of bioethics. Although I endorse Beauchamp and Childress’ shift from an emphasis on ethical theory as the source of moral norms to an emphasis on common morality, I question whether rouging up common morality to make it look like some sort of ultimate and universal foundation for morality, untouched by the dialectics of time and reflective equilibrium, was an equally good move. As for Gert’s magisterial conception of common morality, I conclude that certain elements of his system are controversial at best and woefully inadequate at worst. He has a tendency to find in common morality what he himself put there, and his highly restricted conception of duties of assistance strikes this reader as ad hoc, inadequately defended, and unworthy of a project whose goal is to lessen the amount of misery in the world.